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Abstract 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays an important role in a range of higher-level 
cognition including decision-making, social cognition, executing delayed intentions, 
and creative thinking. Previous studies have proposed a functional specialisation of 
the PFC region, and that this heterogeneity is associated with both structural and 
functional typicality between individuals. In order to examine this possibility, a 
reverse engineering approach was used to develop a PFC battery measuring 
behaviours relating to gambling, referential judgment, mentalizing, and faux pas 
detection. 107 typical-developing (TD) adults were recruited to establish the 
behavioural baseline, and identify the neural correlates of the measures in the PFC 
battery using voxel-based morphometry (VBM). The VBM analysis revealed 
significant relationships between different mental abilities and the size of different 
PFC sub-regions. Subsequently, 34 adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; a 
pathological group diagnosed with deficits on decision-making and social cognition) 
were tested on the new PFC battery. The results show that it provides new tools for 
detection of the ASD phenotype, and demonstrated the atypicality of ASD subjects 
when using single-case analysis. The thesis then turned to the functional 
specialisation of rostral PFC. A dissociation between lateral vs. medial rostral PFC 
activation was revealed when executing delayed intentions (the ability referred as 
prospective memory, or PM), compared with baseline ongoing activities. A novel PM 
paradigm for use with fMRI was designed to examine the specificity of PM cues. The 
results demonstrated the role that BA9/46 region plays in the detection of certain vs. 
uncertain future intentions. The final study examined cross-cultural differences in 
creativity, a cognitive ability thought to be substantially underpinned by frontal lobe 
structures. Matched adults from the UK and Taiwan were compared on adapted 
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version of standard measures of creativity. Cross-cultural differences were found on 
the novelty aspect of the creativity, but not on the usefulness aspect, which seemed 
to reflect different Eastern vs. Western self-construal. Altogether, the thesis used a 
range of approaches to highlight functional and structural variation within the PFC 
region and the mental abilities it supports, demonstrating some principles of 
organisation that exist across individuals, but also differences between individuals, 
and between populations of individuals. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction of the thesis 
  In the developmental course of neuropsychology, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
was once considered almost ‘silent’ in terms of its role in human cognition, since 
large removals of the PFC region led to only mild disability (e.g., Mesulam, 1986), 
and there were no reliable measurement tool specifically designed to examine its 
functional role. However, the PFC remained ‘silent’ no more after an accident on a 
railroad construction site that changed the life of a foreman, Phineas Gage, forever, 
and the unofficial term ‘frontal lobe syndrome’ emerged out of Harlow’s report of this 
famous clinical case. Later on, consistent observations from other neurological case 
studies demonstrated that people could show remarkable deficits in a wide range of 
cognitions with ‘acquired’ lesions or damage to the PFC region. With the advance of 
neuroimaging techniques since the early 90’s, research into the PFC region has 
provided findings using various methodologies demonstrating converging evidence 
that the PFC region is involved in performance of all kinds of cognitive tests. This 
technology revolution in the field of cognitive neuroscience has established a new 
direction of investigating the function (human cognition) - structure (brain region) 
relationship in this fascinating cortical region. 
One of the main issues with studying the functions supported by the PFC is 
its complexity in both functional and structural ways. Functionally, results from 
functional imaging studies provide only correlative rather than causative evidence, 
where the changes of hemodynamic signals indicate the particular region is involved 
with the underlying processes in a particular test, but are unable to identify whether 
the region is necessary for it. For example, a consistent finding of activations in brain 
region X is observed during performance of test measuring Y function, and it is easy 
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to conclude that region X is essential for function Y. However, this link would be 
challenged if damage to region X led to mild change in performance of test 
measuring Y. Nevertheless, neuroimaging techniques do provide a more accurate 
localisation of the brain regions that associate with a given test. Furthermore, 
findings from functional imaging studies allow breaking down different cognitive 
abilities on a temporal scale, which could potentially compensate some difficulties 
when using neuropsychological method. For example, Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & 
Husain (2004) reported a patient with extensive damages to the medial part of the 
prefrontal cortex, and this region was identified to be critical for ‘Theory of Mind’ 
using functional imaging technique. This mental ability is critical to make inference to 
other’s mind, but extensive experimentations failed to find any significant impairment 
using psychological tests measuring ‘Theory of mind’. This finding revealed the 
possibility that one patient alone could cause a complete rethink of a cognitive model, 
and this discrepancy between two different experimental methods highlighted the 
danger to use solely on imaging techniques to investigate cognitive neuroanatomy. 
Structurally, the PFC is one of the latest cortical structures to mature (Teffer and 
Semendeferi, 2012), and this unique characteristic enables this structure to adapt 
and connect to mostly every other regions in the brain (Alvarez and Emory, 2006). 
This indicates that investigation of the PFC region requires not only considering its 
relationship to other cortical regions (and/or the functions they support), but also 
requires considering highly variable individual differences that are secondary to 
heterogeneity of a person’s background experiences. As a result, it becomes 
increasingly likely that no cognitive function could be allocated to a specific cortical 
region in particular and exclusively, and one particular brain region supports only 
one cognitive function. According to the discrepancy on the function-structure 
relationship between different methods and the complexity of the PFC region, it 
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seems necessary to combine different methodological approaches to have a better 
understanding of the underlying constructs supported by the PFC region. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to characterise the functions supported by 
the PFC region that either received little attention or have not yet been thoroughly 
examined. These include cognitive processes like decision-making to potential risks, 
making self-judgment, and interpersonal behaviours like understanding other’s mind, 
social embarrassment detection. Furthermore, the PFC also plays an important role 
in complex functions involve future performances like maintaining delayed intentions, 
and establishing new linkage or something new like creativity. In the current thesis, 
we implemented different methodologies and techniques from the field, and focused 
on capturing the variations of function-structure relationship in the PFC between 
individuals. Based on the cognitions that the PFC region supports, this thesis could 
be divided into three major sections, the first section discusses the cognitive 
processes on decision-making and social cognition aspects, the second section 
focuses on mental ability to anticipate future events, and the third section measures 
behaviours relating to creative thinking. 
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Chapter 2. Introduction of the PFC battery 
2.1  The rationale of the PFC battery 
In the field of cognitive neuroscience, one of the core issues was the 
mapping between anatomical structure in different brain region and the human 
behaviour it supported. The human PFC has been long proposed to play an 
essential role in higher-level human cognitive functions (Shallice, 1982). In human 
brain, different cytoarchitectural sub-divisions were shown to correspond well with 
clear functional boundaries in other cortical regions like primary motor and sensory 
cortices (see Kanai and Rees, 2011 for review). However, it reached little consensus 
on the mapping between specific cognitive functions onto anatomical sub-divisions 
in the PFC region (see Ramnani & Owen, 2004). The PFC was the largest single 
architectonic region of the frontal lobes (Christoff et al., 2001), and covered a 
significantly larger proportion of the cerebral cortex in human than in other species 
(Semendeferi, Armstrong, Schleicher, Zilles, & Van Hoesen, 2001). Furthermore, 
previous studies identified that the human PFC was involved with a range of 
complex cognitive processes, including multitasking (Burgess, Alderman, Volle, 
Benoit, & Gilbert, 2009), prospective memory (Burgess, Quayle, and Frith, 2001), 
self-judgment (Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, & Burgess, 2010), mentalizing (Gilbert, 
Williamson, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2007), analogical reasoning 
(Volle, Gilbert, Benoit, & Burgess, 2010), and directing attending either to the 
external or internal states (Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2005). Despite evidences from 
human neuropsychological studies, lesions, electrophysiological studies and 
neuroimaging studies demonstrated the ‘versatility’ of the PFC region, the way of 
this large brain region linked to various complex cognitive processes was not yet 
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clear. For example, the ventrolateral part of the PFC (or inferior orbital frontal cortex), 
was associated with different but not mutually exclusive cognitive functions including 
task switching, reversal-learning, stimulus selection, and specification of retrieval 
cues (see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014). It was fascinating that one sub-region 
of the PFC could account for a range of cognitive processes, and this unique nature 
intrigued us to use a reverse-engineering approach to examine the ‘versatility’ of the 
PFC region. In order to achieve this, we first focused on our region-of-interest, the 
PFC region, and then selected a range of behaviours that constantly shown to link 
with the PFC region. Next, we developed a set of new psychometric tests that 
putatively measured the cognitive functions behind these observable behaviours. 
We would then introduce the rationale and the basic settings of this set of new 
psychometric tests, the PFC battery.   
In cognitive psychological studies, psychometric tests measuring different 
human behaviours were established, and experimentations were conducted to 
measure human cognitions ranged from basic cortical functions (e.g., visual, 
auditory, olfactory, somatosensory processing) to higher-level cognition (e.g., 
decision-making, social-cognition). With the advancement of neuroimaging 
techniques, massive and rapidly growing body of findings on human cognitive 
functions were identified. Nevertheless, studies focusing on measuring the same 
cognitive function using different techniques would face replication problem if 
researchers from different labs unable to find convergent results. To overcome this 
potential issue, Stuss et al. (2005) organised the Rotman-Baycrest Battery to 
Investigate Attention (ROBBIA) group of studies investigating performances of 
different sub-groups of prefrontal damaged patients on a set of neuropsychological 
tests between 1995 and 2005. The series of studies adopted several methodological 
approaches to control for potential artefacts in studying the functional-structural 
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relationship of the PFC region using well-established neuropsychological 
measurements: 1) to use of different tasks with the same group of subjects; 2) to use 
the same subgroup to compare performances across all tasks; 3) to use of at least 
10 subjects per subgroup; 4) to use of tasks involved with the same set of input and 
output processes; 5) to use of simple tasks so that the componential analysis would 
reveal reliable sets of processes. These principles were important guidelines when 
comparing the performances in different cognitive tasks measuring different 
subgroups of subjects, especially in lesion approach studies. In lesion-behaviour 
mapping literature, both single and group studies demonstrated theories of 
structure-function relationship in the PFC region (Shallice and Burgess, 1991; 
Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Stuss and Alexander, 2000). Compared with functional 
imaging studies, where hemodynamic changes in the same PFC region might be 
identified using very different cognitive paradigms, e.g., dorsolateral PFC: Duncan 
and Owen, 2000; rostral PFC: Burgess, Gilbert, & Dumontheil, 2007; Ramnani and 
Owen, 2004), lesion-behaviour mapping provided evidence that a brain region 
‘inactivated’ and subsequently disrupted the linked function (D’Esposito and Postle, 
2002). In lesion approach, findings showed that damage to a given PFC region 
impaired performance relating to a specific cognitive process by both association 
and dissociation of deficits using different tasks. Nevertheless, patients with frontal 
lobe damage in the PFC region are relatively rare to find, and it is beyond 
experimental control to restrict the lesions to small and specific sub-regions of the 
PFC area. On the other hand, in functional imaging studies, findings showed the 
same cognitive process activated the same PFC region by contrasting between 
conditions. However, this contrast method usually involved with unwanted cognitive 
processes during the task, and inevitably elicited signal changes that were not 
related to the functions to be measured. The inference of a functional role for the 
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specific PFC region would be much stronger when converging evidence was 
established, and it seemed necessary to find another way to establish the 
function-structure linkage of the PFC region. 
Amongst all kinds of neuroimaging techniques, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) provided measurement to the brain activity by detecting 
associated changes in regional blood flow, which was achieved by using the 
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast to map neural activity in the brain 
when performing different experimental conditions. In order to integrate research 
findings and compare findings across different researchers, one of the ways is to use 
meta-analysis approach. Meta-analysis is a useful tool for quantitative analysis and 
for localising the brain regions that demonstrated consistent activations across 
different psychometric paradigms. Using this methodological approach, new theories 
could be developed based on the convergent location of the brain activations 
between different tasks, or even enabled researchers to identify groups of regions 
that consistently co-activated during the same task. However, meta-analysis 
approach has a potential issue relating to ‘specificity’ when considering the 
activations associated with different functions located in the same brain region (see 
Kober and Wager, 2010). For example, previous meta-analysis revealed that the 
ventromedial part of the prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was activated when subjects 
performing tasks that related to reward processing. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
observing activations in the vmPFC region do not necessarily indicate that the same 
cognitive function (e.g., reward processing) has occurred. To solve this issue 
regarding to specificity, two ways were proposed to justify the change of regional 
blood flow in the vmPFC region was specific to experiencing reward processing. 
First, to test the consistency of the activation observed in the vmPFC region by 
including all the tasks that involved reward processing. Second, to test the 
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consistency of the NON-activation in the vmPFC region by reviewing all the tasks 
that does NOT involve reward processing. Both ways require intensive investigation 
and theoretically unable to achieve. Furthermore, the later way would possibly 
introduce false positive inferences that required proper statistical corrections, and 
eventually makes it even harder to justify the function-structure relationship in the 
vmPFC after proper corrections. The fundamental problem of the meta-analysis 
using fMRI data was that, the observed activations were established upon indirect 
mapping between the regional blood flow changes and the associated underlying 
processes intrigued by the designed psychometric paradigms. Moreover, the 
relatively poor temporal resolution and poor localisation of the activation in different 
PFC sub-regions also limited the interpretation of the findings. As a result, in order to 
examine the function-structure link more directly, we proposed to use a novel way of 
reverse-engineering method by using structural-based analyses instead of functional 
ones. First, we focus on one part of the brain, the PFC region, and developed a set 
of psychometric tests that measured functions relating to PFC evident by previous 
fMRI and neuropsychological studies. Next, we followed the principles suggested by 
the ROBBIA project (Stuss et al., 2005) to implement the same set of simple tasks 
on a large group of subjects, and eventually conducted componential analysis to 
examine the underlying sets of cognitive processes. 
 
2.2  The establishment of the PFC battery 
The establishment of the PFC battery could be divided into four stages. In the 
first stage, as mentioned above, we focused on the functions along two broad lines: 
decision-making and social cognition, which were evident to be supported by the 
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PFC region demonstrated by previous functional imaging studies. Using this 
reverse-engineering method, we designed four new psychometric tests adapted 
from previous studies measuring decision-making and social cognition, which 
presumably would involve neural activity in the PFC region evident by meta-analysis 
approach. In order to create a ‘functional’ baseline for the new PFC battery, a large 
group (N=107 subjects) of healthy typical-developing (TD) adults were recruited to 
administer the PFC battery. The aim of the first stage was to explore the behavioural 
data obtained from our newly-designed PFC battery, which allowed us to 1) compare 
our findings with previous relating studies measuring decision-making and social 
cognition, and 2) serve as the ‘functional’ baseline for further purposes. 
In the second stage, we focused on investigating the ‘structural’ baseline of 
the PFC battery by establishing the function-structure relationship between the 
behaviours and the specific PFC sub-regions using a neuroimaging technique called 
voxel-based morphometry (VBM; Ashburner and Friston, 2000). T1-weighted 
structural scans were acquired from a sub-group (N=62 subjects) of the larger 
healthy typical-developing adults, who met the safety criterion and suitable for MRI 
scanning. This VBM technique enabled us to conduct regression analysis to localise 
the link between the behavioural performances of the PFC battery and localise the 
regional grey matter (GM) size of specific sub-regions in the PFC. VBM multiple 
regression analysis was conducted by using the behavioural performances 
extracted from the PFC battery in the first stage as covariate-of-interest. 
Furthermore, previous functional neuroimaging studies observed the association 
between different PFC sub-regions and different cognitive processes they supported 
in decision-making and social cognition. To test the established link demonstrated in 
relating functional imaging studies, we first identifed the region-of-interests (ROIs) in 
the PFC according to a human brain atlas called Automated Anatomical Labeling 
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(AAL; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and examined the function-structure 
relationships in a hypothesis-testing way. In order to achieve this, a lenient threshold 
(p<0.001, whole brain uncorrected) for exploration purpose was first applied to 
localise the GM clusters in the PFC region that correlated with the behavioural 
performance derived from the PFC battery. A further small volume correction (SVC) 
using the ROIs from the AAL atlas was applied to adjust for family-wise error (FWE) 
at p<0.05. The aim of the second stage was to investigate the functional-structural 
relationship between the behavioural performance measured by the PFC battery 
and different PFC sub-regions. This allowed us to: 1) identify the neural correlates of 
the PFC battery variables; 2) validate the behavioural performance measured by the 
PFC battery was associated with the GM volume in different PFC sub-regions; 3) 
examine the convergence between the location of the activation observed in relating 
fMRI studies and the structural-based VBM analysis. 
The third stage of the PFC battery focused on comparing the baseline 
performance acquired from the typical-developing healthy adults with adults with 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). ASD individuals were diagnosed with 
impairments on social behaviours, repetitive mannerism, and deficits on language 
comprehensions (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Various 
kinds of psychometric experiments measuring behaviours associated with 
decision-making and social cognition demonstrated that individuals with ASD had 
difficulty processing interpersonal communications and manifested fixated 
behaviours with rigid interests. In imaging studies, both structural abnormalities in 
the PFC region and atypical functional specialisation were identified in individuals 
with ASD. These converging results on showing problems in decision-making and 
social cognition, along with functional and structural abnormalities in the PFC region, 
intrigued us to examine the atypical performance on ASD subjects. As a result, in the 
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third stage, a group of adults diagnosed with high-functioning autism with IQ greater 
than 70 were recruited to administer the PFC battery. The aim of the third stage 
focused on examining the between-group difference on the ‘atypical’ responses in 
the ASD group, compared with the baseline performance of the typical-developing 
group established in the first stage. 
The psychometric tests included in the PFC battery were described in each 
of the following four chapters, which included a gambling test measuring risky 
behaviours, a referential judgment test measuring response consistency, a video 
mentalizing test measuring the ability to make inference of other’s mind, and a 
cartoon faux pas test measuring detection of social norm violation. Each of the PFC 
battery chapter followed the three stages for establishing the PFC battery described 
above. First, set up the baseline performance for the PFC battery test by analysing 
the behavioural results of the 107 typical-developing (TD) healthy adults. In the 
second stage, to investigate the regional GM volumes in different PFC sub-regions 
that correlated with the derived variables from the PFC battery, we conduct VBM 
regression analysis by including 62 of the total 107 TD subjects, who were suitable 
for MRI scanning. In the third stage, we included the data acquired from the recruited 
34 adults diagnosed with ASD and focused on the between-group difference 
compared with the baseline performance established by the 107 TD subjects using 
the experimental variables measured by the PFC battery. 
 
2.3  Subjects recruited for the PFC battery 
All the 107 subjects recruited for administering the PFC battery were aged 
from 18-70, native English speakers with no histories of hearing, visual or motor 
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impairments. Subjects from both the TD and the ASD groups had estimated IQs 
derived from the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991). For 
the VBM analysis, the TD sub-group with T1 weighted structural scans (n=62) and 
the TD group (n=107) were matched for age (t(167)=0.310, p=0.757), gender 
(χ2=0.015, p=0.901), and NART derived intelligence scores (t(167)=0.982, p=0.327). 
For the TD vs. ASD comparisons, all ASD subjects had clinical diagnoses, and 
subjects from the TD group had no psychiatric or neurological disorders, or any ASD 
diagnosis amongst their first-degree relatives. Subjects in the ASD group (n=34) 
were diagnosed with high-functioning autism (2 subjects), Asperger’s syndrome (25 
subjects), or met the Autism Diagnosis Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 
2000) criteria for autism spectrum or autism from qualified clinician (7 subjects). In 
the ASD group, all the subjects had full-scale Wechsler Intelligence Quotients (FSIQ) 
greater than 80 (WAIS-III-UK, Wechsler, 1999; WASI, Wechsler, 1999), and 52 of 
the 107 TD subjects similarly had WAIS scores (all FSIQ greater than 80). The ASD 
and the TD subjects with WAIS scores (n=52) were matched for age (t(84)=0.558, 
p=0.578), gender (χ2=0.862, p=0.353), Verbal IQ (t(84)=0.683, p=0.496), and 
Performance IQ (t(84)=-0.494, p=0.623). The other 55 TD subjects without WAIS 
scores were also included for analysis given no significant difference was found in 
NART derived intelligence (t(105)=-0.868, p=0.387) between the two TD sub-groups. 
Therefore, a total of 107 subjects in the TD group and 34 subjects in the ASD group 
were included for statistical analysis with comparable age (t(139)=1.607, p=0.110), 
gender (χ2=1.907, p=0.167), and NART derived intelligence scores (t(139)=-1.413, 
p=0.160) see Table 2.1, for summary). 
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Table 2.1. The characteristics of the subjects recruited in the PFC battery. 
  TD   TD with WAIS   TD sub-group a   ASD 
    mean (SD)   mean (SD)   mean (SD)   mean (SD) 
Subject number 107 52 62 34 
male/female 58/49 30/22 33/29 23/11 
Age 32.55 (10.62) 34.63 (10.20) 33.08 (10.78) 35.91 (10.63) 
NART 115.77 (6.42) 115.21 (6.76) 116.77 (6.44) 113.85 (8.17) 
Verbal IQ b 113.67 (12.59) 115.71 (14.78) 
Performance IQ b 111.48 (12.75) 110.00 (14.79) 
AQ c     15.86 (5.84)       35.50 (8.95) 
a TD subjects with structural brain scans 
b n=52 in the TD group 
c n=37 in the TD group 
 
2.4  Voxel-based morphometry 
MRI data acquisition 
T1 structural brain scans were acquired from a 3T Siemens MRI scanner at 
the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK. Three-dimensional 
Magnetisation Prepared Rapid Acquisition Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) sequence 
consisting of a 180 inversion pulse followed by a Fast Low Angle Shot (FLASH) 
collection (flip angle 12, TR=10 msec., TE=4 msec., TI=200 msec. and relaxation 
delay time 500 msec., field of view 250 x 250 mm) to give 128 contiguous slices of 
1.88 mm thickness. 
  
Voxel-based morphometry: pre-processing 
All pre-processing procedures were conducted using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Every subject’s T1-weighted structural 
images was first segmented into different tissue classes using unified segmentation 
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procedure implemented in the “new segment” toolbox of SPM8 (Ashburner and 
Friston, 2005). The new segmentation procedure applied tissue probability maps 
including grey matter (GM), white matter (WM), cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), soft tissue, 
skull, and non-brain regions to the T1-weighted structural image. This new segment 
toolbox used the prior probability maps to a given voxel belonging to a tissue class 
based on a previous finding using large sampled healthy adults across the lifespan 
(Good et al., 2001). The prior information is also combined with the distribution of 
voxel intensities using Gaussian mixture modelling and sampled every 3mm.  
The GM tissue images created after segmentation were then used to 
generate a customised template using DARTEL method (Ashburner, 2007; 
Ashburner and Friston, 2009). Combining registration and spatial normalisation, 
DARTEL method used an iterative process to warp all the structural images into a 
common space and refine them progressively. For each participant’s image, flow 
fields were calculated during template generation which describe the transformation 
from each native image to the custom template. The information from the flow fields 
were then applied to each original image. To transform the images into the standard 
space, the custom template was registered to the tissue probability map using an 
affine transformation, which was incorporated during the warping process. When 
warping the structural images into a standard space, we used modulated 
normalisation to scale the intensity due to non-linear spatial normalisation by the 
determinant of the Jacobian transformation matrix at each voxel, which preserved 
the total amount of GM for each participant and provided a quantitative assessment 
of regional GM volume. Analysis performed on modulated images examined 
regional differences in the absolute volume of GM. The final step of the 
preprocessing involved in a smoothing procedure using an 8 mm FWHM by isotropic 
Gaussian kernel for statistical analysis. 
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Voxel-based morphometry: statistical analysis 
The VBM multiple regression modelled the data with analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) including age, gender and total intracranial volume as covariates of no 
interest due to known effects based on a previous VBM study using a large sample 
of healthy adults (Good et al., 2001). A threshold masking using the absolute value 
of 0.1 was applied, which indicates the voxels included for analysis have at least 10% 
of grey matter. The variables from each of the task in the PFC battery were entered 
as covariates of interest in each ANCOVA model. For reporting the results, whole 
brain analysis included voxel values for each contrast constituted statistical 
parametric map of the t statistics were first set at a p value of p=0.001 for exploratory 
purposes. All the clusters in the PFC region above the lenient threshold were first 
reported. The clusters in the PFC region were further examined by multiple 
corrections at familywise error (FWE) p<0.05 using small volume correction (SVC; 
Worsley et al., 1996) implemented in the SPM software to test our a priori 
hypotheses. The binary images we applied for SVC were the automated anatomical 
labelling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) derived from the Marsbar 
toolbox. The region-of-interest (ROI) for VBM analysis corresponded to different 
sub-areas in the PFC region, which included 1) the caudal part of the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital; 2) the rostral part of the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex: AAL_ Frontal_Orbital_Middle 3) the medial part of the 
orbitofrontal cortex: AAL_ Frontal_Medial_Orbital; 4) the superior part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex: AAL_ Frontal_Superior_Medial. The projected illustration of each 
ROI region, the size of the ROIs, as well as the corresponding Brodmann area, were 
summarised in Figure 2.1. Further FWE corrections at p<0.05 for whole brain 
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analysis was applied for exploring any voxels outside the PFC region. Resulting 
voxels were reported as x, y, z coordinates in MNI space, and were then converted 
to standard Talairach brain coordinates (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) for labelling 
using Talairach Client. Clusters having more than 10 voxels (k>10) were reported 
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Figure 2.1. The description and projection of the AAL ROIs used for VBM analysis. 
 
VBM multiple regression analysis provided a tool to directly investigate the 
linkage between regional grey matter volumes and the experimental variables 
measuring cognitive behaviours. Hence, the VBM analysis here allowed us to 1) 
examine the functional-structural relationship established from previous related 
functional neuroimaging studies, and 2) test the theories based on previous 
meta-analysis using the hypotheses-testing approach. The behavioural and VBM 
results of each task in the PFC battery were described in the following sections. 
 
2.5  The structure for the PFC battery chapters 
In the following four chapters, we introduced each of the four psychometric 
tests included in the PFC battery, and organised each chapter in the same structure. 
In the first section, we described the behaviours we measure and their underlying 
functions. We reviewed previous relating studies examining the cognitions of our 
interest, and introduced the classic experimental paradigms measuring them. Next, 
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we raised the potential issues or highlighted the inconsistent findings regarding to 
the functions supported by the PFC region, and proposed our hypotheses to the 
questions we would like to examine. In the second section, we described detailed 
methodology of each newly developed psychometric test, and the experimental 
measurements that designed for investigating the underlying processes of our 
interest. In the third section, we reported the behavioural results from the healthy TD 
subjects, and discussed the findings acquired from the TD subjects in the fourth 
section. In the fifth section, we reviewed previous imaging studies measuring the 
functions of our interest, and identified the specific PFC sub-regions that were 
evident to associate with those cognitions. In the sixth section, we showed the 
behavioural and the VBM results acquired from the 62 TD subjects with structural 
scans, and examined the function-structure relationship using a hypothesis-testing 
approach by conducting small volume correction to the ROIs that covered the PFC 
sub-region of our interest. The VBM findings of the TD sub-group were discussed in 
the seventh section. In the eighth section, we reviewed previous findings that 
observed impairments to the functions of our interest amongst ASD subjects, and 
proposed our hypotheses to the performance of the ASD group compared with the 
baseline performance acquired from the TD group. In the ninth section, we focused 
on the behavioural effects that showed significant between-group differences 
between the ASD and the TD group, and discussed the implications of the findings in 
the tenth section. After the four chapters describing the behavioural, VBM, and 
between-group effect of the PFC battery tests, we further took the PFC battery as a 
whole and investigated the between-test effect. In chapter 7, we conducted a range 
of statistical analyses including examining the effect of IQ and gender, principal 
component analysis, single-case approach analysis, logistic regression analysis for 
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predicting group membership, and some preliminary ideas to the VBM findings 
across the four PFC battery tests. 
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Chapter 3. PFC battery – the gambling test 
3.1  Measurements of risk-taking behaviour in response to 
potential wins vs. losses 
In daily situations, people are often required to make decisions accompanied 
by uncertainty in various contexts. Using laboratory-based tests, psychological 
paradigms simulate open-ended scenarios, like making decisions under ambiguous 
situations, allowing individuals to implement their unique strategies, and adapt their 
decisions to changes of contexts accordingly. A commonly used psychological 
paradigm measuring decision-making involving uncertain outcomes is gambling. 
The key feature of gambling paradigms is the implementation of different 
experimental contexts, which provide opportunities to measure responses to 
potential rewards or punishments under different conditions. Another important 
feature is that the scores in gambling paradigms focus on measuring the likelihood 
of making risk-taking choices, or the pattern of responses between individuals, 
compared with variables measuring performance with absolute correctness like 
accuracy. A classic gambling test, the Iowa Gambling test (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) offers subjects repeated deck selections associated 
with positive and negative outcomes, and subjects are required to make 
advantageous choices over time based on trial-by-trial feedback. It has been shown 
that healthy TD subjects are able to identify the advantageous deck and fixate upon 
it as the task progresses. Importantly, previous lesion and imaging studies has 
established the link between successful IGT performance and the PFC region 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998; Ernst et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 
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2006), which demonstrates the essential role of the PFC region played in risk-taking 
actions. 
The IGT has provided well-established measures and consistent findings 
about adaptive learning of making advantageous choices during risky 
decision-making. Nevertheless, the IGT did not measure risk-taking actions to 
potential gains and losses separately, and people tended to implement different 
response strategies under different contexts. For example, the studies of prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) demonstrated that a sure choice was more 
appealing than a risky choice when it comes to potential gains, but it was the 
opposite when it comes to potential losses. This vulnerability to contextual changes 
indicated that people had different response patterns to uncertain rewards and 
losses. Another gambling paradigm, the Cups test (Levin, Weller, Pederson, & 
Harshman, 2007; Weller, Levin, Shiv, & Bechara, 2007), manipulated different levels 
of expected values (EVs), which described a concept taking both probability and 
monetary magnitude into account, and presented trials associated with potential 
gains and losses in separate blocks. This manipulation provided an opportunity to 
measure risk-taking behaviours when facing potential rewards and punishments 
separately. In the Cups test, some options provided sure outcomes, and some 
options were risky ones. The risky options were accompanied with a range of EVs 
varying at nine levels, and subsequently made some combinations of sure vs. risky 
choices ‘risk advantageous’ (RA), some ‘risk disadvantageous’ (RD), and some had 
‘equal expected values’ (EQEV). Previous studies using the Cups test revealed that 
healthy TD subjects made more risk-taking behaviours with increasing EVs of the 
risky options on gain trials, and fewer risk-taking behaviours with increasing EVs of 
the risky options on loss trials. It was interpreted that be able to adjust the propensity 
to make risky decisions demonstrated sensitivity to the manipulations of EVs. In 
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addition, a higher risk rate to potential losses than to gains was found in healthy 
adults (Levin et al., 2007), and this domain-specific strategy to potential rewards vs. 
punishments was consistent with the classic cognitive bias of the framing effect 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Evidence from neuropsychological studies further 
established the link between performances in the Cups test and the PFC region. In 
Weller et al. (2007), patients with lesions to the ventromedial part of the PFC region 
displayed insensitivity to manipulation of EVs by showing more risk-taking 
behaviours to RD trials in the loss domain than control subjects did. Xue, Lu, Levin, 
Weller, Li, and Bechara (2009) used fMRI on the Cups test and defined the risk rate 
on EQEV trials as an index of ‘risk preference’, where the risky and the sure options 
had identical EVs without favouring either decision. The imaging results found that 
neural activation in the ventromedial PFC was positively correlated with individual’s 
risk preference in the win vs. loss contrast. These converging results demonstrated 
that the Cups test provided useful measurements to investigate risk-taking actions to 
potential gains and losses separately, and showed a function-structure relationship 
between risk preference and a specific PFC sub-region. 
Following the rationale of the Cups test, we developed the gambling test of 
the PFC battery to measure risk-taking behaviours under various contexts to our 
recruited subjects. The first part of the modification focused on the experimental 
stimuli. The original Cups test used the number of ‘cups’ to illustrate three levels of 
probability and 3 levels of monetary magnitude to form a total 9 levels of EVs. In the 
current gambling test, we used pie charts to depict four levels of probability, and the 
number of £1 coin photos to depict four levels of monetary magnitude to form a total 
16 levels of EVs. The second modification was the experimental design of the trials. 
As in the original Cups test, each trial consisted of a risky option varying in EVs and 
a sure option with certain outcomes, where different combination of risky vs. sure 
  
36 
 
 
options yielded experimental conditions that were labelled as RA, RD and EQEV 
trials. Critically, the same combinations were presented multiple times in the current 
gambling test, and this multiple exposure manipulation enabled us to measure the 
‘consistency’ of responding to particular options, which was then referred as the 
‘repetitiveness’ variable in later sections. To elaborate on this repetitiveness variable, 
each combination (e.g., a 50% chance to win £2 vs. a 100% chance to win £1) was 
presented nine times in the win and the loss conditions respectively. By definition, 
repetitive behaviours involved with making the same decision multiple times under 
different contexts, and the mental process relating to making adjustments in 
accordance with task demands, or cognitive flexibility, was evident to associate with 
the PFC region (Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005; Kim, Johnson, 
Cilles, & Gold, 2011). A robust phenomenon observed in gambling paradigms 
revealed that individuals tended to fixate on risky options when receiving rewards as 
a positive reinforcement, and tended to show a shift of risk-taking behaviours when 
receiving punishment as a signal to change, or the ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ principle. To 
examine this cognitive bias relating to repetitive behaviours in gambling, we further 
calculated the repetitiveness, a variable highlighted the option-based response 
pattern to different gambling contexts besides examining the likelihood to make risky 
actions (i.e., risk rate) to EQEV, RA and RD trials,. More details of this repetitiveness 
variable were given in the Methods section. Lastly, we used block design and always 
showed the win block first, then the loss block. Compared with gambling paradigms 
that interleaved win and loss trials (e.g., De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 
2008), it is possible that constant shifts between domains might cause subjects 
unable to establish a mental set specifically for a particular context. Therefore, the 
current gambling test used a block design that enabled subjects to develop a 
strategy or engage in a rewarding or punishing mode in a period of time. 
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Furthermore, the win condition always came first, and then the loss condition, which 
allowed us to establish a stable baseline between individuals when examining any 
effect relating to switch of domains, e.g., a between-subject balance of the block 
order (win then loss vs. loss then win) would introduce two potentially distinct sets of 
strategies given that people tended to process potential wins and losses differently. 
The aim of this section was to establish the baseline performance of the gambling 
test, which included measuring risk rate, repetitiveness, and reaction time in the win 
and loss conditions separately. Based on previous findings using the Cups test, we 
hypothesised that TD subjects would show sensitivity to varying levels of EVs in the 
win and the lose conditions. Furthermore, we hypothesised that TD subjects would 
demonstrate the classic framing effect by making more risk-taking actions when 
facing potential losses than to wins. Lastly, based on the ‘win-stay, lose shift’ 
principle in gambling, we expected to observe a higher level of consistency, or the 
repetitiveness in the current paradigm, to wins than to losses.  
 
3.2  Methods of the gambling test 
Materials and Design 
The gambling test consisted of a win condition and a loss condition, and each 
condition contained 144 trials. In each trial, subjects were asked to choose between 
a risky option and a safe option presented side-by-side on the screen. All the options 
were illustrated by pie charts demonstrating varying levels of probability to win/lose a 
certain amount of imaginary money, and pictures of £1 coins demonstrating varying 
levels of monetary magnitude. The sure options were always illustrated by a pie 
chart showing a 100% chance to win/lose a £1 coin (i.e. no “chance” at all). The risky 
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options, on the other hand, were illustrated by pie charts varying in 4 levels of 
probability (20%, 25%, 33%, or 50%) to win/lose 4 levels of money (£2, £3, £4, or £5) 
(see Figure 3.1). Compared with the original Cups test having 9 levles of EVs, the 
current gambling test had 16 levels of EVs ranging from £0.4 (20% x £2) to £2.50 
(50% x £5) depicted by the risky options. Subsequently, the combinations of EVs 
could be divided into three categories: 1) risk advantageous (RA) trials: 
combinations that favoured risk-taking behaviours with higher EVs in the win 
condition and lower EVs in the loss condition; 2) risk disadvantageous (RD) trials: 
combinations that favoured risk-aversive behaviours with lower EVs in the win 
condition and higher EVs in the loss condition; 3) equal expected values (EQEV) 
trials: combinations that favoured neither risk-taking nor risk-aversive behaviours 
with identical EVs to the sure options in the win and the loss conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The experimental procedure of the gambling test. All subjects 
administered the win condition first, then the loss condition. In this illustration, 
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subjects were required to choose from a sure option to win £1 vs. a risky option to 
have 50% chances to win £3 in a winning scenario. In the depicted losing scenario, 
subjects were required to choose from a sure option to lose £1 vs. a risky option to 
have 33% chances to loss £5. 
 
The win and the loss condition each comprised of nine blocks, and there 
were 16 trials in each block. In each block, 16 kinds of combinations (safe vs. risky 
options) varying in EVs appeared once. A proportion of positive outcomes (25%, 
50%, or 75% of the trials) were pre-determined in each block. The order of all trials 
was presented in an identical order across all subjects, which was to ensure that all 
subjects received the same testing experience during the gambling test. The 
position of the sure and risky options presented on the screen was counterbalanced.  
 
Procedure 
The gambling test was presented on a laptop using MATLAB R2008a (The 
MathWorks) and stimuli were presented by the Cogent toolbox v1.32 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent). Subjects were told that they would be given 
several chances to win and lose some imaginary money, and were encouraged to 
end up with as much money as they can. All subjects performed the win condition 
first, and then the loss condition.  
During each trial, a cue saying ‘Your chance of winning/losing…’ would be 
presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds in the win and the loss condition, and a 
trial depicting a sure option and a risky option were presented side-by-side on the 
screen. Subjects were told to choose either the sure or the risky option by pressing 
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one of the corresponding keys (the left or the right arrow key). Each trial stayed on 
the screen until a decision was made. After responding, the option selected was 
highlighted with a green border for 300 milliseconds, and the outcome of that trial 
was presented on the screen for 700 milliseconds. If participants chose the sure 
option, the outcome would always be ‘You win £1’ in the win condition and ‘You lose 
£1’ in the loss condition. If subjects chose the risky option, the outcome would be 
‘You win £0/£2/£3/£4/£5’ in the win condition, and ‘You lose £0/£2/£3/£4/£5’ in the 
loss condition depending on the pre-determined probability for positive outcomes in 
the given blocks. There were two 10 second breaks at the end of the third and the 
sixth blocks in the win and the loss conditions. The gambling test took each subject 
approximately 20 minutes to administer.  
 
Measurements  
We focused on the analysis of three variables in the gambling test: (1) risk 
rate, the likelihood to make risky decisions; (2) overall reaction times, the latent 
period to make responses; (3) repetitiveness, the consistency of making the same 
decision to each combination that varies in EVs. Unlike risk rate that measured the 
overall risky performance across all combinations, the repetitiveness variable 
measured response pattern to each particular combination. To elaborate on this, 
what we tried to measure was the consistency of making choices when presented 
same combination several times. For example, a trial depicting ‘a 50% chance to win 
£2 vs. a 100% chance to win £1’ appeared 9 times in the win condition, so the 
frequency to take a risk to this combination was ranged from 0 to 9. A 
newly-assigned score out of a maximum possible 9 instances is followed by: 0->5, 
1->4, 2->3, 3->2, 4->1, 5->1, 6->2, 7->3, 8->4, and 9->5. This ‘V-shape’ weighting 
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scheme gave higher scores to both extreme risk-taking and risk-avoiding behaviours. 
On this basis, to take a risk on one particular combination 4 or 5 out of 9 times can 
be considered ‘less repetitive’, and as subject chose to take a risk on that particular 
combination 0 or 9 out of 9 times can be considered ‘highly repetitive’. Following this 
logic, we first calculated the frequencies for each subject to take risks on 
combinations varying in 16 levels of EVs, and then transformed the frequencies 
according to the ‘V-shape’ transformaiton to yield a repetitiveness score. We 
summed the repetitiveness score and scaled this score according to a range of 
possible maximum and minimum values into percentile for statistical analysis. For 
example, amongst the total 144 trials, if a subject chose the ‘50% chance to win £2’ 
over the ‘a 100% chance to win £1’ option every time this combination appeared (9 
times in total), and never chose the risky option to the rest of the 135 trials. Risk rate 
would give a 6.25% (9/144), but repetitiveness would show 100, a perfect repetitive 
behaviour.  
In order to examine risky behaviours on trials varying in EVs under different 
conditions, repeated measures ANOVAs with condition (win and loss) and EVs (RA, 
EQEV and RD) as within-subject factors were conducted to examine the main 
effects and interactions on risk rate and repetitiveness. However, due to extreme 
risk-taking or risk-avoiding behaviours, reaction times under some EV combinations 
were not available, e.g., a conservative subject would have no, or very little reaction 
time score for RD trials. Hence, the reaction times were collapsed across EVs and 
analysis was conducted using paired t tests to compare the effect between domains 
(win vs. loss).  
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3.3  Behavioural result of the TD group 
Experimental variables including risk rate, repetitiveness, and reaction time 
were entered into repeated measures ANOVA with condition (win vs. loss) and EVs 
(RA, EQEV, RD) as within-subject factors. The behavioural result of the gambling 
test in the TD group were summarised in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. The mean and standard deviations of risk rate, repetitiveness, and 
reaction time (msec.) overall, and to RA, EQEV, RD trials in the win and the loss 
conditions were summarised separately. 
Condition   Variable EV mean SD 
Win  
Risk rate  
Overall 0.42 0.20  
RA 0.71 0.26  
EQEV 0.39 0.28  
RD 0.15 0.20  
 
Repetitiveness  
Overall 0.69 0.18  
RA 0.78 0.24  
EQEV 0.62 0.24  
RD 0.73 0.20  
 
Reaction time (msec.)  
Overall 1384.4 494.4  
 
Loss  
Risk rate  
Overall 0.52 0.21  
RA 0.72 0.24  
EQEV 0.49 0.26  
RD 0.33 0.28  
 
Repetitiveness  
Overall 0.59 0.22  
RA 0.66 0.24  
EQEV 0.58 0.25  
RD 0.63 0.24  
 
Reaction time (msec.)  
     Overall 1472.8 646.8  
 
Risk rate 
To test the sphericity of the EV variable, Mauchly’s test first revealed that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 (2)=70.739, p<0.00), and degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity 
(ε=0.671). However, the condition x EV interaction has met the assumption of 
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sphericity (χ2 (2)=1.302, p=0.521), so there was no correction of the F-ratios for the 
interaction effect. Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate revealed a significant 
main effect of condition (F(1,212)=12.946, p<0.001, where TD subjects took 
significantly more risk-taking actions in the loss condition than in the win condition. 
Repeated measures ANOVA also identified a significant main effect of EVs (F(1.342, 
209.418)=271.132, p<0.001), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction 
confirmed that TD subjects made more risky decisions in the RA>EQEV>RD order 
(all pairwise comparison p<0.001). Importantly, repeated measures ANOVA found a 
significant condition x EV interaction (F(2,212)=31.098, p<0.001). Follow-up analysis 
showed that the interaction was driven by more risk-taking behaviours to EQEV and 
RD trials in the loss condition than in the win condition, but risk rate to RA trials was 
comparable between the win and the loss condition.  
 
Repetitiveness 
Mauchly’s test of the EV variable first found that the assumption of sphericity 
was met (χ2 (2)=1.795, p=0.408), as well as the condition x EV interaction (χ2 
(2)=4.904, p=0.086). As a result, we did not correct for the degrees of freedom of the 
F-ratios. Repeated measures ANOVA on repetitiveness revealed a significant main 
effect of condition (F(1,212)=19.635, p<0.001, where TD subjects demonstrated 
significantly higher repetitiveness in the win condition than in the loss condition. 
Repeated measures ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of EVs 
(F(2,212)=26.780, p<0.001), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction identified 
that the level of repetitiveness on risk-taking behaviours was in the RA>RD>EQEV 
order (all pairwise comparisons p<0.05, except for RA vs. RD p=0.053). Furthermore, 
repeated measures ANOVA found a significant condition x EV interaction 
  
45 
 
 
(F(2,212)=3.047, p=0.05). Follow-up analysis showed that the interaction was 
contributed by a much higher repetitiveness to RA and RD trials in the win condition 
than in the loss condition, but the repetitive behaviour was comparable to EQEV 
trials between conditions.  
 
Reaction time 
Paired t test showed that the difference between the win and the loss 
conditions was not significant (t(106)=-1.836, p=0.069). 
 
Correlation analysis 
In order to investigate the relationships between the three variables, we 
collapsed risk rate and repetitiveness across varying levels of EVs to enable 
correlation analysis with reaction time. Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis 
was conducted in two different approaches. In the first approach, we focused on the 
within-variable effect, where the relationships on risk rate, repetitiveness, reaction 
time between the win and the loss conditions were examined. In the second 
approach, analyses on the between-variable effect were conducted, where the 
relationships between the win and the loss conditions using risk rate, repetitiveness, 
and reaction time were examined separately.  
In the first approach, correlation analysis revealed that the relationship 
between risk rate in the win and the loss condition was not significant (rs (107)=0.100, 
p=0.307). A positive significant correlation was found between repetitiveness in the 
win and the loss conditions (rs (107)=0.441, p<0.001). Analysis of reaction time 
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revealed a positive significant correlation between the win and the loss conditions (rs 
(107)=0.752, p<0.001). In the second approach, correlation analysis between 
variables revealed a negative significant relationship between risk rate and 
repetitiveness in the win condition (rs (107)=-0.457, p<0.001). No significant 
correlations were found in the win condition between risk rate and reaction time (rs 
(107)=-0.112, p=0.252), neither as between repetitiveness and reaction time (rs 
(107)=0.105, p=0.280). On the other hand, between-variable correlation analysis in 
the loss condition identified a negative significant relationship between risk rate and 
reaction time (rs (107)=-0.252, p=0.009). No significant correlations were found in 
the loss condition between risk rate and repetitiveness (rs (107)=0.011, p=0.912), 
neither as between repetitiveness and reaction time (rs (107)=0.077, p=0.431). 
 
3.4  Discussion of the behavioural result in the TD group 
 The gambling test examined individuals’ risk-taking behaviours under 
varying levels of EVs between the win and the loss domains separately. First, 
repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate demonstrated that healthy TD subjects had 
sensitivity to the manipulations of EVs by taking more risks to trials in the 
RA>EQEV>RD order. This indicated that TD subjects made their risk-taking 
behaviours in a rational way by adjusting their propensity to potential uncertainty in 
accordance to EVs. The significant main effect of condition displayed more 
risk-taking behaviours to potential losses than to gains, and this domain-sensitive 
bias was consistent with framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Furthermore, 
a significant interaction between condition and EV on risk rate was identified, which 
demonstrated an increasing loss averse strategy to EQEV and RD trials, but 
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comparable to RA trials between domains. This suggested that the cognitive bias 
(e.g., framing effect) was only observed under fair or disadvantageous situations, yet 
under situations that strongly favoured risk-taking actions, TD subjects did not show 
a higher loss-aversive strategy than to potential gains. It was proposed that an 
irrational emotional interference over rational cognitive process that contributed to 
framing effect (see De Martino et al., 2008). In the current paradigm, it was possible 
that TD subjects experienced comparable emotional interference to RA trials in both 
win and loss domains, where the chance of gaining extra reward and the change of 
avoiding extra punishment was greatly favoured, and subsequently led to a 
comparable propensity to take a risk rather than played it safe.  
Besides risk rate, we further calculated the repetitiveness variable that 
measured the response pattern to different combinations. Repeated measures 
ANOVA of repetitiveness revealed a significant main effect of EV, which indicated 
that the rigidness of responding was in a RA>RD>EQEV order. This finding 
indicated that the decision to each appearance of the same combination was more 
random, and subjects were the least decisive to EQEV trials. The repetitiveness was 
the highest to RA trials, which showed that the response pattern was the most 
fixated under situation favoured risk-taking behaviours. This also supported that TD 
subjects were sensitive to the manipulation of EV, where subjects made more risky 
decision, and made them consistently. Analysis of repetitiveness also found a 
significant main effect of condition, which showed that subjects responded more 
repetitively in the win condition than in the loss condition. This was in accordance 
with the ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ principle in gambling paradigms, and suggested that the 
response pattern was more susceptible in the loss condition than in the win condition. 
Interestingly, repeated measures ANOVA identified a condition x EV interaction 
showing higher repetitiveness to RA and RD trials to wins than to losses, but in a 
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comparable way to EQEV trials between domains. This result was similar to the 
selective framing effect observed on risk rate, which showed that the ‘win-stay, 
lose-shift’ principle applied only to situations that favoured either risk-taking or 
risk-avoiding actions. When it comes to situations that favoured neither option, the 
response pattern was comparable beween domains due to higher degree of 
randomness. Analysis of reaction time found no significant difference between the 
win and the loss condition, which indicated that TD subjects spent comparable time 
making decisions to potential wins and losses, and further suggested that the risky 
decision-making processes to potential rewards or punishments was equally 
demanding amongst TD subjects. 
In order to examine the relationships within and between variables in 
different conditions, correlation analyses were conducted in two approaches. In the 
first approach, analysis of within-variable effect found that the correlation between 
risk rate in the win and the loss conditions was not significant. This suggests that the 
propensity to take risks when evaluating potential gains and losses involved with 
distinct cognitive processes, where taking fewer risks to gain more rewards does not 
necessary associate with fewer loss-aversive actions to avoid more punishments. 
On the other hand, correlation analysis of repetitiveness and reaction time 
demonstrated positive significant relationships between domains. These significant 
relationships suggested that the repetitive pattern, as well as the response speed to 
risky decision-making was less domain-specific, where a general guideline was 
implemented for processing potential wins and losses in each individual. In the 
second approach, the relationships between variables were examined in the win and 
the lose condition separately. In the win condition, a negative significant correlation 
between risk rate and repetitiveness was observed, whereas no significant 
correlation was found between risk rate and repetitiveness in the lose condition. This 
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indicated that, for example, the fewer risk-taking actions accompanied with higher 
repetitive response patterns in the win condition, but this is not necessarily true in 
the lose condition. Analysis of the skewness of the overall repetitiveness in the win 
condition showed a value of -0.5, which indicated that the tail on the left side was 
longer than the right side, compared with a value of -0.355 for the overall 
repetitiveness in the loss condition. The difference of skewness suggested that the 
lower risk rate to wins than to losses reflects a more confined risk-taking preference 
to potential wins, where risky decisions were made to particular options 
(demonstrated by risk rate) and subjects further fixated on them (indicated by 
repetitiveness). In the lose condition, one the other hand, TD subjects were more 
willing to take risks in order to avoid potential losses. This might subsequently lead 
to a higher propensity to make risk-taking actions as a whole (demonstrated by risk 
rate), and a less confined resonse pattern on risk-taking preference (indicated by 
repetitiveness). This domain-specific strategy was consistent with the classic 
‘exploration – exploitation’ dilemma, which delineated the mind of gamblers trying to 
optimise decisions on the basis of accumulated experience, the richest option, and 
the learning process from choosing less familiar option with bigger potential. 
Previous studies have identified the PFC region played in supporting this trade-off 
mechanism between executing and not executing a given action (Daw, O’Doherty, 
Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). Lastly, the null 
relationships between the overall reaction time and other two variables indicated that 
longer consideration did not accompany systematic increase or decrease in the 
propensity to take risks, and the repetitive response pattern.  
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3.5  Neuroimaging findings of risk-taking behaviour to 
potential wins vs. losses 
The gambling paradigm used here provides laboratory-based measurements 
of risk-taking behaviours when facing uncertain situations accompanied with 
potential rewards or punishments. Previous theoretical accounts have argued that 
the decisional process could be based on rational consideration (e.g., sensitivity to 
manipulation of varying EVs) with different strategies (e.g., exploration vs. 
exploitation) under different contexts (e.g., the framing effect). As discussed earlier, 
one of the critical features of the gambling paradigm was that the scores allowed 
measuring unique preferences or strategies between individuals, rather than being 
examined by variables with absolute rightness (e.g., accuracy) as in other 
psychological paradigms (e.g., is this test item a ‘new’ one or an ‘old’ one in the 
recognition memory paradigm).In gambling paradigms, the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) 
measured the pattern of deck selections associated with potential positive and 
negative outcomes, and subjects were required to identify the advantageous deck 
as the test progressed based on trial-by-trial learning. Bechara et al. (1998) used the 
IGT to reveal that patients with damage in the ventromedial PFC region make fewer 
advantageous deck selections compared with control subjects. Importantly, the 
impairment on IGT performance was selectively linked to lesions in the ventromedial 
PFC region, where patients with dorsolateral PFC lesions had intact performance on 
the IGT, but demonstrated deficits on working memory instead. Evidence from 
neuroimaging studies employing the IGT also gave convergent evidence showing 
that the orbital part of the PFC (or OFC region) was activated consistently during the 
IGT (Ernst et al., 2002), and also identified the level of neural activity in the 
ventromedial PFC region significantly correlated with IGT performance (Northoff et 
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al., 2006). These results established a robust link between the ventromedial part of 
the PFC region and the gambling behaviours measured by the IGT. 
In gambling paradigms, distinct behaviours were observed when processing 
positive and negative outcomes. Patients with damage to the OFC region had 
impairments on maximizing rewards and minimizing losses, as well as showing 
deficits in social interactions and emotional processing characterized by 
inappropriate or irresponsible behaviours (Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). 
This raised a possible question regarding the functional role of the OFC region in 
processing representations of positive and negative values. A possible explanation 
of this unique role the OFC region plays in domain-specific risky behaviours was 
evident by its anatomical connections with other brain regions, where the OFC 
region received information from all sensory modalities (Rolls, Critchley, Browning, 
Hemadi, & Lenard, 1999). Previous functional neuroimaging studies have shown 
that activations in the medial OFC region were associated with processing monetary 
reward, increasing satiation whilst eating chocolate, exposure to pleasant smell and 
touch, happy autobiographical episodes, beautiful paintings and successfully 
processing jokes. On the other hand, the lateral OFC region was found to associate 
with monetary punishment, increasing aversion whilst eating chocolate, being 
exposed to unpleasant smell and touch, and sad autobiographical episodes 
(O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Small, Zatorre, Dagher, 
Evans, Jones-Gotman, 2001; Rolls, O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Francis, Bowtell, & 
McGlone, 2003; Markowitsch, Vandekerckhove, Lanfermann, & Russ, 2003; 
Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Goel & Dolan, 2001). A meta-analysis based on fMRI 
literature investigating the functional role of the human OFC region proposed a 
medial versus lateral differentiation, where the medial OFC region was associated 
with activations relating to monitoring reward, and the lateral OFC region was 
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associated with activations related to punishment (see Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). 
Therefore, it seems necessary to distinguish the relationship between different 
sub-regions in the PFC area along the medial-lateral axis and the cognitive 
behaviours associated with processing rewards and punishments. 
In the current gambling test, we modified the Cups test (Levin et al., 2007; 
Weller et al., 2007) and investigated risk-taking behaviours to potential gains and 
losses at varying levels of EVs separately. Xue et al. (2009) employed the Cups test 
during fMRI and found that subjects’ risk preference (risk rate to EQEV trials) was 
positively correlated with the level of ventromedial PFC activation in the win versus 
lose contrast. Moreover, fMRI result also revealed that the activation in the 
dorsomedial PFC region was stronger when subjects made risky decisions 
compared with making safe decisions. A similar dorsomedial PFC activation was 
also observed in studies using the IGT when subjects choose the risky option 
comparing with choosing the safe option (Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama, Hayashi, & 
Hanakawa, 2005; Tanabe, Thompson, Claus, Dalwani, Hutchison, & Banish, 2007). 
These results implied that the ventral part of the medial PFC region was involved 
with functions relating to ‘processing the representation of values’, whereas the 
dorsal part of the medial PFC region was associated with cognitive processes 
relating to ‘make risk-taking actions or not’. When it comes to risky decisions, TD 
people tended to take risks when it is advantageous and to play it safe when it is 
disadvantageous, e.g., sensitivity to EVs in Levin et al. (2007). This suggested that 
risk-taking actions to different scenarios (e.g., RA, RD situations) might involve with 
different cognitive processes. In the gambling test here, we followed the rationale 
established by the Cups test, and presented subjects two competing options varying 
in EVs, where some trials were risk advantageous (RA), some trials were risk 
disadvantageous (RD), and some trials had equal expected values (EQEV). In the 
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previous section, baseline performances established by 107 healthy TD subjects 
showed distinct relationships between risk rate and repetitiveness in the win and the 
lose conditions. In the current section, we focus on identifying the neural correlates 
that associated with risk rate and repetitiveness under different experimental 
conditions. To achieve this, we examined the link between the GM volumes in 
different PFC sub-regions and risk-taking behaviours to RA, RD and EQEV trials in 
the win and the loss conditions separately. Based on the evidences demonstrated by 
previous functional imaging studies, we hypothesised that the neural correlates in 
different PFC sub-regions would be associated with different risk-taking behaviours. 
In the first step, we analysed the overall risk rate and the overall repetitiveness in the 
win and the loss conditions. For the neural correlates associated with risk rate, 
based on the functional distinction between medial vs. lateral OFC and processes 
relating to rewards vs. punishments, we hypothesised that the overall risk rate in the 
win condition would correlate with the medial OFC region, whereas the overall risk 
rate in the lose condition would correlate with the lateral OFC region. For the neural 
correlates associated with repetitiveness, we hypothesised that the overall 
repetitiveness in the win and the loss condition would both correlate with the 
dorsomedial PFC region. In the second step, the neural correlates that associated 
with risk rate and repetitiveness to varying levels of EVs were investigated. 
Furthermore, we also investigated the neural correlates associated with the 
cognitive bias of framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), which was evident 
in the original Cups test, as well as in the baseline performance established by the 
TD group in previous section. Previous fMRI studies investigating framing effect 
revealed that activation in the lateral OFC region modulated the framing effect using 
the IGT (Windmann et al., 2006), and a modified version of the ‘Asian disease 
problem’ (Zheng, Wang, & Zhu, 2010). These functional findings implied that the 
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lateral OFC region was involved with biasing a weighting mechanism between 
rewards and punishments. As a result, we hypothesised that the size of the framing 
effect in the gambling test would correlate with the GM volume in the lateral OFC 
region.  
 
3.6  Behavioural and VBM result of the TD sub-group 
Behavioural investigation into the gambling test 
The behavioural part of the result in the TD sub-group were summarised in 
Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2. The mean and standard deviations of risk rate, repetitiveness, and 
reaction time (msec.) overall, and to RA, EQEV, RD trials in the win and the loss 
conditions of the TD sub-group were reported separately. 
Condition   Variable   EV mean SD 
Win 
Risk rate 
Overall 0.42 0.20 
RA 0.69 0.25 
EQEV 0.39 0.26 
RD 0.15 0.19 
Repetitiveness 
Overall 0.67 0.18 
RA 0.77 0.24 
EQEV 0.60 0.23 
RD 0.71 0.20 
Reaction time (msec.) 
Overall 1475.7 577.8 
Loss 
Risk rate 
Overall 0.51 0.20 
RA 0.69 0.23 
EQEV 0.50 0.24 
RD 0.33 0.27 
Repetitiveness 
Overall 0.58 0.22 
RA 0.66 0.22 
EQEV 0.58 0.23 
RD 0.60 0.24 
Reaction time (msec.) 
        Overall 1518.1 684.4 
 
Risk rate 
To test the sphericity of the EV variable, Mauchly’s test showed that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 (2)=53.309, p<0.00), and degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity 
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(ε=0.629). However, the condition x EV interaction has met the assumption of 
sphericity (χ2 (2)=4.287, p=0.117), so no correction of the F-ratios for the interaction 
effect. Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate revealed a significant main effect of 
condition (F(1,122)=6.530, p=0.013), where the TD sub-group had significantly 
higher likelihood to make risky decisions in the loss condition than in the win 
condition. Repeated measures ANOVA also identified a significant main effect of 
EVs (F(1.259, 114.130)=164.016, p<0.001), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni 
correction demonstrated that the likelihood to make risky decisions was in the 
RA>EQEV>RD order (all pairwise comparison p<0.001). In addition, repeated 
measures ANOVA found a significant condition x EV interaction (F(2,122)=18.311, 
p<0.001). Follow-up analysis showed that the interaction was driven by more 
risk-taking behaviours to EQEV and RD trials in the lose condition than in the win 
condition, but risk rate to RA trials was comparable between the win and the lose 
condition.  
 
Repetitiveness 
Mauchly’s test of the EV variable first found that the assumption of sphericity 
was met (χ2 (2)=0.363, p=0.834), as well as the condition x EV interaction (χ2 
(2)=3.704, p=0.157). Therefore, no correct for the degrees of freedom of the F-ratios 
was required. Repeated measures ANOVA on repetitiveness revealed a significant 
main effect of condition (F(1,122)=9.612, p=0.003, where the TD sub-group showed 
significantly higher repetitiveness in the win condition than in the lose condition. 
Repeated measures ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of EVs 
(F(2,122)=18.839, p<0.001), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction 
confirmed that the level of repetitiveness on risk-taking behaviours was in the 
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RA>RD>EQEV order (all pairwise comparisons p<0.05). Nevertheless, repeated 
measures ANOVA did not find a significant condition x EV interaction 
(F(2,122)=2.905, p=0.059).  
 
Reaction time 
Paired t test did not find a significant difference between reaction time in the 
win and the lose conditions (t(62)=-0.723, p=0.472). 
 
Correlation analysis 
The same procedure was conducted as the analysis in the TD group. In the 
first approach, correlation analysis did not find a significant relationship between risk 
rate in the win and the lose condition (rs (62)=0.010, p=0.936). The analysis 
identified a positive significant correlation between repetitiveness in the win and the 
loss conditions (rs (62)=0.448, p<0.001). A positive significant correlation between 
reaction time in the win and the loss conditions was also observed (rs (62)=0.843, 
p<0.001). In the second approach, between-variable correlation analysis revealed a 
negative significant relationship between risk rate and repetitiveness in the win 
condition (rs (62)=-0.495, p<0.001). No significant correlations were found between 
risk rate and reaction time (rs (62)=-0.022, p=0.863), neither as between 
repetitiveness and reaction time (rs (62)=0.125, p=0.333) in the win condition. On the 
other hand, correlation analysis on the between-variable effect in the lose condition 
did not find any significant correlations between risk rate and reaction time (rs 
(62)=-0.202, p=0.115), between risk rate and repetitiveness (rs (62)=0.028, p=0.828), 
and between repetitiveness and reaction time (rs (62)=0.074, p=0.569). 
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VBM investigation into the gambling test 
For VBM regression analysis, we first examined the neural correlates that 
were associated with the overall risk rate and the overall repetitiveness in each 
domain (see Table 3.3 for summary, and Figure 3.2 for illustration). Next, we 
inputted the variable under each condition (e.g., risk rate and repetitiveness to RA, 
EQEV, RD trials in the win and the lose conditions respectively) as 
covariates-of-interest to the regression model to explore the neural correlates that 
associated with the risk-taking behaviours under different conditions. The observed 
GM cluster that associated with risk rate and repetitiveness to varying levels of EVs 
are summarised in Table 3.4, and Figure 3.3, for illustration. 
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Table 3.3. The VBM result of the gambling test (part 1). The observed GM clusters that associated with the overall risk rate, the overall 
repetitiveness in the win and the loss conditions were reported, along with the peak MNI coordinate, the approximate BA region, and the 
ROI for small volume correction using hypothesis-testing approach based on previous relating fMRI literature. 
p<0.001, uncorrected Small Volume Correction (FWE<0.05)
  Whole brain analysis AAL_Medial_Orbital AAL_Inferior_Orbital AAL_Superior_Medial 
  k t MNI BA p MNI p MNI p MNI 
Overall risk rate 
Win condition 2 3.34 [14, 39, -8] BA10 0.046 [14, 39, -8]
Loss condition 12 3.51 [23, 21, -9] BA47
11 3.35 [51, 24, -9] BA47
2 3.33 [44, 18, -6] BA47
Overall repetitiveness 
Win condition 130 4.21 [-2, 50, 28] BA9 0.014 [-2, 50, 28] 
loss condition 40 4.02 [-2, 68, 15] BA10 0.024 [-2, 68, 15] 
13 3.62 [38, 32, -9] BA47 0.043 [38, 32, -9]
  20 3.47 [2, 50, 21] BA9     
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Figure 3.2. The depiction of the GM volume that significantly correlated with the 
variables in the gambling test. (a) The overall repetitiveness in the win condition was 
positively correlated with a GM cluster located in the dorsomedial PFC region. (b) 
The overall repetitiveness in the loss condition was positively correlated with a GM 
cluster in the dorsomedial PFC region (left side of the panel b), as well as a GM 
cluster in the lateral OFC region (right side of the panel b).  
 
  
61 
 
 
 
Overall risk rate and overall repetitiveness between domains 
Overall risk rate 
VBM regression analysis did not find a significant relationship between the 
overall risk rate in the win condition and any PFC region, neither as in the loss 
condition.  
 
Overall repetitiveness 
In the win condition, VBM regression analysis identified a positive significant 
correlation between the overall repetitiveness and the GM volume in the 
dorsomedial PFC region located in BA9 (peak MNI: -2, 50, 28; SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.014). On the other hand, in the loss 
condition, VBM regression analysis identified a positive significant correlation 
between the overall repetitiveness and the GM volume in the dorsomedial PFC 
region located in BA10 (peak MNI: -2, 68, 15; SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.024) and the GM volume in lateral OFC 
region located in BA47 (peak MNI: 38, 32, -9; SVC: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_R, 
p=0.043). 
 
Risk rate and repetitiveness to varying levels of EVs 
Risk rate 
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In the win condition, VBM regression analysis revealed a positive significant 
correlation between risk rate to RA trials and the GM volume in the dorsomedial PFC 
region located in BA9 (peak MNI: -6, 50, 19; SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.008). The analysis did not find any GM 
volume in the PFC region that significantly correlated with risk rate to EQEV and RD 
trials. In the loss condition, VBM regression analysis revealed a positive significant 
correlation between risk rate to RA trials and the GM volume in lateral OFC region 
located in BA47 (peak MNI: 47, 27, -15; SVC: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_R, 
p=0.025). Nevertheless, the analysis did not find any significant correlations 
between risk rate to EQEV and any PFC region, neither as risk rate to RD trials and 
any PFC region.   
 
Repetitiveness 
In the win condition, no significant relationships were found between any 
PFC region and repetitiveness to RA, EQEV and RD trials. On the other hand, in the 
lose condition, VBM regression analysis found a positive significant correlation 
between repetitiveness to RA trials and the GM volume in the medial OFC region 
located in BA11 (peak MNI: 3, 42, -14; AAL_Frontal_Medial_Orbital_Right, p=0.028), 
and the GM volume in the dorsomedial PFC region located in BA10 (peak MNI: -2, 
68, 15; SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.019). No significant 
correlations were found between any PFC region and repetitiveness to EQEV and to 
RD trials.  
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Table 3.4. The VBM result of the gambling test (part 2). The observed GM clusters that associated with risk rate, repetitiveness to 
varying levels of EVs in the win and the loss conditions were reported, along with the peak MNI coordinate, the approximate BA region, 
and the ROI for small volume correction using hypothesis-testing approach based on previous related fMRI literature. 
 
 
 p<0.001, uncorrected Small Volume Correction (FWE<0.05) 
  Whole brain analysis AAL_Medial_Orbital AAL_Inferior_Orbital AAL_Superior_Medial 
  k t MNI BA p MNI p MNI p MNI
Risk rate
Win condition 
RA 175 4.42 [-6, 50, 19] BA9 0.008 [-6, 50, 19] 
53 3.61 [9, 50, 13] BA10
3 3.30 [14, 39, -8] BA10 0.051 [14, 39, -8] 
EQEV 1 3.33 [14, 39, -8] BA10 0.048 [14, 39, -8] 
RD 18 3.38 [-5, 24, -21] BA11
Loss condition 
RA 97 3.83 [47, 27, -15] BA47 0.025 [47, 27, -15] 
EQEV 
RD 
Repetitiveness 
Win condition 
RA 14 3.41 [0, 50, 31] BA9
EQEV 
RD 14 3.43 [-8, 50, 18] BA9
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Loss condition 
RA 138 4.25 [6, 42, -17] BA11 0.028 [3, 42, -14] 
31 4.10 [-2, 68, 15] BA10 0.019 [-2, 68, 15] 
36 3.53 [33, 59, 3] BA10
41 3.52 [3, 51, 2] BA10
EQEV 9 3.53 [39, 35, -9] BA47 0.053 [39, 35, -9]
 RD 11 3.52 [38, 32, -9] BA47   0.055 [38, 32, -9]
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Figure 3.3. The depiction of the GM volume that significantly correlated with 
variables in the gambling test. (a) Risk rate to RA trials in the win condition was 
positively correlated with a GM cluster located in the dorsomedial PFC region. (b) 
Risk rate to RA trials in the lose condition was positively correlated with a GM cluster 
in the lateral OFC region. (c) Repetitiveness to RA trials in the lose condition was 
positively correlated with a GM cluster in the dorsomedial PFC region (panel c, left), 
as well as a GM cluster in the lateral OFC region (panel c, right).  
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Framing effect 
VBM regression analysis identified that the size of the framing effect (the 
overall risk rate in the loss condition minus the overall risk rate in the win condition) 
was positively correlated with two GM volumes in the lateral OFC region that 
survived small volume corrections using the AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Right ROI 
(peak MNI: 32, 24, -14, p=0.01; peak MNI: 41, 29, -21, p=0.016) (see Figure 3.4). 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The size of the framing effect was positively correlated with two GM 
volumes in the lateral OFC region. 
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3.7  Discussion of the VBM result in the TD sub-group 
The behavioural part of the result identified consistent findings of risk rate, 
repetitiveness and reaction time in the baseline performance established by the TD 
group. Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate demonstrated that the TD sub-group 
had a higher propensity to take risks in the lose condition than the win condition, and 
showed sensitivity to manipulations to EVs. Analysis of repetitiveness revealed that 
the TD sub-group had higher repetitive behaviours in the win condition than in the 
loss condition, and the repetitive pattern to trials varying in EVs was in a 
RA>RD>EQEV order. No significant difference in reaction time was observed, which 
indicated that the TD sub-group spent comparable time evaluating risk-taking 
actions between the win and the loss conditions. Importantly, correlation analysis of 
the within-variable effect did not find a significant relationship between risk rate 
between the win and the loss conditions, yet a positive significant relationship was 
identified between repetitiveness in the win and the lose conditions. Together the 
behavioural performance demonstrated that the TD sub-group: 1) were sensitive to 
manipulations to EVs; 2) took more risks to losses than to wins and showed a 
framing effect; 3) demonstrated a potential differentiation on risk rate between 
domains, yet showed a correlation between the repetitive behaviours to wins and to 
losses.  
VBM regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, 
VBM regression analysis of the overall risk rate aimed at testing the lateral versus 
medial dissociation in the OFC region. In the win condition, although the overall risk 
rate to wins was positively correlated with the GM volume in the medial OFC region, 
the GM cluster that survived FWE correction was too small to meet the exclusion 
criterion (k<10). Nevertheless, this weak association was consistent with proposed 
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function role of the medial OFC played in reward processing (Kringelbach and Rolls, 
2004). On the other hand, VBM regression analysis in the lose condition found no 
significant correlation between the overall risk rate and the lateral OFC region. Still, it 
is important to note that several GM clusters located in the BA47 region were found 
to positively correlate with the overall risk rate to losses when using a lenient 
p<0.001 uncorrected threshold. Together the examination of the medial vs. lateral 
dissociation in the OFC region between the risk-taking behaviours associated with 
processing potential rewards vs. punishments failed to observe a reliable link using 
structural-based analyses.  
The repetitiveness variable we calculated measured the response pattern of 
risk-taking actions, and analysis of the overall repetitiveness aimed at examining the 
link between the degree of repetitive actions whilst gambling and the regional GM 
volumes in the dorsomedial PFC region. VBM regression analysis of the overall 
repetitiveness revealed a positive significant relationship between the GM volume in 
the dorsomedial PFC region located in BA9 and the overall repetitiveness to both 
wins and to losses. This indicated that TD subjects with larger GM volumes in the 
dorsomedial PFC tended to choose the same options more repetitively regardless of 
facing potential gains or losses, which was consistent with the positive significant 
correlation identified at the behavioural level. It is interesting to note that the GM 
cluster in BA9 (peak MNI: -2, 68, 15) correlated with the overall repetitiveness in the 
lose condition, which located closely to the GM cluster correlated with the overall 
repetitiveness in the win condition (peak MNI: -2, 50, 28). Nevertheless, small 
volume correction using the peak MNI coordinates: -2, 50, 28 as the centre with 5 
mm radius revealed that the two GM clusters in the dorsomedial PFC region were 
not the same GM cluster (FWE p>0.05). In a meta-analysis investigating the 
functional role of the rostral PFC region, Gilbert, Spengler, Simons, Steele, Lawrie, 
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Frith, and Burgess (2006) demonstrated an anterior versus posterior dissociation 
along the medial line, where the anterior medial PFC region was associated with 
multitasking, and the posterior medial PFC region was associated with mentalizing. 
It is possible that the posterior medial PFC, a part of the social cognition network 
(Frith & Frith, 1999), is involved with more the affective aspect of cognitions, and this 
emotional regulation contributed to the repetitive behaviours following the ‘win-stay’ 
principle to reward expectation. On the other hand, the anterior medial PFC is 
involved with the guidance of performance, a relatively more rational aspect of 
cognitions. This rational consideration might contribute to the repetitive behaviours 
following the ‘lose-shift’ principle to adapt or change the routine actions in order to 
avoid potential punishments. In addition, VBM regression analysis of the overall 
repetitiveness in the loss condition also found a positive correlation with the GM 
volume in the lateral OFC region located in BA47, which showed that the overall 
repetitiveness to losses was positively correlated with a cortical region proposed to 
associate with processing punishment (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). It has been 
showen that the lateral OFC region was involved with a range of cognitive functions, 
including in the reversal-learning paradigm. A key aspect of reversal-learning was to 
switch from an existing association, via an overriding process, to a new alternative 
option due to a change in feedback contingency. Fellows and Farah (2003) used a 
reversal-learning paradigm and found that patients with lesions to the ventral PFC 
region had impairments in reversal-learning performance. In order to disentangle the 
complex function associated with this complex process, Hampshire, Chaudry, Owen, 
and Roberts (2012) implemented a reversal-learning test to examine the contribution 
of different PFC sub-regions during the following time points: processing negative 
feedback, initiation of new search, reversal, and switching from one object to another. 
Functional imaging result revealed that both lateral OFC and lateral PFC regions 
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responded at the point of reversal. Critically, only the lateral OFC region activated at 
the time of the switch occurred following contingency reversal, whereas the lateral 
PFC region activated in an indistinguishable way during all switching points. The 
‘win-stay, lose-shift’ principle in gambling implied an universal tendency to change 
when experiencing a negative association between punishment and a particular 
option. Under that circumstance, subjects would reverse their strategy to the 
negatively associated option based on the feedback, and switch to other alternative 
options. Therefore, this implied that the variables measuring risk-taking actions (e.g., 
risk rate, repetitiveness) were like two sides of the same coin, where the lateral OFC 
region could be associated with a ‘change of behaviours’, as well as processing 
punishment. Further evidence was provided by Liu, Powell, Wang, Gold, Corby, and 
Joseph (2007), where lateral OFC was not recruited when negative outcomes arose 
in a gambling test, but arose at a later time when an urge was overridden based on 
negative feedback. Taken together, the repetitiveness variable provides another 
perspective to view risk-taking behaviours other than the risk rate, and further 
suggests an ‘action-based’ interpretation replying on different PFC sub-regions 
including the dorsomedial PFC and the lateral OFC regions.  
In the second step of the VMB analysis, we further analysed the 
function-structure relationship between risk-taking behaviours to varying levels of 
EVs and the regional GM volume in different PFC sub-regions. VBM analysis found 
a positive significant correlation between risk rate to RA trials and the GM volume in 
the dorsomedial PFC region located in BA9 (peak MNI: -6, 50, 19), a region close to 
the identified GM cluster that associated with the overall repetitiveness to wins (peak 
MNI: -2, 50, 28). In the behavioural part of the result, the propensity to make risky 
decisions was the highest to RA trials, and a significant relationship between the 
overall risk rate and the overall repetitiveness was only evident in the win condition. 
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Given that repetitive behaviour was more prominent when it comes to situations that 
favoured risk-taking decisions, it is possible that the observed correlation here 
demonstrated a link between evaluations of positive valence and enhanced 
repetitive behaviours. In the loss condition, on the other hand, VBM regression 
analysis found a positive significant correlation between risk rate to RA trials and the 
GM volume in the lateral OFC region located in BA47. This indicated that the bigger 
size of the lateral OFC region, the higher propensity for TD subjects chose to avoid 
punishments under situations favouring risk-taking actions, which was consistent 
with the proposed role of the lateral OFC played in evaluating potential punishments 
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). Furthermore, as discussed earlier, brain activity in the 
lateral OFC region has been found to activate during the switch of existed 
association due to contingency reversal, as well as an urge to override existed 
behaviour pattern due to negative feedback. The behavioural part of the result 
demonstrated that risk rate was the highest to RA trials, which indicated that the 
‘urge to change behaviour’ was most prominent in the situations that favoured 
risk-taking actions. As a result, the behavioural and VBM results together suggest a 
possible link between the size of different PFC sub-regions and the potential 
mechanism behind the ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ principle of risk-taking behaviours, where 
the likelihood to take risks to potential wins was associated with repetitive actions, 
and the likelihood to take risks to potential losses was associated with change of 
actions. Furthermore, the analysis of risk rate to varying levels of EVs highlighted a 
possible distinction between risk-taking actions in scenarios specifically favouring 
risk-taking actions, which provided further insights on the evaluation processes to 
potential rewards and punishments in the gambling paradigm.   
VBM regression analysis of repetitiveness in the win condition did not identify 
any significant relationships between the repetitive behaviours to varying levels of 
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EVs and any PFC region. On the other hand, in the lose condition, repetitiveness to 
RA trials was found to positively correlate with GM volumes in the dorsomedial PFC 
region located in BA10 (peak MNI: -2, 68, 15), the same GM cluster that positively 
correlated with the overall repetitiveness to losses (peak MNI: -2, 68, 15). It is 
important to note that repetitiveness to RA trials did not find to correlate with the GM 
volumes in the lateral OFC region as the overall repetitiveness to losses did. It is 
therefore consistent with a proposed role for the dorsomedial PFC region in ‘making 
the action’ per se. Interestingly, VBM regression analysis also identified a positive 
relationship between repetitiveness to RA trials to losses and the GM volumes in the 
medial OFC region, an area frequently linked to reward processing. The observed 
association suggested that the repetitiveness variable we calculated measured 
cognitive behaviours other than processing positive or negative valence. Given that 
repetitiveness was the highest to RA trials in the loss condition, it is possible that a 
risk-aversive ‘action’ under situations that favoured risky decisions was associated 
with the similar affectively rewaring processes as evaluating outcomes in positive 
valence.  
Lastly, VBM regression analysis revealed that the size of framing effect was 
positively correlated with the GM volume in the lateral OFC region located in BA47. 
To examine the social aspect of framing effect, Zheng et al. (2010) asked subjects to 
administer a modified ‘Asian disease problem’ involving a large group size (600 
endangered people) and a small group size (6 endangered people). Their result 
showed that the positive frame elicited greater activation in the lateral OFC region 
(peak MNI: 33, 29, -8) in the large group context, a location very close to the 
identified GM cluster in BA47 in our VBM finding. Furthermore, brain activities in the 
lateral OFC have been shown to correlate with behaviours relating to risk aversion 
(Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz., 2009), and interruption to this 
  
73 
 
 
brain structure results in changes of risk attitude (Fecteau, Knoch, Fregni, Sultani, 
Boggio, & Pascual-Leone, 2007; Knoch et al., 2006). As a result, this lateral OFC 
region seems to play an important role in a cognitive control mechanism specifically 
for regulating risk-taking impulses. 
 
3.8  Atypical performance of risk-taking behaviour to 
potential wins vs. losses in ASD subjects 
Adherence to restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped behaviours is one of the 
core symptoms of ASD, along with social and communication difficulties. The 
classes of repetitive mannerisms are characterised by high frequency, repetition in 
an invariant manner, and desire for sameness in the environment (Kanner, 1943). 
The repetitive behaviours including preoccupation with restricted interests and 
non-functional routines or rituals, which is described by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1994), has been characterised as ‘desire for sameness to a marked degree’ (Prior & 
Macmillan, 1973). Turner (1999) described the repetitive symptoms, including 
insistence on the maintenance of sameness and circumscribed interests, as 
‘higher-level’ repetitive behaviours, compared with ‘lower-level’ repetitive motor 
actions. Previous studies of this repetitive mannerism reported a unitary repetitive 
factor amongst individuals with ASD (South, Ozonoff, & Mcmahon, 2005), and an 
‘insistence on sameness’ factor emerged reliably across studies of children with 
ASD (Leekam, Prior, & Uljarevic, 2011). However, the underlying cognitive process 
underneath these repetitive behaviours observed in ASD individuals is not yet clear.  
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One of the theories raises a possibility that the poor regulation or impaired 
control mechanism of repetitive behaviours may be associated with cognitive 
inflexibility or executive dysfunction (see Hill, 2004; Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & 
Wallace, 2008; Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009 for review). Studies of cognitive 
flexibility using gambling paradigms provide opportunities to measure individual’s 
unique response pattern in terms of risk-taking behaviours. For example, De Martino 
et al. (2008) used a gambling test that requited subjects to make decisions by 
comparing a sure and a gamble option with balanced expected value under gain and 
loss frames. The result revealed that adults with ASD demonstrated a reduced 
framing effect, compared with the control group, which demonstrated significantly 
more similar risk-taking behaviours between the win and the loss frames. This less 
susceptibility to framing effect suggested a failure to integrate contextual information 
between different domains. Coincidently, the medial PFC region has been shown to 
be responsible for integrating cognitive and emotional information, and previous 
neuroimaging studies reported that people with ASD had structural abnormalities in 
the medial PFC region (Waiter et al., 2004; Courchesne, Campell, & Solso, 2011). 
Based on previous studies using the Cups test showed that patients with 
ventromedial PFC lesions demonstrated insensitivity the manipulation of varying 
levels of EVs (Levin et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2007), we hypothesised that ASD 
adults would demonstrate similar insensitivity to EVs between the win and the loss 
condition in the gambling test here. We examined the susceptibility to the framing 
effect between the TD and the ASD groups as reported in De Martino et al. (2008), 
and expected to find that adults with ASD would show atypical susceptibility to the 
switch of frames compared with the baseline performance established by the TD 
group. 
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Another topic that raised increasing attention in studies using gambling 
paradigms to investigate the inflexible, repetitive behaviours among ASD subjects 
was the change of response pattern over time. For example, Johnson, Yechiam, 
Murphy, Queller, and Stout (2006) used the IGT to evaluate risk-taking behaviours in 
adolescents with ASD, and reported no deficits in advantageous deck selection 
compared with the control group. However, the ASD group made shorter 
consecutive runs of selecting the advantageous deck than the control group, which 
suggested a constant shift between the four alternative decks amongst ASD 
subjects. Furthermore, despite similar proportions of advantageous deck selection 
between groups on average, Johnson et al. (2006) found a trend of increasing 
between-group differences in proportion of advantageous deck selection as the IGT 
progressed, where ASD subjects learnt the advantageous deck more slowly. Similar 
finding was demonstrated by Yechiam, Arshavsky, Shamay-tsoory, Yaniv, and 
Aharon (2010), which revealed that both ASD and control groups learnt to make 
advantageous deck selection over time, yet a significant group x test block 
interaction indicated that the adaptive learning process of advantageous deck 
selection was significantly slower in the ASD group than in the control group. A 
recent study by South et al. (2014) used the IGT to study decision-making in 
adolescents with ASD, and also found a significant group x block interaction driven 
by more frequent and a longer runs of the advantageous deck selection over time in 
the ASD group, compared with the control group. Taken together, previous IGT 
studies reveal a potential dynamic change of adaptive learning style to risk-taking 
actions over time. This intrigued us to examine if a similar adaptive learning pattern 
could be observed in the gambling test here. As a result, we examined the change of 
risk-taking behaviours along a temporal scale by dividing the performance into an 
early stage (the first half of all the trials) and a late stage (the second half of all the 
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trials). Based on previous findings using the IGT, we hypothesised that ASD 
subjects would demonstrate atypical risk-taking behaviours compared with TD 
subjects as the test progressed. 
 
3.9  Behavioural result between the ASD and the TD groups 
Between-group effect 
Experimental variables including risk rate, repetitiveness, and reaction time 
were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with condition (win vs. loss), EVs 
(RA, EQEV, RD) as within-subject factors, and group (TD vs. ASD) as 
between-subject factor. The behavioural result of the ASD group, as well as the 
baseline performance in the TD group, were summarised in Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5 The mean and standard deviations of risk rate, repetitiveness, and 
reaction time (msec.) overall, and to RA, EQEV, RD trials in the win and the loss 
conditions were reported separately for the TD and the ASD groups. 
	
         TD group ASD group 
Condition   Variable    EV mean SD mean SD 
Win  
Risk rate  
Overall 0.42 0.20 0.36  0.23 
RA 0.71 0.26 0.64  0.34 
EQEV 0.39 0.28 0.30  0.31 
RD 0.15 0.20 0.12  0.20 
 
Repetitiveness  
Overall 0.69 0.18 0.52  0.19 
RA 0.78 0.24 0.86  0.22 
EQEV 0.62 0.24 0.78  0.20 
RD 0.73 0.20 0.80  0.21 
Reaction times (msec.)  
Overall 1384.4 494.4 1699.2  500.3 
 
Loss  
Risk rate  
Overall 0.52 0.21 0.52  0.19 
RA 0.72 0.24 0.76  0.24 
EQEV 0.49 0.26 0.50  0.28 
RD 0.33 0.28 0.30  0.27 
 
Repetitiveness  
Overall 0.59 0.22 0.66  0.27 
RA 0.66 0.24 0.70  0.28 
EQEV 0.58 0.25 0.59  0.29 
RD 0.63 0.24 0.68  0.30 
Reaction times (msec.)  
       Overall 1472.8 646.8 1795.6  651.6 
 
 
Risk rate 
First, test of sphericity first revealed that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated on the EV factor (Mauchly’s test χ2 (2)=92.6409, p<0.001), and 
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degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε=0.672). However, the condition x EV interaction has met the 
assumption of sphericity (χ2 (2)=0.620, p=0.734), so there was no correction of the 
F-ratios for the interaction effect. Repeated measures ANOVA did not find a 
significant main effect of group (F(1,139)=0.890, p=0.347). The analysis identified a 
significant main effect of condition (F(1,139)=22.059, p<0.001) and of EV 
(F(2,278)=243.018, p<0.001), where subjects made significantly more risk-taking 
behaviours in the loss condition than in the win condition, and the propensity to take 
risks was in the RA>EQEV>RD order (all pairwise comparison p<0.001 using 
Bonferroni correction). No significant condition x group (F(1,139)=1.349, p=0.247), 
or EV x group interactions (F(2,278)=0.186, p=0.830) was found. Nevertheless, a 
marginally significant condition x EV x group interaction (F(2,278)=2.876, p=0.058) 
was found, and follow-up analysis revealed that the higher propensity to take risks to 
RA trials in the loss condition than in the win condition was higher in the ASD group 
than in the TD group.  
 
Repetitiveness 
Mauchly’s test on the EV variable found that the assumption of sphericity 
was met (χ2 (2)=3.671, p=0.160), as well as the condition x EV interaction (χ2 
(2)=4.783, p=0.092). As a result, we did not correct for the degrees of freedom of the 
F-ratios. Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,139)=4.242, p=0.041), where the ASD group had significantly higher 
repetitiveness than the TD group. The analysis also identified a significant main 
effect of condition (F(1,139)=34.943, p<0.001) and of EV (F(2,278)=22.305, 
p<0.001), which showed a significantly higher degree of repetitive behaviours in the 
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win condition than in the loss condition, and the repetitiveness was in the 
RA>RD>EQEV order (all pairwise comparisons p<0.05 using Bonferroni correction). 
No significant condition x group (F(1,139)=2.940, p=0.089), EV x group interactions 
(F(2,278)=0.465, p=0.629), and condition x EV x group interaction (F(2,278)=2.112, 
p=0.123) was found. 
 
Reaction time 
Similar to the procedure in the TD group, we collapsed the EV factor and 
conducted repeated measures ANOVA using condition (win vs. loss) as a 
within-subject factor, and group (TD vs. ASD) as a between-group factor. Repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group (F(1,139)=9.649, 
p=0.002), which showed that the ASD group made risky decisions significantly 
slower than the TD group in general. No significant main effect of condition 
(F(1,139)=3.615, p=0.059), or condition x group interaction (F(1,139)=0.007, 
p=0.935) was found. 
 
Supplementary analysis  
In order to compare the susceptibility to framing effect described in De 
Martino et al. (2006), where gambling trials had equal expected values, we analysed 
the framing x group interaction of risk rate to EQEV trials. The framing x group 
interaction on repetitiveness to EQEV trials was also examined. Repeated measures 
ANOVA of risk rate to EQEV trials did not find a significant framing x group 
interaction (F(1,139)=1.451, p=0.230). On the other hand, analysis of repetitiveness 
to EQEV trials found a significant framing x group interaction (F(1,139)=5.977, 
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p=0.016). Follow-up analysis showed that the enhanced repetitiveness in the ASD 
group than in the TD group was significant only in the win condition (p=0.001) but not 
in the loss condition (p=0.797) (see Figure 3.5, for illustration).  
 
 
Figure 3.5. The demonstration of the significant framing x condition interaction on 
the repetitiveness to EQEV trials. 
 
Adaptive learning over time 
The aim of this section was to examine the change in behaviour as the test 
progressed by introducing an additional factor of stage, where the first half of the 
data were labelled as the early stage, and the second half of the data were labelled 
as the late stage. Repeated measures ANOVA with condition (win vs. loss), stage 
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(early vs. late) as within-subject factors, and group (TD vs. ASD) as between-subject 
factor was conducted. The results of overall risk rate, overall repetitiveness, and 
overall reaction time, as well as the results of each variable in the early stage and 
the late stage were summarised in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6. The mean and standard deviations of risk rate, repetitiveness, and 
reaction time (msec.) in the earky and the late stages of the win and the loss 
conditions were reported separately for the TD and the ASD groups. 
       TD group  ASD group
Condition  Variable  Stage mean SD  mean SD
Win 
Risk rate 
Early 0.41 0.21 0.35  0.22 
Late 0.43 0.21 0.37  0.24 
Repetitiveness
Early 0.75 0.16 0.84  0.17 
Late 0.77 0.16 0.87  0.18 
Reaction times (msec.)
Early 1625.7 622.2 2052.1  656.1 
Late 1143.0 425.5 1346.4  427.2 
Loss 
Risk rate 
Early 0.56 0.21 0.54  0.19 
Late 0.47 0.24 0.50  0.23 
Repetitiveness
Early 0.69 0.18 0.71  0.21 
Late 0.70 0.18 0.76  0.21 
Reaction times (msec.)
Early 1709.4 781.5 2227.1  920.0 
      Late 1236.1 563.4   1364.2  459.4 
 
 
Risk rate 
Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate found a significant main effect of 
stage (F(1,139)=6.106, p=0.015), which showed that subjects had significantly more 
risk-taking behaviours in the early stage than in the late stage. The analysis also 
revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(1,139)=22.273, p<0.001), where 
subjects took significantly more risks in the loss condition than in the win condition. 
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Repeated measures ANOVA did not find a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,139)=0.850, p=0.358). Importantly, the analysis revealed a significant condition 
x stage interaction (F(1,139)=18.827, p<0.001). Follow-up analysis showed that the 
tendency to take fewer risk-taking actions in the late stage was higher in the loss 
condition than in the win condition. No significant stage x group (F(1,139)=1.126, 
p=0.270) and significant condition x stage x group interaction (F(1,139)=0.794, 
p=0.375) were found.  
 
Repetitiveness 
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stage 
(F(1,139)=6.013, p=0.015), where subjects responded more repetitively in the late 
stage than in the early stage. The analysis found a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,139)=5.491, p=0.021), which revealed that the ASD group had significantly 
higher repetitiveness than the TD group. Repeated measures ANOVA also found a 
significant main effect of condition (F(1,139)=35.586, p<0.001), which showed that 
the repetitiveness was significantly higher in the win condition than in the loss 
condition. Nevertheless, no significant stage x group interaction, condition x group 
interaction, condition x stage interaction, and condition x stage x group interaction 
were found (all p>0.05). 
 
Reaction time 
Repeated measures ANOVA on reaction time revealed a significant main 
effect of stage (F(1,139)=257.764, p<0.001), which showed that all subjects 
responded significantly slower in the early stage than in the late stage. The analysis 
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also found a significant main effect of group (F(1,139)=9.649, p=0.002) showing 
ASD subjects responded significantly slower than TD subjects in general. No 
significant main effect of condition was found (F(1,139)=3.615, p=0.059). Repeated 
measures ANOVA identified a significant stage x group interaction (F(1,139)=15.172, 
p<0.001). Follow-up analysis revealed that the response slowness of the ASD group 
was higher in the early stage than in the late stage. No significant condition x group 
(F(1,139)=0.007, p=0.935) and condition x stage (F(1,139)=3.004, p=0.085) 
interactions were found. Importantly, repeated measures ANOVA found a marginal 
significant group x condition x stage interaction (F(1,139)=3.819, p=0.053). 
Follow-up analysis showed that the ASD group had response slowness in both 
stages of the win condition, the early stage in the loss condition, but the response 
speed was comparable to the TD group in the late stage of the loss condition. 
 
Supplementary analysis 
In the current gambling test, we used a block design that required all subjects 
to administer the win condition first, and then the loss condition. As a result, there 
was one major ‘switch’ of frames between the win and the loss condition in the 
current paradigm, where subjects needed to disengage from the scenarios of facing 
potential gains and changed to a mode of facing scenarios with potential losses. 
Behavioural results from previous sections indicated that all subjects took significant 
fewer risky decisions, had significantly higher repetitiveness, and a tendency 
towards faster response speed (p=0.059) in the win condition than in the loss 
condition. These results suggested that subjects implemented a different strategy 
between processing potential monetary rewards and potential monetary 
punishments. To investigate this ‘switch’ of frames under the block design, we 
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conducted repeated measures ANOVA by inputting the three variables (risk rate, 
repetitiveness, reaction time) in the late stage of the win condition and the early 
stage of the loss condition, and focused on examining the group x ‘switch of frames’ 
interaction. Analysis of risk rate did not find a significant interaction (F(1,139)=0.489, 
p=0.485). Repeated measures ANOVA of repetitiveness identified a significant 
group x ‘switch of frames’ interaction (F(1,139)=4.399, p=0.038). Follow-up analysis 
showed that the enhanced repetitive behaviour amongst ASD subjects was higher in 
the late stage of the win condition than in the early stage of the loss condition (see 
Figure 3.6). Repeated measures ANOVA of reaction time also revealed a significant 
group x ‘switch of frames’ interaction (F(1,139)=5.263, p=0.023). Follow-up analysis 
demonstrated that the ‘cost’ of switching frames from win to loss was higher in the 
ASD group (mean difference=880.7 msec.) than in the TD group (mean 
difference=566.4 msec.). 
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Figure 3.6. The group x ‘switch of frames’ interaction on repetitiveness showing 
adaptation to change of contexts. 
 
3.10  Discussion of the behavioural result between the ASD 
and the TD groups 
The first part of the analysis focused on examining between-group 
differences by comparing the risk-taking behaviours to varying levels of EVs in the 
win and the loss condition amongst ASD subjects to the baseline performance 
established by 107 TD subjects. Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate showed 
that both groups revealed a sensitivity to manipulation of EVs by taking more risky 
decisions in a RA>EQEV>RD order. In addition, both groups revealed a framing 
effect by taking more risks in the loss than in the win condition. However, despite 
showing lower propensity to take risks in the ASD group, no significant main effect of 
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group was found, which showed that ASD subjects did not demonstrate a 
significantly more risk-averse strategy in the gambling test. Analysis of the 
interaction identified a marginal three-way interaction. Follow-up analysis identified 
that framing effect to RA trials was higher in the ASD group than in the TD group, 
which suggested an enhanced cognitive bias to avoid potential losses under 
situations favouring risky decisions. Repeated measures ANOVA of repetitiveness 
first showed a significant condition effect, which suggested that both groups followed 
a ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ principle by making decisions more repetitively to wins than to 
losses. The analysis also identified a significant main effect of condition, where the 
repetitive behaviours were in a RA>RD>EQEV order in both groups. Critically, 
analysis of repetitiveness found a significant effect of group, where the ASD group 
demonstrated significantly higher repetitiveness than the TD group. This revealed 
that ASD subjects were more fixated on a certain response pattern than the TD 
group. Repeated measures ANOVA of reaction time found a significant main effect 
of group, showing ASD subjects responded significantly slower than TD subjects in 
general, which was consistent with the general slowness observed in previous ASD 
studies (Ozonoff, Strayer, Mcmahon, & Filloux, 1994). 
In De Martino et al. (2008), a significantly smaller framing effect was 
observed in the ASD group than in the control group, which suggested insensitivity 
to context amongst ASD subjects. Critically, the trials showing a sure and a gamble 
options in De Martino et al. (2008) were all equal on expected values, but varying in 
EVs in the current gambling test. As a result, in order to examine the susceptibility to 
framing effect reported in De Martino et al. (2008), we focused on investigating the 
group x condition interaction of risk rate, repetitiveness specifically to EQEV trials. 
However, analysis of risk rate did not find a significant group x condition interaction. 
To explain this inconsistency, it is important to note the difference in experimental 
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design between the two gambling paradigms. In De Martino et al. (2008), the win 
and the loss frames were intermixed with each other, whereas we used block design 
to separate the win and the loss condition. It is possible that the presentation of gain 
versus loss frames was either mixed or separated would lead to fundamental 
difference in the strategy implemented. For example, as ASDs are diagnosed to 
have enhanced repetitive mannerisms, it was intuitive to suspect that ASD subjects 
would be more vulnerable to a frequent switch between frames, which might 
subsequently result in the observed insensitivity to contextual change, or actually 
make it indistinguishable between frames amongst ASD subjects as reported in De 
Martino et al. (2008). As the marginal three-way interaction identified in risk rate in 
the current gambling test shows, the enhanced framing effect (taking more risks to 
losses than to wins) to RA trials suggested that ASD subjects tried even harder to 
avoid potential losses in situations favouring risk-taking actions. This highlighted a 
potential differentiation when analysing gambling decisions under risk-advantageous 
and risk-disadvantageous scenarios, where a certain ‘push’ to either side of the 
decision (e.g., to risk or not to risk) might provide fruitful information of the risk-taking 
actions between ASD individuals. On the other hand, repeated measures ANOVA 
found a significant group x condition interaction on repetitiveness to EQEV trials, 
where the ASD subjects responded more repetitively than the TD subjects only to 
potential wins, but not to potential losses. This finding highlighted a more rigid 
response strategy to potential gains implemented in ASD subjects under situations 
that favoured either safe or gamble actions. This interaction also suggested that 
when it comes to facing potential losses, ASD subjects would be willing to explore 
different response strategies as TD subjects, and demonstrated a domain-specific 
rigidness of responding, or a selectively enhanced ‘win-stay’ strategy amongst ASD 
subjects.  
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The second part of the analysis focused on the effect of ‘stage’ by exploring 
the temporal change of performance between the early stage (block1-4) and the late 
stage (block6-9). Repeated measures ANOVA of risk rate revealed a significant 
main effect of stage, where all subjects made more risk-taking actions in the early 
stage than in the late stage. This was consistent with the classic ‘exploration vs. 
exploitation’ dilemma in gambling paradigms, where subjects aimed at optimising 
their decisions based on accumulated feedback. In the current gambling test, all 
subjects tended to implement an exploratory strategy by making more risky 
decisions in the early stage, and exploited the optimised strategy by making fewer 
risky decisions based on their accumulated feedbacks. Furthermore, the observed 
condition x stage interaction indicated that the fewer risky actions effected in the late 
stage was more prominent in the loss condition. This implied a context-dependent 
exploration exploitation transaction, where subjects tended to be more risk-averse, 
or exploited their established strategy based on the exploration process in the early 
stage in an enhanced fashion when facing potential losses than to wins. Repeated 
measures ANOVA of repetitiveness identified a significant main effect of stage, 
which showed that all subjects responded more repetitively in the late stage than in 
the early stage. This enhanced repetitiveness in the late stage was also in line with 
the ‘exploration – exploitation’ explanation proposed earlier when examining the 
temporal change of risk-taking behaviours, where the exploitation process, by 
definition, would involve with more fixated response pattern. It is important to note 
that, although no significant group x stage interaction of repetitiveness was found, 
repetitiveness scores were higher in the ASD group than in the TD group in both 
early and late stages in two domains. A similar finding was reported in South et al. 
(2014), where results of the IGT revealed longer runs of advantageous deck 
selection in the ASD group than in the control group. A key difference between the 
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pattern of deck selection in the IGT and the repetitiveness variable in the gambling 
test was the way to measure repetitive behaviour. In the gambling test, the 
repetitiveness variable represented the pattern of option selection, whereas longer 
runs of advantageous deck selection in the IGT (e.g., South et al., 2014) measured 
repetitive behaviours in a sequentially along a temporal scale. In other words, 
choosing the same option consecutively represented different rigid behaviour 
compared with always choosing the same option whenever that option occurred. 
Further investigation is required to disentangle the differences between ‘inflexibility 
to explore new options’ and ‘rigid exploitation on certain option selection strategy’, or, 
in everyday language, ‘I would rather not go outside of my comfort zone’ vs. ‘I’d 
rather stay inside of my comfort zone’. Repeated measures ANOVA of reaction time 
also revealed a significant main effect of stage, and the result identified that all 
subjects made their decisions significantly faster in the late stage than in the early 
stage. Importantly, repeated measures ANOVA of reaction time revealed a marginal 
significant three-way interaction. Follow-up analysis confirmed the interaction was 
driven by significant general slowness amongst ASD subjects throughout the whole 
win condition, the early stage of the loss condition, but the slowness became 
insignificant in the late stage of the loss condition. This suggested that the ASD 
subjects were able to compensate their response slowness, specifically when 
evaluating potential losses, as the test progressed. In previous studies using the IGT, 
temporal changes of risk-taking behaviours in the ASD group were reported, 
including slower advantageous deck learning and longer runs of advantageous deck 
selection (Johnson et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 2010; South et al., 2014). Our finding 
concerning reaction time is consistent with Johnson et al. (2006) and Yechiam et al. 
(2010), where ASD subjects, compared with TD subjects, revealed a slower learning 
curve on risk-taking behaviours. Nevertheless, we have further raised a potential 
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issue regarding different learning curves to potential wins and losses amongst ASD 
subjects.  
In other gambling test studies investigating ASD subjects, like De Martino et 
al. (2008), win trials and loss trials were presented in an intermixed way, which 
created a certain ‘switch’ of domains between processing potential wins and losses. 
In our gambling test, we used a block design to separate the win and the loss 
conditions to enable building up a certain response strategy as the test progressed. 
In order to examine the sensitivity to change of context, we measured the effect of 
‘switch of frames’, which was the late stage in the win condition and the early stage 
in the loss condition. Repeated measures ANOVA did not find a significant group x 
‘switch of frames’ interaction of risk rate, but on repetitiveness instead. Follow-up 
analysis showed that ASD subjects responded more repetitively than TD subjects 
did in the late stage of the win condition, but demonstrated comparable 
repetitiveness as TD subjects in the early stage of the loss condition after a switch of 
context. This was first in line with the enhanced repetitiveness amongst ASD 
subjects only to wins but not to losses, and further highlighted a differentiation in the 
repetitive behaviours that was sensitive to switch of frames. Repeated measures 
ANOVA of reaction time also identified a significant group x ‘switch of frames’ 
interaction, which showed a significantly higher ‘cost’ of reaction time whilst context 
switched. This prolonged time from evaluating potential wins to potential losses 
implied that the response speed amongst ASD subjects was more vulnerable to 
contextual change. Methodologically, these adaptive changes on a temporal scale 
and the effect of switching frames validated the block design and the ‘win condition 
comes first’ manipulation. In the gambling test, robust effects between conditions 
were found in risk-taking behaviours. It is reasonable to suspect that the identified 
vulnerability to contextual change would be fundamentally different between a switch 
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from win to loss, and a switch from loss to win. We admit that the win condition 
always came before the loss condition design is not the ideal experimental design 
and has its own artefact. Nevertheless, in order to examine sensitivity to switch of 
frame s amongst a pathological group of subjects diagnosed with rigid interest and 
repetitive mannerism, the current experimental design provides a fair comparison to 
investigate the unique risk-taking strategy of ASD subjects that requires the less 
turbulence as possible.  
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Chapter 4. PFC battery - the referential judgment test 
4.1  Measurements for preference consistency on social vs. 
non-social judgements 
In previous psychometric paradigms involved measuring decision-making 
between multiple options, subjects were required to choose the preferred option 
based on their personal preference. During the decisional process, it was suggested 
that choosing one option over others signified a respective rank on one’s internal 
scale (Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009). Importantly, this 
comparative process involved choosing one over another could be vulnerable to 
context, e.g., the framing effect demonstrated a tendency for people to take more 
risky actions to avoid potential losses than to pursue potential gains. An important 
modulating factor of this context-sensitive effect was the uncertainty of the outcome, 
where the outcomes of the possible gains or losses were sometimes unpredictable. 
Nevertheless, the problems we encountered in everyday life were not always 
accompanied with uncertainty, and the decisions could be made without facing 
ambiguous context. For example, Fellows & Farah (2007) used a preference 
judgment paradigm to examine the functional role of the PFC region played in 
decision-making. The basic procedure of this preference judgment test was that 
subjects were required to choose between paired stimuli in three different categories 
(food, famous people and colour swatches). Subjects were instructed to choose the 
item they preferred without reference to their previous choices, but were not 
specifically reminded to be internally consistent on responding. The dependent 
variable of the preference judgment test was the number of erratic choices deviated 
from the overall pattern of preferential choices based on one’s own internal metric in 
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each category. In order to make fewer erratic choices, subjects needed to construct 
their own preferential hierarchy and responded consistently. The result showed that 
patients with lesions in the ventromedial PFC region responded more inconsistently 
than the controls by making more choices that are erratic. This impairment indicated 
that the PFC region was involved with decision-making processes under situations 
without uncertainty or any trial-by-trial learning, and actions could be made based on 
internal metric without considering external effects. This consistent responding 
ability relied more on self-awareness, or self-referential processing, which was 
evident to associate with the ventromedial PFC region (Mitchell et al., 2005). This 
raised the importance of the functional role of ‘self’ played in decision-making. 
Despite the preference judgment paradigm (Fellows and Farah, 2007; Fellows, 2011; 
Henri-Bhargava, Simioni and Fellows, 2012) provided evidence on the linkage 
between consistent decision-making and the ventromedial PFC region, the potential 
role of self-referential processing played was not discussed. 
In the area of investigating the concept of ‘self’ in human cognition, it was 
identified that words were remembered better when encoded with self-referential 
processing, and this enhanced memory effect was referred as the self-reference 
effect (SRE). For example, Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker (1977) investigated the effect of 
self-reference during encoding could affect later recall on the rate words in a 
memory paradigm, and found that the adjectives rated under the self-reference 
condition, compared other conditions, and were recalled the best. The basic 
structure of the experiments measuring SRE effect involved first memorising some 
words in an encoding phase, and subjects were required to make judgments on the 
words based on their personal relevance, e.g., after presenting the words, subjects 
responded to the question, "Does this describe you?" In the following testing phase, 
a new set of words mixing with words from the encoding phase were presented to 
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subjects. This enhanced memory performance suggested that information relevant 
to one’s own is processed and/or stored in a more elaborate form than other types of 
information, which subsequently led to better memory performance. Benoit, Gilbert, 
Volle, & Burgess (2010) also used a recognition memory paradigm to measure 
self-referential processing, and further examined if this cognitive process supported 
thinking about other people. In the study phase, personality trait words were 
presented and subjects needed to indicate the degree of the traits were descriptive 
of themselves in the ‘self’ condition, judge where their best friend would be 
characterised by those traits in the ‘other’ condition, and count the number of 
syllables of the trait words in the ‘control’ condition. Both old and new words were 
presented in the subsequent testing phase, and half of the trait words were 
encountered in the corresponding study condition (old/same), and the other half 
were either shown in the other two conditions (old/different) or not presented (new). 
The behavioural result demonstrated a more accurate performance in the ‘self’ than 
other two conditions, which was consistent with the enhanced memory performance 
for information involved self-referential processing. However, these memory effects, 
including the SRE effect, were observed using memory paradigm, which inevitably 
would involve possible confound from mnemonic capability between individuals. 
More importantly, personally relevant information would be inherently encoded at a 
deeper level than other information, as the original depth-of-processing model 
proposed by Craik and Tulving (1975). It is therefore necessary to examine the 
advantage of self-reference processing, if true, using other experimentation that 
differentiated self-related from self-unrelated processing more directly.   
In the current referential judgment test, we combined the rationale behind the 
preference judgment test and the insight suggested by the SRE effect, and 
developed a novel experimentation aimed at measuring the ability to construct one’s 
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own internal hierarchy relying on referential judgments instead of preference (c.f., 
the preference judgment paradigm). Based on the finding from Benoit et al. (2010), it 
revealed a better recognition for trait words encoded as similar to one’s own than 
trait words encoded as similar to the best friend’s. A key differentiation between 
these two conditions was the involvement of processing self-related information 
(personality of self) and of processing self-unrelated information (personality of 
other’s). As a result, the experimental stimuli we used were in two different 
dimensions, a self-related construct and a self-unrelated construct. The self-related 
construct was one’s own personality, which involved referencing to ‘self’ information. 
On the other hand, the self-unrelated construct was the weight of bottle water, and 
referencing to this information presumably rely relatively lower amount of 
self-information. During the test, Instead of asking subjects to choose the preferred 
item between two options as in the preference judgment paradigm, we asked 
subjects to choose the person with the personality most like theirs in the personality 
condition, and to choose the object with the weight most like bottle water in the 
weight condition. For the variables measuring the degree of self-related vs. 
self-unrelated processing, we used a ‘consistency score’ to demonstrate the 
response consistency during referential judgment. The rationale behind this 
consistency score was that the better understanding of self, the higher degree of 
consistency, or better-organised internal hierarchy would be established. More 
detailed information of this consistency score would be described in the 
Methodology section. In the referential judgment test, subjects were required to 
construct their own hierarchical metric according to a self-related reference and a 
self-unrelated reference. Based on previous studies suggesting deeper processing 
of self-related information (Craik and Tulving, 1975), as well as the enhanced 
memory performance related to self-processing in SRE experiments, we 
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hypothesised that the consistency score we calculated, which measured the ability 
to establish internal hierarchy, would be higher when referencing to one’s own 
personality than referencing to the weight of bottle water. In Benoit et al (2010), 
analysis on response times revealed that subjects responded faster in the ‘self’ than 
in other two conditions. As a result, we hypothesised that the reaction time would be 
faster in the personality condition than in the weight condition. Lastly, in order to 
compare the established internal hierarchy between relying on self-related vs. 
self-unrelated information, we also examined the distribution of the top-ranked item 
between individuals. 
 
4.2  Methods of the referential judgment test 
Materials and Design 
There were two conditions in this referential judgment test: a personality 
condition and a weight. In the personality condition, pairs of human faces with 
neutral expression were presented side-by-side on the screen. The 12 colourful 
faces were extracted from the Centre for Vital Longevity Face Database (Minear and 
Park, 2004) including males and females, age ranging from 19-29 and differing in 
four ethnicities (East Asian, Indian, African-American, and Caucasian). In the weight 
condition, pairs of daily objects were presented side-by-side on the screen. The 12 
colourful objects were extracted from shopping websites on the internet including 
items weighing from 0.1 kilograms to 5 kilograms. The face stimuli in the personality 
condition were presented 8 x 10 cm in size and the objects in the weight condition 
were presented 8 x 8 cm in size. All possible 66 pairs of stimuli in each condition 
were presented in the same order across all subjects (see Figure 4.1 for all stimuli).  
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Figure 4.1.The experimental stimuli for the referential judgment test. Panel (a): male 
and female neutral face stimuli varying in ethnicities. Panel (b): common daily 
objects varying in weight from 0.1 kilograms to 5 kilograms. 
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Procedure 
Before the beginning of the referential judgment test, an instruction with two 
practice trials of each condition was given. In the personality condition, 66 pairs of 
colourful neutral faces were presented side-by-side on the screen (see Figure 4.2). 
Subjects were told to choose the face with the most similar personality as theirs by 
pressing the corresponding left or right arrow keys. The instruction emphasised that 
the decisions could be based on any characteristics of the faces presented including 
gender, ethnicities, or any other facial attributes. In each trial, a cue saying ‘my 
personality is more like…’ was presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds, and a 
pair of faces was presented on the screen until a response was made. After a 
response was registered, the option selected was highlighted with a green outline for 
500 milliseconds, and the next trial was presented after another 500 milliseconds of 
blank screen. In the weight condition, 66 pairs of colourful objects were presented 
side-by-side on the screen. Subjects were told to choose the object with the most 
similar weight to a bottle of water by pressing the corresponding left or right arrow 
keys. In each trial, a cue saying ‘the weight of a bottle of water is more like…’ was 
presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds, and a pair of objects was presented 
on the screen until a response was made. The selected option would be highlighted 
with a green outline for 500 milliseconds, and the next trial was presented after a 
500 milliseconds of blank screen. The referential judgment test took each subject 
approximately 15 minutes to finish. All subjects were asked to administer the 
personality condition first, and then the weight condition. 
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Figure 4.2. The experimental procedure for the referential judgment test. In the 
personality condition, subjects were required to make referential decisions using 
their own personality as the reference. In the weight condition, subjects were 
required to make referential decisions using the weight of bottle water as the 
reference. 
 
Measurements 
To measure individuals’ response patterns in referential judgment, a 
Repertory Grid (Kelley, 1955) approach was used to calculate a score demonstrating 
the ‘consistency’ of decision-making in each condition. The rationale of this 
Repertory Gird analysis was to examine the ability to build up a perfect hierarchy of 
referential judgments amongst all the possible options. For example, imagine that 
there were three options, A, B, and C, and three options were compared with each 
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other. If someone chose A over B and B over C, then a perfect hierarchy would 
expect a response choosing A over C in order to be internally consistent. This 
outcome would lead to a series of responses where A was chosen two times, B was 
chosen one time, and C was chosen zero time. The Repertory Grid method would 
give: A=2, B=1, C=0, showing a perfect range with no ties. As a result, this would 
yield a range of 3, or in in terms of the referential judgment test here, a consistency 
score of 3. By contrast,  a response choosing C over A would be considered as an 
erratic choice or a violation of the perfect hierarchy and the Repertory Grid method 
would give this: A=1, B=1, C=1, given that A, B and C were all chosen one time. This 
leads to a range of 1 with three ties, or a consistency score of 1. In the referential 
judgment test designed here, the consistency score ranged from a perfect score of 
12 to the lowest possible score of 2. A higher consistency score demonstrated a 
more consistent set of referential judgments that were made presumably based on 
one’s own internal metric. In addition to the consistency score, the reaction times to 
each response were also recorded.   
The consistency score thus represented the internal mental scale derived 
from each subject. The most frequently chosen option would be considered the 
referential ‘preference’ in each condition. In the personality condition, the most 
preferred item can be the most similar personality as the subject with the highest 
relevance. It is possible that, according to the SRE effect, subjects would respond 
faster to the most preferred faces when self-referential processing was involved (see 
Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, and Burgess, 2010, for similar acceleration when comparing 
self-trait judgments with control condition). In order to examine if any particular 
response pattern was applied to the most preference item in each condition, we 
further extracted individual’s reaction times to the most preferred item on a post-hoc 
basis. 
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4.3  Behavioural result of the TD group 
The ranking scheme between conditions 
The top-ranked item in each condition of each subject was first identified. In 
the personality condition, the item got selected as the top-ranked varied between 
individuals, i.e., each of the twelve possible options was ranked as the top item at 
least once, and the number of TD subject choosing each of the top-ranked items 
ranged from 2% to 17% of the 107 TD subjects (see Table 4.1, and Figure 4.3 for 
illustration). In the weight condition, the item was selected as the top-ranked was 
clustered at one particular item, where 55% of the subjects considered a ‘ketchup’ 
bottle have the most similar weight as bottle water. Nine of the twelve items were 
selected having the most similar weight as the reference by less than 5% of the 
subjects, and two items were never ranked as the top across 107 TD subjects.  
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Table 4.1. The frequency and proportion to the top-ranked faces in the personality 
condition, and the top-ranked object in the weight condition between each TD 
subjects. For subjects who had ties, e.g., two ties, in their ranking scheme, the 
frequency top-ranked items were counted as multiple times, e.g., twice. 
Personality condition  Weight condition 
Face no. Frequency Proportion  Object no. Frequency Proportion 
1 11 0.08  1 0 0.00  
2 12 0.09  2 2 0.02  
3 11 0.08  3 1 0.01  
4 10 0.07  4 3 0.02  
5 23 0.17  5 1 0.01  
6 19 0.14  6 1 0.01  
7 9 0.07  7 71 0.55  
8 11 0.08  8 6 0.05  
9 7 0.05  9 21 0.16  
10 10 0.07  10 7 0.05  
11 12 0.09 11 2 0.02 
12 3 0.02 12 13 0.10 
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Figure 4.3. The ranking scheme of the top-ranked items in the referential judgment 
test. 
 
Behavioural results between conditions 
The behavioural results of the TD were summarised in Table 4.2. Repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition (F(1,106)=11.954, 
p=0.001), where consistency score was significantly higher in the weight condition 
than in the personality condition. Repeated measures ANOVA on overall reaction 
time also demonstrated a significant effect of condition (F(1,106)=18.470, p<0.001), 
which showed that the response time was significantly faster in the weight condition 
than in the personality condition.  
 
Table 4.2 The mean and standard deviations of consistency score and the overall 
reaction time (msec.) between conditions in the referential judgment test of the TD 
group. 
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          mean SD 
Personality condition 
Consistency score 8.46  1.38  
Reaction time (msec.)  1946.5  1080.7  
Weight condition 
Consistency score 9.01  1.43  
  Reaction time (msec.)    1560.6  553.0  
 
Correlation analysis 
Due to all the variables deviated from normal distribution (p value below 0.05 
in test of normality), Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis was conducted to 
examine the relationship between experimental variables in the referential judgment 
test. In the first approach, we focused on the within-variable effect, where the 
relationships on consistency score between conditions (personality and weight) and 
overall reaction time between conditions were examined. In the second approach, 
we analysed the between-variable effect, where the relationships between the two 
experimental conditions using consistency score and overall reaction time were 
examined separately. In the first approach, Spearman rank-order correlation 
analysis showed that both consistency score (rs (107)=0.263, p=0.006), as well as 
overall reaction time (rs (107)=0.669, p<0.001) were positively correlated between 
the two conditions. Correlation analysis on the between-variable effect found the 
relationship between consistency score and overall reaction time was not significant 
in the personality condition (rs (107)=-0.011, p=0.912), but positively significant in the 
weight condition (rs (107)=0.257, p=0.008). 
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4.4  Discussion of the behavioural result in the TD group 
The referential judgment test used a Repertory Grid approach to measure 
the response consistency on decision-making processing based on self-related and 
self-unrelated references separately. The investigation of the item ranking scale 
between conditions across individuals showed that the top-ranked item was more 
variable between subjects when referencing to one’s own personality, but the 
top-ranked item was more agreeable between subjects when referencing to the 
weight of bottle water. This fundamental difference on the ranking scheme amongst 
options between TD individuals demonstrated the impact of self-referential 
processing, which was demonstrated by the higher variability when decision process 
relied on self-related information. On the other hand, making referential judgments to 
the weight of bottle water, a less abstract reference than self, involved lesser degree 
of self-evaluation, and thus led to higher agreement between individuals. The results 
on the difference between ranking schemes in the personality and the weight 
condition supported the distinct underlying process of the referential judgment under 
self-related and self-unrelated situations 
Analysis on the ranking scheme provided measurements of referential 
decision across all of the options, yet analysis on consistency score focused on the 
degree of response pattern fixated on the chosen option. Repeated measures 
ANOVA found that consistency score was significantly higher and overall reaction 
time was significantly faster in the weight condition than in the personality condition. 
This contradicted with our original hypothesis that referential judgments, which 
supposed to involve with self-evaluation, would lead to enhanced performance as 
demonstrated by the SRE effect and Benoit et al. (2010). This discrepancy might be 
due to the nature of the referential decision between conditions, as revealed by the 
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analysis on the ranking scheme. In the weight condition, the reference was the 
weight of a tangible object, and the referential judgment involved lesser degree of 
self-evaluation. Subsequently, this made the construct of the weight less abstract, 
where subjects might find it easier to build a consistent hierarchical metric. This 
raised an interesting issue regarding the enhanced effect on self-referential 
processing, which might not contribute to performance measured by item-based 
analysis like the Repertory Grid approach in the current test. For example, in order to 
get higher consistency score, subjects were required to make decisions based on a 
consistent rank. If a ranking scheme is not only more agreeable across subjects, but 
also easier to build based on a tangible construct, it is not surprised that the internal 
hierarchy could be built more easily, and subsequently led to higher consistency 
score and faster reaction time.  
We further analysed the relationship between the variables measured in the 
referential judgment test. Spearman order-rank correlation analysis showed that the 
consistency score was positively correlated with each other in the two conditions. 
This significant relationship posited a possible shared underlying process to 
establish a consistent internal metric based on self-related and self-unrelated 
constructs. This positive correlation also provided an insight on the null effect of 
self-referential effect, where the scoring mechanism of the consistency score might 
have a profound effect on the cardinal feature we tried to compare against each 
other. In other words, the Repertory Grid approach we implemented might capture 
some other cognitive components that associated with referential judgments, but 
eliminated the effect of ‘self’ by the scoring scheme. Nevertheless, correlation 
analysis on the between-variable effect did not find a significant relationship 
between consistency score and overall reaction time in the personality condition, but 
significant in the weight condition. This distinct correlation between conditions 
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suggested some fundamental difference upon the ‘speed-accuracy’ interaction, 
where subject made slower decisions did not necessarily associated with better 
consistent referential judgments relied on self-related construct. On the other hand, 
the positive significant relationship between consistency score and overall reaction 
time in the weight condition revealed that referential processing based on 
self-unrelated construct seemed to be an intuitive act instead of confined by the 
classic ‘speed-accuracy trade-off’ observed in psychometrical experiments. More 
investigations were required to discover the underlying process that resulted in the 
mixed effects here. Together the results showed that self-referential processing, or 
decision-making processes based on self-related information might not always 
associated with advantageous effect.  
 
4.5  Neuroimaging findings of preference consistency on 
social vs. non-social judgements 
In typically-developing brain, abundant evidence has established the linkage 
between processing self-related information and the ventromedial part of the PFC 
region. For example, the ventromedial PFC activations were observed in tests 
involved trait judgment involving self-referential processing (Mitchell, Banaji, & 
Macrae, 2005; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006), requiring subjects to report their 
own personalities or preferences (Schmitz et al., 2004; Benoit et al., 2010), reflecting 
their own affective states (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001), and 
accompanied with enhanced memory performances for self-related information 
(Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004). Some researchers 
suggested that this self-referential processing played an essential role in social 
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cognition, where people implemented their own experience to make inferences on 
the mental states of others (Frith & Frith, 1999; 2001; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; 
Mitchell et al., 2005), and was referred as the simulation theory. For example, 
Mitchell et al. (2005) used fMRI to investigate the linkage between processing 
information about self and the medial PFC region. Functional results revealed that 
ventromedial PFC activity was shown to correlate with perceived self/other similarity 
only for mentalizing trials. This confirmed the linkage between self-reflection and 
making inferences of others that were similar to self. A possible explanation of this 
linkage between self and others was based on the unique anatomical connections 
between the medial PFC region and other cortical regions (Passingham, Bengtsson, 
Lau, 2009). In previous self-judgment tests, subjects were required to reflect on, or 
introspect about their own inner mental states, personalities or preferences 
(Johnson, Baxter, Wilder, Pipe, Heiserman, & Prigatano, 2002; Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, 
& von Cramon, 2002). Neural activity in the medial PFC region was shown to 
selectively engaged in self-referential judgments about trait adjectives (Kelley, 
Macrae,Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatheron, 2002), correlated with subjects’ 
subsequent ratings of self/other similarity during mentalizing trials (Mitchell et al., 
2005), differentiated self from others for personality traits, mental states and physical 
attributes (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), and further suggested to involve with 
self-representation of both personality traits and social identities (Sul, Choi, & Kang, 
2011). 
In the current referential judgment test, as described in chapter 4-1, was 
developed by following the rationale behind the preference judgment paradigm 
(Fellows and Farah, 2007). However, participants were required to make referential 
decisions instead of making decisions based on their preference. The referential 
judgment test contained a personality condition that involved self-referential 
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processing, and a weight condition that did not require, or in a lesser degree of 
self-referential processing. Subjects were required to make referential decisions to 
all the competing face/object pairs as test progressed based on the internal 
construct of their own, and eventually established a hierarchy using a ranking 
scheme to identify the most similar face/object. In a similar paradigm, in order to 
investigate the neural processes with and without self-referential processing, 
Johnson et al. (2006) compared the neural activity in the ‘internal subjective decision’ 
condition requiring overt self-referential processing (e.g., subjective decision about 
colours) with the ‘external subjective decision’ condition that did not require 
self-referential processing (e.g., colour similarity). The result found greater medial 
PFC activity in the condition with self-referential component, and further suggested 
that the medial PFC specifically involved with processing self-related thoughts, 
rather than to any subjective judgments. In the referential judgment test, we used a 
‘consistency’ score based on the Repertory Grid approach to measure the degree of 
making consistent referential judgment relied on a perfect hierarchy. To obtain 
higher consistency score, subjects needed to make trial-by-trial adjustments to 
override the existing internal metric in order to update the hierarchy after each 
referential decision. For example, if on three consecutive trials, A vs. B, A vs. C, A vs. 
D, and a subject responded A over B, A over C, but when it comes to A vs. D, the 
subject chose for D over A. In this case, option A was no longer at the highest rank 
and one ought to override the old internal metric and establish a new hierarchy as 
test progressed. The adaptive ability to override a predominant behavioural pattern 
in accordance with contextual changes is essential for survival. The underlying 
process of this ‘switch’ from a routine behaviour to a new one according to changes 
of environment or rules was referred as cognitive flexibility. Previous fMRI studies 
using psychological paradigms like the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) or the Wisconsin 
  
111 
 
 
Card Sorting test (Heaton, 1981) revealed that the PFC region was essential for 
tests required cognitive flexibility (Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley, & Dagher, 2001; 
Rougier et al., 2005). Specifically, a classic psychometric paradigm measuring 
cognitive flexibility, the reversal-learning paradigm, required subjects to override a 
previously dominant response-feedback association, and switched to another 
competing alternative due to the change of feedback contingencies. Previous lesion 
and fMRI studies have established robust association between the score of reversal 
learning and the lateral OFC region (Greening et al., 2011; Hampshire et al., 2010; 
Hampshire et al., 2012). In the referential judgment test, subjects were required to 
establish their own internal hierarchy either relying on self-related personality in the 
personality condition or self-unrelated weight of bottle water in the weight condition. 
The higher the consistency score signified a higher capability to override the existed 
metric and eventually identified the top-ranked face based on self-referential 
processing. On the other hand, in the weight condition, the higher the consistency 
score demonstrated a higher capability to override the out-of-date hierarchy and 
choose the top-ranked object consistently, and the referential judgements here did 
not require self-referential processing, compared with the personality condition. As a 
result, we hypothesised that the consistency score in the personality condition would 
correlate with GM volume in the medial PFC region due to the involvement of 
self-referential processes. In contrast, in the weight condition, we hypothesised that 
the consistency score would correlate with GM volume in the lateral OFC region, 
given that no self-referential decisions were involved and the underlying process 
was similar to the core feature of cognitive flexibility in reversal learning paradigm. 
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4.6  Behavioural and VBM result of the TD sub-group 
Behavioural investigation into the referential judgment test 
The behavioural results of the TD sub-group were summarised in Table 4.3. 
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition 
(F(1,61)=8.626, p=0.005), where consistency score was significantly higher in the 
weight condition than in the personality condition. Repeated measures ANOVA on 
overall reaction time also demonstrated a significant effect of condition 
(F(1,61)=7.336, p=0.009), which showed that the response time was significantly 
faster in the weight condition than in the personality condition.  
 
Table 4.3. The mean and standard deviations of consistency score and the overall 
reaction time (msec.) between conditions in the referential judgment test of the TD 
sub-group (n=62). 
          mean SD 
Personality condition 
Consistency score 8.48 1.36 
Reaction time (msec.) 2014.0 1247.5 
Weight condition 
Consistency score 9.10 1.34 
  Reaction time (msec.)   1629.3 604.7 
 
Spearman rank-order correlation analysis on the within-variable effect did not 
find a significant relationship between consistency score in the two conditions (rs 
(62)=0.227, p=0.077), but a significant correlation was identified between overall 
reaction time in the two conditions (rs (62)=-0.639, p<0.001). Between-variable effect 
revealed a positive significant correlation between consistency score and overall 
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reaction time only in the weight condition (rs (62)=0.360, p=0.004), but not in the 
personality condition (rs (62)=-0.037, p=0.773).  
 
VBM investigation into the referential judgment test 
The VBM results were summarised in Table 4.4. VBM regression analysis 
found no significant correlation between consistency score in the personality 
condition and the GM volume in the medial PFC region. Instead, a marginal positive 
correlation was found between consistency score in the personality condition and a 
GM cluster located in the right lateral OFC region at [47, 30, -5] (SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Right, p=0.051). A negative correlation was also found 
between consistency score in the personality condition and the GM volume in the left 
lateral OFC region at [-30, 21, -18] (SVC: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Left, 
p=0.015) (see Figure 4.4(a)). In the weight condition, a positive significant 
correlation was identified between consistency score and the GM volume in the right 
lateral OFC region at [56, 21, -8] (SVC: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Right, p=0.011) 
(see Figure.4.4(b)).  
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Table 4.4. The VBM result of the referential judgment test. The GM clusters in the PFC region showing significant correlations with 
consistency score in the referential judgment test between conditions (p<0.001, uncorrected for whole brain analysis, and p<0.05, 
FWE-corrected for SVC using different ROIs derived from the AAL atlas). Brodmann areas are approximate, (+) indicatespositive 
relationship and (-) indicates negative relationship. 
p<0.001, uncorrected Small Volume Correction (FWE<0.05)
    Whole brain analysis AAL_Inferior_Orbital AAL_Superior_Medial
    k t MNI Label p MNI p MNI
Personality condition 
Score (+) 24 3.55 [47, 30, -5] BA47 0.051 [47, 30, -5]
Score (-) 212 4.00 [-30, 21, -18] BA47 0.015 [-30, 21, -18]
39 3.84 [23. 23. 54]
33 3.76 [48, 18, 30]
Weight condition 
Score (+) 60 4.13 [56, 21, -8] BA47 0.011 [56, 21, -8]
 Score (-)   192 4.09 [-48, 26, 16]   
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Figure 4.4. The GM volume that significantly correlated with the variables in the 
referential judgment test. (a) Consistency score in the personality was negatively 
correlated with a GM cluster located in the lateral OFC region. (b) Consistency score 
in the weight condition was positively correlated with a GM cluster located in the 
lateral OFC region.  
 
4.7  Discussion of the VBM result in the TD sub-group 
The behavioural part of the result on the TD sub-group demonstrated the 
same findings as the baseline performance established by the TD group. Repeated 
measures ANOVA found that consistency score was significantly higher and overall 
reaction time was significantly faster in the weight condition than in the personality 
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condition. Correlation analysis on the TD sub-group did not find a significant 
relationship between consistency score between the two conditions, but replicated 
other findings identified in TD group showing significant relationship on overall 
reaction time between the two conditions. Importantly, the correlation between 
consistency and overall reaction time was only significant in the weight but not in the 
personality condition, which was also consistent with the observed distinction 
observed in the TD group. The only discrepancy was the null relationship between 
consistency in the personality and the weight conditions. We suspected that it was 
due to the relatively smaller sample size, given that the correlation coefficients were 
similar between the analysis using the TD group (rs (107)=0.263, p=0.006) and the 
TD sub-group (rs (62)=0.227, p=0.077). Other statistical analytic method, e.g., 
principal component analysis, could provide further examination of the relationship 
between consistency score under situations relying self-related vs. self-unrelated 
construct, which would be described in the later chapter. 
For the VBM results, regression analysis did not find a significant correlation 
between the consistency score in the personality condition and any GM volume in 
the medial PFC region. This indicated that the ability to make consistent referential 
decisions based on self-referential processing did not necessarily associate with the 
regional volume in the medial PFC region. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised 
that this lack of function-structure relationship did not fundamentally rule out the 
functional role of the medial PFC played in self-referential processing. Instead, a 
negative correlation was found between consistency score in the personality 
condition and the left lateral OFC region. As suggested by reverse-learning 
paradigm, the lateral OFC region was evident to involve with cognitive flexibility. A 
possible explanation for this relationship between left BA47 region and consistent 
decision in the personality condition might be related to processing of face identities. 
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For example, Labar, Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy (2003) examined brain 
activations associated with dynamic changes in facial identity or emotional 
expressions. In the facial identity condition, facial stimuli depicting one person were 
morphed that it gradually changes to another. The result showed that a dorsal 
fronto-cingulo-parietal circuit, including a GM cluster at [-30, 19, -8], was involved 
with such changes. In the current study, pairwise facial stimuli were presented 
sequentially during the personality condition. When viewing different faces 
sequentially, it is possible that a mental process similar to the identity condition in 
Labar et al. (2003) would be engaged. A critical aspect in the personality condition 
was the ability to identify physical features in different faces upon making referential 
decisions using self-related construct. It is therefore possible that this observed 
function-structure relationship in the personality condition reflect the capability to 
identify important features during referential processing.  
In the weight condition, a positive significant relationship was found between 
consistency score and the GM volume in the right lateral OFC region. This was 
consistent with our hypothesis that mental ability involved overriding predominant 
internal metric based on self-unrelated construct was associated with the GM 
volume in the lateral OFC region, as identified in the reversal-learning paradigm. 
Nevertheless, a critical difference between the referential judgment test and the 
reversal-learning paradigm was the lack of feedback after decisions. Hampshire and 
colleague (2012) used a reversal-learning paradigm to examine the contributions of 
different PFC sub-regions during various time points including processing negative 
feedback, initiation of new search, reversal, and switching from one object to another. 
The results showed that both lateral OFC and lateral PFC responded at the point of 
reversal. Specifically, the lateral OFC region was differentially activated during the 
point of ‘switch’ following contingency reversal, whereas the lateral PFC region was 
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activated during all switching points. This indicated that the functional role of the 
lateral OFC in reversal learning was more specific to change of contingency 
between stimulus-response mappings. As a result, it is possible that the BA47 – 
weight consistency score implied that the ‘consistency’ score we used actually 
measured the ability relating to switch, or to override existed contingency of the 
internal hierarchy, to be precise. In our original speculation, the higher the 
consistency score supposed to reflect higher degree of consistent decision upon 
higher-ranked item. It might sound paradoxical at first, but a higher consistency 
score could also reflect a higher capability to override the existed contingency based 
on old ranking scheme and kept updating while more preferable options were 
introduced as the test progressed. Together the VBM results suggest a 
stimulus-specific relationship between consistency score in the personality condition 
and the left lateral OFC region, as well as a potential linkage between consistency 
score in the weight condition and cognitive flexibility.,  
 
4.8  Atypical behaviours relating to preference consistency 
on social vs. non-social judgements in ASD subjects 
A ‘self’ related deficit has been long proposed in ASD, even before it was 
clinically diagnosed. The word ‘autism’ was derived from the Greek word ‘autos’ and 
translated as ‘self’. Early stage studies by Kanner and Asperger had coincidentally 
described fundamental features as ‘extreme autistic aloneness’, and ‘autistic 
psychopathy’ respectively. Early observations of ASD symptoms reported extreme 
egocentrism, and referred to them as locked in a world of their own, which seemed 
unreachable by other people. Evidentially, individuals with ASD were found to have 
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impairments on self-referential processing, which was demonstrated by the 
observed deficit on self-reference effect (SRE), where ASDs failed to show 
enhanced memory performance on self-referentially encoded information via an 
elaborational or organisational mechanism in autobiographical memory (Rogers, 
Kupier, & Kirker, 1977; Klein & Loftus, 1988). For example, Lombardo, Barnes, 
Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2007) measured the SRE effect in adults with ASD 
in a paradigm asking subjects to judge how descriptive personality traits words were 
related to ‘Self’, ‘Friend’, ‘Harry Potter’, and syllable counts. The SRE effect was 
found to attenuate in ASD subjects between the scores of ‘Self’ and ‘Harry Potter’ 
conditions, which showed a reduced recognition memory effect on words processed 
in relation to self. Critically, comparison of the SRE effect between groups in each 
condition revealed significantly worse memory performance for traits of ‘Self’ and 
‘Friend’, but not of ‘Harry Potter’. This indicated a differentiation of social processing 
in self-referential deficits, where reduced performances were observed in 
close/similar others (‘Friend’), but not in non-close/dissimilar others.  
The observed egocentrism and self-referential deficits in ASD were 
previously characterised as the ‘absent-self’ hypothesis (Frith and Happe, 1999; 
Frith, 2003; Happe, 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2005). The idea of this hypothesis was 
based on an abnormal top-down control mechanism that failed to regulate bottom-up 
information in the autism brain. To support this hypothesis, previous neuroimaging 
studies demonstrated atypical modulations in the frontal regions (Ring et al., 1999; 
Lee et al., 2007; Manjaly et al. 2007), and enhanced short-range but diminished 
long-range connectivity associated with the frontal region (Just, Cherkassky, Keller, 
& Minshew, 2004; Courchesne and Pierce, 2005). Lombardo et al. (2010) recruited 
male ASD adults with matched male controls and asked them to make mentalizing 
judgments or physical judgments about themselves or the British Queen. The result 
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found that neural activity in control subjects preferentially recruited the ventromedial 
PFC region in the self vs. other contrast, whereas ASD subjects revealed equal 
ventromedial PFC activation. Furthermore, ASD subjects also demonstrated atypical 
neural network associated with the PFC region, where neural response for 
self-referential processing was observed by showing reduced functional connectivity 
between the ventromedial PFC and areas associated lower-level processing 
including premotor and somatosensory cortex. Together these results revealed an 
atypical brain mechanism relating to self-referential processing observed in the 
ventromedial PFC region, and was consistent with the ‘absent-self’ hypothesis in 
ASD individuals. 
In the referential judgment test, we followed the rationale of the preference 
judgment paradigm (Fellows and Farah, 2007), and asked subjects to make 
referential decisions based on self-related construct (personality) in the personality 
condition and on self-unrelated construct (weight) in the weight condition. In the 
personality condition, subjects engaged in trial-by-trial referential judgments 
between two competing options, and the decisions could be made based on any 
physical characteristics of the presented faces. The ‘anchored’ reference was one’s 
own personality, which involved with processes centred on self-related 
representation. On contrary, in the weight condition, subjects also engaged in 
trial-by-trial referential judgments between two options, but the ‘anchored’ reference 
was the weight of bottle water, which involved with processes without self-referential 
component. Previous studies suggested that medial PFC differentially activated for 
subjective decision-making with and without self-referential processing (Johnson et 
al., 2006), and ASD subjects had specific impairments on elaborating or organising 
self-related information (Lombardo et al., 2007), as well as atypical neural 
mechanism in the ventromedial PFC region (Lombardo et al., 2010). However, the 
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VBM results demonstrated by the TD sub-group failed to identify any GM volume in 
the medial PFC region was correlated with consistency score in the personality 
condition. Instead, consistency score in both conditions (marginal significant in the 
personality condition) reflected a positive relationship with the GM volume in the 
right lateral OFC, or ventrolateral PFC region. As discussed earlier, this raised a 
possibility that the response consistency we calculated in the referential judgment 
test measured other cognitive processes that were not expected, e.g., cognitive 
flexibility. Incidentally, it was shown that ASD subjects had deficits on cognitive 
flexibility using a range of tests (see Hill, 2004; Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009 for 
review). For example, the Intradimensional-Extradimensional shift (ID/ED shift) test 
from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB) 
measured the cognitive control process that required shifts within and between 
dimensions. In the ID/ED shift test, the first five levels involved learning to respond 
selectively to specific targets, and the next four levels (6-9) provided measurements 
on the number of trials to achieve criterion and the number of errors committed for 
rule violations. In level 6 and 7, where ID-shift and ID reversal were introduced, 
subjects needed to ignore previous rules within dimension. In level 8 and 9, where 
ED-shift and ED reversal were introduced, subjects needed to respond to previously 
ignored rule between dimensions. Errors on rule acquisition and inhibition during 
later stages illustrated cognitive inflexibility as a function of increase in rule 
complexity. Ozonoff et al. (2004) implemented the ID/ED shift test on ASD subjects 
and found more errors were made in stage 8 and 9, compared to control participants. 
A similar psychological paradigm measured cognitive flexibility that highlighted the 
role of reversal was the reversal-learning paradigm. The critical aspect of the 
reversal-learning paradigm was a dominant response was overridden by an 
alternative due to changes of feedback contingencies. Previous studies evident the 
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PFC region played an essential role of this complex behaviour (Clark, Cools, 
&Robbins, 2004; Fellows and Farah, 2003; Hornak, O’Doherty, Bramham, Rolls, 
Morris, Bullock, & Polkey, 2004). South et al. (2014) recruited children with ASD and 
conducted a reversal-learning paradigm that accompanied with a surprising air puff 
as Pavlovian fear conditioning. After the reversal of cue contingencies, where a 
previously safe cue switched to air puff threat, only the controls but not the ASD 
children responded more strongly to the new threat cue. Critically, the performance 
of reversal learning in the ASD group was negatively correlated with symptoms of 
behavioural inflexibility. Evidence from neuroimaging studies revealed that both the 
ID/ED shift test and the reversal learning tests were involved with the OFC and/or 
the lateral PFC region (O’Reilly, Noelle, Brayer, & Cohen, 2002; Hampshire et al., 
2012). This observed function-structure relationship in functional studies was 
consistent with the significant correlation we found between consistency score and 
the GM volume in the lateral OFC region. In the referential judgment test, ASD 
subjects were required to construct their internal hierarchy based on either 
self-related personality or self-unrelated weight of bottle water. During the 
trial-by-trial progress of the test, regardless of condition, subjects needed to override 
the existing hierarchy and fixated on the updated top-ranked item to get a higher 
consistency score. ASD individuals were diagnosed to have repetitive mannerism 
and/or restricted interest. As a result, if consistency score measured cognitive 
flexibility, we hypothesised to observe higher consistency score in both conditions in 
the ASD group than the baseline performance established by the TD group. On the 
other hand, referential judgements in the personality condition required 
self-referential processing, but not in the weight condition. If consistency score was 
able to capture different referential decision with and without the construct of self, we 
hypothesised that ASD adults would have selective impairments on the condition 
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requiring self-referential decision (e.g., the personality condition), but intact 
performance compared with the baseline established by the TD group in the weight 
condition. Furthermore, in the gambling test chapter, ASD subjects demonstrated a 
dynamic change over time on the response speed under uncertain risky situations. 
In the referential judgment test, decision could be made based on the established 
internal hierarchy using self-related and self-unrelated constructs. It is possible that 
a similar dynamic change on response speed would manifest on a temporal scale in 
later trials as the test progressed. Therefore, we hypothesised that ASD subjects 
would demonstrated different response speed in the later stage of the test compared 
with TD subjects.  
 
4.9  Behavioural result between the ASD and the TD groups  
The ranking scheme in the ASD group 
To compare the difference of the ranking scheme between conditions in the 
ASD group, the top-ranked item in the personality and the weight conditions of each 
ASD subject was first identified (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5 for illustration). In the 
personality condition, the item ranked at the top varied between ASD subjects, as 
the TD group did. For example, each of the twelve options was ranked as the top 
item at least once, and the number of ASD subject for each top-ranked item was 
ranged from 2% to 24% of the 34 ASD subjects. In the weight condition, the 
top-ranked item was clustered at one particular item. Similar as TD subjects, 55% of 
the ASD subjects considered a ‘ketchup’ bottle had the most similar weight as bottle 
water, and four items were never ranked the top.  
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Table 4.5. The frequency and proportion to the top-ranked faces in the personality 
condition, and the top-ranked object in the weight condition between each ASD 
subjects.    
Personality condition  Weight condition 
Face no. Frequency Proportion  Object no. Frequency Proportion 
1 4 0.10  1 1 0.02  
2 3 0.07  2 0 0.00  
3 5 0.12  3 0 0.00  
4 1 0.02  4 0 0.00  
5 10 0.24  5 3 0.07  
6 2 0.05  6 0 0.00  
7 3 0.07  7 24 0.55  
8 3 0.07  8 2 0.05  
9 2 0.05  9 4 0.09  
10 1 0.02  10 3 0.07  
11 3 0.07  11 2 0.05  
12 4 0.10 12 5 0.11 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. The ranking scheme of the ASD group in the personality (left) and the 
weight condition (right). In the personality condition, the items were faces with 
neutral expressions, and daily objects in the weight condition. 
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Between-group effects 
The behavioural result of the ASD group, as well as the ‘baseline’ 
performance established by the TD group, were summarised in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6. The mean and standard deviations of consistency score and the overall 
reaction time (msec.) between conditions in the referential judgment test of the TD 
and the ASD groups. 
     TD   ASD
     mean SD   mean SD
Personality condition 
Consistency score 8.46 1.38 8.68  1.45 
Reaction time (msec.) 1946.5 1080.7 2725.9  1255.7 
Weight condition 
Consistency score 9.01 1.43 9.29  1.43 
Reaction time (msec.) 1560.6 553.0 2132.9  784.2 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA on consistency score showed a significant main 
effect of condition (F(1,139)=12.362, p=0.001), where the consistency score was 
significantly higher in the weight condition than in the personality condition. No 
significant effect of group (F(1,139)=1.270, p=0.262) and condition x group 
interaction (F(1,139)=0.040, p=0.842) was found. Repeated measures ANOVA on 
overall reaction time identified a significant main effect of condition (F(1,139)=27.140, 
p<0.001), which showed that response speed was significantly faster in the weight 
condition than in the personality condition. The analysis also found a significant main 
effect of group (F(1,139)=19.833, p<0.001), where ASD subjects responded 
significantly slower than TD subjects. No significant condition x group interaction 
was found (F(1,139)=1.214, p=0.272). 
 
Temporal change on response speed 
In order to examine if the decision-making processes underlie the referential 
judgment test had similar temporal change observed in the gambling test, where the 
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acceleration rate differed between TD and ASD subjects, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with ‘stage’ as an additional within-subject factor. The reaction 
time for the first 33 trials was categorised as the early stage, and the later 33 trials 
were categorised as the late stage (see Table 4.7 for summary). First repeated 
measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of stage (F1,139)=132.890, 
p<0.001), where the response speed accelerated in the later stage than in the early 
stage. Next we examined all the stage-related effect. Repeated measures ANOVA 
did not find a significant condition x group x stage interaction (F(1,139)=0.046, 
p=0.830). However, a marginal significant group x stage interaction (F(1,139)=3.879, 
p=0.051) was observed, and follow-up analysis showed that the acceleration (mean 
reaction time in the later stage minus mean reaction time in the early stage) was 
higher in the ASD group (mean difference: 782.38 msec.) than in the TD group 
(mean difference: 554.06 msec., t(139)=1.969, p=0.051) (see Figure 4.6). 
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Table 4.7. The reaction time in the early and the late stages in the personality and 
the weight conditions between the ASD and the TD groups. 
          TD  ASD 
          mean SD  mean SD 
Personality condition 
Reaction time (msec.) - Early stage 1933.8  973.2 2785.7  1650.9 
Reaction time (msec.) - Late stage 1368.7  837.3 2012.2  1114.7 
Weight condition 
Reaction time (msec.) - Early stage 1651.7  913.0 2197.0  995.5
Reaction time (msec.) - Late stage 1108.7  469.2 1405.7  611.0
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. The acceleration of the reaction time between conditions was 
significantly higher in the ASD group than the TD group.  
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4.10  Discussion of the behavioural result between the ASD 
and the TD groups 
The referential judgment test examined the decision-making processes 
based on judgments with or without self-referential components. First, the analysis 
on the ranking scheme found similar pattern as identified in the TD group, where the 
distribution of the top-ranked item was distinct between the personality and the 
weight conditions. This result demonstrated that the establishment of the internal 
hierarchy during referential judgment amongst ASD subjects was similar as TD 
subjects. In the previous sections, baseline behavioural performance established by 
the TD group and the neural correlates demonstrated by the TD sub-group showed 
that the consistency score in the current study did not directly measure 
self-referential processes, but mental processes relating to cognitive flexibility 
instead. The core feature that distinguished processing using self-related from 
self-unrelated constructs might be eliminated due to the scoring mechanism we 
implemented, or was unable to observe due to the facet of structural-based analysis 
instead of functional one. Repeated measures ANOVA failed to identify significant 
main effect of group, or condition x group interaction on consistency score, which 
indicated that no deficit relating to cognitive flexibility was found in the ASD group. 
However, it is interesting to note that the raw consistency score in both conditions 
were actually higher in ASD subjects than in TD subjects. This raised a possibility 
that the impairments found in ASD subjects in previous studies, e.g., ASD studies 
using the ID/ED test and the reversal learning tests, did not measured the same 
underlying process identified in the current study. Instead, it is possible that it was 
the repetitive mannerism or the rigid behavioural interests of ASD subjects that 
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contributed to the enhanced, yet not significant, consistency score. In order to have 
higher consistency score, as discussed earlier in the VBM section, subjects needed 
to override existed contingency of the internal hierarchy. However, after identifying 
the top-ranked item, or the higher-ranked item amongst the two options, subjects 
who were able to fixate to it would show more consistent decisions, and 
subsequently led to higher consistency score. The consistency score using complex 
Repertory Grid approach not only failed to tap on the difference between self-related 
and self-unrelated processing, but also introduced other complicated sub-processes 
associated with cognitive flexibility.  
Analysis on overall reaction time revealed a main effect of group, which 
showed that ASD subjects responded significantly slower than TD subjects did. This 
was consistent with the robust response slowness reported in previous ASD studies 
(Ozonoff et al., 1994; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton, & Tonge, 2001; Geurts, Verte, 
Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; Schmitz, Daly, & Murphy, 2007), which was 
considered as an index of cognitive inflexibility. Due to the identified compensation 
on reaction time amongst ASD subjects in the later stage of the loss condition in the 
gambling test, we also investigated the temporal change on reaction time as the test 
progressed in the referential judgment test. Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
marginal significant group x stage interaction, which showed that, when collapsing 
two conditions, higher acceleration in the later stage was observed in the ASD group 
than in the TD group. ASD subjects seemed to ‘catch up’ with TD subjects in the 
later stage of the test, which was the period of time that the internal hierarchy was 
gradually established and a certain ranking scheme was ready to follow. However, 
independent t test revealed that TD subjects still responded significantly faster than 
ASD subjects in the later stage (t(139)=3.957, p<0.001). Therefore, it is possible that 
the marginal group x stage interaction was driven by a ceiling effect, where the ASD 
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subjects had more ‘room’ to accelerate than the TD subjects in the later stage of the 
test. Taken together, the result raised an interesting direction on measuring the 
repetitive mannerism in ASD subjects, which involve the consistency of fixating to 
the preferred option, and subsequently resulted in dynamic change of response 
speed on a temporal scale. Specifically, this dynamic change on reaction time was 
usually ignored or overlooked by using averaged scores, which was similar as taking 
one single snapshot of sequential moves. This ‘averaging artefact’ has been 
proposed in behavioural experiments which showed that systematic pattern of 
inter-individual differences were sometimes ignored and can be dissociated from 
averaged activities (see illustration in Kanai & Rees, 2011). It is therefore important 
to examine decision-making process on a temporal scale to recognise this ‘temporal 
averaging artefact’, especially in ASD research where repetitive mannerism, a 
feature that required multiple exposure of the same option, is inherently more 
prominent over time. 
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Chapter 5. PFC battery: the video mentalizing test 
5.1  Measurements for understanding other's mind using 
video varying in intentionality and complexity  
Making decisions under risky situations or evaluating self-referential thoughts 
could be complex enough mental processes in our daily lives. However, it is even 
more overwhelming for people to make inter-personal decisions, rather than making 
decisions on their own, while interacting with other individuals. The ability to process 
complex social information, e.g., making inferences to others’ states of mind, or 
based on subtle cues like facial expression, voice tones, or body movements is 
essential for social interaction. In cognitive psychology, the term ’Theory of Mind 
(ToM)’ refers to the kind of ability to make inferences to other’s intentions, beliefs, 
desires or wishes (Frith and Frith, 2006). Previous studies using lesion and 
functional neuroimaging approaches demonstrated that the PFC region played an 
important role in ToM processing (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; Stuss et al., 
2001; Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002). Psychological tests like the ‘Sally 
and Anne’ test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) was a classic example for ToM 
tests. In order to perform accurately in the test, subjects are required to ‘put oneself 
in other’s shoes’ by experiencing a situation from other’s perspective, and make 
correct inferences to other’s belief. In ToM studies, different psychological 
paradigms designed to measure ToM competence employ a variety of experimental 
materials. For example, the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test developed by 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997) used pictures of eyes as 
stimuli, and required subjects to make inferences about others’ mental states from 
viewing photographs of others’ eyes. Besides using static stimuli as pictures, other 
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paradigms like ‘the Awkward Moments’ test (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & 
Rutter, 2000) used commercial videos, which combined both visual and auditory 
inputs to depict scenarios that were more realistic to subjects. An important 
advantage of using videos as stimuli is that they provide opportunities to create 
natural scenes that included subtle, transient social cues, like actual daily situations. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that using commercials as experimental stimuli, like the 
Awkward Moments Test, might involve too exaggerated social interactions created 
from uncommon or unrealistic scenarios. In order to control for this potential 
unrealistic effect, Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, and Rutherford (2007) developed a 
‘Reading the Mind in Films’ (RMF) test, which consisted of short scenes taken from 
feature films relating to everyday lives. Despite the advantage of video film stimuli 
simulating real-life scenarios, a possible confound that co-exists in both ‘the 
Awkward Moments’ test’ and the RMF test occurs in the testing phase. In both 
paradigms, the questions proposed to subjects during the testing phase consist of 
emotional adjectives, like ‘embarrassed’, ‘shocked’, or ‘awkward’. The 
implementation of emotional adjectives as measurements for ToM-related ability 
might introduce unexpected variations, e.g., different understanding of the emotional 
adjectives leading to different interpretations of the questions between individuals. 
Moreover, using emotional adjectives could be instructive to subjects in some 
senses. For example, when instructed ‘don’t think of an elephant’ usually led to 
subjects start thinking of an elephant instead. It is therefore possible that using 
emotional adjectives as the testing options (e.g., the Awkward Moments Test, 
Heavey et al., 2000) would guide subject’s mental status in an instructive way, 
instead of solely relied on mind-reading ability.  
In order to control for the potential confounds described above, we 
developed a video mentalizing test by making modifications to both experimental 
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stimuli and testing questions. The video mentalizing test, as the RMF test, used 
short video clips as experimental stimuli, and we further categorised the videos 
along two diagonal dimensions, the level of ‘intentionality’ and ‘complexity’. The level 
of intentionality in video clips was determined by the principle proposed by Castelli 
and colleagues (2000; 2002), where the materials for measuring ToM ability were 
rated on a 0-5 point scale. The social behaviours rated by a score of 0-3 points 
referred to the actions that were non-deliberate in nature, or without response to 
other’s action. The social behaviours rated by a score of 4-5 points referred to 
deliberate actions in response to other’s mental state or with the goal of affecting 
other's mental state. Following this principle, the videos involved high level of 
intentionality, where scenarios depicting behaviours rated 4-5 in Castelli et al. (2000; 
2002) and subjects were required to make inferences to the character’s mental state, 
were labelled as ‘high-mentalizing’ videos. In comparison, the videos that involved 
low level of intentionality, where scenarios depicting behaviours rated 0-3 in Castelli 
et al. (2000; 2002) and subjects were required only to understand the scene without 
inferring character’s feeling and mental states, were labelled as ‘low-mentalizing’ 
videos. Apart from the level of intentionality of the videos, we also categorised the 
video materials along a ‘complexity’ dimension, which differentiated the amount of 
social information required to process. Previous ToM studies had implemented 
different number of characters in the depicted social interaction, e.g., two characters 
were involved in the ‘Sally and Anne’ test, multiple characters were involved in the 
‘Awkward Moments Test’, and 1-4 characters were involved in the RMF test. It is 
therefore possible that the number of characters might introduce a systematic effect 
in ToM performance due to appearance of interactions, which were supposed to 
involve at least two characters, and more characters involved in the social scenarios 
would increase the amount of social information. Accordingly, in our video 
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mentalizing test, half of the videos, regardless of the level of intentionality, involved 
only two characters and the other half involved more than two characters. Following 
the speculation described above, we labelled the videos depicting social interaction 
between two characters as ‘dyad’ videos, and the videos depicting social interaction 
between more than two characters as ‘group’ videos. As a result, the video 
mentalizing test involved a 2 x 2 design between two levels of intentionality and two 
levels of complexity, which led to four conditions of the videos including 
high-mentalizing + dyad (HD), high-mentalizing + group (HG), low-mentalizing + 
dyad (LD), and low-mentalizing + group (LG). 
Besides the 2 x 2 design in experimental materials, we also manipulated the 
structure of the questions during the testing phase. In order to control for a potential 
confound by using emotional adjectives, we employed the same neutral question in 
every question and structured the question in a systematic way. In previous ToM 
studies, ToM competence was measured by accuracy, in an all-or-nothing fashion, 
but it seems perhaps unnatural to dichotomize the ToM ability between individuals 
as either ‘capable’ or ‘incapable’ of making correct inferences of other’s intentions. 
Therefore measuring ToM competence in a continuous way might provide further 
insights on this essential ability. In order to examine this possibility, we used multiple 
choices questions (MCQs) to measure ToM ability between individuals. Each MCQ 
consisted of four options, and each option varied in four levels of ‘appropriateness’ 
(Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000). The ‘correct’ response meant that subjects 
made correct inferences about the intentions or emotional states of the characters. 
The ‘plausible’ response meant that subjects made inferences about the intentions 
or emotional states of one of the characters as well, but based on the information 
that were not central to the scene. The ‘incorrect’ response meant that subjects 
made incorrect inferences to the intentions or emotional states of one of the 
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characters. The ‘irrelevant’ response meant that subjects described statements that 
included only key words from the scene and/or misunderstood the character’s 
mental states. To quantify this appropriateness, a weighted score scheme was 
calculated: correct->4, plausible->3, incorrect->2, irrelevant->1, and no response->0. 
The higher the weighted appropriateness referred to better understanding of other’s 
mind, and provided a potential scope to examine ToM capability in a continuous way. 
The aim of the current chapter was to establish the baseline performance of the 
video mentalizing test. As a result, we focused on examining the effect between 
intentionality x complexity in the four kinds of video conditions (HD, HG, LD, LG 
conditions). We further investigated if measurements addressing ToM competence 
differed using an all-or-nothing variable (e.g., accuracy) and a continuous index (e.g., 
appropriateness). The response speed for making decisions in each video condition 
was also analysed.  
 
5.2  Methods of the video mentalizing test 
Materials and Design  
The video mentalizing test was displayed on DMDX experimental software 
(Forster & Forster, 2003) and consisted of fourteen coloured short video clips taken 
from the BBC television programme. Two of the fourteen video clips were used for 
practice, and the other twelve were used for experimental stimuli. The video clips 
included both visual inputs (facial expression, body language, and physical 
interactions) and auditory inputs (verbal content, and intonation changes) depicting 
various kinds of social interactions. The video clips can be categorised into four 
conditions: high mentalizing dyad (HD), high mentalizing group (HG), low 
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mentalizing dyad (LD), and low mentalizing group (LG), according to the level of 
intentionality (Castelli et al., 2000, 2002) and complexity differed in the numbers of 
characters involved. For videos varying in levels of intentionality, the 
high-mentalizing videos depicted social situations that characters making inferences 
to others minds under a various kinds of contexts, e.g., a mother made poor excuses 
for not attending her daughter’s important event, an employer tried to be nice when 
firing his employee, a female tended to flirt with her new collegue, or love affairs 
between two boys and one girl. The low-mentalizing videos demonstrated daily 
situations that characters discussing some facts or exchanged information without 
making inferences to others’ minds, e.g., a policeman checked the license of a driver, 
a show host asked the recipe of Malteese pie, two men disussed the function of 
Victorian theatre, or a secretary helped two visitors arranging evening schedules. 
For videos varying in complexity, only two characters were included in dyad videos, 
whereas there were more than two characters involved in group videos. Two MCQs 
were asked for each video clip using the standard question ‘Which of these 
statements best describes the situation you have just seen?’ followed by four 
possible options varying in four levels of appropriateness. All the options in the 
MCQs were matched for sentence length and readability between conditions (see 
Figure 5.1). In the video mentalizing test, each condition contained three video clips, 
along with six MCQs. The order of the video clips was counterbalanced using a 
Latin-Square design and was identical across all subjects. The position of the correct 
answer in each MCQ was also counterbalanced. A threshold for maximum reaction 
time (RT) was set to two standard deviations above the mean (Max RT = 27000ms) 
from the pilot study. 
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Figure 5.1. The experimental procedure of the video mentalizing test, where each 
30 second video clip was accompanied with two MCQs that varied with level of 
appropriateness. 
 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the video mentalizing test, participants were given 
instructions for keypress and two videos along with four MCQs for practice. Subjects 
were instructed to choose the option best describing the scene depicted in the video 
and made a decision using the corresponding 1, 2, 3, 4 keys. There was a 3 second 
countdown and a fixation cross presented before the presentation of each video clip 
for subjects to prepare themselves. After the presentation of each video, the first 
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MCQ appeared on the screen for 27000 milliseconds. If the maximum reaction time 
expired, a sign saying, “Time is up!” was displayed for 300 milliseconds on the 
screen and the next question appeared. Otherwise, the second question was 
presented after a response was registered. Subjects were required to wear 
headphones throughout the video mentalizing test, and were allowed to adjust the 
volume to the comfortable level. The video mentalizing test took each subject around 
20 minutes to administer. The responses and the reaction times to each MCQ were 
recorded. Only the valid trials with a response registered within the time threshold 
were included and analysed. The weighted score based on the appropriateness of 
each option was also calculated. 
 
5.3  Behavioural result of the TD group 
The accuracy, appropriateness and reaction time for each condition were 
entered into repeated measures ANOVA with intentionality (high vs. low) and 
complexity (dyad vs. group) as within-subject factors. The behavioural result of 
accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time in each condition were summarised in 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. The mean and standard deviation of accuracy, appropriateness, and 
reaction time (msec.) between conditions in the video mentalizing test of the TD 
group. Left panel: the result in each condition; Right panel: the main effect of 
intentionality and complexity separately. 
    mean SD   mean SD
Accuracy 
HD videos 0.77 0.16 High-mentalizing  0.74 0.13 
HG videos 0.70 0.20 Low-mentalizing 0.72 0.15 
LD videos 0.85 0.16 Dyad conversation 0.81 0.12 
LG videos 0.60 0.22 Group conversation 0.65 0.17 
Appropriateness  
HD videos 3.62 0.36 High-mentalizing 3.51 0.32 
HG videos 3.40 0.47 Low-mentalizing 3.49 0.32 
LD videos 3.71 0.34 Dyad conversation 3.66 0.28 
LG videos 3.27 0.45 Group conversation 3.34 0.37 
Reaction time (msec.) 
HD videos 10730.7 2933.6 High-mentalizing 12013.9 2749.8
HG videos 13297.1 3077.4 Low-mentalizing 11068.8 2478.0
LD videos 10549.0 2751.2 Dyad conversation 10639.9 2704.6
  LG videos  11588.6 2487.7 Group conversation 12442.8 2591.7
 
Between-condition effects 
Accuracy 
Repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy revealed a significant effect of 
complexity (F(1,102)=96.018, p<0.001), which showed that accuracy for dyad videos 
was significantly higher than for group videos. The result also revealed a significant 
intentionality x complexity interaction (F(1,102)=31.079, p<0.001). Follow-up 
analysis confirmed the interaction by showing higher complexity effect in 
low-mentalizing videos (mean difference=0.25) than in high-mentalizing videos 
(mean difference=0.07).  
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Appropriateness 
Repeated measures ANOVA on appropriateness demonstrated a significant 
effect of complexity (F(1,102)=84.461, p<0.001), which showed that appropriateness 
for dyad videos was significantly higher than for group videos. Similar to analysis on 
accuracy, a significant intentionality x complexity interaction (F(1,102)=9.968, 
p=0.002) was also identified on appropriateness. Follow-up analysis revealed that 
the interaction was driven by a higher complexity effect in low-mentalizing videos 
(mean difference=0.43) than in high-mentalizing videos (mean difference=0.22).  
 
Reaction time 
 Repeated measures ANOVA first identified a significant effect of intentionality 
(F(1,102)=50.171, p<0.001) and of complexity (F(1,102)=134,309, p<0.001), where 
response speed was significantly faster for low-mentalizing than for high-mentalizing 
videos, as well as faster for dyad than for group videos. The result also found a 
significant intentionality x complexity interaction (F(1,102)=30.976, p<0.001). 
Follow-up analysis confirmed the interaction by revealing a higher intentionality 
effect for group videos than for dyad videos. 
 
Correlation analysis 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis was conducted in two different 
approaches. In the first approach, we focused on the within-variable effect, where 
the relationships on accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time between the four 
experimental conditions (HD, HG, LD, LG) were examined. In the second approach, 
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we then analysed the between-variable effect, where the relationships between the 
four experimental conditions using accuracy and reaction time were examined 
separately.  
In the first approach, correlation analysis revealed positive significant 
relationships of accuracy between HG vs. LG, and LD vs. LG (all p<0.05), but not for 
other pairwise combinations. Analysis of appropriateness found positive significant 
correlations between HG vs. LG, LD vs. LG, and LD vs. HG (all p<0.05), but no 
significant correlations were found between other combinations. Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation analysis on reaction time found positive significant 
relationships between response speed for all pairwise combinations (all p<0.001). In 
the second approach, significant relationships were found between accuracy, 
appropriateness, and reaction time for HD videos (all p<0.01), HG videos (all 
p<0.01), LD videos (all p<0.01 except for accuracy and reaction time p=0.058), and 
LG videos (all p<0.01). Notably, all the correlations were in a positive way between 
accuracy and appropriateness, yet in a negative way between reaction time vs. 
accuracy, as well as in reaction time vs. appropriateness.   
 
5.4  Discussion of the behavioural result in the TD group 
The video mentalizing test measured ToM competence using short videos 
depicting daily social interaction. For the experimental stimuli, we further categorised 
the videos along two orthogonal dimensions, an intentionality aspect that differed in 
levels of mentalizing, and a complexity aspect that differed in amount of social 
information involved. For the testing phase, we controlled the structure of the 
question and further analysed the appropriateness of the responses according to a 
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weighted score in a continuous fashion. In this section, the aim was to establish a 
‘baseline’ performance for the video mentalizing test, and explored the effect of 
intentionality and complexity to ToM performance, as well as the potential difference 
when using appropriateness to measure ToM competence.  
Repeated measures ANOVA identified a significant main effect of 
intentionality only in reaction time, which showed that the response time was 
significantly longer for high-mentalizing videos than for low-mentalizing videos in TD 
subjects. The null effect of intentionality on accuracy and appropriateness indicated 
that TD subjects did not find videos requiring higher intentionality more difficult than 
lower intentionality items. Nevertheless, TD subjects took significantly longer to 
make decisions to high-mentalizing videos, which suggested more mental 
processing is involved when making inferences to other’s minds. Repeated 
measures ANOVA on accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time all revealed 
significant main effects of complexity, where TD subjects responded more 
accurately, more appropriately, and responded faster for dyad videos than for group 
videos. This implies that the number of characters involved in the conversation has a 
strong impact on ToM competence. A possible explanation of this effect is the 
amount of social information required to process, where videos involving 
conversation between more than two characters supposedly contains more 
information for subjects to process than videos involving conversations between only 
two characters. Nevertheless, the link between the number of characters and the 
amount of social information requires more examination to validate. It is possible that 
more characters involved in a social interaction do not necessarily create more 
social information to process, and other factors including the nature of context or the 
characters involved might be influential for the effect. For example, two politicians 
making sarcastic statements toward each other during a live national talk show 
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might create a more complicated social scenario than four Amish people planning a 
surprise party for their close friends in a peaceful village. Another possible 
explanation of this complexity effect on all three variables involves distracted 
attention, e.g., social scenarios involving more than two characters would inevitably 
lead to more distraction or more changes of eye gaze when switching amongst 
characters. It is also possible that the implementation of recorded videos, despite 
depicting real-life social interaction, was not ecological enough to simulate actual 
overwhelming interpersonal communication. In ToM tests using videos as stimuli, 
the switch of camera controls the direction of eye gaze between characters, but in 
real-life situations, this direction of eye gaze is a voluntary move instead. For 
example, certain close-up scenes focusing on eyes would create similar effects as 
the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes test’, whereas an intense scene using a distant 
shot for cinematic purposes might hinder subjects from discovering the subtle yet 
crucial social cues on the characters. Further investigations are required to 
disentangle the effect of complexity contributed by the factors discussed above.  
Repeated measures ANOVA also identified significant interactions between 
intentionality and complexity on accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time. 
Follow-up analysis revealed that the superior performance for dyad over group 
videos was stronger in the low-mentalizing condition than the high-mentalizing 
condition. This indicates that the previously discussed effect of complexity had a 
stronger impact when lesser level of intentionality was required. If the effect of 
complexity resulted from the restriction of camera, then this cause originated from 
the nature of experimental stimuli and should have an equivalent effect on both 
high-mentalizing and low-mentalizing videos. On the other hand, if the effect of 
complexity came from the difference in social information, given that 
high-mentalizing involved far more complex scenarios than low-mentalizing videos, it 
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seems possible that TD subjects were engaged in ToM-related processing and this 
diminished the effect of complexity in a more overwhelming situation. Analysis of 
reaction time also found a significant intentionality x complexity interaction. 
Follow-up analysis demonstrated that the effect of intentionality made much more 
impact on group videos than on dyad videos. A possible explanation is that under 
social situations involving a larger amount of social information, subjects will take 
longer to decipher and make inferences about other’s minds, but find it relatively 
easier under situations that contained lesser amount of social information.  
Correlation analyses of within-variable effects revealed several positive 
significant relationships between different conditions. Analysis of reaction time 
revealed strong positive correlations between all kinds of videos. This raises a 
possibility that there was a ‘general’ competence on ToM-related processing speed, 
where the boundary between varying levels of intentionality and complexity was 
vague, or further suggests a continuous spectrum. For the between-variable effect, 
the positive correlations between accuracy and appropriateness for all kinds of 
videos suggested that there was no fundamental difference between measuring 
ToM competence using an absolute accuracy or continuous measure of 
appropriateness. On the other hand, reaction time was found to negatively correlate 
with both accuracy and appropriateness in all four kinds of videos. This indicates that 
spending a longer time making decisions to social interactions did not accompany 
better performance as suggested by the classic ‘speed-accuracy trade-off’, but led to 
worse performance instead in the video mentalizing test. This result might suggest 
that mentalizing ability might be a rather intuitive cognitive process, where longer 
consideration would elicit other ToM-unrelated processes and subsequently brought 
more errors instead.  
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5.5  Neuroimaging findings of mentalizing ability varying in 
intentionality and complexity 
The ability to understand other people’s mental states or make inferences 
from other’s perspective is referred as mentalizing, which requires theory of mind 
(ToM). Previous functional neuroimaging studies have established a robust link 
between different mentalizing tests and the medial PFC region (see Frith & Frith, 
2006). For example, Gallagher et al. (2002) used the ‘stone, paper, scissors’ game 
to simulate on-line interactions with another person comparing with control 
conditions. Their result revealed only the medial PFC region was more activated 
when making intentional stances and evident the linkage between the medial PFC 
region and making attributions about other’s mental states. In another functional 
study of mentalizing, Castelli et al. (2000) used animations of geometric shapes as 
stimuli to simulate mental state attribution, and subjects were required to watch the 
‘interactions’ between the shapes passively. The result found increased activation in 
the medial PFC region, which highlighted an important notion that the ability to make 
inferences of other’s mind was originated from making inferences of abstract actions, 
even when passively viewing movements for non-living objects. As described earlier, 
the nature of the experimental stimuli varied between different ToM tests, e.g., 
pictures of the eyes in Baron-Cohen et al. (1999), verbal stories in Fletcher, Happe, 
Frith, Baker, Dolan, and Frackowiak (1995), non-verbal cartoon stories in Brunet, 
Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, and Decety (2000), and verbal and non-verbal stories in 
Gallagher, Happe, Brunswick, and Fletcher (2000). It is critical to observe that, 
regardless of the nature of experimental materials used in ToM tests, neural activity 
in mentalizing conditions has been reported consistently in the medial PFC. 
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Nevertheless, several other brain regions are frequently observed in mentalizing 
tests as well. For example, Britton, Phan, Taylor, Welsh, Berridge, and Liberzon 
(2006) used video films differing along sociality (non-social vs. social) and valence 
(positive vs. negative) dimensions to compare different regional coding of brain 
activations. The result revealed that social positive videos that associated with joy 
activated the medial OFC region (peak MNI coordinate: 15, 60, -12), which 
suggested the involvement of emotional valence during social processing in the 
medial OFC region. In order to directly contrast emotional perspective-taking versus 
cognitive perspective-taking, Hynes, Baird, and Graftonl (2006) used written 
scenarios developed by Fletcher et al. (1995) to investigate the functional role of the 
OFC involved in ToM tests. The result showed that, despite the medial PFC 
activated in both cognitive and emotional perspective-taking contrasts, the medial 
OFC (included both BA11 and BA25 regions) was preferentially involved with 
emotional rather than cognitive perspective-taking, which revealed that distinct 
functional sub-components are associated with ToM-related processing. Other 
techniques have been introduced to investigate the sub-components that supported 
mentalizing. For example, Hampton, Bossaerts, and O’Doherty (2008) used a 
model-testing approach to investigate the computations underlying mentalizing, 
which included measurements to the associations between neural activities in 
different parts of the mentalizing network and different cognitive components. The 
result showed that the signals in a sophisticated ‘influence’ model, which simulated 
not only tracking other’s actions but also incorporating knowledge of how one’s own 
actions influenced the other’s strategy, significantly correlated with neural activities 
in the medial PFC, as well as the medial OFC region. Together these findings 
highlight that the cognitive processes relating to ToM elicit a network including not 
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only the medial PFC region, but also the OFC region that is associated with 
emotional components. 
In the current video mentalizing test, the short videos were categorised along 
two orthogonal dimensions, the intentionality (high- and low-mentalizing) and the 
complexity (dyad and group conversations). Subjects were required to answer the 
same question ‘which of these statements best describes the situation you have just 
seen?’, and made decisions from four options varying in appropriateness. Along the 
intentionality dimension, to have better performances for high-mentalizing videos, 
subjects needed to understand and make correct inferences of the character’s mind, 
whereas to have better performances for low-mentalizing videos, it did not 
necessarily require the ability to make correct inferences of the character’s mind. 
Along the complexity dimension, to have better performances for group videos, 
subjects needed to process social information based on interactions between more 
than two characters, whereas to have better performances for dyad videos, subjects 
only needed to process fewer amount of social information based on interactions 
between only two characters. Previous functional studies measuring mentalizing 
ability demonstrate a function-structure relationship between ToM competence and 
different PFC sub-regions along the medial line (BA9, 10, 11, and 25). As a result, 
the aim of this VBM regression analysis was to examine the distinct correlations 
between behavioural performance in different conditions and different PFC 
sub-regions. For the videos varying in intentionality, we hypothesised that the GM 
volume along the medial line of the PFC would correlate with the performance 
relating to high-mentalizing videos, but not to low-mentalizing videos. For the videos 
varying in complexity, we hypothesised that the GM volume along the medial line of 
the PFC would correlate with performance for both dyad and group videos, given 
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that the scores for dyad and group videos both involved understanding the 
character’s mental states.  
 
5.6  Behavioural and VBM result of the TD sub-group 
Behaviour investigation into the video mentalizing test 
The accuracy, appropriateness and reaction time for each condition were 
entered into repeated measures ANOVA with intentionality (high vs. low) and 
complexity (dyad vs. group) as within-subject factors. The behavioural part of the 
result, including accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time in each condition are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time (msec.) between conditions 
in the video mentalizing test of the TD sub-group (n=62). Panel (a): the result in each 
condition; panel (b): the main effect of intentionality and complexity. 
(a)    mean SD (b)  mean SD
Accuracy Accuracy  
HD videos 0.77 0.17 High-mentalizing 0.73 0.14
HG videos 0.70 0.19 Low-mentalizing 0.72 0.15
LD videos 0.84 0.16 Dyad conversation 0.80 0.12
LG videos 0.60 0.22 Group conversation 0.65 0.16
 
Appropriateness Appropriateness  
HD videos 3.64 0.38 High-mentalizing 3.50 0.36
HG videos 3.37 0.49 Low-mentalizing 3.47 0.35
LD videos 3.67 0.37 Dyad conversation 3.65 0.31
LG videos 3.26 0.46 Group conversation 3.32 0.38
 
Reaction time Reaction time  
HD videos 11222.5 2883.2 High-mentalizing 12590.0 2709.5
HG videos 13957.5 3115.0 Low-mentalizing 11518.4 2467.3
LD videos 11034.2 2645.7 Dyad conversation 11128.3 2584.2
  LG videos   12002.7 2504.3 Group conversation 12980.1 2634.4
 
Accuracy 
Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of complexity 
(F(1,61)=49.016, p<0.001), where subjects had better accuracy for dyad videos than 
for group videos. The analysis identified a significant intentionality x complexity 
interaction (F(1,61)=17.239, p<0.001). Follow-up analysis revealed that the 
interaction was driven by higher dyad vs. group difference in low-mentalizing videos 
(mean difference=0.233) than in high-mentalizing videos (mean difference=0.073). 
No significant main effect of intentionality was found (F(1,61)=0.281, p=0.598). 
 
Appropriateness 
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Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of complexity 
(F(1,61)=57.155, p<0.001), where subjects responded more appropriately to dyad 
videos than group videos. No significant main effect of intentionality was found 
(F(1,61)=0.628, p=0.431). The intentionality x complexity interaction was not 
significant (F(1,61)=3.120, p=0.082).  
 
Reaction time 
Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of intentionality 
(F(1,61)=31.418, p<0.001), which revealed that subjects made decisions 
significantly more slowly to high-mentalizing videos than low-mentalizing videos. The 
analysis also revealed a significant main effect of complexity (F(1,61)=90.928, 
p<0.001), where subjects responded significantly slower for group videos than for 
dyad videos. A significant intentionality x complexity interaction (F(1,61)=24.701, 
p<0.001) was found. Follow-up analysis confirmed that the faster response speed 
for low-mentalizing videos than for high-mentalizing videos was more prominent in 
videos involved group conversation than in videos involved dyad conversation.  
 
Correlation analysis 
We used Spearman’s rank-order correlation and followed the same 
procedure as in the TD group. In the first approach, correlation analysis of accuracy 
only revealed a positive significant relationship between LD vs. LG videos (rs 
(62)=0.286, p=0.024), but not for other pairwise combinations. Analysis of 
appropriateness only identified a positive significant correlation between LD and LG 
videos (rs (62)=0.290, p=0.022), but no significant correlations were found between 
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other combinations. Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis of reaction time 
found positive significant relationships between response speed for all pairwise 
combinations (all p<0.001). In the second approach, significant relationships were 
found between accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time for HD videos (all 
p<0.05), HG videos (all p<0.05), LD videos (all p<0.05), and LG videos (all p<0.05). 
The identified correlations were positive between accuracy and appropriateness, yet 
negative between reaction time vs. accuracy, and between reaction time vs. 
appropriateness as well.   
 
VBM investigation into the video mentalizing test 
The VBM part of this investigation is organised in two approaches. In the first 
approach, we explored the neural correlates associated with accuracy and 
appropriateness for each of the four kinds of videos, and the results were 
summarised in Table 5.3. In the second approach, given that a robust link between 
mentalizing ability and the medial PFC region has been established by previous 
functional neuroimaging, we further examined the correlation between the 
performance for the main effect of intentionality (high and low-mentalizing videos), 
as well as the complexity (dyad and group conversations), and the GM volume in the 
medial PFC region. The relationship between the performance for dyad and group 
conversations and the medial line of the PFC region was also examined for 
exploratory purpose (see Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.3. The VBM result of the video mentalizing test. The GM cluster in the PFC region showing significant correlations with the 
accuracy, appropriateness in the video mentalizing test between the four conditions (p<0.001, uncorrected for whole brain analysis, and 
p<0.05, FWE-corrected for SVC using different ROIs derived from the AAL atlas). Brodmann areas are approximate. 
p<0.001, uncorrected SVC (FWE<0.05) 
Whole brain analysis AAL_Superior_Medial   
      k t MNI Label   p MNI   
Accuracy for videos in different conditions 
High-Dyad 2947
a
  6.25 [0, 41, -24] BA11 <0.001 
93 4.20 [-11, 57, 18] BA10 0.014 [-11, 57, 18]
135 3.81 [-3, 33, 51] BA8 0.042 [-3, 33, 51] 
High-Group 10 3.42 [-6, 53, 16] BA9 
Low-Dyad 
Low-Group 59 3.84 [0, 56, 25] BA9 0.038 [0, 56, 25] 
      45 3.72 [8, 48, 36] BA8   0.041 [8, 48, 36]   
a
 survived from small volume correction (SVC) at the whole brain level at p<0.001 
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Table 5.4. The VBM result of the video mentalizing test. The GM clusters in the PFC region showing significant correlations with the 
accuracy, appropriateness in the video mentalizing test between the main effect of intentionality and complexity (p<0.001, uncorrected 
for whole brain analysis, and p<0.05, FWE-corrected for SVC using different ROIs derived from the AAL atlas). Brodmann areas are 
approximate. 
p<0.001, uncorrected Small Volume Correction (FWE<0.05)
Whole brain analysis AAL_Superior_Medial AAL_Cinculum_Ant_Right
BA25 
(WFU_pickatlas) 
 k t MNI Label  p MNI p MNI p MNI 
Accuracy for videos in different conditions
High-mentalizing 198 4.63 [-5, 53, 16] BA9 0.004 [-5, 53, 16]
66 4.39 [15, 33, 30] BA32 0.024 [12, 33, 28]
24 3.46 [-12, 30, -30] BA11 0.045 [-12, 30, -15] 
Low-mentalizing 
Dyad conversation 12 3.48 [-15, 41, 16] BA9
38 3.47 [12, 30, -15] BA25 0.036 [12, 30, -15] 
29 3.35 [3, 39, -24] BA11
 Group conversation 85 4.04 [-5, 51, 15] BA9  0.023 [-5, 51, 15]  
 
  
155 
 
 
 
Accuracy 
VBM regression analysis found a significant positive correlation between the 
accuracy for high-mentalizing dyad videos and the GM volume in bilateral medial 
OFC (BA11) region that survived FWE correction at the whole brain level (peak MNI 
coordinate: 0, 41, -24, k=2947, p=0.001) (see Figure 5.2(a)). The accuracy of 
high-mentalizing dyad videos was also positively correlated with other medial PFC 
regions along the midline structure including BA10 (peak MNI: -11, 57, 18; SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.014) and BA8 regions (peak MNI: -3, 33, 
51; SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.042)(see Figure 5.2(b), 5.2(c)). 
The accuracy for the high-mentalizing group videos was also positively correlated 
with GM volume in the dorsomedial PFC region at [-6, 53, 16] using a lenient 
threshold at p<0.001 uncorrected (SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, 
p>0.05). A positive significant correlation was identified between accuracy for 
low-mentalizing group videos and the GM volume in the dmPFC region at [0, 56, 25] 
(SVC: SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.038) and the GM volume in 
BA8 region at [8, 48, 36] (SVC: SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.041) 
(see Figure 5.2(d), 5.2(e)). No significant correlation was found between the 
accuracy for low-mentalizing dyad videos and any GM volume in the medial PFC 
region. 
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Figure 5.2. The GM volume that significantly correlated with the variables in the 
video mentalizing test. Accuracy for the high-mentalizing+dyad (HD) videos was 
positively correlated with a GM cluster located in the ventromedial PFC region (panel 
a), a GM cluster in the medial rostral PFC region (panel b), and a GM cluster in the 
dorsomedial PFC region (panel c). Accuracy for the low-mentalizing+group (LD) 
videos was positively correlated with a GM cluster in the dorsomedial PFC region 
approximately in BA9 (panel d), and a GM cluster in the dorsomedial PFC region 
approximately in BA8 (panel e). 
 
In the second part of the VBM analysis, we examined the relationship 
between the GM volume in the medial PFC region and the main effects of 
intentionality and complexity separately. VBM regression analysis revealed a 
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significant positive correlation between accuracy for high-mentalizing videos and the 
GM volume along the midline structure of the PFC region, including the dorsomedial 
PFC region at [-5, 53, 16] (SVC: AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.004), 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) at [15, 33, 30] (SVC: AAL_Cinculum_Ant_Right, 
p=0.024), and in medial BA25 region (SVC: BA25 binary mask generated from WFU 
Pickatlas toolbox, p=0.045) (see Figure 5.3(a), 5.3(b), 5.3(c)). No significant 
correlation was observed between the accuracy for low-mentalizing videos and any 
GM volume in the medial line of the PFC region. A significant positive correlation 
was revealed between the accuracy for dyad videos and the GM volume in multiple 
PFC sub-regions along the medial line, including BA25 region at [12, 30, -15] (SVC: 
BA25 binary mask generated from WFU_Pickatlas toolbox, p=0.036) (see Figure 
5.3(d), as well as BA9 and BA11 regions using a lenient threshold at p<0.001). In 
addition, the accuracy for group videos was found to positively correlate with the GM 
volume in the dorsomedial PFC region at [-5, 51, 15] (SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left, p=0.023) (see Figure 5.3(e)). 
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Figure 5.3. The GM volume that significantly correlated with the variables in the 
video mentalizing test. Accuracy for the high-mentalizing videos was positively 
correlated with a GM cluster located in the dorsomedial PFC region (panel a), a GM 
cluster in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; see panel b), and a GM cluster in the 
medial BA25 region (panel c). Accuracy for the dyad conversation videos was 
positively correlated with a GM cluster in medial BA25 region (panel d). Accuracy for 
the group conversation videos was positively correlated with a GM cluster in the 
dorsomedial PFC region (panel e). 
 
Appropriateness  
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No significant correlations were found between appropriateness score in all 
conditions and any GM volume in the medial line of the PFC region. 
 
5.7  Discussion of the VBM results in the TD sub-group 
The behavioural part of the analysis found similar results to the baseline 
performance established by the TD group.  Repeated measures ANOVA of 
accuracy and appropriateness did not find a significant effect of intentionality, which 
indicates that the performance to videos varying in intentionality was comparable 
either in an absolute or in a continuous way. Correlation analysis of the 
between-variable effect also demonstrated a consistent pattern of relationship, 
where positive correlations were observed between accuracy and appropriateness 
for all videos. This suggests that, behaviourally, the ways of measuring ToM 
competence using an absolute accuracy and a continuous appropriateness were 
strongly associated with each other.  
The VBM part of the analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, 
we focused on investigating the function-structure relationship between the PFC 
region and the behavioural performance for each of the four kinds of videos. In the 
second stage, we examined the function-structure relationship between the PFC 
region and the behavioural performance on the main effect of intentionality and 
complexity separately. VBM regression analysis revealed a positive significant 
relationship between accuracy for HD videos and the GM volume in several cortical 
structures along the medial line including medial OFC (BA11), dorsomedial PFC 
(BA10 and BA8) regions. A recent lesion study conducted by Jenkins et al. (2014) 
recruited patients with lesions in different PFC sub-regions and found that isolated 
  
160 
 
 
orbital or medial PFC lesions alone were not sufficient to produce impairments in an 
emotion recognition test (Montagne, Kesseks, De Haan, & Perrett, 2007) and 
perspective-taking test (Hynes et al., 2006). The results suggested that it was the 
combination of lesions in two PFC sub-regions had profound effects on social 
cognition. It is therefore possible that the identified wide spread function-structure 
relationship along the midline structure reflected a concept of a network that 
supported social cognition. The analysis also found a positive significant relationship 
between accuracy for LG videos and the GM volume in dorsomedial PFC region 
including BA9, BA8 regions. These identified neural correlates have been 
consistently found in functional neuroimaging studies that measured ToM 
competence (see Amodio & Frith, 2006, for review). Nevertheless, it was the 
accuracy for LG accuracy that was associated with the GM structure in the 
dorsomedial PFC region. As discussed when considering the baseline performance 
established by the TD group, the complexity of videos had a profound effect on the 
engagement of ToM ability. It is possible that social situations involving conversation 
between more than two characters elicit equally complex interpersonal 
communication, regardless of the level of intentionality required. To support this 
speculation, a positive relationship was also observed between accuracy for HG 
videos and the GM volume in dorsomedial PFC region using a lenient threshold at 
p<0.001 whole brain uncorrected. This potential link, together with the association 
between accuracy for LG accuracy, suggests that the ability to make correct social 
decisions involving group conversation could be related to the regional volume of 
dorsomedial PFC region, a frequently reported structure in social cognition. On the 
other hand, VBM regression analysis using appropriateness for all four kinds of 
videos did not find any significant relationships in any PFC region. Despite the 
behavioural part of the results revealing strong correlations between accuracy and 
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appropriateness in all conditions, it seems that the function-structure association 
between ToM competence and the medial PFC region could be only observed when 
measuring ToM competence in an all-or-none way. It may be, in psychometric terms, 
which for this test at least, “a miss is as good as a mile”. 
In the second stage of the VBM analysis, we examined the neural correlates 
that associated with the main effect of intentionality and complexity separately. VBM 
regression analysis revealed a positive significant correlation between accuracy for 
high-mentalizing videos, but not for low-mentalizing videos, and the GM volume in 
multiple midline structures including the dorsomedial PFC region, the anterior 
cingulate gyrus, and BA25 region. This observed function-structure relationship 
corresponded well with previous fMRI studies demonstrating dorsomedial PFC 
activations in tests involving ToM abilities compared with the control conditions 
(Gallagher et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000; Hynes et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
anterior cingulate gyrus was shown to be one of the regions of the social brain 
(Blakemore, 2008) that was involved with social cognitive processes. This was in 
line with the findings reported by Jenkins et al. (2014), where social cognition was 
supported by a combination of the functional role from different cortical regions 
instead of solely relying on one core structure. On the other hand, VBM regression 
analysis on the main effect of complexity found significant relationships between 
accuracy for dyad videos and the GM volume in BA25 region. This observed GM 
structure located closely to the medial OFC activation (peak MNI: 0, 36, -21) in the 
‘influence model’ reported by Hampton et al. (2008). In the influence model, an 
interactive strategy involving tracking other player’s actions, as well as incorporating 
inspection of how other’s action would influence back to self was simulated. It is 
therefore possible that this BA25 structure including the medial OFC region supports 
social interaction that emphasises one-on-one perspective-taking processes. In 
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comparison, accuracy for group videos was found to positively correlate with the GM 
volume in the dorsomedial PFC region. This finding supported our speculation that 
the dorsomedial PFC region is associated with deciphering social situations 
involving larger amounts of social information (e.g., conversation involved more than 
two characters), but not with social situations involving a smaller scale of interaction, 
like conversation between only two characters. Taken together, this distinct link 
between accuracy for dyad and group videos and the PFC sub-regions along a 
dorsal-ventral axis may highlight a differentiation in a social cognition network, where 
the dorsal part of the medial PFC region is involved with processing more complex 
situations, and the ventral part of the medial PFC region is involved with processing 
less complex situations. 
 
5.8  Atypical performance of mentalizing ability in ASD 
subjects 
Ever since the study of Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985) reported that 
children with ASD lack of theory of mind, ASD research has focused on the nature 
and the cause of this deficit on interpersonal communication. In Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985), the ‘Sally-Anne’ test showed that children with ASD failed this test by 
assessing false belief compared with typical-developing children.  It was then 
proposed that the impairment in ToM could be indexed by failure on false belief tests, 
and was viewed as the cause of the deficits on social interaction in ASD individuals. 
Several psychological tests purportedly measuring mentalizing ability found 
converging results showing children and adults with ASD had relatively poor 
performances than the control subjects. For example, the ‘Strange Stories test’ 
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presented mental and control stories targeting at understanding non-literal 
interpersonal conversations like bluffs, jokes, sarcasm, white lies, etc. (Frith and 
Happe, 1994; White, Hill, Happe, & Frith, 2009). Other ToM tests implemented visual 
stimuli to depict human or human-like interactions in order to generate complex 
social situations that require ToM-related ability. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) 
developed a ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test that required subjects to ‘read’ a 
person’s mental state based on the information around the presented eyes stimuli 
(see also Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Other ToM tests 
involved stimuli movements like Castelli et al. (2002), who recruited ASD adults and 
asked them to watch animations of two triangles moving randomly, goal-directly, or 
with implied interactions. Paradigms using more realistic experimental stimuli with 
actual humans measuring ToM capability like the Awkward Moment test (Heavey et 
al., 2000), which used commercials that combined both visual and auditory inputs to 
show interpersonal interactions. Other tests like the ‘Reading the Mind in Films’ test 
(Golan et al., 2006) and the ‘Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition’ (MASC; 
Dziobek et al., 2006), which used videos that showed more realistic scenarios to 
illustrate daily social interactions between people. Despite the difference in 
experimental stimuli and paradigms, all of these ToM tests aimed to assess the 
ability to understand other’s mental states, and found that ASD subjects had 
impaired performance compared with control subjects. It is therefore plausible to 
suspect that ToM-related dysfunction is a core symptom of ASD, but the causes or 
the potential contributions of this impaired ToM ability in ASD is still unclear.  
Previous theories implicate several possible causes for the observed 
ToM-related deficits in ASD. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) proposed a defective 
meta-representation as the cause of impaired ToM. Further models investigating this 
meta-representation deficit defined it as a cognitive development mechanism that 
  
164 
 
 
enabled TD children to represent ToM module in their own mind, and further used 
this meta-representation to reason about the behaviours of others (Leslie, 1987; 
Leslie and Roth, 1993).  Similar accounts proposed that the concept of ‘self’ is 
deeply embedded in the social world and is integrated with many social behaviours, 
and this integral relationship between the self and the social world is referred as 
simulation theory (e.g. Goldman, 2006). Evidence was received from studies 
investigating infants (Meltzoff and Brooks, 2008), children and adults (Birch and 
Bloom, 2003; 2004), and the neural network including the medial part of the PFC 
region was also identified (Gallese, 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010). Other possible 
explanations including problems with language comprehension in order to make 
pragmatic inferences (see Loukusa and Moilanen, 2009), emotional recognition to 
understand more complex perception of faces (Castelli, 2005), and the potential 
indirect influence from executive dysfunction (see Hill, 2004; Robinson, Goddard, 
Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009) were also proposed. In the video mentalizing test 
developed for the present study, we used short video clips as stimuli and this has 
several advantages for investigating the explanations for ToM deficits amongst ASD 
individuals. In order to have good ecological validity, the videos included 
representations of the characters’ mental states by showing perceptual, conative, 
emotional or epistemic features. Therefore, each of the 15-second videos actually 
contained abundant social information, including language comprehension, emotion 
recognition to process. In the testing phase, a constant neutral question was raised 
and the options were formatted in MCQs varying in appropriateness. Therefore, 
subjects could form a stable representation to respond to this relatively stable format 
of questions, and focused on answering the questions from their own perspective 
(e.g., the question was always ‘Which of these statements best describes the 
situation you have just seen?’) 
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In order to examine the ToM-related deficits amongst ASD subjects using the 
video mentalizing test, several speculations were first proposed based on the 
baseline behavioural performance established by the 103 TD subjects and the 
identified neural correlates from the 62 TD subjects from the TD sub-group. 
Compared with previous ToM tests using video as stimuli, the overall accuracy from 
the baseline behavioural result established by 103 healthy TD subjects indicated 
that the mentalizing demands of the test were quite high in the current paradigm 
(mean accuracy=0.73), compared with 0.75 in the Awkward Moment test (Heavey et 
al., 2000), 0.85 in the ‘Reading the Mind in Films’ test (Golan et al., 2006) and 0.76 
in the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006). VBM regression analysis revealed that accuracy 
for high-mentalizing videos were associated with the GM volume along the midline 
structure including dorsomedial PFC, anterior cingulate cortex, and medial OFC 
regions, but no relationship was found between accuracy for low-mentalizing videos 
and any PFC regions. This suggested that the ability to correctly answer videos 
involving a higher level of intentionality was positively correlated with the size of 
cortical areas in a ToM network (Frith and Frith, 2003). As a result, based on the 
previous findings demonstrated in ToM tests, we hypothesised that the ASD 
subjects would show selective impairments to videos required high intentionality 
(high-mentalizing videos), situations that involved making inferences to the 
character’s mind, but not to videos requiring only a low level of intentionality 
(low-mentalizing videos), which did not involve making inferences to the character’s 
mental states. On the other hand, as discussed in earlier sections, we suspected 
that videos involving more than two characters contained more social information to 
process than videos involving only two characters. If the ToM deficits originated from 
deficits in abilities such as comprehension, visual or emotion recognition, then the 
ASD subjects would find it more difficult to answer group videos correctly, compared 
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with TD subjects, and subsequently lead to a group x complexity interaction showing 
more drastic impairments to group videos. Furthermore, the questions we used in 
the video mentalizing test were multiple choices varying in appropriateness. 
Previous ToM tests measuring a group difference mainly focused on the absolute 
accuracy, where the performance could only be scored as either correct or incorrect. 
It is possible that ToM competence between individuals could be measured in a 
continuous way, where the deficits identified amongst ASD individuals would no 
longer be significant when calculated in a continuous way. For example, the 
previously labelled ‘incorrect’ response could be merely ‘less appropriate’ than the 
correct answer, or the ‘most appropriate’ one, and thus intensified the observed 
impairment on social communication in ASD using an arbitrary way. As a result, we 
further explored if mentalizing deficits in ASD were still valid using appropriateness 
as the index for ToM competence. 
 
5.9  Behavioural result between the ASD and the TD groups 
The accuracy, appropriateness and reaction time for each condition were 
entered into repeated measures ANOVA with intentionality, complexity as 
within-subject factors, and group as between-subject factors. In this section, we 
focused on examining the main effect and the interaction of group. The behavioural 
result of each group including accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time in each 
condition are summarised in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5. Accuracy, appropriateness, and reaction time (msec.) between conditions in the video mentalizing test of the TD and the 
ASD groups. Panel (a): the result in each condition; panel (b): the main effect of intentionality and complexity. 
 (a)     TD   ASD   (b)     TD   ASD 
      mean SD   mean SD        mean SD   mean SD 
Accuracy Accuracy 
HD videos 0.77 0.16 0.67 0.19  High-mentalizing 0.74 0.13 0.63 0.17 
HG videos 0.70 0.20 0.58 0.24  Low-mentalizing 0.72 0.15 0.68 0.16 
LD videos 0.85 0.16 0.78 0.19  Dyad conversation 0.81 0.12 0.73 0.14 
LG videos 0.60 0.22 0.58 0.20  Group conversation 0.65 0.17 0.58 0.16 
 
Appropriateness Appropriateness 
HD videos 3.62 0.36 3.42 0.54  High-mentalizing 3.51 0.32 3.26 0.46 
HG videos 3.40 0.47 3.09 0.66  Low-mentalizing 3.49 0.32 3.39 0.31 
LD videos 3.71 0.34 3.52 0.42  Dyad conversation 3.66 0.28 3.47 0.35 
LG videos 3.27 0.45 3.25 0.36  Group conversation 3.34 0.37 3.17 0.38 
 
Reaction time (msec.) Reaction time (msec.)
HD videos 10730.7 2933.6 11920.4 3564.5  High-mentalizing 12013.9 2749.8 13485.4 3537.5 
HG videos 13297.1 3077.4 15050.4 4151.8  Low-mentalizing 11068.8 2478.0 11477.8 3322.6 
LD videos 10549.0 2751.2 11246.3 3648.6  Dyad conversation 10639.9 2704.6 11583.3 3474.0 
  LG videos   11588.6 2487.7 11709.3 3294.5  Group conversation 12442.8 2591.7 13379.8 3430.3 
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Accuracy 
Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,131)=8.788, p=0.004), which showed that the ASD group had lower accuracy 
for all kinds of videos than the TD group in general. The analysis also revealed a 
significant main effect of complexity (F(1,131)=81.759, p<0.001), where accuracy 
was significantly higher for dyad videos than for group videos. No significant main 
effect of intentionality was found (F(1,131)=1.459, p=0.229). The three-way 
interaction between group, intentionality, and complexity was not significant 
(F(1,131)=0.955, p=0.330), but a marginally significant interaction between group 
and intentionality (F(1,131)=3.679, p=0.057) was found (see Figure 5.4). The deficit 
when comparing ASD subjects with TD subjects was much higher for 
high-mentalizing videos than for low-mentalizing videos. No significant group x 
complexity interaction was found (F(1,131)=0.301, p=0.584). A significant 
intentionality x complexity interaction was found (F(1,131)=16.843, p<0.001), which 
showed that both groups had higher complexity effect in low-mentalizing videos than 
in high-mentalizing videos.  
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Figure 5.4. The group x intentionality interaction on the accuracy in the video 
mentalizing test. 
 
Appropriateness 
Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,131)=9.486, p=0.003), where appropriateness was significantly lower in the 
ASD group than the TD group. The analysis also found a significant main effect of 
complexity (F(1,131)=66.103, p<0.001), which showed that all subjects responded 
to dyad videos more appropriately than to group videos. No significant main effect of 
intentionality was found (F(1,131)=1.931, p=0.167). The three-way interaction 
between group, intentionality, and complexity was not significant (F(1,131)=2.753, 
p=0.099). No significant interaction between group x intentionality (F(1,131)=3.607, 
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p=0.06), group x complexity (F(1,131)=0.141, p=0.707), and intentionality x 
complexity F(1,131)=1.068, p=0.303) were found. 
 
Reaction time 
Repeated measures ANOVA did not find a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,131)=2.777, p=0.098). The analysis identified a significant main effect of 
intentionality (F(1,131)=92.876, p<0.001), which showed that the response speed 
was significantly longer for high-mentalizing videos than for low-mentalizing videos. 
The analysis also found a significant main effect of complexity (F(1,131)=106.770, 
p<0.001), where all subjects responded significantly slower to group videos than to 
dyad videos. Repeated measures ANOVA did not find a significant three-way 
interaction between group, intentionality, and complexity (F(1,131)=3.462, p=0.065). 
Importantly, a significant group x intentionality interaction was identified 
(F(1,131)=12.027, p=0.001), and the interaction was confirmed by a significant 
response slowness (ASD vs. TD) in high-mentalizing videos (t(131)=2.410, p=0.017), 
but this slowness was not significant in low-mentalizing videos (t(131)=0.733, 
p=0.465). The response slowness in ASD subjects, compared with TD subjects, was 
more prominent for high-mentalizing videos than for low-mentalizing videos (see 
Figure 5.5). A significant intentionality x complexity interaction was found 
(F(1,131)=46.844, p<0.001), where the intentionality effect was higher for group 
videos than for dyad videos. No significant group x character interaction was found 
(F(1,131)=0.000, p=0.985). 
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Figure 5.5. The group x intentionality interaction on the reaction time in the video 
mentalizing test. 
 
5.10  Discussion of the behavioural result between the ASD 
and the TD groups 
The video mentalizing test used videos depicting daily interpersonal 
communications with varying level of intentionality and complexity. The analysis of 
this section focused on the between-group effect on accuracy, appropriateness 
score, and reaction times for HD, HG, LD, and LG videos. Repeated measures 
ANOVA on accuracy identified a significant main effect of group, which suggested 
that ASD subjects found it more difficult to choose the correct option when passively 
watching videos involving daily conversation between other people, regardless of 
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the intentionality and the complexity of the scenarios. Importantly, a marginally 
significant group x intentionality interaction was found, which revealed that ASD 
subjects had selectively lower performance on high-mentalizing videos compared 
with low-mentalizing videos. This was consistent with a vast literature investigating 
Tom-related deficits amongst ASD subjects using various kinds of ToM tests (Happe, 
1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Castelli et al., 2002; Heavey et al., 2000; Golan et 
al., 2006; Dziobek et al., 2006). A possible explanation that accounts for the deficits 
in processing social situations involved mentalizing pinpointed the impairments 
originating from fundamental stages, for example, processing human faces, as a 
crucial aspect for the video mentalizing test. Studies have consistently found an 
atypical functional role of the visual processing system in ASD individuals, which 
includes evidence showing abnormal activations in fusiform face area, 
under-connectivity with the frontal regions, atypical visual scanning of faces, and 
unique strategies for face processing (Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 
2001; Pelphrey, Sasson, Reznick, Paul, Goldman, & Piven, 2002; Hubl et al., 2003; 
Darkin and Frith, 2005; Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006; Koshino, Kana, 
Keller, Cherkassy, Minshew, & Just, 2008; Muller, Shih, Keehn, Deyoe, Leyden, & 
Shukla, 2011). These abnormal bottom-up mechanisms might cause ASD 
individuals to be unable to process fast-pace, dynamic sequences of facial 
expressions that include social information crucial for mentalizing. On the other hand, 
repeated measures ANOVA did not find a significant group x complexity interaction, 
and a significant main effect of complexity suggested that the ASD subjects also had 
more difficulty processing group videos than processing dyad videos, similar as TD 
subjects. This significant main effect of complexity revealed a profound effect on the 
number of characters involved in conversation using video stimuli, and further 
  
173 
 
 
suggests a possible direction in controlling for the ’qualitative’ difference of the 
experimental stimuli used for ToM paradigms. 
Repeated measures ANOVA of appropriateness also identified a significant 
effect of group, where the ASD group responded less appropriately than the TD 
group for all kinds of videos. This was consistent with the finding using accuracy to 
measure mentalizing ability. The analysis of appropriateness revealed a tendency 
for a group x intentionality interaction, which was similar to the pattern demonstrated 
in accuracy. Furthermore, comparable effects were also identified, which included a 
significant main effect of complexity and null group x complexity interaction when 
using appropriateness. Together these results indicated that, behaviourally, 
measurement for ToM competence using an absolute accuracy and a continuous 
appropriateness yielded similar results when comparing ASD subjects with TD 
subjects. 
Repeated measures ANOVA of reaction time did not find a significant main 
effect of group, which suggests that the response speed in ASD subjects was 
comparable with the baseline performance established in TD subjects. This null 
effect indicated that, despite ASD subjects responding less accurately and less 
appropriately in general, they did not respond significantly slower for processing the 
all the video clips in general in the current paradigm. Nevertheless, a significant 2 x 2 
interaction between group x intentionality was found, which demonstrated that the 
ASD group responded significantly slower in high-mentalizing videos than the TD 
group, but this slowness was not evident in low-mentalizing videos. This selective 
slowness on processing videos that required higher level of intentionality was in line 
with the pattern identified on accuracy, and highlighted a selective deficit to 
high-mentalizing videos accompanied with lower performance and slower 
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responding in ASD subjects, whilst demonstrating comparable performance to the 
‘baseline’ low-mentalizing videos compared with TD subjects. No significant group x 
complexity interaction was found, which indicated that, despite significant a main 
effect of complexity, the number of characters involved in the conversation affected 
the performance of both groups in a similar way. These null interactions between 
group and complexity suggested that the complexity factor was not a powerful 
variable to distinguish ASD subjects from TD subjects, and as a result, we focused 
on the main effect of intentionality for further analyses conducted in later chapters 
discussing the between-test effect.   
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Chapter 6. PFC battery – the cartoon faux pas test 
6.1  Measurements for detection to social norm violation 
In order to measure ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) competence, various 
psychometric tests have been designed to test the ability to make correct inferences 
of other’s mental states. A situation where “a speaker says something without 
considering if it is something that the listener might not want to hear or know, and 
which typically has negative consequences that the speaker never intended” is 
referred as a ‘faux pas’ (Baron-Cohen et al, 1999). The capability to successfully 
recognise of this violation to social norm is viewed as an advanced application of 
ToM, and is closely related to detection of embarrassment. It has been shown that 
adults with medial PFC lesions under-detect faux pas (Stone et al., 1998; Lee et al., 
2010), which indicates that the PFC region played an important role to recognise a 
faux pas, or to detect a violation to social norm.  
The original faux pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) presented social 
situations using audio stories with neutral tones recorded on tapes as experimental 
stimuli. The purpose of using audio stories was to control for the effect from the 
visually presented facial expression, and to avoid the potential contribution of 
emotional turbulence hidden with tone changes. Nevertheless, in real-life 
interactions, the change of audio tone often contained subtle social cues, and was 
essential for successful faux pas detection. As a result, the use of audio recordings 
without naturalistic changes of tones may lack ecological validity. Another important 
issue regarding faux pas tests is the way of scoring. In the experiment 3 of 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999), ten control questions without faux pas were included and 
intermixed with ten faux pas stories. However, no direct measurement of the 
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accuracy for correctly rejecting stories without faux pas was calculated. Similarly, 
Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, and Leboyer (2009) used a modified version of the faux 
pas test including ten control questions without any faux pas that were mixed with 
ten faux pas stories, and the scores for faux pas and control stories were calculated 
separately. Subjects could only acquire scores if correct rejections were made to the 
control stories having no faux pas. Importantly, in previous faux pas tests 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Zalla et al., 2009), the testing phase consisted of multiple 
questions asking about different aspects of faux pas, including detection, 
identification, and false belief. The results highlighted that successful faux pas 
responses involved different cognitive components. The multiple processes while 
answering faux pas questions indicates that complex underlying cognitions like 
social reasoning and/or emotional appreciations are required for recognising social 
embarrassment. Despite the role that different sub-components play while 
identifying a faux pas, to realise that an embarrassing situation has happened can 
be a sudden awareness, without step-by-step reasoning in real life. It is possible that 
the process of detecting a faux pas can be determined by one’s criterion to social 
violations. Signal detection theory (SDT) delineates a decision making process that 
is used to distinguish signal from noises (see Nevin, 1969, for review; Harvey, 
Hammond, Lusk, & Mross, 1992, for application). When a signal is present, based 
on subject’s yes no responses, outcomes are referred to as hit (yes) and miss (no) 
respectively. On the other hand, if a signal is absent, based on subject’s yes or no 
responses, the outcomes are referred as false alarm (yes) and correct rejection (no) 
respectively. In the following faux pas paradigm, successful faux pas detection is 
referred to a combined ability to detect a faux pas when there is one, and to reject a 
non-faux pas when there is not one. Furthermore, we used faux pas related 
questions distinct from comprehension questions in order to control form differences 
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in reading, comprehension, or IQ abilities. This enabled us to have clear 
measurements of an individual’s ability in detecting a faux pas.  
In order to investigate the ability for faux pas detection using a signal 
detection approach, we designed a cartoon faux pas test, which used cartoons to 
depict social interactions amongst characters. The questions in the cartoon faux pas 
test were either asking subjects if there was anything embarrassing for faux pas 
related cartoons, or asking subjects difficult questions with no faux-pas or social 
cognition content for comprehension cartoons. In the faux pas related cartoons, half 
of the cartoons contained a faux pas (faux pas condition) and the other half did not 
(non-faux pas condition). Subjects were required to determine if there was any social 
norm violation. Following signal detection theory, the accuracy for the faux pas 
condition was referred as ‘hit’, and the accuracy for the non-faux pas condition was 
referred as ‘correct rejection’. Given that the question asked in the faux pas related 
cartoons were always ‘Embarrassing?’, there was a potential confound, as 
mentioned in the video mentalizing test chapter, that subjects might got intrigued by 
the question and gave more ‘yes’ responses than to give ‘no’ responses. As a result, 
we hypothesised that accuracy in the faux pas condition would be higher than in the 
non-faux pas condition. 
 
6.2  Methods of the cartoon faux pas test 
Materials and Design 
The cartoon faux pas test used 52 cartoon stories using two or three frames 
to visually illustrate social interactions. Each cartoon story was originally hand-drawn 
(by Flora Thiebaut, a UCL MSc Cognitive Neuroscience student), scanned and 
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transformed into digital version by using the Comic Live software 
(http://plasq.com/products/comiclife2). The facial parts of the characters were 
deliberately left blank to control for the emotional contribution and the conversations 
between characters were presented in speech bubbles. The 52 cartoon stories 
consisted of three conditions: 18 cartoon stories with faux pas, 18 cartoon stories 
without faux pas and 16 stories asking the comprehensive aspect of the stories. In 
the stories containing a faux pas, the appearance of the dialogue that caused 
embarrassment was counterbalanced, where half of the embarrassment happened 
in the second frame and the other half happened in the third frame. Importantly, in 
order to investigate faux pas detection using signal detection approach, the same 
question (‘Embarrassing?’) was presented in both the faux pas and non-faux pas 
conditions. Subjects were asked to respond by pressing either the left arrow or the 
right arrow key to indicate “yes” or “no” to the question. The comprehension 
condition depicting stories without any faux pas served as a baseline condition to 
see if subjects understand the cartoon stories properly. The questions asked in the 
comprehension condition were different from each other and only focused on the 
comprehension aspect of the stories. 
 
Procedure 
The cartoon faux pas test was presented on a laptop using E-Prime software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Subjects were asked to sit 
approximately 80 centimetres from the screen in a quiet testing room. Subjects were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible with a good balance of speed and 
accuracy. At the beginning of the test, instructions with two of the comprehension 
cartoons were used for practice in order to let the subjects familiarize with the layout 
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of the stories (see Figure 6.1). Seven comprehension cartoons were presented first, 
and then the faux pas stories were introduced along with two practice stories, one 
story with a faux pas (see Figure 6.2) and the other story without a faux pas (see 
Figure 6.3). The remaining 34 faux pas and non-faux pas cartoons were then 
presented to the subjects. Lastly, seven more comprehension cartoons were 
presented. The order of the cartoons was counter-balanced for order using a 
Latin-square design and was held constant across subjects. A maximum threshold 
for reaction time was set at 32 seconds based on the pilot data. To ensure subjects 
were ready for each story, a confirmation saying: “Are you ready? Press the 
spacebar and the cartoon will appear.” was presented before the display of each 
story. The proportion of correct YES/NO answers was balanced to avoid a fixated 
response tendency. The cartoon faux pas test took each subject around 15 minutes 
to complete. 
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Figure 6.1. An example of the comprehension cartoons. The comprehension 
cartoons did not contain any faux pas component, and the questions asked differed 
between each other. 
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Figure 6.2. An example of the faux pas cartoons. In the depicted story, the male 
character waering a tie committed a faux pas that made other characters felt 
embarrassing, and the questions asked were always ‘Embarrassing?’. 
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Figure 6.3. An example of the non-faux pas cartoons. In the depicted story, no faux 
pas was committed by any of the characters, but the questions were always 
‘Embarrassing?. 
 
6.3  Behavioural result of the TD group 
Accuracy 
The behavioural results of the TD group were summarised in Table 6.1. The 
accuracy and the reaction times were entered into repeated measures ANOVA with 
condition (faux pas, non-faux pas, and comprehension) as a within-subject factor. 
The behavioural results of the cartoon faux pas test in the TD group were 
summarised in Table.6.2. Repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy first revealed 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 (2)=12.937, p=0.002 in 
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Mauchly’s test), and degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt 
estimates of sphericity (ε=0.908). The result showed a significant effect of condition 
(F(1.82,185.13)=6.015, p=0.004, and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction 
identified that the accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons was significantly higher 
than the faux pas cartoons (p=0.014) and the comprehension cartoons (p=0.031). 
No significant difference on accuracy was found between the faux pas and the 
comprehension cartoons.  
 
Reaction time 
Repeated measures ANOVA on reaction time first confirmed that the 
sphericity assumption has been met (χ2 (2)=5.133, p=0.077 in Mauchly’s test). The 
result found a significant effect of condition (F(2,204)=8.679, p<0.001), and post-hoc 
test using Bonferroni correction demonstrated that the reaction time in the faux pas 
condition was significantly longer than in the non-faux pas condition (p<0.001) and in 
the comprehension condition (p=0.004). No significant difference on reaction times 
was found between the non-faux pas and the comprehension conditions.  
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Table 6.1. Accuacy and reaction time between conditions in the cartoon faux pas 
test of the TD group. 
        mean SD 
Accuracy 
Comprehension 0.81  0.12  
Faux pas 0.80  0.12  
Non-faux pas 0.86  0.15  
Reaction time (msec.) 
Comprehension 9027.2 2928.5 
Faux pas 9509.3 2913.7 
  Non-faux pas      9007.8 2941.5 
 
 
Correlation analysis 
Due to all the variables deviated from normal distribution (p value below 0.05 
in Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test), Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis was 
conducted in two different approaches. In the first approach, we focused on the 
within-variable effect, where the relationships on accuracy between the three 
experimental conditions (faux pas, non-faux pas, and comprehension) and reaction 
time between the three experimental conditions were examined. In the second 
approach, we then analysed the between-variable effect, where the relationships 
between the three experimental conditions using accuracy and reaction time were 
examined separately.  
In the first approach, correlation analysis revealed that the accuracy for the 
faux pas cartoons was significantly correlated with the accuracy for the 
comprehension cartoons (rs (103)=0.276, p=0.005). A significant negative 
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correlation was found between the accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons and the 
accuracy for the faux pas cartoons (rs (103)=-0.202, p=0.04), but no significant 
correlation was found between the accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons and the 
accuracy for the comprehension condition (rs (103)=0.067, p=0.501). Analysis on the 
reaction times showed significant correlations between all pair-wise comparisons 
between the three types of cartoon (all p<0.001). In the second approach, significant 
relationships were found between the accuracy and the reaction times for the faux 
pas cartoons (rs (103)=0.227, p=0.021). No significant relationships were found 
between the accuracy and the reaction times for the non-faux pas cartoons (rs 
(103)=0.134, p=0.178) and for the comprehension cartoons (rs (103)=-0.001, 
p=0.992). 
 
6.4  Discussion of the behavioural result in the TD group  
The cartoon faux pas test used cartoons to illustrate social interactions and 
focused on measuring the ability for faux pas detection. The comprehension aspect 
of the test was isolated, which allowed measuring the accuracy for ‘hit’ and ‘correct 
rejection’ in faux pas detection using signal detection approach. The results on 
accuracy contradicted our hypothesis and revealed that the accuracy was 
significantly higher in the non-faux pas condition than in the faux pas condition. 
Furthermore, the accuracy in the non-faux pas condition was significantly higher 
than the ‘baseline’ comprehension condition, but no significant difference was found 
between the faux pas and the comprehension condition. From the perspective of 
signal detection, better detection in the non-faux pas condition (correct rejection) 
could be viewed as the implementation of a certain strategy, or a rightward shift of 
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the response criterion. This was associated with a higher propensity to give no 
responses when facing potential social embarrassment. Analysis on reaction time 
showed that subjects responded significantly slower in the faux pas condition than in 
the other two conditions. This suggested a selective ‘cost’ on response speed during 
decisional process to social situation actually contained a faux pas component, but 
demonstrated comparable response speed to situation did not contain any faux pas 
component with the ‘baseline’ comprehension scenarios. As a result, the 
behavioural performance of the TD group revealed that better accuracy and faster 
responses on ‘correct rejection’ than on ‘hit’ to detect potential social norm violations. 
In signal detection theory, the general tendency to give more yes or no responses 
reflected a concept of ‘response bias’, as determined by the position of an internal 
criterion between individuals. In the cartoon faux pas test, it is possible that TD 
subjects had a general propensity to give more no response when evaluating 
possible social embarrassment. A potential factor that resulted in this rightward shift 
of criterion might be a relatively higher threshold for social embarrassing detection. 
For example, Naylor and Lawshe (1958) demonstrated that subjects reported 
detection of swear words less often than neutral stimuli, which reflected that a ‘false 
alarm’ was more embarrassing for claiming swear words were detected than for 
neutral stimuli. This cautious attitude about reporting them led to a higher threshold 
to give a yes response, which subsequently led to more no responses in a 
forced-choice environment. Similar effect was shown in Thomas and Hogue (1976), 
where jury instructions had a profound effect on the willingness to convict a suspect, 
e.g., criminal cases with lenient sentences required less evidence to draw a 
conviction than cases with severe penalties. In the context of the cartoon faux pas 
test, it was more ‘embarrassing’ to give a ‘false alarm’ than to a ‘miss’ when facing 
potential social embarrassment. Furthermore, the way of instructions given, or the 
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understanding to ‘embarrassing’ might affect the criterion to give yes or no 
responses to potential social rule violation. In the faux pas and the non-faux pas 
conditions, a question constantly appeared on the screen asking ‘embarrassing?’, 
and this might intrigue TD subjects to suspect that ‘there supposed to be something 
embarrassing’. A supporting evidence of the speculation came from the significantly 
slower reaction time in the faux pas than in the non-faux pas condition.  
Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a significant negative relationship 
between the accuracy for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons, which 
indicated that the better performance in one condition accompanied with the worse 
performance in the other. This confirmed the contribution of the location of criterion 
in faux pas detection using a signal detection approach, where a higher propensity 
to give, for example, no responses, would inevitably brought higher correct rejection 
rate and lower hit rate in the cartoon faux pas test. In the between-variable approach, 
a significant positive relationship was only identified between the accuracy and the 
reaction time for the faux pas cartoons, which could be viewed as a classic 
psychological effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT; Fitts, 1954; see Heitz, 2014 
for review). The selective lack of SAT for the non-faux pas cartoons indicated that 
longer consideration did not necessary accompany with better correct rejection rate 
of a faux pas. This strategic adjustment of SAT in decision-making was modulated 
by environmental demands (Fitts, 1966), and stochastic accumulators model using 
computational perspective proposed that responses were produced when the 
accumulated evidence for one option reached a given threshold, e.g., elevating the 
threshold led to slower, more accurate responses, and lowering the threshold 
produced faster yet less accurate responses. It is therefore possible that a shift of 
internal criterion selectively affected the response bias to decisions upon non-faux 
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pas cartoons, and subsequently resulted in no SAT when requiring rejecting 
potential non-faux pas situations. 
In signal detection theory, the distance between the means of the 
signal-present and signal-absent distributions was referred as the sensitivity, or 
d-prime value. The response bias, referred to as the tendency for individuals to 
decide that a signal is present or is not present, could be dissociated from the 
sensitivity (see Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999, for discussion). From the perspective 
of sensitivity, it seems possible that the considered ‘strength’ of faux pas signals 
were different from each other in the two conditions (faux pas vs. non-faux pas). 
From the perspective of response bias, it is possible that subjects had higher 
tendency to give no responses rather than yes responses. Both possibilities would 
lead to a pattern of higher accuracy and faster responding with the non-faux pas 
cartoons compared to the faux pas cartoons. Further investigation is required to 
examine the effect of sensitivity and response bias during faux pas detection. 
 
6.5  Neuroimaging findings of detection to social norm 
violation   
In human society, certain conventional behaviours or social rules outline an 
acceptable social norm during interpersonal communications. In order not to be 
ostracised, or maintain harmony between group members, it is essential for 
individuals to meet the social standard that is considered appropriate by others. 
Under some circumstances, interactions with other people require understanding 
complex emotional states relying on one’s own standards, or originating from 
concerns about other’s understandings of oneself. These emotional states are 
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referred to as ‘self-conscious emotions’, such as the feeling of embarrassment. 
Recognising such emotional states successfully requires mental abilities including to 
have a sense of the self, understanding the social norms, and the capability to make 
inferences about other’s mental states. Previous functional neuroimaging studies 
have indicated a link between ToM ability and the medial PFC region (Frith & Frith, 
2006). Given that the detection of embarrassing situations is comprised of multiple 
sub-components other than ToM, it seems plausible to suspect that other PFC 
sub-regions are involved the ability to detect social norm violations. An fMRI study 
conducted by Berthoz, Armony, Blair, and Dolan (2002) used written stories with 
different endings including normative behaviours, unintentional violation of social 
norms or intentional violation of social norms to investigate the neural activities 
during social norm evaluation. The results showed that both unintentional and 
intentional violations of social norms activate the medial PFC region, as well as the 
lateral OFC region. The observed lateral OFC activity suggested that this PFC 
sub-region not only responded to angry expressions of others (Blair and Cipolotti, 
2000; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998) but also responded to 
actions that may potentially cause others to become angry. This highlights the 
potential modulatory role that the lateral OFC plays in preventing self and others 
from engaging in socially inappropriate behaviours. Similarly, activation of the lateral 
OFC region was also found in other fMRI studies investigating the neural activities 
involved with processing socially embarrassing conditions. Finger, Marsh, Kamel, 
Mitchell, and Blair (2006) used written stories with moral transgression (intentional), 
social transgression (unintentional) or neutral transgression to investigate the brain 
activations when one ought to modify one’s own behaviours with or without 
audiences. The results found increased activity in lateral OFC during social 
transgressions (unintentional) only in the presence of an audience. Similar lateral 
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OFC activity was also identified in Takahashi et al. (2004) where subjects were 
required to read short sentences carrying guilt, embarrassment or no emotional 
content from the first-person perspective and made evaluations as to the level of 
guilt or embarrassment. The results demonstrated greater activations in the medial 
PFC, as well as lateral OFC regions, in the embarrassing vs. neutral contrast. These 
results suggested that lateral OFC activities reflect an evaluation process of social, 
contextual and emotional information relating to social norm violations. 
One of the ways to examine the capability to detect social norm violations is 
the implementation of a faux pas situation. “Faux pas” refers to social embarrassing 
situations when social norms are unintentionally violated, and is viewed as an 
advanced ToM ability. Previous studies using patients with lesions to the PFC region 
(Stone et al., 1998; Roca et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010) and people with autism 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) had shown that the PFC region plays an important role in 
faux pas detection. Zalla et al. (2009 revealed that people with Asperger syndrome 
not only performed worse than controls on detecting a faux pas, but also had 
tendencies to over-detect faux pas situations, where the accuracy was also lower 
than controls for ‘correct rejection’ to social embarrassment. Furthermore, in Zalla et 
al. (2009), all subjects were required to answer questions regarding ‘detection’, 
‘person identification’, ‘content’, ‘explanation’, ‘the false belief’, and ‘empathy’ to 
each faux pas story. A similar multi-process manipulation was implemented in Lee et 
al. (2010), where all subjects were required to answer four questions including 
‘detecting a faux pas’, ‘understanding a faux pas’, ‘understanding the recipient’s 
mental state’, and ‘understanding the speaker’s mental states’. Together these 
results demonstrated that failure in detecting faux pas may originate from one of the 
sub-processes and these sub-processes can dissociate from each other.  
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In the cartoon faux pas test, we used cartoon stories to visually present 
scenarios involving social interactions. We isolated the comprehension aspect of the 
test and investigated faux pas detection using a signal detection approach. Given 
that previous faux pas studies suggested dissociable sub-process during faux pas 
detection, it is possible that a successful ‘hit’, or a successful ‘correct rejection’ of a 
faux pas situation relied on different weightings between ToM-related abilities and 
other processes such as social evaluation of embarrassment. For example, in 
real-life situations, it seems quite intuitive that when  people identify the 
embarrassed feeling in oneself or others, and as a consequence give a ‘yes’ 
response, this might require a mental process based on a ToM-related ability. On the 
other hand, to give a ‘no’ response may require more evaluation of whether social 
violations were involved, a mental process relied more on social “rule” evaluation. 
Previous studies have revealed that lateral OFC region is associated with social 
evaluation (Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Babaji, 2003; see 
Cunningham and Zelazo, 2007 for review). Taken together, we hypothesise that the 
accuracy for ‘hits’ (relying, in theory, more on ToM ability) would correlate with GM 
volume in the medial PFC region, whereas the accuracy for ‘correct rejection’ 
(relying more on social evaluation) would correlated with GM volume in the lateral 
OFC region. Furthermore, in signal detection theory, the ‘sensitivity’ indicated the 
degree of overlap between the signal and the noise distributions, and the ‘responses 
bias’ measured the tendency to give a yes or a no response, as determined by the 
location of one’s criterion. As a result, we further calculated the value of d prime (d’) 
as a score for measuring sensitivity, the value of β as a score for measuring 
response bias, and investigate the neural correlates of this two scores relating to 
faux pas detection. The formula we used to calculate the values of d’ and β of the 
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cartoon faux pas test were based on Stanislaw & Todorov (1999) using Excel 
software.  
 
6.6  Behavioural and VBM result in the TD sub-group 
Behavioural investigation into the cartoon faux pas test 
Accuracy 
The behavioural results of the cartoon faux pas test in the TD sub-group 
were summarised in Table 6.2. Repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy first 
revealed that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 (2)=8.333, p=0.016 
in Mauchly’s test), and degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt 
estimates of sphericity (ε=0.910). The result did not find a significant effect of 
condition (F(1.82,110.99)=2.832, p=0.068.  
 
Reaction time 
Repeated measures ANOVA on reaction time first confirmed that the 
sphericity assumption has been met (χ2 (2)=3.702, p=0.157 in Mauchly’s test). The 
result found a significant effect of condition (F(2,122)=8.156, p<0.001), and post-hoc 
test using Bonferroni correction demonstrated that the reaction time in the faux pas 
condition was significantly longer than in the non-faux pas condition (p=0.002) and in 
the comprehension condition (p=0.008). 
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Table 6.2. Accuracy, reaction time (msec.), and the signal detection variables 
including d-prime, β values in the cartoon faux pas test of the TD sub-group (n=62). 
        mean SD 
Accuracy 
Comprehension 0.84  0.11  
Faux pas 0.81  0.13  
Non-faux pas 0.86  0.15  
Reaction time (msec.) 
Comprehension 9385.7 3128.5  
Faux pas 9943.1 3071.0  
Non-faux pas 9377.3 3179.4  
Signal detection variables 
a
  
d-prime 2.31  0.83  
  β     3.70  4.25  
a
 The formula was provided by Stainslaw and Todorov (1999). 
 
 
Correlation analysis 
All the variables deviated from normal distribution (p value below 0.05 in 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test), and Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis was 
conducted in the same way as in the TD group. Within-variable Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation analysis revealed that the accuracy for the faux pas condition 
was significantly correlated with the accuracy for the comprehension condition (rs 
(62)=0.299, p=0.018). No significant correlations were found between the accuracy 
for non-faux pas condition and the accuracy for faux pas condition (rs (62)=-0.202, 
p=0.116), nor with the accuracy for non-faux pas condition and the accuracy for the 
comprehension condition (rs (62)=-0.018, p=0.889). Analysis on the reaction time 
showed significant correlations between the three cartoon conditions (p<0.001 in all 
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three pair-wise analyses). Between-variable variable Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation analysis found no significant correlations for all the three kinds of 
cartoons (all p>0.05). 
 
VBM investigation into the cartoon faux pas test 
The VBM part of the result were summarised in Table 6.3. VBM regression 
analysis first identified a marginal positive significant correlation between the overall 
accuracy for the overall-faux pas cartoons and the GM volume in the lateral OFC at 
[45, 27, -9] (SVC: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Right, p=0.052). No significant 
correlation was found between the GM volume in the PFC region and the accuracy 
for the faux pas cartoons, as well as the comprehension cartoons. The accuracy for 
the non-faux pas cartoons was positively correlated with the GM volume in the 
lateral OFC at [-35, 48, -14], but this correlation did not survive from small volume 
correction (p=0.061) using the AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Left ROI. Visual 
inspection showed that the peak coordinate located anterior to the 
AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Left ROI. Further correction using the 
AAL_Frontal_Middle_Orbital_Left ROI, which covered anterior part of the lateral 
OFC region including BA11 region, confirmed the relationship between this GM 
cluster (peak MNI: -35, 48, -14) and BA11 region (SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Middle_Orbital_Left, p=0.034) (see Figure 6.4, for illustration). 
Regression analysis on the d-prime value revealed a marginal positive correlation 
with the GM volume in the lateral OFC region at [45, 27, -9] (SVC: 
AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Right, p=0.056). Regression analysis on the β value 
found no significant correlation with the GM volume in the PFC region, but whole 
brain exploratory analysis revealed a positive correlation between the β value and 
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bilateral amygdala (left: -17, -4, -15, p=0.007 at cluster-level; right: 18, -1, -14, 
p=0.043 at cluster level) (see Figure 6.5).  
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Table 6.3. The VBM result of the cartoon faux pas test. The GM clusters in the PFC region showing significant correlations with the 
accuracy, signal detection variables (d-prime and β values) in the cartoon faux pas test between conditions (p<0.001, uncorrected for 
whole brain analysis, and p<0.05, FWE-corrected for SVC using different ROIs derived from the AAL atlas). Brodmann areas are 
approximate. 
p<0.001, uncorrected Small Volume Correction (FWE<0.05)
Whole brain analysis AAL_Inferior_Orbital AAL_Superior_Medial AAL_Orbital_Middle
 k t MNI Label p MNI p MNI p MNI
Accuracy
Overall faux pas 21 3.54 [45, 27, -9] BA47 0.052 [45, 27, -9]
Non-faux Pas  16 3.53 [26, 63, 24] BA10
44 3.51 [-35, 48, -14] BA11 0.061 [-36, 50, -15] 0.034 [-35, 48, -14]
Faux Pas 
Comprehension 8 3.78 [23, 62, 30] BA9
49 3.66 [-12, 48, 28] BA9
Signal detection 
d-prime value 21 3.54 [45, 27, -9] BA47 0.056 [45, 27, -9]
β value 3139 4.94 [-18, -76, -32] a cerebellum
1179 4.77 [-17, -4, -15] 
b
 amygdala
    758 4.54 [18, -1, -14] c  amygdala             
a
 whole brain analysis showing cluster-level p(FWE-corr) < 0.001  
b
 whole brain analysis showing cluster-level p(FWE-corr) = 0.007 
c
 whole brain analysis showing cluster-level p(FWE-corr) = 0.043 
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Figure 6.4. The GM volume that significantly correlated with the variables in the 
cartoon faux pas test. (a) Accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons was positively 
correlated with a GM cluster located in the left lateral OFC region. (b) Illustration for 
the location of the GM cluster (coloured in yellow) that positively correlated with 
accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons using two AAL atlas ROI masks: the AAL 
atlas ROI mask in blue colour: AAL_Frontal_Inferior_Orbital_Left, and the AAL atlas 
ROI mask in red colour: AAL_Frontal_Middle_Orbital_Left. 
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Figure 6.5. The GM volume that significantly correlated with the variables in the 
cartoon faux pas test, where the β value of the TD sub-group was positively 
correlated with bilateral amygdala. 
 
6.7  Discussion of the VBM result in the TD sub-group   
The behavioural part of the result on accuracy did not find a significant effect 
of condition, but the pattern remained the same as the ‘baseline’ performance 
established by 103 TD subjects. The accuracy was the highest for the non-faux pas 
cartoons than the faux pas and the comprehension conditions. Analysis on reaction 
time found consistent result as the ‘baseline’ performance in the TD group, where 
subjects in the TD sub-group responded significantly faster in the non-faux pas 
condition than in the faux pas condition. Together these results demonstrated that 
correct rejection of a faux pas, a process we hypothesised to be associated more 
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with social evaluation, accompanied with better and faster performance than correct 
detection of faux pas. Due to the rightward shift of response bias (averaged β 
value=3.7), it was possible that the higher accuracy for non-faux pas cartoons was 
associated with a propensity to give no responses. More importantly, correlation 
analysis on the TD sub-group did not find a significant relationship between the 
accuracy for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons, which was inconsistent 
with the finding established by the 103 TD subjects. It raised a possibility that the 
cognitive process supported correct identification of a faux pas might be different 
from the cognitive process supported correct rejection of a non-faux pas. 
 The VBM part of the results revealed function-structure relationships 
between different cortical regions and different measurements in the cartoon faux 
pas test. The accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons was positively correlated with a 
GM cluster located in lateral BA11 at [-35, 48, -14]. This BA11 region located closely 
to the lesion study reported by Stone et al. (1998), where patients with bilateral OFC 
lesion were found to fail the faux pas test. Similarly in Roca et al. (2010), patients 
with lesions in the PFC region demonstrated deficits on the faux pas test compared 
with the controls, and the location of the BA11 cluster at [-35, 48, -14] in the current 
study was similar to the patient sub-group classified as ‘left-lateral’ lesions. 
Furthermore, Spitzer, Fischbacher, Hermberger, Gron, and Fehr (2007) investigated 
the neural correlates of norm compliance using a social punishment paradigm. The 
test involved two players, a victim and a violator, where the victim could punish the 
violator who did not follow the fairness norms in the punishment condition. The key 
point was to investigate how many more ‘money units’ would the violator transferred 
to the victim in the punishment condition in order to avoid even larger punishment 
due to violator’s unfairness acts. To quantify the degree of social compliance, a 
‘transfer difference’ score was calculated by the amount of money units invested in 
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the punishment and the control condition, a situation where the victim was only a 
passive recipient. Functional MRI result revealed a positive correlation between the 
transfer difference score and brain activations located at [-36, 48, -10]. This 
relationship demonstrated by fMRI implied a special role of this BA11 region played 
in detecting and evaluating the potential social punishment bounded to social norms.  
 It is important to highlight that no significant relationship was found between 
any measurements and the GM volumes in the medial PFC region. Despite that 
brain activity in the medial PFC region was consistently observed in psychological 
test measuring ToM ability in fMRI studies, it is possible that the ToM ability relied 
more on a network instead of solely relied on one single brain region (Frith & Frith, 
1999). For example, a single case study reported a patient with extensive damages 
to the medial PFC region failed to have any significant impairment on ToM tests 
including a faux pas test (Bird et al., 2004). This unique and insightful case 
suggested a possibility that the medial PFC region only played a special role in the 
ToM system, but damage to any part of the network was not sufficient to destroy its 
functional integrity. To justify the ToM ability as a system, we further explored the 
neural correlates outside the PFC region that associated with the measurements in 
the cartoon faux pas test, a GM cluster in BA22 at [-68, -9, 9] was found to positively 
correlated with the accuracy for the faux pas cartoons using a lenient threshold 
(p<0.001, uncorrected). The superior temporal gyrus, which included BA21 and 
BA22 regions, was identified to be one of the core regions in ToM network when 
considering the variations introduced by different experimental paradigm or other 
methodological differences (Carrington and Bailey, 2009). Together these VBM 
results highlighted a potential issue upon understanding ToM ability, which required 
investigation of the function-structure relationship between multiple cortical regions 
in the ToM network as a whole. 
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VBM regression analysis on the signal detection scores found a marginal 
significant relationship between the d-prime value and the GM cluster located in 
BA47 region (peak MNI: 45, 27, -9). In signal detection theory, d-prime value 
represented the sensitivity, or the distance between the mean of signal distribution 
and the mean of noise distribution. The larger the d-prime value indicated the 
greater ability to distinguish signals from noises. The observed marginal d-prime – 
BA47 relationship in the cartoon faux pas test indicated that subjects with larger GM 
volumes in lateral OFC had better capability to distinguish social situations with a 
faux pas from social situations without a faux pas. In previous neuroimaging studies, 
the lateral part of the OFC, or the ventrolateral part of the PFC region (vlPFC) was 
evident to involve with a range of interpersonal behaviours, which included social 
rejection (Sebastian et al., 2010), detecting violations of social exchange in a 
Prisoner’s dilemma game (Rilling et al., 2008), social empathy (Kramer, Mohammadi, 
Donamayor, Samii, & Munte, 2010), social reasoning (Barbey, Krueger, & Grafman, 
2009) and general social evaluations (Cunningham and Zelazo, 2007). Furthermore, 
this lateral OFC region including BA47 was also associated with ToM-related 
activities and was identified as part of the ToM network (Carrington and Bailey, 
2009). A possible common process that underlies these various social behaviours 
was the ability to discriminate the authenticity of the intention from other individual. 
For example, a faux pas was a product of an intentional act based on some false 
belief. It is therefore possible that the lateral OFC region was involved with a general 
process that evaluates the acts came from other individual, given that social 
behaviours are usually opaque and misleading in some senses. 
The β value, which represented the response bias that indicated the location 
of the internal criterion when making decisions, were found to positively correlate 
with the GM volume in bilateral amygdala. The linkage between amygdala and 
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emotional processing has been long evident, where amygdala was involved with 
emotional learning through acquiring association with rewarding or aversive events 
(Gallagher and Chiba, 1996). Previous studies showed that the OFC region was 
anatomically interconnected with other brain regions that encoded reinforcement, 
including amygdala (Schoenbaum, Roesch, & Stalnaker, 2006; Roberts, 2006). 
Other evidences that supported the linkage between the OFC region and amygdala 
revealed the role of the OFC region played in representing reinforcement 
expectations, and related more to changes with emotional responsiveness 
compared with ACC (Izquierdo, Suda, & Murray, 2005; Rushworth, Behrens, 
Rudebeck, & Walton, 2007). It is therefore possible that TD subjects with varying 
size of amygdala were accompanied with different emotional responsiveness to 
social embarrassment, and this internal criterion led to different tendencies of yes- or 
no-bias when facing potential faux pas situations. Together these function-structure 
relationships provided some useful insights of the neural correlates in the ToM 
network associated with social rule violation, a complex cognition that involved both 
rational evaluation and emotional processing. 
 
6.8  Atypical performance of detection to social norm 
violation in ASD subjects 
A faux pas occurs when someone says or does something inappropriate 
unintentionally. To detect a faux pas, one has to represent two mental states: that 
the person who committed the faux pas did not know it was inappropriate, and that 
the person who heard it could feel hurt or embarrassed. As a result, it is seems likely 
that successful faux pas detection involved both cognitive and affective component. 
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The original faux pas test developed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) first established 
the performances of typical-developing children, and further validated the ToM 
nature of the faux pas test by recruiting children with Asperger’s syndrome. The 
results highlighted that, despite the capability to pass false-belief tests, children with 
Asperger’s syndrome had deficits on the faux pas test. Consistent findings were 
reported in other studies using faux pas to investigate ToM-related impairments in 
ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Zalle et al., 2009) and patients with lesions in the 
PFC region (Stone et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2010). In the above experiments using the 
faux pas test, the questions in the testing phase were divided into several 
sub-components including faux pas detection, person identification, false belief, faux 
pas content, faux pas explanation, empathy or affective questions. Despite the 
differences on the questions, one converging result pointed out that ASD subjects 
with clinical diagnosis demonstrated deficits to different sub-components relating to 
understanding faux pas. This suggested successful faux pas responses comprised 
of multiple dissociable mental processes that associated with ToM, cognitive, and 
affective components.  
In the cartoon faux pas test, we used visually presented cartoons to depict 
social scenarios and applied the signal detection approach to investigate the 
processing of faux pas detection. The behavioural results from the large TD group 
revealed that the accuracies for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons were 
not correlated with each other, which implied distinct underlying processing for 
making ‘hit’ and ‘correct rejection’ during faux pas detection. Different and somewhat 
mixed results were reported between the ability to correctly identify a faux pas when 
there was one and correctly reject a non-faux pas when there was none. In 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) study 3, ASD children showed comparable performance 
as the control children on the control stories. However, in Zalla et al. (2009), using 
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ten control stories intermixed with ten faux pas stories, the results demonstrated that 
the ASD group revealed an over-detection to faux pas, where they made fewer 
correct rejections than the TD group. In the current study, we used visually 
presented cartoons to depict social interactions instead of auditory stimuli, where 
audio tapes were used in Baron-Cohen et al., 1999, and oral presentation in Zalla et 
al., 2009. Furthermore, we used the data from a large group of TD subjects (n=103) 
to establish a valid baseline for comparison. As a result, we first examined the 
comprehension ability and overall ability for faux pas detection by combining the 
accuracy for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons together, as Baron-Cohen 
et al. (1999) and Zalla et al. (2009) did, and then the ability to hit and correct 
rejection for faux pas detection separately.  
From the VBM results of the TD group, we demonstrated that the accuracy 
for the non-faux pas cartoons was positively correlated with the GM volume in BA11 
region, a structure that was seen to play an important role in faux pas studies (Stone 
et al., 1998; Roca et al., 2010). Furthermore, the index for sensitivity and response 
bias in signal detection analysis was found to associate with the GM volume in the 
right lateral OFC region (BA47) and bilateral amygdala respectively. This was 
consistent with the account that detecting a faux pas is a complex process that 
involved ToM ability, cognitive evaluation, and affective regulations. Interestingly, 
mixed results relating to different sub-components of faux pas processing were 
reported. In Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) study 2, the ASD children had significantly 
lower total scores than the control group, but no significant group difference was 
found for the false belief questions, a process that putatively involved with 
ToM-related ability. As participants were given 1 point for each faux pas identified 
correctly, and failure of any questions led to a score of zero, the null difference on 
the false belief questions implied that the significant group difference was 
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contributed by faux pas detection or identification. However, in Zalla et al. (2009), 
the performances did not differ between the ASD adults and the TD adults on the 
detection and person identification questions, but significantly lower performances 
were found in ASD adults on the content, explanation, and false belief questions. 
With the advantage of using a signal detection approach to analyse faux pas 
detection, the cartoon faux pas test enabled us to compare the sensitivity and the 
response bias, which correlated with the size of BA47 and amygdala respectively, 
between the ASD and the TD group. This provided insights on the differentiation 
between the cognitive and the affective aspects of successful faux pas recognition. 
Furthermore, previous ASD studies using a signal detection approach to examine 
lower-level functions provided mixed findings. For example, ASD subjects were 
shown to have better performance in judging if the pitch of pure tones was same or 
different by showing higher sensitivity (Bonnel et al., 2003), which was in line with 
the ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ model proposed by Mottron et al. (2006). Yet 
Blake et al. (2003) used signal detection approach to measure perceptual sensitivity 
in ASD children, and the results demonstrated significant impairments on 
distinguishing biological and non-biological motions accompanying with lower 
sensitivity using d-prime as the index. In the cartoon faux pas test, we examined 
subject’s faux pas ability, an advanced ToM measure, using signal detection 
approach. As a result, investigations on the sensitivity and the response bias of faux 
pas detection using d-prime and β values as indices between the ASD and the TD 
groups would provide useful information on higher-level cognitions relating to 
lower-level processing. 
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6.9  Behavioural result between the ASD and the TD groups 
The behavioural results of the cartoon faux pas test in the ASD and the TD 
groups are summarised in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4. Accuracy, reaction time (msec.), and the signal detection variables 
including d-prime, β values in the cartoon faux pas test of the TD and the ASD 
groups. 
          TD   ASD 
          mean SD   mean SD 
Accuracy 
Comprehension 0.81  0.12  0.78  0.12  
Faux pas - overall 0.83  0.09  0.76  0.10  
Faux pas cartoons 0.80  0.12  0.76  0.16  
Non-faux pas cartoons 0.86  0.15  0.77  0.19  
Reaction time (msec.) 
Comprehension 9027.2 2928.5 9186.8  3125.1 
Faux pas - overall 9258.6 2863.0 9893.7  3129.4 
Faux pas cartoons 9509.3 2913.7 10111.6  3166.8 
Non-faux pas cartoons 9007.8 2941.5 9675.9  3229.3 
Signal detection variables 
a
  
d-prime value 2.24  0.83  1.73  0.70  
  β value     3.86  4.41    2.47  4.15  
a
 The formula was suggestedd by Stainslaw and Todorov (1999). 
 
 
Overall faux pas vs. comprehension cartoons 
The accuracy and the reaction time were entered into repeated measures 
ANOVA with condition (overall faux pas and comprehension) as a within-subject 
factor, and group (TD and ASD) as a between-subject factor. Repeated measures 
ANOVA on accuracy find a significant main effect of group (F(1,131)=5.742, 
p=0.018), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction identified that the TD group 
had significantly higher accuracy than the ASD group. No significant effect of 
condition (F(1,131)=0.003, p=0.955) or condition x group interaction 
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(F(1,131)=2.218, p=0.139) was found. Repeated measures ANOVA on reaction time 
identified a significant effect of condition (F(1,131)=10.406, p=0.002), and post-hoc 
test using Bonferroni correction confirmed that the reaction time was significantly 
slower in the overall faux pas condition than in the comprehension condition. No 
significant effect of group (F(1,131)=0.623, p=0.431) or condition x group interaction 
(F(1,131)=2.882, p=0.092) was found.  
 
Faux pas vs. non-faux pas cartoons 
The accuracy and the reaction time were entered into repeated measures 
ANOVA with condition (faux pas and non-faux pas) as a within-subject factor, and 
group (TD and ASD) as a between-subject factor. Repeated measures ANOVA on 
accuracy find a significant main effect of group (F(1,131)=10.232, p=0.002), and 
post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction showed that the TD group had significantly 
higher accuracy than the ASD group. No significant effect of condition 
(F(1,131)=2.154, p=0.145) or condition x group interaction (F(1,131)=1.009, p=0.317) 
was found. Repeated measures ANOVA on reaction time found a significant effect of 
condition (F(1,131)=13.407, p<0.001), and post-hoc test using Bonferroni correction 
confirmed that the reaction time was significantly slower in the faux pas condition 
than in the non-faux pas condition. No significant effect of group (F(1,131)=1.370, 
p=0.244) or condition x group interaction (F(1,131)=0.070, p=0.791) was found.  
 
Signal detection analysis 
In order to examine differences in the sensitivity and the response bias of 
faux pas detection between the ASD and the TD groups, independent t tests 
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measuring d-prime and β value were conducted. The analysis found significant 
difference on d-prime (t(131)=-3.054, p=0.002), where the ASD subjects had 
significantly lower d-prime values than the TD subjects. No significant difference on 
the β value was found (t(131)=1.100, p=0.273). Interestingly, Levene’s test for 
equality of variance showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated on β values (F=4.720, p=0.032), which showed that the variance in the TD 
group (SD=4.40) was significantly higher than in the ASD group (SD=4.15). Due to 
the unequal variance between groups, we used non-parametric test to examine the 
group difference on the β value, and Mann-Whitney test revealed a significant 
difference (U=1180.000, p=0.049), which indicates that the ASD had significantly 
lower β value than the TD group. 
 
6.10  Discussion of the behavioural result between the ASD 
and the TD groups 
The cartoon faux pas test used comic strips to visually present social 
situations, and applied a signal detection approach to address the ability of faux pas 
detection amongst ASD subjects, in comparison with the baseline performance 
established by the TD group. The between-group effect was measured in two stages, 
first the comprehension vs. overall ability in faux pas detection, and the second 
stage focused on ‘correct hit’ and ‘correct rejection’ on faux pas detection using a 
signal detection approach. In the first stage, ASD subjects showed comparable 
accuracy as TD subjects on comprehension and overall faux pas detection. This was 
consistent with the findings in Zalla et al. (2009), which found insignificant difference 
on the detection question between ASD and control subjects. However, when 
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comparing the performance for faux pas and non-faux pas cartoons separately, 
repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of group, which revealed 
that ASD subjects (mean=0.762) had a general deficit to correctly identify and to 
correctly reject a potential social embarrassment than TD subjects (mean=0.824). In 
Zalla et al. (2009), the ASD group tended to over-detect the control stories, where no 
faux pas components were included, as the non-faux pas cartoons in the current 
study. We therefore conducted independent t test to examine this potential 
over-detection effect. The result showed that ASD subject (mean=0.767) had 
significantly lower accuracy in the non-faux pas condition than TD subjects 
(mean=0.854; t(131)=-2.529, p=0.013), but no significant group difference was 
found in the faux pas condition (ASD mean=0.756, TD mean=0.795; t(131)=-1.211, 
p=0.233). Previous ASD studies using faux pas detection as a measurement for 
ToM-related deficit found mixed findings, where the study 3 in Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999) reported no deficits in ASD children on the control stories, but Zalla et al. 
(2009) found over-detection to control stories in ASD adults. In the cartoon faux pas 
test, the results was consistent with the findings in Zalla et al. (2009) by showing 
selective deficits in the ASD group to non-faux pas cartoons. A possible explanation 
for this over-detection, as described in Zalla et al. (2009), was mainly due to the 
difference on the chronological age between the participants. As Happe et al. (1996) 
proposed, a possible reason for ASD children failed to develop an intuitive ToM 
ability during early years was due to mentalizing-like ability was acquired through 
effortful learning processes on the basis of a reasoning mechanism. It seems 
plausible that adults with ASD demonstrated a late-developed compensatory 
mechanism for lab-based social cognition tests, faux pas test in this case, and this 
reasoning mechanism resulted in over-detection to non-faux pas cartoons. It is 
important to note that we did not find a significant group difference on the accuracy 
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for the faux pas cartoons, which was consistent with Zalla et al. (2009). This null 
difference was also in line with a case study reported by Shamay-Tsoory et al. 
(2002), which reported two adolescents with ASD were capable to recognise the 
faux pas stories. A possible explanation of this selective impairment was that, as 
shown in previous ASD studies using faux pas paradigm, successful faux pas 
detection comprised of multiple sub-components. For example, the ToM-related 
deficit might occur in questions relating to content/explanation/false belief/empathy 
in Zalla et al. (2009), and in justification to the inappropriate behaviours in 
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2002). Furthermore, Zalla et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
ASD subjects had difficulties conceptualizing faux pas scenario as non-intentional 
acts, and unable to provide reasonable justification to understand the emotional side 
of the effect during social embarrassment. The lack of group effect specifically to 
correct identification of a potential faux pas might be due to the difference on 
understanding of a faux pas and/or the emotion-related processing (e.g., 
empathizing) between TD adults and ASD adults. Analysis on reaction time did not 
find any significant main effect of group or group x condition interaction. This 
indicated that ASD subjects did not manifest any significant slowness responding to 
the depicted social situations.  
The cartoon faux pas test isolated the comprehension aspect, which enabled 
direct measurement to the ability of faux pas detection using a signal detection 
approach. Analysis of the d-prime value showed that the ASD group had significantly 
lower sensitivity than the TD group, which indicated that the ability to distinguish a 
faux pas from a non-faux pas was significantly poorer amongst ASD subjects. 
Previous ASD studies proposed an ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ model 
(Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006), which emphasised that 
increased perceptual processing implicated an over-functioning of a lower-level 
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brain network. Bonnel, Mottron, Peretz. Trudel, Gallun, and Bonnel (2003) used 
similar signal detection approach to investigate the sensitivity on auditory processing 
and found enhanced pitch sensitivity in ASD subjects. In the current study, we used 
signal detection approach to investigate high-level cognition (e.g., faux pas detection) 
and identified lower sensitivity to social rule violations in ASD subjects instead. This 
seemingly opposite finding suggested that, despite the savant characteristics found 
in lower perceptual processing, this enhanced sensitivity on auditory processing did 
not directly contribute to higher-level cognition like faux pas detection. It is possible 
that lower sensitivity had a profound effect to the lower accuracy for overall-faux pas 
cartoons in ASD subjects, given that the distance between faux pas (signal) and 
non-faux pas (noise) was significantly shorter in ASD subjects than in TD subjects. 
On the other hand, analysis on the β values showed that response bias was more 
positive in the TD group than in the ASD group, which indicated a higher propensity 
for ‘no’ responses in TD subjects than in ASD subjects. This rightward shift on the 
criterion in TD subjects had direct influence on the accuracies for faux pas and 
non-faux pas cartoons. For example, it is possible that the superior performance on 
the accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons in the TD group was contributed by the 
higher β value, whereas the ASD adults implemented a compensatory scheme that 
involved using a reasoning mechanism instead of ToM-related processes to solve 
this puzzle of social awkwardness (Happe and Frith, 1996). Furthermore, it is 
important to note that, the Levene’s test on the β value found unequal variance 
between groups, and the standard deviation was significantly lower in the ASD 
group than in the TD group. When illustrating the β value using scatter plot, it 
revealed a more clustered pattern at the lower end amongst ASD individuals, with an 
exception of three ASD subjects who had β value larger than 13, and the rest of the 
27 ASD subjects had β value below 4. In contrast, the β value was found to be in a 
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more widespread pattern amongst TD individuals without any apparent clustered 
sub-groups. For comparison, the scatter plot of both d-prime and β values from both 
groups were illustrated in Figure 6.6. This was surprising in a sense given that ASD 
subjects were shown to have higher variations on behavioural measures. For 
example, Towgood, Meuwese, Gilbert, Turner, & Burgess (2009) used multiple case 
series approach to investigate the variations of behavioural performance between 
ASD individuals on a range of psychometric tests measuring different cognitive 
functions. The result demonstrate that the ASD group had significantly more 
supra-normal and intra-normal performances both within and between various kinds 
of cognitive tests. In the cartoon faux pas test, when excluding the data of the 3 
‘atypical’ ASD subjects, the β value of the rest of the 27 ASD subjects changed 
drastically to mean=1.121, S.D.=0.82, compared to the original mean=2.457, 
S.D.=4.15. In signal detection, β value approaches 1 means subjects favoured 
neither yes response nor no response. The over-detection of faux pas in the ASD 
group, which was demonstrated by the lower accuracy for non-faux pas cartoons but 
not for faux pas cartoons, might result from the position of the criterion for making 
yes/no response when facing potential social embarrassing situations. TD subjects 
had higher tendency to give no responses and subsequently led to better 
performance for correct rejecting non-faux pas cartoons, whereas the majority of the 
ASD subjects did not show a clear bias on giving yes or no responses. Besides the 
biased response criterion, there are other potential explanations for the lower β 
value and selective deficits to non-faux pas cartoons in the ASD group. As described 
earlier, faux pas detection was identified as a complex cognition that involved 
emotion-related processing (e.g., empathizing). VBM regression analysis based on 
the TD sub-group in chapter6-6 found that the β value was positively correlated with 
the GM volumes in bilateral amygdala. Previous ASD studies using faux pas 
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paradigm reported two ASD cases had severe empathic deficits (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2002), and observed impairments to affective perspective taking (Zalla et al., 
2009). Based on the neural correlates established by the TD sub-group, and referred 
the β value – amygdala linkage as ‘typical’, the un-biased neural position of criterion 
amongst ASD individuals might suggest an atypical regulation to emotional impact in 
faux pas detection. 
 
 
Figure 6.6.The scatter plot of the d-prime (in panel a) and β values (in panel b) of 
the ASD and the TD groups. 
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Chapter 7. PFC battery revisit 
7.1  From within-test effect to between-test effect   
Previous functional imaging literatures together with lesion studies provide 
convergent evidence showing that the PFC region, as a whole, plays an essential 
role in a range of psychological paradigms measuring decision-making and social 
cognition. In order to investigate the relationship between different PFC sub-regions 
and the specific cognitive processes they support, we developed PFC battery using 
a set of psychometric tests measuring different behaviours relating to 
decision-making and social cognition. The establishment of the PFC battery was 
based on a reverse engineering approach, where the cognitive functions that were 
evidently associated with the PFC region were first identified. Based on previous 
related paradigms, we then designed four new psychometric tests measuring the 
functions supported by the PFC region. In chapter 3 to 6, we introduced the four 
newly developed psychometric tests, reported the behavioural and VBM results in 
both TD and ASD groups, and discussed the potential implication of each test. The 
behavioural data acquired from 107 healthy TD subjects established the ‘baseline’ 
performance of the PFC battery, which were then used to identify the ‘atypical’ 
performance in the ASD group. In order to examine the function-structure 
relationship between specific PFC sub-regions, we further conducted VBM 
regression analysis to identify the neural correlates that were associated with the 
variables measured by the PFC battery using the data acquired from the 62 TD 
subjects suitable for MRI scanning. The hypothesis-testing approach using 
ROI-based analysis demonstrated consistent function-structure links observed in the 
related functional imaging literature. However, the previous PFC battery chapters of 
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this thesis only showed the effect within each newly developed psychometric test. In 
the current chapter, we take the four psychometric tests as a whole, and explore the 
between-test effect of the PFC battery following various kinds of methodological 
approaches suggested by previous theoretical frameworks investigating PFC 
functions.  
 
7.2  Is the PFC region a functionally homogeneous or 
heterogeneous region? 
Despite convergent evidence demonstrating that the PFC region plays an 
important role in higher-level cognition, the mapping of specific PFC sub-regions to 
specific cognitive function is debatable and often yields inconsistent findings. By 
comparison, for other cortical functions, robust linkages are observed between brain 
regions like visual, auditory, motor, somatosensory cortices and the lower-level 
processes they support (see Kanai and Rees, 2011 for review). In the PFC region, 
different theories have different points of view in regard to the function-structure 
relationship in the PFC region. For example, in Ramnani and Owen (2004), the 
anterior PFC region was proposed to be a functionally homogeneous region, where 
“the level of functional description must accommodate the range of tasks that reliably 
recruit the anterior PFC, and the recruitment of that area alone should be the 
common link between those tasks” (p.185). On the other hand, other literatures 
suggest that the PFC is a functionally dissociated region where a specific type of 
behaviour corresponds to activation in a particular PFC sub-region (Duncan and 
Owen, 2000; Stuss et al., 2001; Stuss, 2007). In other words, a frequently debatable 
point is that it is possible that the entire PFC region is associated with a set of 
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functions altogether, or one specific region is associated with a particular function, or 
a range of similar functions that inter-correlate with each other. Using functional 
imaging techniques, evoked brain activations provide evidence based on links 
between changes in regional blood flow and accompanying cognitive processes. 
Functional imaging findings enable us to localise the activation in an approximate 
brain region, but provide relatively poor spatial resolution especially when 
distinguishing detailed brain regions according to cytoarchitectural features. 
Structural-based analyses like VBM, on the other hand, provide evidence about 
relations between regional GM volume (or density, depending on which modulation 
approach is conducted) and the capability for particular mental abilities. More 
importantly, the ROI we used was derived from the AAL atlas, which was based on 
manual macro-anatomical parcellation of the single subject MNI space template 
brain (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). As a result, the VBM results reported in 
previous chapters provide more solid evidence on the relationship between detailed 
brain structure and the mental abilities supported by them. Importantly, before 
making any further interpretations on between-test effects, it is necessary to 
examine the relationships between the variables between tests used for VBM 
regression analysis. 
In chapters 3 to 6, the VBM part of the analysis found the variables derived 
from each test were associated with different PFC sub-regions. The identified 
function-structure relationships were established by small volume corrections using 
the ROIs derived from the AAL atlas. The observed neural correlates associated 
with the measurements in the PFC battery were mainly in the dorsomedial part of the 
PFC region and the lateral part of the OFC region. Despite the fact that the 
associations between the variables and the regional PFC volumes in each test were 
consistent with the relating fMRI findings investigating decision-making and social 
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cognition, it is important to note that some variables derived from different tests were 
associated with the PFC sub-region labelled by the same ROI. For example, overall 
repetitiveness in the win condition, the risk rate for RA trials in the win condition, the 
overall repetitiveness in the loss condition of the gambling test, along with the 
accuracies for high-mentalizing and group conversation videos, were all associated 
with the same GM cluster in the dorsomedial PFC region (ROI: 
AAL_Frontal_Superior_Medial_Left). As mentioned in chapter 2, the rationale 
behind establishing the PFC battery was based on a reverse engineering approach 
by first identifying the cognitive function that supported by the PFC region, and then 
designing new psychometric tests measuring them. Here we showed that the 
volume of the same PFC sub-region seemed to associate with different cognitive 
functions. As a result, it seems necessary to consider the inter-relationships between 
the cognitive functions we tried to measure in the PFC battery. 
The overlap between the underlying processes associated with risk-taking 
and inter-personal behaviours are frequently discussed from various kinds of 
perspectives. For example, Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 
(1999) reported two adults with early PFC lesions and administered comprehensive 
neuropsychological evaluations on them. The result showed that damage to the PFC, 
mainly in the medial PFC region, resulted in impairment of social behaviours, 
insensitivity to future consequences of decisions, defective autonomic responses to 
punishment contingencies, and response failure to interventions. This lesion study 
suggested abnormal social behaviours and impairments in cognitive flexibility, a 
critical process for decision-making, might involve the medial part of the PFC. 
Additionally, Steinberg (2008) proposed a framework that discussed the relationship 
between social neuroscience and risk-taking behaviours. The framework proposed 
that one of the critical developments from adolescence to adulthood is a decline in 
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risk-taking actions. This was accompanied with the changes in the brain’s cognitive 
control system, which showed improvement in an individual’s capacity for 
self-regulation, a function that is putatively substantially associated with the PFC 
region. This development of a neural system allows individuals to put a ‘brake’ on 
impulsive risk-seeking actions and, socially, attenuates the influence from other 
individuals. Together these theories indicate a potential relationship between 
decision-making and social cognition, as well as their common structural linkage to 
the medial PFC region.  
 Given that the aim of the PFC battery was to examine function-structure 
relationships in the PFC region, it is possible that the cognitive functions measured 
by the PFC battery were inter-correlated in some senses, and can be explained by 
some overlapping or common construct that accommodates a range of seemingly 
different mental processes. For example, Ramnani and Owen (2004) proposed five 
theoretical accounts that described the functions supported by the rostral PFC 
region, including discussing the possibility of the rostral PFC region as a functional 
homogeneous region. However, other researchers suggest that the PFC region is a 
‘versatile’ structure, where similar brain activation can be observed when performing 
a wide range of cognitive tests (Cabeza and Nyberg, 1997; 2000; Duncan and Owen, 
2000). This particular functional role of a PFC region was also motivated from single 
cell electrophysiology studies in monkeys, where neurons of lateral PFC appear able 
to code specific information and adapt their activities to different experimental 
contexts (Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997; Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 
2001; Duncan, 2001). These adaptive neural activities are commonly observed in 
many PFC sub-regions including the lateral PFC region and the dorsomedial PFC 
region (Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2012), and have therefore been referred 
as a multiple-demand (MD) system, that organises many different kinds of 
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behaviours (Duncan, 2006, 2010). As a result, in order to examine these possible 
theories regarding PFC functions, we followed the rationale of previous relating 
literatures and conducted statistical analysis of the data acquired from the PFC 
battery.  
 
7.3  PFC region and intelligence 
Early during the development of cognitive psychology, it was proposed that 
there is a general factor (g factor) that contributes to the processing of all cognitive 
functions (Spearman, 1904, 1927), and a potential measure of this common process 
is those that purport to measure general intelligence. Laboratory-based tests 
measuring this intelligence quotient (IQ), like Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven 
and Court, 1998), provide reliable measurements on ‘fluid intelligence’ based on 
novel problem solving using different materials. Previous studies have demonstrated 
that people with PFC lesions can have impairments on fluid intelligence tests and 
have demonstrated this g factor can be closely associated with PFC functions 
(Duncan et al., 1995; 1996; 2000). Furthermore, different PFC sub-regions including 
BA9, 10, 46 have been identified as supporting a range of measurements of IQ 
(Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire, 2004; Barbey, Colom, & Grafman, 2013). In 
addition, a series of studies on a variety of frontal lobe pathologies including patients 
with frontal lobe lesions, Parkinson’s disease, frontotemporal dementia, and 
schizophrenia have been conducted to examine executive functions deficits (Roca et 
al., 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014). The converging results showed that, although PFC 
supported a range of cognitive functions, a potential parcellation based on the 
degree of contribution of fluid intelligence was consistently observed. For one set of 
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neuropsychological tests measuring executive function, the between-group 
differences became insignificant after the effect of fluid intelligence was partialled 
out by ANCOVA. This suggested that the deficits were associated with the core 
function of the MD system, which supports complex cognition during a series of 
attentional episodes (Duncan, 2013). In contrast, for another set of 
neuropsychological tests measuring multi-tasking, social cognition and risky 
decision-making, the between-group differences remained significant after the effect 
of fluid intelligence was partialled out. This indicated that the deficits cannot be 
explained by the general factor and may relate to other PFC regions outside the 
frontal-parietal MD system (Duncan, 2010). In previous PFC battery chapters, we 
developed new psychometric tests measuring different aspects of decision-making 
and social cognition, and identified the deficits observed in the ASD group, 
compared with the baseline performance established by the TD group. Previous 
ASD studies revealed that people with ASD had both structural and functional 
abnormalities in the medial PFC region (Waiter et al., 2004; Carper and Courchesne, 
2005; Schmitz, Rubia, Daly, Smith, Williams, & Murphy, 2006; Courchesne, Campell, 
& Solso, 2011; McAlonan et al., 2005; Gilbert, Gollowitzer, Cohen, Burgess, & 
Oettingen, 2009). Therefore, before examining the underlying processes measured 
by the PFC battery, it seems necessary to first test the contribution of this general 
factor to the PFC battery performance. As a result, in the current chapter, we 
re-examined if the between-group difference still existed after the general 
intelligence effect (the NART score, in the current study) was partialled out by 
ANCOVA. Furthermore, we examined the relationships between the experimental 
variables across different PFC battery tests that significantly correlated with the 
NART score, and further investigated the neural correlates that associated with the 
NART score. The NART is a test of irregular word reading, which is of course a test 
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of crystallized rather than fluid intelligence. However, here it is used as a proxy for 
fluid IQ since in a healthy population they should be highly correlated. 
 
7.4  PFC region and gender 
Compared with the series of studies conducted by Roca et al., (2011; 2012; 
2013; 2014) examining executive functions deficits in neurological patients, in the 
previous PFC battery chapters in this thesis we recruited adults diagnosed with ASD, 
a clinical group that typically show deficits on decision-making and social cognition, 
as well as structural abnormality in the PFC region. More specifically, ASD is a 
gender-linked developmental disorder encompassing impairments in social 
interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication, and gender was evident to have 
profound effect on brain structure and functions in ASD subjects (Lai et al., 2011; 
2013). Similarly, in TD subjects, a widely-cited VBM study of 465 normal adults 
revealed that females, compared with males, have significantly increased GM 
volume in the right lateral orbital region and cingulate gyrus (Good et al., 2001). It is 
important to note that these two PFC sub-regions were discovered to associate with 
a range of experimental variables in the PFC battery. In previous studies 
investigating PFC functions from developmental perspective, it was reported that 
males and females have age-related changes across the period of adolescence in 
the medial PFC region (Giedd et al., 1999; Mills et al., 2014). The transition period of 
adolescence can be considered as a preparation stage for fulfilling a person’s role 
as an adult. For example, daily behaviours relating to social interactions change 
dramatically during adolescence, and functional changes have also been discovered 
between adolescence and adulthood in pattern of brain activity within the social 
  
223 
 
 
brain network (Frith, 2007; Blakemore, 2008), a theoretical framework involving the 
medial PFC region. In TD subjects, gender-related differences were observed in a 
range of cognitive tests including risky decision-making (e.g., IOWA gambling test, 
see van den Bos et al., 2013) and alteration of social interactions (Bussey and 
Bandura, 1999). Previous studies found that females score significantly higher than 
males in tests required perspective-taking, the capacity to understand others’ mental 
states, and the faux pas test (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). 
When comparing risk-taking behaviours, Lee, Chan, Leung, Fox, & Gao (2009) used 
a Risky-Gains test and showed that female participants, compared with male 
participants, make significantly more safe options. It appears that converging 
evidence has demonstrated that gender-related difference, both functionally and 
structurally, has strong linkage to the PFC region. As a result, we hypothesised that 
both TD and ASD subjects might show gender-related difference on the behaviours 
measured by the PFC battery. In order to examine this possibility, we examined the 
group x gender interaction on the variables associated with risky decision-making 
(the overall risk rate and the overall repetitiveness in the gambling test) and social 
cognition (the accuracies for mentalizing and faux pas detection). Furthermore, we 
also examined the neural correlates that showed gender-related differences within 
the PFC region, and investigated the relationships between the variables showing 
gender difference in the PFC battery. 
 
7.5  PFC region and the function is supported 
Besides investigating the potential contributions from mediating factors such 
as general intelligence and gender discussed earlier, it is also important to answer 
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questions concerning the exact underlying processes the PFC battery measured. 
The establishment of the four psychometric tests included in the PFC battery 
focused on two seemingly different functions, one was decision-making and the 
other social cognition. We discussed the previous lesion and neuropsychological 
evidence suggesting the overlap between these two domains, and as a result, it is 
possible that the number of underlying processes we measured in the PFC battery 
were fewer that we expected. In other words, a rather radical possibility was that the 
four tests actually measured one single complex construct. Alternatively, it was also 
possible that the mental processes associated with the four different tests were 
inter-correlated with each other. For example, to do or not to do a certain action 
under a specific context is probably the most common decision in everyday life, and 
we were often required to make decisions under uncertain situations. In 
laboratory-based conditions, gambling paradigms provided opportunities to receive 
rewards or punishments by making voluntary decisions after evaluating potential 
risks (e.g., the win and the loss conditions in the gambling test). However, not every 
decision we made was under uncertainty, for example, the decisional processes 
based on one’s own internal metric can be ‘risk-free’. Daily situations like choosing to 
start a conversation with a stranger in a bar (e.g., the personality condition in the 
referential judgment test) or deciding to lift a heavy grocery bag with your preferred 
hand (e.g., the weight condition in the referential judgment test) were the kinds of 
decisions without external uncertainty. These decision-making processes could be 
accomplished solely relied on one’s own internal construct. The idea of this personal 
construct proposed by George Kelly described individual’s understanding toward 
events that were influenced by one’s own anticipation. Specifically, processing a 
construct related to ‘self’ was argued to be processed differently from other 
constructs, and the idea of self-referential processing could be viewed as a mental 
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process that people referred to themselves as an anchor, or reference point. In daily 
situations, some decisions we make might involve others, and the ability to consider 
another’s perspective is an important skill of our lives.  As a result, making 
inferences about another’s mind is a kind of social behaviour requiring inter-personal 
judgment (Mitchell et al., 2005). The ability to make correct inferences about another 
person’s mental states or belief is one of the abilities associated with ‘Theory of Mind’ 
(e.g., the accuracy for making correct decisions in the video mentalizing test). When 
social groups become bigger, in order to have harmonic inter-personal relationships 
with other members, people tend to consider some social behaviour as ‘standard’, 
and view them as social norm. As long as there are standardised behaviours, there 
are violations to the social norm as well. Therefore, it is essential for individuals to 
detect inappropriate social behaviours that make people feel embarrassed (e.g., the 
accuracy for detecting faux pas and correct rejecting non-faux pas in the cartoon 
faux pas test). The internal standard that determines embarrassment from 
non-embarrassment and the criterion that distinguished norm from violation could be 
considered as the ability to detect a faux pas using a signal detection approach. As 
described above, despite the four psychometric tests measuring different aspects of 
functions supported by the PFC region, the underlying processes we measured in 
the PFC battery linked with each other in some senses. Moreover, the VBM part of 
the results reported in each test validated the function-structure associations in 
different PFC sub-regions using a hypothesis-testing approach. As suggested earlier, 
it is critical to understand the inter-relationships between the underlying processes 
measured by the variables in each test. In order to investigate how many 
independent cognitive components measured in the PFC battery, we conducted 
principal component analysis (PCA), a dimension reduction method, to identify the 
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potential components across the four psychometric tests included in the PFC 
battery. 
 
7.6  The PFC region and individual differences 
In terms of the acquired deficits in patients with neurological disorders, the 
observed atypical performance can vary case-by-case. Structurally, there is no 
doubt that there are no two brains that are completely identical, and the variation 
between pathological patients is expected to be greater, which may lead to greater 
observable difference in their symptoms. In the cognitive neuropsychology literature, 
famous single-case studies like Phineas Gage who suffered from injuries in the PFC 
region provide fruitful insights into human cognitive functions. Cognitive 
neuropsychology not only focusses on understanding how the normal or typical 
cognitive network is organised, but also investigates atypical individuals, which 
provide strong evidence on the relationship between brain structure and cognition. 
The single-case approach of pathological studies has studied psychometric tests in 
a wide range of domains including perception, memory, language, and executive 
functions (see Shallice, 1988 for review).  
In previous PFC battery chapters, the pathological group we investigated 
was adults with ASD, a neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by repetitive 
mannerisms, impairments in social interactions, as well as verbal and non-verbal 
communication difficulties. Previous investigators have proposed that it seems 
unlikely that there is one single deficit that covers the wide range of ASD symptoms 
demonstrated on cognitive tests, but instead that there are complex patterns of 
associations of deficits between and within domains (Happe, Ronald, & Plomin, 
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2006). Evidences from neuroimaging studies suggests that people with ASD have 
an abnormal pattern of functional specialisation in the PFC region (Gilbert, Meuwese, 
Towgood, Frith, & Burgess, 2009) and outside the PFC region (Pierce, Muller, 
Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001). In previous ASD studies, the deficits were 
typically identified by using between group statistics across a range of cognitive 
domains. However, this traditional approach does not always yield converging 
results, and studies using different psychometric tests measuring the same construct 
have led to inconsistent findings, with some finding significant deficits yet some 
finding null results. Hill (2004) reviewed the literature investigating deficits relating to 
executive functions in ASD and found mixed results. In ToM tests, on the other hand, 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) developed the classic ‘Sally-Anne’ test and found children 
with ASD failed this test by assessing false belief compared with typical-developing 
children. However, not every ASD children failed the ‘Sally-Anne’ test in 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), and mixed findings on ToM deficits amongst ASD 
individuals is also evident in numerous subsequent studies (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 
1995). Thus even with the feature that most theorists these days argue is 
fundamental to ASD (ToM deficits), the evidence shows some inconsistencies. 
Perhaps the only converging outcome is that ASD individuals demonstrate 
an uneven pattern of cognitive strengths and weakness (Frith, 2003). The reported 
deficits in Frith (2003) included poor language comprehension, working memory 
deficits, failures to use context to support memory, poor memory for complex visual 
information, difficulties with planning, and problems with set shifting attention. On the 
other hand, strengths were also reported in spatial reasoning, abstract problem 
solving, and performances required focussed attention. A possible explanation was 
the experimental design of the psychometric tests implemented. Happe and Frith 
(2006) reviewed over 50 ASD studies and found some paradigms generate 
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consistent results but some lead to inconsistent or even negative findings. Another 
possible explanation for the disparity of the discoveries in ASD studies is that the 
clinical diagnosis might incorporate subjects with high variations in strengths and 
weakness across different domains, perhaps suggesting multiple distinct sub-groups 
amongst the recruited ASD population. Furthermore, it is also possible that the 
attentional deficits in ASD cause perturbations during test administration. Some 
researchers have proposed that the impaired performances in ASD are due to 
deficits in some fundamental processes including language comprehension, 
perception or short-term attention, where minor difference lead to major effects on 
performance. The sources of the attentional variations include deficits in using social 
cues efficiently compared with controls, or the enhanced performances on tests 
requiring focussed attention. It is likely that these unpredictable impairments during 
processing lower-level features (e.g., stimulus materials) affect performances 
particularly when using paradigms targeted at higher-level cognitions (e.g., 
decision-making and social cognition).  
The variation in behavioural performance on the variables measured by the 
PFC battery was also found in the ASD group. Some significant atypical 
performances in the ASD group were supra-normal, and some were sub-normal, 
compared with the baseline established by the TD group. This suggests a marked 
heterogeneity of abilities in the ASD group across a range of domains supported by 
the different PFC sub-regions. Analysis at the group level can only reveal the 
abnormality in a general sense, instead of discovering variations between each ASD 
individual. Towgood et al. (2009) therefore used a multiple case series approach to 
analysis to demonstrate the greater functional heterogeneity of the ASD subjects. 
However, the psychometric tests included in Towgood et al. (2009) covered a wide 
range of functions. In the current study, all the psychometric tests we conducted 
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measured functions putatively supported by different PFC sub-region evident by 
VBM regression analysis in previous PFC battery chapters. As a result, we followed 
the rationale described in Towgood et al. (2009) and examined the size of the 
individual differences within the ASD subjects. More detailed procedure is described 
in the later method section below.  
 
7.7  PFC region and potential diagnostic tool for predicting 
ASD population 
The evidence provided by the single-case studies was established by an 
empirical procedure with several stages of scientific examinations. First, the core 
cognitive deficits of the pathological subject needed to be identified, and a 
theoretical model was proposed to describe the relevant cognitive network that 
putatively associated with the observed symptoms. Then intensive investigations 
involving a series of psychometrical tests seeking to isolate the underneath 
processes that underpinning the impairment were conducted, and in the meantime 
excluding other possibilities or controlled for potential confounds. As a result, the 
process of the investigation required a range of psychometric tests that measuring 
the latent construct that tapped on the deficits, and eventually developed reliable 
psychometric measurements that had strong power to predict group membership 
when no further information was provided. In order to achieve this, we conducted 
binary logistic regression analysis to identify the measurements that had good 
predictive power for distinguishing ASD subjects from TD subjects. 
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7.8  Experimental hypotheses and the variables included 
for analyses 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the between-test effects of the 
PFC battery. This included the analyses of 1) the contribution of general intelligence 
to between-group difference; 2) the group x gender interaction on variables 
measuring decision-making and social cognition; 3) the identification of potential 
components in the PFC battery; 4) the single-case approach analysis to the atypical 
performance in the ASD group; 5) identification of the diagnostic tools for identifying 
ASD subjects. In order to describe the variables in each test briefly, we used 
abbreviation to refer to each variable in the following sections. In the gambling test, 
or the G test, the overall risk rate, overall repetitiveness, and overall reaction times 
were referred as G_wrate, G_lrate, G_wrep in the win condition, and G_lrep, G_wrt 
and G_lrt in the loss condition. In the referential judgment test, or the R test, the 
consistency score and the overall reaction times were referred as R_pscore, R_prt in 
the personality condition, and R_wscore and R_wrt in the weight condition. In the 
video mentalizing test, or the M test, the accuracies for high-mentalizing, 
low-mentalizing, dyad conversation, and group conversation videos were referred as 
M_highacc, M_lowacc, M_dyadacc, M_groupacc, and the reaction times were 
referred as M_highrt, M_lowrt, M_dyadrt, M_grouprt. In the cartoon faux pas test, or 
the F test, the accuracies for comprehension, faux pas, and non-faux pas cartoons 
were referred as the F_compacc, F_fpacc, F_nfpacc, and the reaction times were 
referred as F_comprt, F_fprt, and F_nfprt. The d prime and β score representing the 
sensitivity and the response criterion were referred as F_dprime and F_β 
respectively.  
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7.9  Methods of the between-test analysis 
Subjects 
In order to have equal numbers of subjects for examining between-test effect, 
we included the 103 TD adults (55 males, 53 females) and 30 adults with ASD (20 
males, 10 females) having complete data for all the four psychometric tests in the 
PFC battery for statistical analyses. No significant differences were found between 
the age and NART between the TD and the ASD groups (see Table 7.1). All the 30 
ASD subjects had IQ measured with the WAIS and had Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ: Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). In the TD group, 
49 TD subjects had WAIS and 35 had AQ score.  
 
Table 7.1. The demographic information of TD and ASD subjects included for the 
between-test analysis in chapter7.   
  TD group  ASD group  p-value 
Subject number 103 30 
male/female 55 20 0.216 
c
  
Age 32.41 36.1 0.098 
NART 115.82 114.3 0.295 
Verbal IQ 
a
  113.8 116.4 0.416 
Performance IQ 
a
  111.12 110.1 0.896 
AQ 
b
  16.11 35.3 <0.001 
a
 n=49 in the TD group 
b
 n=35 in the TD group 
c
 The significance was calculated using Fisher's Exact test 
 
 
PFC battery variables for analysis 
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All the variables included for statistical analyses in the current chapter, 
including ANCOVA, ANOVA, PCA, multiple case series approach analysis, and 
binary logistic regression analysis, were derived from the four tests in the PFC 
battery. However, based on the purpose and constraint for different statistical 
analysis, the variables and the format of the variables included were different.  
For PCA, any computed variables (or linearly transformed variables) were 
excluded, due a correlation of almost 1 with the raw, untransformed values. For 
example, in the video mentalizing test, the variables included for PCA were the 
accuracies for high-mentalizing dyad, high-mentalizing group, low-mentalizing dyad 
and low-mentalizing group videos instead of the averaged accuracies for the high vs. 
low-mentalizing and/or dyad vs. group conversation videos. Similarly, in the cartoon 
faux pas test, d-prime and β values were not included for PCA. In the gambling test, 
given that the repetitiveness variables were calculated by a V-shaped transformation, 
not linearly transformed, the repetitiveness variables were included for PCA. 
Furthermore, the aim of PCA was to examine the potential construct in the PFC 
battery, the variables included were organised in the same direction. In order to 
achieve this, all the reaction time variables were mirrored as the negative values, 
e.g., turned a reaction time of 15000 msec. as -15000 msec. As a result, the higher 
the values for any non-reaction time variable indicated better performances, and the 
higher the values for any reaction time variable represented better performances as 
well. When it comes to between groups PCA, given that the ASD group were 
subjects diagnosed with deficits on social interactions and stereotyped behaviours, it 
is possible that the ASD and the TD groups considered the observable variables in 
the PFC battery in a distinct way. Hence, we conducted PCA for TD and ASD 
subjects separately.  
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For all the rest of the analyses, including ANCOVA, ANOVA, multiple case 
series approach and binary logistic regression analysis, we included transformed 
variables and focused on identifying factors that distinguished group difference and 
membership. For example, in the video mentalizing test, robust findings revealed 
that people with ASD had selective difficulty on responding to social situation relying 
on high intentionality. We used averaged accuracy and reaction time collapsing the 
complexity factor and examined the effect between videos with high vs. low 
intentionality. In the cartoon faux pas test, we included the d-prime and β values for 
analysis, given that previous studies identified signal detection related atypicality 
amongst ASD subjects. The variables included for each statistical analysis were 
listed in Table 7.2.   
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Table 7.2. The variables in each test of the PFC battery that included in the between-test analysis in chapter7. 
PFC battery test Variables included for statistical analysis
The gambling test G_wrate, G_lrate, G_wrep, G_lrep, G_wrt, G_lrt
The referential judgment test R_pscore, R_wscore, R_prt, R_wrt 
The video mentalizing test 
a
  M_highacc, M_lowacc, M_highrt, M_lowrt 
The cartoon faux pas test 
b
  F_fpacc, F_nfpacc, F_compacc, F_fprt, F_nfprt, F_comprt, F_dprime, F_beta 
a
 M_highdyadacc, M_highgroupacc, M_lowdyadacc, M_lowgroupacc, M_highdyadrt, M_highgrouprt, M_lowdyadrt, M_lowgrouprt for PCA 
b
 F_dprime, F_beta were excluded for PCA 
  
  
235 
 
 
7.10  Results of the between-test analysis 
ANCOVA analysis of general intelligence 
Behavioural result  
The results of all the between-group effects in the four psychometric tests 
without partialling out the NART score were reported in the previous chapters. The 
ASD group had significantly slower reaction time, compared with the TD group, in 
G_wrt, G_lrt, R_prt, R_wrt, and M_highrt. In addition, compared with the TD group, 
the ASD group demonstrated significantly higher scores in G_wrep, and had 
significantly lower scores in M_highacc, F_nfpacc, and F_dprime. Before conducting 
ANCOVA with NART as the controlled variable, we first examined the correlations 
between the NART score and each variable in the TD and the ASD groups. 
Spearman rank-order correlation analysis revealed that G_wrep was the only 
variable that had significant relationship with the NART score in both groups. The 
NART score was significantly correlated with G_wrt, G_lrt, M_highacc, F_nfpacc, 
F_dprime only in the TD group, but not in the ASD group (see Table 7.3.). Next, we 
used ANCOVA to partial out the contribution of IQ (the NART score in the current 
study), and the result showed that all the variables that demonstrated significant 
group difference remained significant after the NART score was introduced as a 
covariate of non-interest. 
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Table 7.3. The mean of the PFC battery variables showing significant group effect and their correlations between the NART score, as 
well as the significance before and after the NART score was introduced as a covariate of non-interest in ANCOVA model. 
            Spearman's Spearman's Main effect of group: Main effect of group: 
PFC battery mean mean correlation correlation before NART was after NART was 
variable  (ASD group) (TD group) with NART with NART introduced as a introduced as a 
            (TD group) (ASD group) covariate covariate
G_wrt (msec.)  1671.1 1389.5 -0.241 * 0.255 p=0.007 p=0.007
G_lrt(msec.) 1767.8 1481.0 -0.262 ** 0.123 p=0.035 p=0.028
G_wrep 81.15 72.38 0.261 ** 0.368 * p=0.017 p=0.006
R_prt(msec.)  2685.5 1947.5 -0.092 -0.022 p=0.002 p=0.002
R_wrt(msec.)  2063.1 1562.8 -0.145 0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
M_highacc 0.63 0.74 0.236 * -0.107 p<0.001 p=0.001
M_highrt(msec.)  13485.4 12013.9 0.072 0.332 p=0.017 p=0.026
F_nfpacc 0.77 0.85 0.254 ** 0.008 p=0.013 p=0.019
F_dprime   1.73 2.23 0.309 ** 0.059 p=0.003 p=0.005
* p<0.05 (two-tailed); ** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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VBM result 
In VBM analysis, when putting age, gender and total intra-cranial volume as 
covariate of no interest in the regression model, no GM cluster were significantly 
correlated with the NART score in both positive and negative directions. 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA on group x gender  
Repeated measures ANOVA models were set up using group (TD vs. ASD) 
and gender (male vs. female) as the between-subject factor, and the experimental 
condition in each of the four tests in the PFC battery as the within-subject factor.  
 
The gambling test 
The analysis of the overall risk rate in the win and the loss conditions showed 
only significant main effect of condition (F(1,129)=17.352, p<0.001), where the 
overall risk rate in the loss condition was significantly higher than the overall risk rate 
in the win condition. No significant main effect of group, gender, and any interactions 
were found. The analysis of the overall repetitiveness showed a significant main 
effect of condition (F(1,129)=43.551, p<0.001), where the overall repetitiveness was 
significantly higher in the win condition than in the loss condition. The analysis did 
not find a significant effect of gender (F(1,129)=3.622, p=0.059). Importantly, 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant condition x group x gender 
interaction (F(1,129)=17.385, p<0.001). Follow-up analysis showed that the group x 
gender interaction was only significant in the loss condition (F(1,129)=7.883, 
p=0.006), but not significant in the win condition (F(1,129)=1.409, p=0.237). 
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Independent t test confirmed that the significant interaction in the loss condition was 
contributed by a significant effect of gender in the ASD group (male: 74.69; female: 
50.75; t(28)=2.357, p=0.026), but the gender effect was not significant in the TD 
group (male: 65.51; female: 61.91; t(101)=-0.498, p=0.619) (see Figure 7.1, for 
illustration). 
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Figure 7.1. The significant group x gender x condition interaction on the overall 
repetitiveness in the gambling test. The group x gender interaction in the win 
condition was illustrated in the left panel, and the group x gender interaction in the 
loss condition was demonstrated in the right panel. 
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The referential judgment test 
 The analysis showed a significant main effect of condition (F(,129)=11.557, 
p=0.004), where subjects had higher consistency score in the weigh condition than 
in the personality condition. No significant main effects of group, gender, and any 
interactions were found. 
 
The video mentalizing test 
Analysis of the accuracy in the video mentalizing test revealed a significant 
main effect of group (F(1,129)=8.933, p=0.003), where the ASD group had 
significantly lower accuracy than the TD group in general. Repeated measures 
ANOVA also demonstrated a marginal significant condition x group interaction 
(F(1,129)=3.788, p=0.054). Independent t test confirmed that the effect was driven 
by significant group difference to high-mentalizing videos (ASD: 0.63; TD: 0.74; 
t(131)=-3.646, p<0.001), but the group effect was not significant to low-mentalizing 
videos (ASD: 0.68; TD: 0.72; t(131)=-1.215, p=0.226). 
 
The cartoon faux pas test 
Repeated measures ANOVA measuring the accuracy found a significant 
main effect of group (F(1,129)=7.614, p=0.007), which showed that TD subjects 
made significantly more accurate response to the cartoons than ASD subjects did in 
general. No significant gender, condition, and any interactions were found. Analysis 
of the d-prime value found a significant main effect of group (F(1, 129)=7.865, 
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p=0.006). No significant gender and group x gender interactions were found. 
Analysis of the β value did not find any significant effect of group, gender, and group 
x gender interaction. 
 
VBM analysis of gender in the TD sub-group 
 When putting age and total intra-cranial volume as covariate of no interest in the 
regression model, VBM analysis found no GM cluster survived from FWE-corrected 
p<0.05 threshold in the PFC region in the male > female comparison. On the other 
hand, when comparing female > male, VBM analysis identified a GM cluster in the 
medial PFC region (k=2423, p(FWE-corrected)<0.001, Z=4.28, peak MNI 
coordinate=-15, 38, 24). This massive GM cluster extended from BA9 posteriorly to 
BA6 region (see Figure.7.2, for illustration).  
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Figure 7.2.The GM cluster that was significant in the female > male contrast in the 
TD-subgroup. Blue colour: whole brain analysis (FWE p<0.05) showing female > 
male; Red: GM cluster positively correlated with the G_wrep variable in the TD 
sub-group.  
 
Principal component analysis 
The principle component analysis was conducted in two steps. First, we 
conducted PCA in the within-test level to isolate the independent factors in each 
psychometric test. Then we conducted PCA in the between-test level to examine the 
dissociable factor in the PFC battery as a whole. We used the principal components 
method for data reduction and set the eigenvalues greater than 1 as the inclusion 
threshold for potential components. For any components having eigenvalues greater 
than 1, the factor rotation method we implemented was the Varimax option, which 
demonstrated the factors that were orthogonal with each other. The factors having 
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absoluate values above 0.5 in the rotated component matrix were categorised as the 
same component. The eigenvalues, variance explained, and the variables included 
in each newly-defined factor were summarised in Table 7.4, where the panel (a) 
showed the result of the TD group, and the panel (b) demonstrated the result of the 
ASD group.  
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Table 7.4. The within-test PCA and the between-test PCA result of the TD group (panel a) and the ASD group (panel b). The extracted 
component, eigenvalue, accumulated variance, as well as the newly-labelled factor name were summarised in each column 
 (a)  TD group Component  Eigenvalues  Variance (%)   Cumulative (%)  Variables (factor name)   
Within-test PCA 
The gambling test 
1 1.96 32.58 32.58 G_wrt, G_lrt (G_reactiontime) 
2 1.45 24.17 56.75 G_wrep, G_lrep (G_repetitiveness) 
3 1.03 17.11 73.85 G_wrate, G_lrate (G_riskrate) 
The referential judgment test 
1 1.66 41.44 41.44 R_prt, R_wrt (R_reactiontime) 
2 1.22 30.43 71.87 R_pscore, R_wscore (R_consistency) 
The video mentalizing test 
1 3.63 45.36 45.36 M_highdyadrt, M_highgrouprt,  
M_lowdyadrt, M_lowgrouprt (M_reactiontime) 
2 1.27 15.84 61.20 M_highgroupacc, M_lowdyadacc,  
M_lowgroupacc (M_high+lowmentalizing) 
The cartoon faux pas test 
1 3.02 50.39 50.39 F_fprt, F_nfprt, F_comprt (F_reactiontime) 
2 1.13 18.80 69.20 F_fpacc, F_compacc (F_fpacc+compacc) 
3 1.04 17.38 86.58 F_nfpacc 
Beween-test PCA 
1 2.31 23.09 23.09 G_reactiontime, R_reactiontime 
2 1.91 19.11 42.20 M_reactiontime, F_reactiontime 
3 1.16 11.62 53.82 G_repetitiveness, M_high+lowmentalizing, F_nfpacc 
    4  1.04  10.44   64.26  R_consistency, F_fpacc+compacc   
a
 negative correlation 
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 (b)  ASD group Component  Eigenvalues  Variance (%)   Cumulative (%)  Variables (factor name)   
Within-test PCA 
The gambling test 
1 1.88  31.34  31.34  G_wrt, G_lrt, G_lrate (G_reactiontime+lrate) 
2 1.74  28.99  60.32  G_wrate 
3 1.16  19.25  79.57  G_wrep, G_lrep (G_repetitiveness) 
The referential judgment test 
1 1.66  41.40  41.40  R_prt, R_wrt (R_reactiontime) 
2 1.22  30.61  72.01  R_pscore, R_wscore (R_consistency) 
The video mentalizing test 
1 3.98  49.75  49.75  M_highdyadrt, M_highgrouprt,  
M_lowdyadrt, M_lowgrouprt (M_reactiontime) 
2 1.26  15.80  65.55  M_lowdyadacc, M_lowgroupacc (M_lowmentalizing) 
3 1.03  12.83  78.38  M_highdayaacc, M_highgroupacc (M_highmentalizing) 
The cartoon faux pas test 
1 2.95  49.15  49.15  F_fprt, F_nfprt, F_comprt (F_reactiontime) 
2 1.27  21.19  70.34  F_fpacc, F_nfpacc 
a
 (F_fpacc+nfpacc) 
3 1.03  17.14  87.48  F_compacc 
Beween-test PCA 
1 2.63  23.94  23.94  G_reactiontime+lrate, R_reactiontime,  
M_reactiontime, F_reactiontime 
2 1.93  17.56  41.50  M_highmentalzing, F_compacc 
3 1.66  15.07  56.57  M_lowmentalizing, F_fpacc+nfpacc 
    4  1.47   13.37    69.94   G_wrate, R_consistency 
a
    
a
 negative correlation 
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Step 1: Within-test PCA 
The gambling test 
PCA of the TD group extracted three components. The first factor included 
the overall reaction time in both conditions (the G_reactiontime factor), the second 
factor included the overall repetitiveness in both conditions (the G_repetitiveness 
factor), and the third one included the overall risk rate (the G_riskrate factor). On the 
other hand, PCA of the ASD group also identified three components. The first factor 
included the overall reaction time in both conditions, as well as the overall risk rate in 
the loss condition (the G_reactiontime+loseriskrate factor). The second factor 
included the overall risk rate in the win condition (the G_winriskrate factor), and the 
overall repetitiveness in both conditions were identified as the third factor (the 
G_repetitiveness factor). 
 
The referential judgment test 
PCA extracted two unrelated components in both the TD and the ASD 
groups. The first factor included the overall reaction time in both conditions (the 
R_reactiontime factor), and the second factor included the consistency score in both 
conditions (the R_consistency factor).  
 
The video mentalizing test 
  
247 
 
 
In the TD group, PCA extracted two uncorrelated components. The first 
factor included the reaction time in all the four conditions (the M_reactiontime factor), 
and the second factor included the accuracy in the high-mentalizing group, 
low-mentalizing group, and low-mentalizing dyad conditions (the 
M_high+lowmentalizing factor). PCA of the ASD group identified three different 
components. The first factor included the reaction time in all the four conditions (the 
M_reactiontime factor). Interestingly, PCA extracted the accuracy for 
low-mentalizing group and low-mentalizing dyad videos as the second factor (the 
M_lowmentalizing factor), and the accuracy for high-mentalizing group and 
high-mentalizing dyad videos as the third and separate factor (the 
M_highmentalizing factor).  
 
The cartoon faux pas test 
PCA of the TD group extracted three separate components. The first factor 
included the reaction time in the three conditions (the F_reactiontime factor), the 
second factor included the accuracy for the faux pas and the comprehension 
cartoons (the F_fpacc+compacc factor), and the third factor is the accuracy for the 
non-faux pas cartoons (the F_nfpacc factor). In the ASD group, PCA identified three 
isolate components. The first component included the reaction time in the three 
conditions (the F_reactiontime factor), the second component included the accuracy 
for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons in a negative relationship (the 
F_fpacc+nfpacc factor), and the accuracy for the comprehension cartoons was 
identified as the third component (the F_compacc factor).  
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Step 2: Between-test PCA 
Next, we used the saved factor scores calculated by the within-test PCA in 
the first step, and conducted a between-test PCA using those newly obtained factor 
scores as the variables (see Table 7.4, for summary).  
The between-test PCA extracted four components in the TD group. The first 
component included the G_reactiontime and the R_reactiontime factors, the second 
component included the M_reactiontime and the F_reactiontime factors. 
Furthermore, the G_repetitiveness, the M_high+lowmentalizing, the F_nfp factors 
were extracted as the third component, and the R_consistency, as well as the 
F_fpacc+compacc factors were identified as the fourth component. In the ASD group, 
PCA also revealed four but different components. The first component included the 
G_reactiontime+lrate, the R_reactiontime, the M_reactiontime, and the 
F_reactiontime. The second component included the M_highmentalizing and the 
F_compacc components. The third component included the M_lowmentalizing and 
the F_fp+nfp components. Lastly, the G_wrate and the R_consistency factors were 
the fourth and negatively correlated component. 
 
Multiple case series analysis 
In previous PFC battery chapters, the between-group results showed that the 
ASD group had some significant supra-normal performances and some intra-normal 
performances, compared with the baseline performance in the TD group. This high 
variation of performance demonstrated a marked heterogeneity of abilities across a 
range of cognitive functions supported by the different PFC sub-regions in the ASD 
group. However, the tradition statistical analysis of group level can only provide an 
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inaccurate perspective to this functional heterogeneity, rather than demonstrating 
the unique variations between each ASD individual. In order to investigate the 
unique variations of performance in the ASD group statistically, we followed the 
principle described in Towgood et al. (2009) and conducted the multiple case series 
analysis to demonstrate 1) each ASD individual’s performance compared with the 
normative sample, and 2) the performances across different tests within each ASD 
individual. One of the critical differences between Towgood et al. (2009)’s study and 
current study was that the PFC battery was not a standardised psychometric tool. 
The various kinds of well-established psychometric measurements included in 
Towgood et al. (2009) had reliable norm to define the so-called ‘typical’ performance. 
To compensate this difference, we used a distribution-free approach to set up our 
cut-off criterion to draw the line between ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ performance, instead 
of using standard deviation as in Towgood et al. (2009). We first ranked each of the 
26 variables acquired from the 103 TD subjects, and then used the fifth scores from 
the top and from the bottom as the approximate 5 percentile cut-off criterion for each 
variable. Next, we applied this cut-off score to both TD and ASD group and identified 
the performances that were ‘out-of range’ (OoR). For any scores in each variable 
above the upper criterion were categorised as ‘supra-normal’ performance and for 
any scores in each variable below the lower criterion were categorised as 
‘sub-normal’ performance. The number of subjects having ‘supra-normal’, 
‘intra-normal’, and overall ‘out-of-range’ performances that combined both 
‘supra-normal’ and ‘sub-normal’ performances in the TD and the ASD groups was 
summarised in Table 7.5. The statistical analysis to define significant between-group 
effects was examined by Fisher’s exact test. Based on Towgood et al. (2009)’s result, 
hypothesised that the ASD group would have more OoR performance than the TD 
group, and a p=0.05 criterion was set for significance. Subjects with ASD were 
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diagnosed with stereotyped mannerism and deficits on social interactions, and as a 
result, we hypothesised that the ASD group would demonstrate more ‘supra-normal’ 
performances on the variables measuring the repetitive behaviours, and show more 
‘sub-normal’ performances on the variables measuring the ability requiring ToM. 
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Table 7.5. The result of the multiple case series approach analysis. The criterion for the range of typical performance was based on the 
top 5 and the bottom 5 scores of the TD group, which defined the boundaries of supra-normal and sub-normal performance applied to 
the ASD group. The number of ASD subjects showing OoR performance was the sum of the number of ASD subjects having both 
supra- and sub-normal performances. 
      Criterion for typicality  Number of ASD subjects with   Significance between group  (p-value) 
a
 
PFC battery variable bottom 5 top 5 sub-normal supra-normal OoR sub-normal supra-normal OoR
    scores scores performance performance performance performance performance performance 
The gambling test 
G_wrate 0.09 0.78 3 0 3
G_lrate 0.15 0.93 1 1 2
G_wrep 34.38 98.44 1 8 9 <0.001 0.003
G_lrep 29.69 93.75 4 6 10 0.009 0.001
G_wrt 811.5 2394.1 1 1 2
G_lrt 714.1 3164.9 1 2 3
The referenrial judgment test 
R_pscore 6 10 1 1 2
R_wscore 7 12 1 0 1
R_prt 881.8 3420.9 7 0 7 0.003 0.042
R_wrt 869.7 2622.4 9 1 10 <0.001 0.003
The video mentalizing test 
M_highacc 0.50 0.92 5 0 5 0.027
M_lowacc 0.42 0.92 1 0 1
M_highrt 7509.8 16097.4 7 1 8 0.003 0.01
M_lowrt 7161.4 15279.4 4 4 8 0.01
The cartoon faux pas test 
F_fpacc 0.59 0.94 3 2 5
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F_nfpacc 0.53 1.00 4 0 4
F_compacc 0.57 1.00 1 0 1
F_fprt 5141.8 14549.2 2 1 3
F_nfprt 4600.4 15865.8 2 1 3
F_comprt 4949.4 15895.6 2 1 3
F_dprime 0.65 3.50 2 0 2
  F_beta   0.07 3.32 2 2 4
a
 the significance was calcuated using Fisher's Exact test (two-tailed) 
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In the gambling test, the result demonstrated that the ASD group had 
significantly more ‘supra-normal’ performance and ‘OoR’ performance than the TD 
group on the overall repetitiveness in the win and the loss conditions. No significant 
differences were found on the overall risk rate and the overall reaction times in both 
conditions. In the referential judgment test, the ASD group revealed significantly 
more ‘sub-normal’ performance and ‘OoR’ performance than the TD group on the 
overall reaction times in both personality and weight conditions. No significant group 
difference in the consistency score was found in either condition. In the video 
mentalizing test, the result showed the ASD group had significantly more 
‘intra-normal’ performance on the accuracy for high-mentalizing videos, as well as 
significantly more ‘intra-normal’ and ‘OoR’ performance on the reaction time for 
high-mentalizing videos. For low-mentalizing videos, ASD subjects had significantly 
more ‘OoR’ reaction time than TD subjects, but no significant difference was found 
on the accuracy. In the cartoon faux pas test, no significant between group effects 
were found on any variables. However, it is important to note that the upper limit for 
the accuracy was 100%, which suggested a potential ceiling effect that prevented us 
identifying the ‘supra-normal’ performance on the faux pas detection ability. As a 
result, we compared the number of subjects having perfect performance (accuracy = 
100%) in both groups, as the indicator for ‘supra-normal’ performance. Given that 
ASD subjects were people diagnosed with deficits on social behaviours, we 
hypothesised that the TD group would have significantly more ‘supra-normal’ 
performance than the ASD group. The result confirmed our hypothesis, which 
identified 28 of the 103 TD subjects scored 100% on the accuracy for non-faux pas 
cartoons, but only 3 of the 30 ASD subjects scored 100%, and this  (p=0.027 in 
Fisher’s Exact test, one-tailed). 
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We further analysed the pattern of performance across the four psychometric 
tests on the individual basis. When examining each ASD subject individually, not any 
ASD subjects had ‘supra-normal’ performances across all tests, nor did any ASD 
subjects have ‘sub-normal’ performances across all tests. Many ASD subjects 
demonstrated ‘supra-normal’ performance in some tests, and ‘sub-normal’ 
performance in others. To compare the average number of ‘OoR’ performance 
between groups, the result revealed that the ASD group had significantly more ‘OoR’ 
performance that the TD group (ASD mean=3.133; TD mean=1.291; t(131)=4.830, 
p<0.001). Furthermore, to compare this atypicality on the individual basis, we 
calculated the proportion of subjects within each group having at least one ‘OoR’ 
performance across the four tests. The results revealed that the ASD subjects had 
significantly higher atypicality than the TD group, where 27 out of the 30 ASD 
subjects, compared with 61 out of the 103 TD subjects, had at least one ‘OoR’ 
performance (p=0.002 in Fisher’s Exact test).  
 
Binary logistic regression analysis 
In binary logistic regression analysis, we included the experimental variables 
from the PFC battery as a predictor factor, and group membership (i.e., ASD=0, 
TD=1) as dependent variable. The variables included for binary logistic regression 
analysis were the same set of variables as included for the multiple-case series 
approach analysis, which were listed below: the overall risk rate, the overall 
repetitiveness, the overall reaction time in the win and loss conditions of the 
gambling test; the consistency score, the overall reaction time in the personality and 
the weight conditions of the referential judgment test; the accuracy and the reaction 
time for high-mentalizing and low-mentalizing videos of the video mentalizing test; 
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the accuracy, the reaction time for comprehension, faux pas, non-faux pas cartoons, 
as well as the d-prime and β values of the cartoon faux pas test. We further inputted 
the number of ‘OoR’ performance across the four tests acquired from the multiple 
case series approach as an additional predictor factor.    
Backward stepwise model using Wald statistics as the criterion showed that 
the model explained 49.6% (Nagelkerke R square value) of the variance in the group 
factor. In addition, the goodness-of-fit test showed no mis-specification of the 
predictive capacity of the model (Hosmer and Lemeshow X2=9.786, p=0.280). The 
classification table in the last step reveal that the model correctly predicted overall 
87.2% of cases (ASD: 56.7%; TD: 96.1%), compared with the null model which 
predicted 77.4% (ASD: 0%; TD: 100%). The variables that survived the Wald 
statistics were the overall repetitiveness in the win condition of the gambling test, the 
overall reaction time in the weight condition of the referential judgment test, the 
reaction time for videos requiring high intentionality of the video mentalizing test, the 
reaction time for the comprehension cartoons of the cartoon faux pas test, and the 
number of ‘OoR’ performance of the PFC battery (see Table7.6).  
 
Table 7.6. The PFC battery variables that survived from Wald statistics in a 
descending order, which showed significant predictive power for group membership. 
    B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
number of OoR performance -0.454 0.128 12.606 <0.001 0.635 
G_wrep -0.600 0.200 9.148 0.002 0.942 
R_wrt 0.001 0.000 6.453 0.011 1.001 
M_highrt 0.000 0.000 3.990 0.046 1.000 
F_comprt   0.000 0.000 8.081 0.004 1.000 
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7.11  Discussion of the between-test analysis 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationships of the variables 
between each test of the PFC battery. Based on previous related studies that 
focused on investigating the cognitive functions supported by the PFC region, we 
used a range of statistical analyses to examine these different, yet inter-correlating 
functions. We have discussed the potential explanation of the findings, and some 
preliminary speculations based on results observed in the current chapter. 
 
The effect of general intelligence to the PFC battery 
In a series of pathological studies comparing between-group differences 
including patients with frontal lobe lesions, Parkinson’s disease, frontotemporal 
dementia, and schizophrenia (Roca et al., 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), the results 
consistently showed that a general factor that accounted for some, but not all of the 
executive deficits identified in the compared pathological group. Specifically, in the 
Roca et al. studies, the significant between-group differences observed in some sets 
of executive function tests became insignificant after the effect of general 
intelligence was partialled out, but remained significant for some other executive 
function tests, including multi-tasking, social cognition, and risky decision-making 
tests. Amongst the PFC battery variables, Spearman rank-order correlation analysis 
demonstrated several significant relationships between the NART score and the 
variables showing significant group difference between the TD and the ASD groups. 
It is important to note that G_wrep was the only variable that showed significant 
between-group effect, as well showing significant correlation with the NART score in 
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both groups. Other variables including G_wrt, G_lrt, M_highacc, F_nfpacc, and 
F_dprime were significantly correlated (all p<0.05) with the NART score only in the 
TD group, but not in the ASD group. This distinct correlation with the NART score 
between groups implied that general intelligence had more profound contribution to 
PFC battery variables that identified group differences to TD subjects than to ASD 
subjects. On the other hand, the null relationship between the PFC battery variables 
and the NART score in the ASD group suggested that the impaired performance 
could not be explained by a general factor that might potentially worsen the 
behaviours as a whole. Interestingly, the only variable that showed significant 
relationship with the NART score in both groups, the G_wrep, was evident to be 
higher in the ASD group, instead of showing deficits, compared with the ‘typical’ TD 
group performance. Further investigation is required to examine the link between 
general intelligence and the repetitiveness to risky actions, and test if the effect was 
similar to TD and ASD subjects. Next, ANCOVA model revealed that after partialling 
out the NART score, all the significant between-group differences remained. This 
indicates that the group differences observed in the current study cannot be 
explained by differences in crystallized intelligence. In the PFC battery used here, 
the identified deficits in accurately responding to high-mentalizing videos, non-faux 
pas cartoons, and lower sensitivity to faux pas detection in the ASD group could not 
be explained by a general factor, but may reflect the primacy of diagnosed social 
impairment in ASD subjects instead. Similarly, other significant between-group 
differences including higher overall repetitiveness in the win condition, general 
slowness across decision-making and social cognition domains, which were 
categorised as the core symptoms of ASD, could not be explained by general 
intelligence either. Together these results revealed that the observed difference 
between the ASD and the TD groups could not be explained by general intelligence. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the performance showing significant group 
difference in the ASD group did not significantly correlate with the NART score, 
except for the G_wrep variable. It is therefore possible that the ANCOVA approach 
used in Roca et al.’s series of studies is not a powerful tool to control for the 
mediating contribution that led to significant group difference, in this case, the 
estimated general intelligence measured by the NART score. 
 
The effect of gender to the PFC battery 
Previous psychological studies have identified gender-related differences on 
ToM-related and risky decision-making paradigms. Coincidently, ASD is a 
gender-linked developmental disorder with impairments on social behaviour, along 
with repetitive behaviours. Furthermore, previous structural-based analysis also 
found that the PFC region was one of the brain regions that showed sex-related 
differences, and that the PFC region is involved with a range of higher-level 
cognitions including ToM and gambling actions. Taken together, it is possible that 
there might have been an inter-relationship between gender (male vs. female), 
group (TD vs. ASD), and the regional volume in the PFC region. Repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the group x gender interactions on the 
variables measuring risky decision-making and social interactions in the PFC 
battery.  
In the gambling test, behavioural results showed that the overall risk rate 
found a significant group x gender x condition interaction on the overall 
repetitiveness, and the group x gender interaction was only significant in the loss 
condition. There were two possible implications to this finding. When examining the 
  
259 
 
 
effect from the perspective of gender, the male ASD subjects made significantly 
more repetitive behaviours when facing potential losses than female ASD subjects 
did, but no significant gender effect was found in the TD group. This suggested an 
enhanced repetitive mannerism in the male ASD subjects compared with female 
ASD subjects, which suggested this repetitiveness as a male-like symptom, which is 
in line with the extreme male theory on autism proposed by Baron-Cohen (2002). 
When examining the effect from the perspective of group, male ASD subjects made 
significantly more repetitive behaviours when facing potential losses than female TD 
subjects did (t(73)=2.171, p=0.033), but no significant group effect was found in 
female subjects between the TD and the ASD groups (t(56)=-1.365, p=0.201). This 
selective enhanced repetitive mannerism of male ASD subjects further supports the 
extreme male theory on autism proposed by Baron-Cohen (2002). When 
considering the effect between the win and the loss conditions, De Martino et al. 
(2008) showed that both TD and ASD subjects demonstrated the framing effect 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), where people tended to avoid risk in a positive 
frame but to seek risk in a negative frame. To investigate further this extreme male 
feature of repetitive behaviour rather than risk-taking behaviour in ASD subjects, we 
examined the framing effect on the overall repetitiveness amongst the ASD subjects. 
In male ASD subjects (n=20), a paired t test found no significant difference between 
the win and the loss condition (t(19)=1.757, p=0.095), but female ASD subjects 
(n=10) showed significantly higher repetitiveness to potential wins than to losses 
(t(9)=3.319, p=0.009). This indicated an insensitivity of frames in the repetitive 
behaviours specifically for male ASD subjects, which is in line with Lai et al. (2011), 
who demonstrated that ASD females had less autistic behaviours than ASD males in 
RSB (repetitive, restrictive and stereotyped behaviours) sub-scores in the ADOS 
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(Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; Lord et al., 2000). No significant gender- 
and group-related difference was found in the referential judgment test. 
In the video mentalizing test, analysis of the accuracy revealed a significant 
main effect of group, where the ASD subjects made fewer correct responses to 
questions varying in appropriateness than the TD subjects. Repeated measures 
ANOVA showed a significant condition x group interaction, where the observed 
deficits in the ASD group in making correct decisions was only significant when 
answering high-mentalizing videos, but the group difference was not significant 
when answering low-mentalizing videos. This result was consistent with previous 
behavioural ASD studies showing ToM-related impairment using videos as stimuli 
(Heavey et al., 2000; Golan et al., 2006). In previous ToM studies measuring 
gender-related effects, Stiller and Dunbar (2007) used TD subjects and found that 
TD male subjects had lower capacity in perspective-taking than TD female subjects. 
Lai et al. (2011) used ASD subjects and showed that female ASD subjects had fewer 
socio-communication difficulties than male ASD subjects did. In the video 
mentalizing test, no significant gender-related effect or interaction was found. A 
possible explanation for this insignificant gender-related effect might come from the 
difference on the measurement between experimental paradigms. In Stiller and 
Dunbar (2007), written short stories were used as stimuli and the measurement was 
the ability to answer perspective-taking question (up to nine orders) until one started 
to fail. Importantly, the capacity of answering perspective-taking questions was 
correlated with the performance on memory questions, which suggested a potential 
mediating effect from memory-related ability to the measurement. In Lai et al. (2011), 
the socio-communication ability was measured by the diagnostic algorithm of natural 
interpersonal contact whilst assessing ASD syndromes, and this interview-based 
instrument on detecting ASD, a gender-linked syndrome, might not be an 
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appropriate measure for detecting any gender-related effect. In the video 
mentalizing test, this lack of gender difference, along with a significant group x 
condition interaction, implied a selective impairment in responding to videos 
involving high intentionality regardless of the gender of the subjects. In the cartoon 
faux pas test, repeated measures ANOVA found a significant group effect showing 
that the ASD subjects made significantly fewer correct responses to the depicted 
social interactions in general. Although no significant group x condition was found, 
the ASD group had lower accuracy to all three kinds of depicted social scenarios, 
and the difference was highest to the non-faux pas cartoons (TD: 0.854; ASD: 
0.767), compared with the faux pas cartoons (TD: 0.795; ASD: 0.751) and the 
comprehension cartoons (TD: 0.804; ASD: 0.790). This prominent yet not significant 
deficit in rejecting non-faux pas cartoons was consistent with the findings identified 
in Chpater6 introducing the cartoon faux pas test. The significant lower d-prime 
score in the ASD group compared with the TD group was also consistent with the 
finding shown in Chapter 6. These results together confirmed that the ASD subjects 
had impairments in distinguishing social scenarios with and without embarrassment, 
and manifested an over-detection to non-faux pas cartoons. 
 
The identified components in the PFC battery 
The PFC battery included four psychometric tests measuring a wide range of 
behaviours relating to different aspects of decision-making and social cognition 
domains. It is possible that some experimental variables, within or between tests, 
actually tapped overlapping cognitions, given that shared features between 
decision-making and social cognition have been proposed. In order to investigate 
how many uncorrelated variables, and further isolate the underlying factor in the 
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PFC battery, we conducted PCA of the TD and the ASD groups separately. In the 
first step of PCA, we focused on the within-test factor of each test in each group. In 
PCA, the first extracted component has the highest eigenvalue and explains the 
most variance. In the PFC battery, PCA of each test consistently identified reaction 
time as the first component. This converging evidence indicated a general factor of 
response speed across experimental conditions of each test. Apart from the reaction 
time factor, the within-test PCA highlighted several important implications within 
each test.  
In the gambling test, PCA of the TD group identified the overall risk rate and 
the overall repetitiveness in both the win and the loss conditions as separate 
components. This further supported the view in chapter 3, which suggested that the 
risk rate and the repetitiveness variables measured two different aspects of 
risk-taking behaviours. Furthermore, orthogonal transformation in PCA did not 
differentiate between the risk rate and the repetitiveness under win and loss 
domains. Yet in the ASD group, the overall risk rate in the loss condition was 
extracted as a different component from the overall risk rate in the win condition, and 
was identified as the same component as the ‘G_reactiontime’ factor. This implied a 
possible relationship between the risk-taking behaviours to avoid potential losses, 
and the response latency to evaluate uncertain situations, amongst ASD subjects. 
This independence of the risk rate in the win and the loss conditions further 
suggested that the underlying mechanism to evaluate risk-taking actions to gains 
and losses was different in ASD subjects. Importantly, the overall repetitiveness in 
the win and the loss conditions were loaded upon the same component in the ASD 
group as well. This suggested that the level of repetitive behaviour to potential wins 
and losses was correlated with each other in both TD and ASD subjects.  
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In the referential judgment test, PCA identified the consistency score in the 
personality and the weight conditions as the same component in both groups. This 
result supported our speculation of the effect of our scoring scheme in chapter 4, 
where the calculation of the consistency score using Repertory Grid approach was 
unable to reflect the advantage of self-referential processing. Nevertheless, the 
behavioural result identified that subjects had distinct ranking scheme between 
conditions, and demonstrated significant effect of condition that differentiated 
referential judgments based on self-related constructs vs. self-unrelated constructs. 
A possible explanation of the PCA result was shown in the VBM regression analysis 
of the TD sub-group, where the consistency score was positively correlated with the 
GM volume in the right lateral OFC region in the weight condition and marginal 
significant in the personality condition. This suggested that the observed behaviour 
using the consistency score measured the ability to override previously established 
contingency of the internal metric as test progressed, a key feature required in 
performance of reversal-learning paradigm. 
In the video mentalizing test, PCA of the TD subjects showed that the 
accuracies for the videos in three conditions (except for high-mentalizing dyad 
videos) were extracted as one single component. This may suggest that that the 
mentalizing process is a continuum, where videos requiring either high or low level of 
intentionality, as well as videos involving two, or more than two, characters required 
a shared resource but perhaps varied in degree of ToM-related ability. It is plausible 
that TD subjects implemented a certain amount of mentalizing ability to answer 
low-mentalizing videos. Castelli et al. (2000) asked subjects to passively view 
animations of geometric shapes moving in a way that simulated interactions 
amongst people, and observed increased activation in the medial PFC region. This 
medial PFC activation suggested that subjects projected their knowledge of social 
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attributions even to life-less geometric shapes without ‘actual’ social interaction. In 
the video mentalizing test, subjects witnessed conversations in all kinds of videos, 
and naturally required perspective-taking ability to answer the questions afterwards. 
Since all the questions were identical (which statement best described the situation 
you have just seen?), this may have helped subjects to make decisions in a constant 
respond mode rather than being affected by emotional adjectives that might be 
suggested in the Awkward Moments Test or the RMF test (Heavey et al., 2000; 
Golan et al., 2006). In the ASD group, PCA identified that the accuracies for 
high-mentalizing videos and low-mentalizing videos were two orthogonal 
components. This highlighted an important implication that the ability to understand 
videos requiring high and low intentionality could be categorised by different 
psychometric components in the ASD group. In chapter 5 examining the effect of 
group, repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy demonstrated a marginal significant 
condition x group interaction, where a significant effect of group was only observed 
in high-mentalizing videos, but not in low-mentalizing videos. Nevertheless, when 
interpreting this marginal significant interaction from the perspective of condition, 
ASD subjects had significantly lower accuracy for high-mentalizing videos, 
compared with answering to low-mentalizing video, whereas TD subjects responded 
videos varying in intentionality in a comparable way. Together with the distinct PCA 
segregation between groups, these results provided another scope to explain the 
selective impairment observed in processing social situation requiring higher level of 
mentalizing ability, where ASD subjects responded to videos requiring 
high-mentalizing and low-mentalizing ability using different underlying mechanism, 
yet TD subjects considered videos varying in intentionality using the same cognitive 
process.  
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In the cartoon faux pas test, PCA of the TD group performances identified the 
accuracies for the faux pas and the comprehension cartoons as loaded on the same 
component, but the accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons as a separate one. This 
suggested that the ability to correctly reject non-faux pas cartoons might rely upon a 
dissociable factor from correct identification of faux pas. In the ASD group, the 
accuracies for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons were identified as 
supported by the same component, and the accuracy for the comprehension 
cartoons was a separate one. It is important to note that accuracies for the faux pas 
and the non-faux pas cartoons were in a negative direction. This negative correlation 
was in line with the implication from  the signal detection analysis, where subjects 
implemented an internal response bias in faux pas detection, i.e., where the criterion 
became more conservative to yes responses, a better non-faux pas accuracy 
accompanied with a lower faux pas accuracy would be observed, and vice versa. To 
examine this negative correlation, Pearson’s correlation analysis using the raw 
accuracy score provided the same pattern. The correlation between the accuracies 
for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons was only significant in a negative 
way in the ASD group (r=-0.395, p=0.030), but not significant in the TD group 
(r=-0.107, p=0.283). This perhaps implied that only the ASD subjects implemented a 
certain internal criterion in faux pas detection when encountering questions asking if 
there was anything embarrassing, but the superior performances in the TD group on 
the non-faux pas accuracy was a standalone ability uncorrelated with the shift of 
response bias in a signal detection account.  
The between-test PCA revealed that the underlying components in the PFC 
battery were distinct between the TD group and the ASD group. First, the factors 
relating to reaction time of each test were extracted as the component that explained 
most of the variance in both groups. Between-test PCA showed that, in the TD group, 
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the G_reationtime, and the R_reactiontime factors were identified as one component, 
and the M_reactiontime, the F_reactiontime factors were extracted as another 
component. This separation of the factors relating to reaction time suggested a 
possible dissociation between the processing speed of the decision-making and 
social cognition domains amongst TD subjects. On the other hand, in the ASD group, 
the reactiontime factors in all the four tests were identified as the same component. 
This result suggested that ASD subjects who responded slowly in one test would 
also respond slowly in others, which indicated a universal response speed across 
psychometric tests measuring decision-making and social cognition domains. This 
difference on the reactiontime factors between groups implied that, in a set of tests 
measuring a range of functions supported by different PFC sub-regions, the 
response speed in ASD subjects across domains, mostly a general slowness, was 
more predictable. However, TD subjects demonstrated a specialisation of 
processing speed between decision-making and social cognition domains. In the TD 
group, the third component following the reactiontime factors in decision-making and 
social cognition domains included the G_repetitiveness, the M_high+lowmentalizing, 
and the F_nfp factors. The identification of the G_repetitiveness and the 
M_high+lowmentalizing factors as the same component was consistent with the 
VBM results reported in previous chapters. VBM regression analysis showed that 
mentalizing ability in the video mentalizing test and the overall repetitiveness in the 
gambling test were significantly correlated with similar GM cluster in the dorsomedial 
PFC region. PCA demonstrated converging evidence and further provided 
behavioural validation on the structural-based analysis using neuroimaging 
technique. As described in Chapter 2, evidence suggested by functional 
neuroimaging studies provided only indirect linkage between brain activation and the 
approximate brain region, and the ‘specificity’ issues of the meta-analysis approach. 
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The PFC battery established strong evidence on the function-structure relationship, 
where between-test PCA identified the orthogonal underlying components, and VBM 
localised a detailed PFC sub-region that linked to the cognitive behaviours across 
decision-making and social cognition domains.   
 
The heterogeneity of the ASD subjects evident by the PFC battery  
In order to investigate the unique functional specialisation amongst the ASD 
subjects, we conducted a multiple-case approach following the rationale 
demonstrated in Towgood et al. (2009). Compared with the psychometric tests 
administered in Towgood et al. (2009), which included measurements of language, 
perception, memory and executive functions, the PFC battery measured the 
cognitive functions supported by the PFC region evident from previous related fMRI 
studies. VBM results in previous chapters validated that the experimental variables 
we calculated were associated with different PFC sub-regions using a 
hypothesis-testing approach. Furthermore, it is important to note that Towgood et al. 
(2009) recruited only 21 ASDs and 22 matching TDs for the single case series 
approach analysis. It was reasonable to use smaller number of subjects given that 
the neuropsychometric tests they administered were already routinely used in 
clinical practice. In the current study, we used newly developed psychometric tests, 
and as a result, a distribution-free approach was conducted to set up the criterion 
based on the finding from 103 TD subjects to define the ‘atypical’ performance in the 
ASD group. In Towgood et al. (2009), the group-level analysis revealed only a 
limited set of deficits in the ASD group including processing speed, visual memory 
and executive functions involving inhibition, initiation and set shifting. In the current 
study, previous chapters demonstrated that the ASD subjects, compared with TD 
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subjects, responded significantly slower in all the four tests, as well as significantly 
higher repetitiveness to wins in the gambling test, significantly lower accuracy for 
high-mentalizing videos in the video mentalizing test, and significantly lower 
accuracy for the non-faux pas cartoons. These results further revealed a profound 
group-level deficit in ToM-related abilities, which was not shown in Towgood et al. 
(2009). 
In the single-case analysis conducted by Towgood et al. (2009), the variation 
of the wide range of functions was demonstrated by the combined 77 ‘measures’ 
from a huge set of tests in a neuropsychological battery. The atypical performance 
was therefore calculated by using two standard deviations of the standardised score 
as the criterion to highlight the atypical performance. In the current study, the OoR 
performance was defined by the best and the worst of five scores amongst TD 
subjects as our criterion for atypical performance. Then we conducted Fisher’s exact 
test to test the significance of any between-group effect using the number of 
subjects that showed atypical behaviours in each test. The results were consistent 
with the findings in Towgood et al. (2009), where the higher variation cannot be 
explained by a total impairment across a set of psychometric tests. Some ASD 
subjects were observed to have ‘supra-normal’ performance in one test but 
‘sub-normal’ in another. Fisher’s exact test revealed that the proportion of subjects 
with ‘OoR’ performance was significantly higher on the G_wrep, the G_lrep, the 
R_prt, the R_wrt, the M_highacc, and the M_highrt in the ASD group than in the TD 
group. In previous PFC chapters, we showed that ASD subjects had significantly 
higher repetitiveness, significantly slower reaction time on referential judgment, 
significantly lower accuracy and slower reaction time than TD subjects in various 
aspects of decision-making and social cognition based on group-level analysis. 
Multiple case series approach further identified the ‘atypicality’ of the ASD subjects 
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in  repetitive mannerisms, response speed, and ToM-related ability, which were all 
diagnostic feature of ASD syndromes, based on a single-case approach. In the 
cartoon faux pas test, given that the upper limit exceeded a perfect score of 100% 
on the accuracy, we further examined the number of subjects who scored 100% in 
the cartoon faux pas test. Fisher’s exact test revealed that the number of subjects 
who had perfect scores on the non-faux pas accuracy was significantly higher in the 
TD group than in the ASD group. This indicated that, when considering the 
behavioural data acquired from the 103 TD subjects as ‘typical’, the ASD group had 
fewer subjects supposing to have perfect correct rejection of potential faux pas. 
Compared with previous PFC battery chapter discussing the cartoon faux pas test, 
accuracy on the non-faux pas cartoons was also identified to be significantly lower in 
the ASD group than in the TD group. Multiple case series approach further 
confirmed this relative impairment of ASD subjects on social behaviour specifically to 
identify situations without social rule violation. 
Comparing with the results reported in Towgood et al. (2009), the number of 
ASD subjects who had ‘sub-normal’ performance on response speed was significant 
higher on the R_prt, the R_wrt, and the M_highrt. This response slowness in 
decision-making and social cognition was consistent with the finding in Towgood et 
al. (2009), which showed deficits on measures of processing/motor speed. 
Interestingly, in the PFC battery, the multiple case series approach found that some 
ASD subjects, yet not the same subject, even had ‘supra-normal’ performance on 
reaction times across all four tests. This was another evidence of the marked 
variation within ASD subjects, and this unique heterogeneity was not apparent from 
the group-level analysis. When addressing the variation within individuals, ASD 
subjects had in average more number of ‘OoR’ performance than TD subjects did, 
and the proportion of subjects who had at least one ‘OoR’ performance was 
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significantly higher in the ASD group than in the TD group. This individual-based 
result supported the results reported in Towgood et al. (2009), and further provided 
insights on the variation within the ASD subjects was also more prominent than the 
TD subjects, even using a set of newly developed tests measuring higher-level 
functions supported by the PFC region. Despite the results revealed in single-case 
analysis were mostly consistent with the group-level analysis of the PFC battery, the 
theoretical implication behind them is quite different. There are several possibilities 
that could lead to a significant difference using group-level analysis, e.g., the effect 
between members on the same direction, on mixed directions, or because of some 
extreme outliers. The multiple case series approach provided supporting evidence 
on the third possibility that the observed group differences was contributed by the 
‘supra-normal’, or ‘sub-normal’ performance observed in the ASD group. When 
excluding all the ‘OoR’ performance in both groups, independent t tests revealed 
that only 4 out the 9 variables remained significant, which included the G_wrt, the 
G_lrt, the M_highacc, and the F_dprime factors. The five variables including G_wrep, 
the R_prt, the R_wrt, the M_highrt, and the F_nfpacc became insignificant when 
using group-level analysis (see Table7.7). However, the comparison of β values in 
the cartoon faux pas test became significant when excluding the ‘OoR’ 
performances, which was consistent with the result we discussed previously in 
chapter 6 regarding the exclusion of the unique cases in the ASD group. Hence, the 
danger of this possible averaging artefact (Shallice and Evans, 1978) explained the 
findings acquired at the group-level, which cannot display the true nature of the 
heterogeneity of a single member, especially for ASD subjects who were evident to 
have distinct functional specialisation within and between individuals (Towgood et al., 
2009; Gilbert et al., 2009). This unique way of addressing the considerable variability 
between and within ASD subjects also provides a strong explanation for the mixed 
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findings in the ASD literature using a range of psychometric paradigms between 
different researchers. Furthermore, one might suspect that ASD subjects 
demonstrated mostly impaired performance except for the repetitiveness in the 
gambling test, it is therefore possible that the identified ‘higher variability’ could be 
heavily relied on ‘sub-normal’ performance using the single case approach. In order 
to examine this possibility, we calculated the largest discrepancy in performance 
between all the PFC battery variables included for the multiple case series approach. 
For instance, if a subject scored Z=3 on one variable (where positive values 
indicated supra-normal performance) and Z=-2 on another (where negative values 
referred to sub-normal performance), then the subject got a range of score Z=5. 
Independent t test of this range of Z score between group revealed a significant 
difference (ASD mean=4.083, TD mean=3.384; t(131)=3.041, p=0.003), where the 
ASD group had significantly larger range of Z score than the TD group. This 
confirmed the higher variability we observed using single-case approach could not 
be solely explained by poor performance amongst ASD subjects, but demonstrated 
a greater functional heterogeneity in a range of cognitive functions supported by the 
PFC region. Furthermore, a robust and repeated finding regarding to variability 
between individuals proposed that males have a greater range of ability than 
females, and previous studies identified that men did fall at the extremes of the 
spectrum (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008; Johnson, Carothers, & Deary, 2008). In 
the current study, independent t test on the range of Z score found no significant 
effect of group (male mean=3.613, female=3.449; t(131)=0.824, p=0.411), neither 
as group x gender interaction (F(1,129)=0.589, p=0.444). This null effect of gender 
suggested that the observed pattern of increased variability amongst ASD subjects 
was not an exaggeration of the ‘typical’ pattern of the enhanced gender-linked or 
male-like to be specific, variability. ASD is a male dominant developmental disorder 
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and it was proposed that ASD could be considered as extreme of the normal male 
(see Baron-Cohen, 2002). Our result did not support this extreme male brain theory 
of ASD, and reflected an atypical functional specialisation within the ASC population 
instead.  
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Table 7.7. The change of significance (highlighted using v) to the main effect of group when including all cases and excluding OoR 
scores of the PFC battery variables using multiple case series approach. 
      Effect of group Effect of group Effect of group: Effect of group: Effect of group:
including all cases excluding OoR scores remained significant significance significance
      (p-value) (p-value) in both approaches disappeared appeared
The gambling test 
G_wrate 0.341 0.619 
G_lrate 0.864 0.749 
G_wrep 0.017 0.310 v
G_lrep 0.436 0.499 
G_wrt 0.007 0.001 v
G_lrt 0.035 0.002 v
The referenrial judgment test 
R_pscore 0.390 0.226 
R_wscore 0.670 0.628 
R_prt 0.002 0.134 v
R_wrt 0.001 0.128 v
The video mentalizing test 
M_highacc 0.001 0.012 v
M_lowacc 0.226 0.558 
M_highrt 0.017 0.509 v
M_lowrt 0.465 0.483 
The cartoon faux pas test 
F_fpacc 0.154 0.239 
F_nfpacc 0.013 0.099 v
F_compacc 0.428 0.542 
F_fprt 0.274 0.342 
F_nfprt 0.235 0.334 
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F_comprt 0.712 0.963 
F_dprime 0.003 0.011 v
  F_beta   0.273 0.045 v
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Several theories have discussed possible explanations for this higher 
functional heterogeneity observed in ASD subjects, for example, Minshew, Goldstein, 
& Siegel (1997) proposed that ASD is a disorder of complex information processing 
that leads to multiple deficits observed in different ASD cases. Geurts et al. (2009) 
raised similar explanations by hypothesising a frequent lapse of attention or arousal. 
In that case, a fluctuation on the reaction time within and between tests should be 
observed in the PFC battery indexed by sub-normal performance on variables 
measuring response speed. However, the results reported in this chapter did not 
fully support this hypothesis regarding attentional deficits in ASD subjects. For 
example, behavioural analysis of the gambling test found that the ASD group, 
compared with the TD group, showed higher acceleration of response speed in the 
later stage of the loss condition. At the between-test level, despite PCA revealing a 
robust general slowness in the ASD group across all four psychometric tests in 
comparison to the TD group, multiple case series analysis was able to highlight that 
some ASD subjects had supra-normal performances on reaction times. These 
results proposed that ASD subjects were able to ‘catch up’ or sometimes 
demonstrated ‘enhanced’ performance on psychometric tests measuring 
higher-level cognition. Another explanation for simultaneous supra-normal and 
sub-normal performance at a single-case level was introduced by Frith (2003). Frith 
(2003) speculated that the abnormalities in ASD subjects could result from reduced 
synaptic pruning in early years. This was evident from the robust observation of 
greater total brain volume in structural studies, where individuals with ASD had 
greater size and weight in post-mortem brains (Bailey et al., 1998) and greater brain 
volumes (Hardan et al., 2001). Critically, this abnormality of volumetric difference 
was not seen at birth (Courchesne et al., 2001) but manifested with an abnormally 
rapid rate of brain growth during infancy and slowed again during adolescence. 
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Brain growth accompanied by synaptic pruning is critical for cognitive development, 
where a major reorganisation of connectivity in the brain coincides with new 
formation of synapses, dendritic growth and myelination. The concept of pruning 
focuses on elimination of a large number of synapses to enable functional 
specialisation to facilitate cognitive processes (Huttenlocher, 1999). Previous 
functional neuroimaging experiments using executive function tests have 
demonstrated unusual functional specialisation by localising different peak 
activations between ASD and control groups (Gilbert, Bird, Brindley, Frith, & Burgess, 
2008). Similarly, Gilbert et al., (2009) implemented an executive test that involved 
medial PFC activation and reported abnormal connectivity within the medial PFC 
region amongst ASD subjects. It is important to note that the results were analysed 
on a case-by-case basis, which clearly demonstrated that distinct brain networks 
were specialised for particular functions and hence resulted in highly diverse 
performance on the measured cognitive ability. This single-case approach using 
neuroimaging technique, along with the behavioural evidence reported in Towgood 
et al. (2009), supports an explanation based on a possible abnormality of synaptic 
pruning in a developmental perspective.  
 
Potential diagnostic tools for identifying ASD in the PFC battery 
After establishing the function-structure relationship in the PFC region, and 
further identifying the uniqueness of ASD subjects using group-level and single-case 
analyses, it is perhaps more clinically important to investigate the validity of the 
variables measured in the PFC battery to distinguish ASD from TD adults. In order to 
achieve this, we conducted binary logistic regression analysis that enabled us to find 
the variables that predicted group membership. A backward stepwise approach 
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identified the number of OoR performances, as well as four variables from each of 
the PFC battery test including the G_wrep, the R_wrt, the M_highrt, and the 
F_comprt. The regression model showed that the number of OoR performance 
identified by the multiple case series approach highlighted the importance of the 
functional heterogeneity in the ASD population. As mentioned in previous sections, 
inconsistent findings were frequently reported in ASD studies, and probably the only 
consensus was the high variation of performance in different psychometric 
paradigms. It is therefore a possibility that the core feature of the ASD syndrome is 
remarkable individual uniqueness, which is evident by single-case analysis, and 
supports the synaptic pruning hypothesis (Frith, 2003). Next the regression model 
identified the G_wrep variable as having the second highest significance to survive 
the Wald statistics. This was consistent with the results demonstrated in the 
group-level, as well as the single-case approach analyses, and further confirms that 
this item-based variable measuring the response pattern to risky options provides a 
dissociable index of risk-taking behaviours other than risk rate, which is able to 
capture the core feature of the repetitiveness syndrome in ASD adults.  
The remaining variables that survived Wald statistics criterion were the R_wrt, 
the M_highrt, and the F_comprt variables. It is interesting to see that all the 
remaining three variables were measurements of response speed in a particular 
experimental condition. In the referential judgment test, overall reaction time in the 
weight condition was able to predict group membership. Although significantly 
slower reaction times in ASD subjects was found in both conditions using 
group-level and single-case analyses, the overall reaction times in the personality 
condition was not identified as a good predictor for group membership. Indeed, the 
variance of the overall reaction times between groups was significant in the weight 
condition (Levene test of homogeneity of variance=9.681, p=0.002) but not 
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significant in the personality condition (Levene test of homogeneity of 
variance=3.637, p=0.059). This indicates that the distribution of the overall reaction 
times in the weight condition was more clustered in the TD group (SD=556.71 msec.) 
than in the ASD group (S.D.=777.67 msec.), and as a result improved the 
predictability of group membership. Nevertheless, the Levene test of homogeneity 
variance was not significant between groups in all the other four variables that 
predict group membership (number of OoR performance: p=0.074; G_wrep: p=0.738; 
M_Highrt: p=0.129; F_Comprt: p=0.768). This indicates that the predictive power of 
the other variables could not be explained by the distribution of data. In the video 
mentalizing test, only the reaction time for high-mentalizing videos was a significant 
predictor of group membership. The accuracy for high-mentalizing videos, despite a 
significant group difference found at both group-level and single-case level analyses, 
did not survived the Wald statistics. A possible explanation was provided by PCA, 
where the response speed was identified as the first component in the video 
mentalizing test that explained the most variance amongst all other variables. After 
partialing out the covariance between variables, the stepwise method revealed the 
reaction time for high-mentalizing videos that had the strongest, as well as isolated 
predictive power for group membership. Lastly, the reaction times for the 
comprehension cartoons in the cartoon faux pas test were identified as a good 
predictor for group membership. It is quite puzzling to find this variable has 
significant predictive power given that both group-level and single-case analyses 
found no significant group effect. However, between-test PCA found that ASD 
subjects had the reactiontime factors across four tests as the same component, 
whereas TD subjects had the reactiontime factors in decision-making and social 
cognition domains separately. It is possible that the reactiontime factors in each test 
were strong candidates for predicting group membership, and the reaction time for 
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the comprehension cartoons in the cartoon faux pas test was the most 
representative one that independently differentiated between the TD and the ASD 
groups. In other words, the significant predictive power on the F_comprt was a 
product of the distinct between-test PCA result on the reaction time-related factors. 
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Chapter 8. PFC region and prospective memory 
8.1  Theories of human prospective memory studies 
In previous chapters, we discussed the functional role that different PFC 
sub-regions play in higher-level human cognition in decision-making and social 
cognition. It is widely accepted that the PFC region supports executive function (EF), 
an umbrella term that covers top-down regulatory processes (Alvarez and Emory, 
2006). These executive processes contribute to a range of cognitions that are 
essential not only for previously learnt or stored information (e.g., decision-making 
and social cognition), but also for foresight of future events. The ability involving 
remembering to execute a future intention is referred as prospective memory (PM). 
Such ability is essential for facilitating simple tasks like remembering to reply to 
emails, as well as critical situations like remembering to perform safety checks 
before a flight takes off. Previous evidence has established a relationship between 
PM ability and the PFC region by demonstrating ‘acquired’ PM deficits in patients 
with structural abnormality in the PFC region (Fortin, Godbout, & Braum, 2003; Volle, 
Gonen-Yaacovi, de Lacy Costello, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011). Previous studies 
examining PM focused on investigating the linkage between PM capability and 
executive processing by using different kinds of neuropsychological tests (Kliegal, 
Eschen, & Thone-Otto, 2004; Knight, Titov, & Crawford, 2006; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
McDaniel, Glisky, Rubin, Guynn, & Routhieaux, 1999). It has been claimed that 
prospective memory is a complex function that involves many theoretically 
independent cognitive processes including planning, sustained attention, inhibition, 
multi-tasking, and even retrospective memory (RM). These underlying processes 
have been shown to associate with different PFC sub-regions, and impairment 
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during any of these processes might result in observable deficits in PM. Therefore, 
although converging evidence from lesion and behavioural studies has established 
the essential role of the PFC region played in PM, it seems possible to suspect that 
distinct neural processes supported by different PFC sub-regions contribute to 
different aspects of this complex function.  
Earlier evidence discussing PM function, or PM-like deficits to be precise, 
came from a classic single case study reported by Eslinger and Damasio (1985). 
The patient EVR, who had undergone surgical removal of bilateral frontal 
meningioma, was once a financial officer and a respected member of his community. 
After the surgery, EVR lost his job, bankrupt, was divorced by his wife, and 
accompanied with a serious of inappropriate actions. Critically, extensive 
psychological evaluation found no deficit, where EVR was diagnosed with above 
average IQ and unimpaired performance on EF test like the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
test, and still able to discuss professional matter relating to work and moral decisions. 
Nevertheless, EVR was unable to make simple daily decisions like which to buy, 
where to eat, what to wear, and often ended up with making no decisions at all. 
These symptoms showing disorganisation of daily events were similar to PM 
problems, and highlighted an important implication that individuals with normal 
intelligence and intact performance on some executive functions tests might show 
some selective executive dysfunctions similar to PM impairments. Nevertheless, no 
qualitative assessment or laboratory-based tests were developed to specifically 
examine PM-related performances at that time, which limited the implications of the 
EVR case to prospective memory. Later, Shallice and Burgess (1991) reported three 
patients suffering frontal lobe damage following traumatic brain injuries. Similarly, 
these three patients had normal intelligence and intact performance in a range of EF 
tests, but selectively impaired on the Multiple Errands Test (MET) and the Six 
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Element Test (SET) developed by Shallice and Burgess (1991). For example, these 
patients demonstrated many kinds of erroneous behaviours in SET and MET that 
could be interpreted as PM failures. Goldstein, Bernard, Fenwick, Burgess, and 
McNeil (1993) further confirmed the dissociable PM-related deficits from the EF tests 
by reporting a clinical case of GN, who had a resection of left frontal pole region and 
subsequently showed disorganised behaviours in his daily life. Despite normal 
cognitive abilities with normal intelligence, GN made significantly more errors than 
controls in the MET (Shallice and Burgess, 1991). These PM lesion case studies 
highlighted the distinction between PM deficits and patients with executive 
dysfunctions, where PM-specific deficits could not be identified by 
neuropsychological paradigms sensitive to EF impairments. 
In order to dissociate PM, or even PM-specific deficits if any, Burgess, Veitch, 
Costello, & Shallice (2000) recruited patients with brain lesions showing strategy 
application disorder and gave a multi-tasking procedure to investigate the 
contributions of task learning and remembering. Anatomical-behavioural analysis 
identified that different stages of multitasking seemed to be disrupted by lesions to 
different brain regions. Critically, structural equation modelling revealed three 
underlying constructs that supported multitasking: retrospective memory, 
prospective memory, and planning. It was shown that the left anterior and posterior 
cingulate cortices played an important role in retrospective memory, whilst the 
prospective memory and planning components required cognitive processes 
supported by the left BA 8, 9 and 10 and the right dorsolateral PFC region. This 
result further suggested that the components supported by the PFC region not only 
contribute to PM performance, but also contributed to other behaviours. The 
advance of neuroimaging techniques provided another approach that enabled us to 
examine the link between the PFC region and PM ability directly. Burgess, Quayle, 
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and Frith (2001) used positron emission tomography (PET) technique to investigate 
the brain activity associated with PM performance, and found that regional cerebral 
blood flow (rCBF) increased in the lateral BA10 region in PM conditions relative to 
‘baseline’ task alone. Incidentally, Okuda et al. (1998) also reported increased brain 
activity in the frontal polar region, but the experimental design in Okuda et al. (1998) 
did not provide enough evidence to determine if the observed PFC activation was 
associated with intention maintenance, an essential factor relative to PM, or simply 
reflected involvement for divided attention between planned or routine actions. On 
the other hand, in Burgess et al. (2001), increased rCBF in the lateral BA10 was 
discovered in the condition where subjects were told that a PM target might appear, 
but none actually did. This validated the role of the lateral BA10 in the maintenance 
of a delayed intention rather than simply cue recognition or intention execution. 
Furthermore, another PET study conducted by Burgess, Scott, & Frith (2003) 
revealed that the medial BA10 was more active in ‘baseline’ condition than in PM 
condition. These two PET studies (Burgess et al., 2001; 2003) established a 
standard pattern of brain activations within rostral PFC region for the PM paradigm.  
With the increasing amount of research discussing PM functions, a variation 
of PM tests were developed to focus on examining different factors that affected PM 
performance. Theories and ideas often originated from functions that were 
intensively studied in the past. For example, the phenomenon relating to the 
acquisition and the reproduction of existing information or content is referred as 
retrospective memory (RM; Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984). In RM experiments, subjects 
are typically asked to learn and remember certain experimental material during an 
encoding stage, and subsequently are required to remember the learnt materials at 
the appropriate time, or a retrieval stage. Despite the opposite direction along the 
temporal scale, where RM investigates mental processes related to the past, and 
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PM examines the cognitions relating to the future, it is unsurprising that PM and RM 
shared a similar neural machinery since a growing body of literature demonstrates 
that imagining the future depends heavily on remembering the past (see Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2007 for review). In the encoding stage of PM studies, subjects 
are required to remember to perform a delayed intention in the future. Subsequently, 
in the retrieval stage, subjects are required to maintain the delayed intention and 
execute the associated actions depending on the context. A common distinction 
between the types of context involving PM intentions was event-based and 
time-based PM (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & 
Mayhorn, 1997). In event-based PM, the environment provides external cues to 
prompt the encoded intention, whereas in time-based PM, the intention was 
encoded and expects to be executed either at a specific time or after a specific 
period since the delay elapsed. For the purpose of simulating a real-life PM situation, 
the experimental paradigm of PM consists of an ongoing (OG) activity (Ellis, 
Kvavilashvili, & Milne, 1999) in order to prevent continuous, conscious rehearsal of 
the encoded intention during the entire delay period. Later, PM instructions are 
introduced and subjects are asked to remember to perform an additional action 
under a particular circumstance, or in a particular retrieval context (Ellis, Kvavilashvili, 
& Milne, 1999). As a result, a typical PM paradigm allows measuring performance 
including the proportion of correct responses, as well as reaction time, for the PM 
task and the ongoing task. Burgess, Scott, & Frith (2003) summarised the 
characteristics of laboratory-based PM studies, and different kinds of manipulations 
were implicated including the cognitive load of the ongoing task, the nature of the 
PM task, the material used for the task, the relationships between encoding and 
retrieval, in order to examine different cognitive processes relating to PM.  
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Different theories have been proposed to explain the underlying processes 
supporting PM ability. In PM experiments, one of the most debatable issues was the 
mechanism that supports successful PM detection. Smith (2003; Smith & Bayen, 
2004) proposed a preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM) theory, 
which proposed that PM retrieval was based on a capacity-demanding process, and 
an attentional mechanism was involved in monitoring the environment. As a result, 
successful event-based PM required maintaining a preparatory state to monitor the 
occurrence of PM target events. The critical notion of the PAM theory is that limited 
cognitive resources are allocated between the ongoing activity and preparation for 
the detection of PM targets. In order to enable this constant discrimination between 
PM-related and PM-unrelated events, the PAM theory also highlighted the 
engagement of RM processes in PM tasks, where recollection of the intended action 
was likely to occupy some limited attentional resources. Supporting evidence for the 
PAM theory came from the intention ‘cost’ of resources available for the ongoing 
task, where response speed for the ongoing task before PM instruction was faster 
than response speed for the ongoing task after PM instruction. This intention cost 
was robust even when the expected PM cues were not actually presented at all 
(Burgess et al., 2001; Smith, 2003). Similarly, other PM studies yielded consistent 
findings on the role of preparatory attention in PM (Burgess, Quayle, and Frith, 2001; 
Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen, Burgess, & Oettingen, 2009; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005; 
Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2006). However, this constant use of attentional resources 
might be possible only in laboratory-based experiment. In other words, such 
demanding functioning of attentional resources was not possible for real-life 
situations (McDaniel and Einstein, 2007). Therefore, McDaniel and Einstein 
proposed a spontaneous retrieval theory based on the feedback from their subjects 
whilst administering their PM experiments. It was reported that some successful PM 
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detection popped into subject’s minds without any attentional processing (McDaniel, 
Robinson-Riegler, and Einstein, 1998). This spontaneous detection of PM intentions 
was linked to the automatic-associative mechanism proposed by Moscovitch (1994), 
who described that an associative link was formed between the intention and the 
action. If the PM cue produced sufficient power to activate the memory trace, then 
the associated action would be transferred to awareness without too much effort 
(McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein, 1998). In order to coincide with the 
contradictory PAM theory and the robust evidence consistent with the PAM theory, 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) updated their single-process spontaneous retrieval 
theory to a multi-process theory. The idea of the multi-process theory was to account 
for both attention-demanding monitoring and spontaneous processes during 
successful PM retrieval. To decide which approach would be more dominant, the 
experimental material used in the PM and the ongoing tasks, as well as different 
manipulations, were likely to favour each process. For example, the extent of 
attention directed from the ongoing activity to the PM cues (McDaniel and Einstein, 
2007), cognitive load of the ongoing activity (March, Hancock, and Hicks, 2002), 
saliency of the PM cue (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000), association between the PM 
cue and the intended action (McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004), 
importance of the PM intention (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000), the length of PM 
retention interval (McDaniel and Einstein, 2007), and even the planning process for 
PM intention (Burgess, Dumontheil, Gilbert, Okuda, Scholvinck, & Simons, 2008). 
Therefore, it seemed necessary to investigate the complex cognitive processes that 
contribute to this flexible and inter-dependent mechanism in PM proposed by 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000). 
In the multi-process theory, one of the most critical factors that favouring 
spontaneous retrieval is the overlap between the delayed intention at encoding and 
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the subsequent PM target in PM task. Based on the multi-process theory, the PM 
cue in the word condition and the PM cue in the syllable condition were referred to 
as the focal and nonfocal cues respectively. Focal cues were the kind of PM cues 
that overlapped with the information relevant to the ongoing task, and could rely on 
spontaneous retrieval processes. On the other hand, nonfocal cues were the kind of 
PM cues that were not part of the information relevant to the ongoing activity, and as 
a result required attentional monitoring to the environment. In Einstein et al. (2005), 
subjects were asked to do a category verification task as the ongoing activity, and 
then informed the PM instruction to respond differently when encountering a specific 
word (e.g., the word ‘dormitory’) or any word containing a specific syllable (e.g., the 
syllable ‘tor’). The accuracy for PM cue detection was significantly higher for a 
specific word than for a specific syllable, and task interference to the ongoing activity, 
which was calculated by the difference of reaction time relative to the PM task, was 
found to be significant in the syllable condition but not in the word condition. This 
was interpreted as the contribution of focal processing, where the ongoing task 
encouraged processing of the features that were emphasised at encoding. As a 
result, this highlighted the importance of the focality on PM cues in subsequent PM 
studies (Brewer, Knight, Marsh, & Unsworth, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel & Einstein, 
2010; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010). However, the contribution of the 
focality factor to PM performance has not yet been fully explored. 
A cardinal distinction between the focality between PM cues was the varying 
level of specificity. In previous PM studies investigating the focality factor, focal PM 
cues were more specific (e.g., the word ‘cat’, the word ‘tortoise’, words with three 
e’s), and non-focal PM targets were less specific (e.g., items from the ‘animal’ 
category, the syllable ‘tor’) (see Table.2 in Einstein and McDaniel, 2005; and also 
Meier and Graf, 2000). One might suspect that focal PM cues not only had higher 
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specificity but also accompanied a higher degree of repetitive features between 
each other, compared with non-focal PM target. In other words, if a focal PM cue 
‘tortoise’ was encoded, that was all the combined features in an exact order (e.g., 
t-o-r-t-o-i-s-e) that a subject needed to identify during PM retrieval. On the other 
hand, if a non-focal PM cue ‘tor’ was encoded, the PM targets could be flanked by 
additional letters (e.g., tor-ch, tor-pedo, tor-nado), which shared a lower degree of 
repetitive features, along with higher variations between potential PM targets. As a 
result, the difference between focal and non-focal PM cues might be a quantitative 
distinction between the repetitive features during encoding and a subsequent 
detection process. Coincidently, this repetitive exposure at the perceptual level using 
identical stimuli in focal PM cues was similar to the classic repetition priming effect, 
where the stimulus that was previously experienced leads to quicker and better 
performance for the later exposure of the same stimulus (Forster & Davis, 1984). 
This repetitive priming effect is more salient when the two stimuli are in the same 
modality, and was very robust when using perceptual, semantic, or conceptual 
materials (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Friederici, Steinhauer, & Frisch, 1999). This 
posited a possibility that the advantage of focal processing, at least in certain degree, 
relied on repetition priming based on repetitive exposure to the identical features 
between encoding and retrieval in PM paradigm.  
Another important feature between the level of focality between PM cues was 
the concept taken from the transfer appropriate processing (TAP), which was 
originally identified in RM experiments. The TAP effect indicated that memory 
performance could be influenced by the relationship between the way of information 
initially encoded and later retrieved (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). In order to 
examine the effect of TAP in PM paradigm, Meier and Graf (2000) asked subjects to 
perform the ongoing task requiring either semantic or perceptual processing to 
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words, and the PM task required either semantic or perceptual processing to words. 
The result showed that performance was higher when the processing between 
ongoing and PM tasks were the same (i.e., semantic-semantic, 
perceptual-perceptual) than the processing were different. A series of studies were 
conducted to investigate the different contributions between TAP and transfer 
inappropriate processing (TIP) conditions to the level of the attentional demands 
required for successful PM performance (Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005; Meiser and 
Schult, 2008; Abney, McBride, & Petrella, 2013). The converging evidence revealed 
that the degree of overlap between the experimental materials used during the 
ongoing task and the subsequent PM task influenced PM performances. As a result, 
combined with the implication from repetitive priming and the TAP effect, it is 
possible that the more specific a focal PM cue, the more perceptual similarity is 
shared between potential PM targets, which allows subjects to rely more on 
perceptual processing, compared with less specific non-focal PM targets. The bias 
between the reliance of perceptual processing might explain at least part of the link 
of the TAP effect observed in PM studies. In order to understand better successful 
PM detection, it seems necessary to dissociate the underlying mechanism of 
processing PM cues varying in focality under the situation where the effects of TAP 
and repetitive priming are controlled. 
In the current PM experiment, we implemented three manipulations to control 
for the potential TAP and repetitive priming effects, and investigated the 
performance to PM cues varying in specificity: 
(1) First, we used a cross-modal design to control for the effect of TAP to PM 
performance. To achieve this, the way that the  PM target was initially encoded 
and later retrieved was in different format, e.g., the PM intention was encoded in 
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one format (e.g., verbal) and was the cue would be presented in the opposite 
format (e.g., non-verbal), and vice versa. It is important to note that, in previous 
PM studies investigating the TAP effect in prospective memory (Meier and Graf, 
2000; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005; Meiser and Schult, 2008; Abney, McBride, & 
Petrella, 2013), the experimental material used were word stimuli. Despite 
labelling the semantic and perceptual conditions, subjects were required to focus 
more on the semantic features or the perceptual features of the word stimuli, 
instead of actually requiring processing of verbal vs. non-verbal materials. In the 
current PM experiment, the cross-modality design enabled us to control for the 
TAP effect, and provided direct measurement of the difference between 
processing PM intentions in verbal and non-verbal formats.  
 
(2) Second, in order to control for a possible repetition priming effect when 
processing focal PM cues, we implemented an additional task during the PM 
encoding stage. Subjects were required to work out the PM intention by 
themselves instead of being orally or visually instructed as in a typical PM 
paradigm. To achieve this, subjects needed to decide which item was the ‘odd 
one out’ amongst three items (for example, a strawberry, a watermelon, and a 
briefcase), where two items belonged to the same category (e.g., a strawberry 
and a watermelon could be categorised as ‘fruit’), and the third item belonged to 
another category (e.g., a briefcase). By working out which was the ‘odd one out’, 
we ensured that participants could either come up with a specific PM target (e.g., 
a briefcase), and encode it as an ‘exemplar’ PM target, or alternatively, they 
could come up with a category (e.g., fruit), and encode it as a ‘category’ PM 
target. For example, for an ‘exemplar’ PM target (e.g., a picture of a briefcase) 
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might be encoded as the PM target. In the subsequent PM task, the PM target 
would be presented in the opposite format (e.g., the word ‘briefcase’). This was 
similar to the concept of focal PM cues proposed by the multi-process theory, 
except for the cross-modality design. On the other hand, for a ‘category’ PM 
target (e.g., a word ‘strawberry’ and a word ‘watermelon’ would make a category 
of ‘fruit’) would be encoded as the PM target. In the subsequent PM task, the 
item that belonged to the ‘fruit’ category (e.g., a picture of an apple) would be the 
PM target in the subsequent PM task. This category PM target example was 
similar to the concept of non-focal PM cue proposed in the multi-process theory, 
except for the cross-modality design. More importantly, through the ‘odd one out’ 
procedure, both the ‘exemplar’ and ‘category’ PM targets that subjects were 
required to detect during the subsequent PM task were self-generated in some 
senses, rather than presented perceptually or instructed orally in advance. This 
additional ‘odd one out’ procedure, as a result, controls the repetition priming 
effect at the perceptual level. Together with the cross-modality design, the 
comparison between ‘exemplar’ and ‘category’ PM targets therefore allowed 
direct measurement of the underlying mechanism for processing PM targets 
varying in specificity when the TAP and repetition priming effects to PM 
performance were controlled.  
 
(3) Third, we used a design that enabled us to investigate the effect of target 
specificity without the potential confound of number of PM cues that may have 
occurred in previous PM studies. The prospective memory literature suggests 
that the number of PM targets has a profound impact on detecting PM targets 
that vary in specificity. For example, Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos 
(2003) showed reduced PM accuracy when the PM intention was to execute the 
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PM action whenever any words of a semantic category were encountered (while 
performing an ongoing task) compared to where the PM intention was to respond 
to a specific word. This indicates the importance of cue quality including 
decreased cue specificity or increased number of cues upon PM accuracy. 
Furthermore, Knight, Meeks, Marsh, Cook, Brewer, & Hicks (2011) 
demonstrated that PM intentions associated with a specific target had higher 
level of intention-induced interference than PM intentions associated with a 
category intention. This indicates that specific PM targets have a higher chance 
to elicit a spontaneous response, and is consistent with the multi-process theory 
(Schullin, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2009). Recently, Wesslein, Rummel, & Boywitt 
(2014) investigated the effect of cue specificity and list length of PM cue to PM 
performance using multinominal model analysis. The results revealed that 
manipulation to list length of PM cue affects the distinction between the PM cue 
and ongoing items, as well as intention retrieval. By contrast, manipulation to cue 
specificity selectively affected intention retrieval only. This finding demonstrates 
that, although both manipulations resulted in decrements to PM performance, 
the effect of memory load and PM target specificity modulates different 
underlying cognitive processes. In the current PM experiment, in order to 
examine the effect of PM cues specificity more directly, we used block design 
where only one PM target was embedded in each block. This single PM target 
design therefore enabled us to investigate the effect of target specificity without 
other potential confound (e.g., the number of PM cues) shown in previous PM 
studies (Marsh et al., 2003; Wesslein et al., 2014). Although the cue specificity 
and number of cues might affect different underlying processes, this single PM 
target block design is especially important since subjects might gradually rely 
more on the repetitive features in focal processing conditions, where the same 
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specific target appears multiple times throughout the test. Alternatively, 
category-type PM targets have a lower degree of repetitive features between 
each other, and therefore might elicit different effects unless this aspect of 
repetition is controlled for. .  
 
The aim of the current PM experiment was to investigate the performance to 
PM targets varying in specificity. Previous PM studies revealed an advantage for 
processing focal PM targets (Einstein et al., 2005; Brewer, Knight, Marsh, & 
Unsworth, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel & Einstein, 2010; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & 
Lee, 2010). Using the three manipulations described above, we controlled for the 
TAP and repetitive priming effects, and compared the performance between the 
‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions, which are similar to the design of typical 
“focal” vs. “non-focal” PM conditions respectively. In the behavioural part of the study, 
based on the multi-process theory, we hypothesised that accuracy would be higher 
for detecting exemplar PM targets than category PM targets. For analysis of reaction 
time, we calculated the ‘cost’ of the response speed during the PM task, in relative to 
speed during the ongoing task. Based on the multi-process theory (Einstein et al., 
2005), we hypothesised that the ‘cost’ of reaction time between ongoing and PM 
tasks should be significant in the ‘category’ condition, but not the ‘exemplar’ 
condition. Furthermore, a critical manipulation in the current PM experiment was the 
cross-modality design, where experimental materials could be in either word or 
picture format. There is a robust psychology effect that concepts are memorised 
better if they are presented as pictures than presented as words, and this is referred 
to as the picture superiority effect (Nelson, Reed, & Walling, 1976). Based on the 
picture superiority effect, which suggests an advantage for pictures, we further 
analysed the effect of the ‘cost’ of response speed in word and picture stimuli 
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separately. In the fMRI part of the study, we examined brain activities elicited by the 
current PM paradigm, and focused on the comparison of the neural activations 
between the ‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions. Previous PM studies using 
functional neuroimaging techniques has identified a robust lateral vs. medial 
dissociation in the rostral PFC region (den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005; 
Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2009; Okuda et al., 2007; Okuda, Gilbert, Burgess, Frith, 
& Simons, 2011; Simons, Schölvinck, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006; Hashimoto, 
Umeda, & Kojima, 2011; Okuda et al., 2007). Activations in the lateral rostral PFC 
(rPFC) were viewed as maintaining a delayed intention (den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & 
Blakemore, 2005; Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2009; Okuda et al., 2011; Reynolds, 
West, & Braver, 2009; Simons et al., 2006). The medial rostral PFC activation often 
seen during PM experiments was first identified by Burgess et al. (2003). He 
proposed that the observed lower medial rPFC activation reflected a mechanism 
allowing maintenance of attention upon external stimuli (i.e., ongoing events), 
whereas lateral rPFC activation is involved enhanced attentional focus on internally 
generated cognitions. This interpretation was further supported by Gilbert, Frith, & 
Burgess (2005), who contrasted the neural activation that occurs when subjects 
perform tasks with stimuli presented on the screen against performing the same 
tasks only in the subjects’ mind (ie. in the absence of stimuli). The medial rPFC 
region was found to activate in the condition where stimuli were externally displayed 
(stimulus-oriented; SO) compared with doing the task in the absence of seeing the 
stimuli on the screen (stimulus-independent; SI). This ‘rostral PFC attentional 
gateway’ (see Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2007) evidently associated with 
performance in PM experiments: Benoit, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess (2011) used a 2 x 
2 factorial design to compare PM (PM vs. non-PM) with attentional gateway (SO vs. 
SI), and found that the medial rPFC were jointly recruited in ongoing vs. PM, as well 
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as SO vs. SI processing. This finding demonstrated that the observed medial rPFC 
activity during PM performance was the same as that which was involved in 
differences in SO vs. SI processing. Interestingly, the PM contrast reported in Benoit 
et al. (2011) was also found to associate with more dorsal part of the medial rPFC 
than the attentional gateway contrast along the medial line, and this was interpreted 
as an engagement of future intention, or prospection (see Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, 
& Volle, 2011 for review). This dorsomedial PFC activity has been found to be 
involved during other cognitions, including making analogical inferences (Volle, 
Gilbert, Benoit, & Burgess, 2010), detection of similarity between dissimilar targets 
(Pothos, 2005), comparison between expectation (Summerfield et al., 2006), 
envisaging farsighted decisions (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011), and apparently 
plays a proactive role in generating predictions for the future (Bar, 2009). This 
literature together suggests that the dorsomedial PFC region supports processing of 
future intentions that vary in relevance or similarity between expected and presented 
stimuli. Taking the above PM fMRI literature as a whole, we first examined if the 
current PM experiment elicited the standard lateral vs. medial dissociation in the 
rPFC region between the PM and the ongoing tasks established by Burgess et al. 
(2001; 2003). After confirming that the novel PM paradigm evoked a PM-like neural 
network, we next compared the neural activities when processing ‘exemplar’ and 
‘category’ PM targets. For this comparison, McDaniel, LaMontagne, Beck, Scullin, & 
Braver (2013) used fMRI and identified a distinct neural network between focal vs. 
nonfocal PM processing. In the focal PM blocks, the PM cue was a particular word 
(e.g., table), and in the non-focal PM blocks, the PM cue was a particular syllable 
(e.g., tor). The result highlighted the distinction between sustained activities (i.e., 
‘block’ effect in focal and non-focal PM blocks) in attentional control areas including 
rPFC region, and transient activities (i.e., ‘trial’ effect between correct PM trials in 
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focal and non-focal blocks) in ventral brain regions. This suggested PM cues 
differing in focality were involved with two different neural routes, and further 
supported the multi-process theory by showing PM performance required both 
top-down attentional control and bottom-up spontaneous retrieval. In the current PM 
experiment, we further controlled the contribution of the TAP and repetitive priming 
effects, which affected PM performance more on the perceptual level, and 
supposedly was related to the bottom-up route described in McDaniel et al., (2013). 
Therefore, after the TAP and repetitive priming effect to PM cue detection were 
controlled, we hypothesised that the difference between detecting exemplar and 
category PM targets was the strength between the encoded item and the expected 
PM target. In other words, we hypothesised that the process for matching a category 
to the PM target involved brain regions would be related to make associations 
between concepts and/or determining what one expects to respond to (i.e., sculpting 
response space). By contrast, the semantic ‘distance’ between an encoded 
exemplar and the forthcoming target is relatively ‘negligible’, since they were the 
identical items, albeit in different format in the current PM paradigm. The matching 
process presumably did not require much associative link. In previous relating fMRI 
studies, Dolan and Fletcher (1997) revealed that the left dorsolateral PFC region 
was involved with formation of associations between study materials. This left 
dorsolateral PFC region was also found to play an important role in cognitive 
functions relating to ‘sculpting response space’. In Fletcher, Shallice, & Dolan (2000), 
brain activations between the formations of distantly linked word pairs and closely 
linked word pairs were compared with each other. The result found greater activity 
for distantly linked word pairs than closely linked pairs in the left dorsolateral PFC 
region (BA46, MNI: -44, 26, 18). This left dorsolateral PFC region was not only 
involved with the formation of associative links, but also played an important role in 
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making actions that varied in ‘response space’. Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak 
(1991) used PET to examine the cerebral blood flow associated with willed and 
routine acts. The results identified that willed, open-ended acts, compared with 
routine, specified acts, were associated with increased activations in the left 
dorsolateral PFC region (BA46, MNI: -43, 29, 20). These two studies highlighted that 
the left dorsolateral PFC activity was linked to semantic associative processing 
varying in specificity. As a result, we hypothesised that the transient brain activation 
(e.g., brain activity to correct PM detection trials) for category PM targets would be 
higher in the left dorsolateral PFC region, compared with exemplar PM targets. 
Furthermore, without the contribution of bottom-up, spontaneous retrieval 
processing from the TAP and repetitive priming effects that favoured the ‘exemplar’ 
PM condition, we hypothesised that analysis for sustained activity (e.g., brain 
activation throughout the whole block) would show enhanced left dorsolateral PFC 
activation in the ‘category’ PM blocks, compared with the ‘exemplar’ PM blocks. For 
exploratory purposes, we also examined the effect of modality (picture vs. word 
stimuli), and the neural activities during PM encoding and the classification process 
during the ‘odd one out’ procedure.  
 
8.2  Methods of the prospective memory test 
Subjects 
Seventeen subjects participated in this PM experiment. All subjects were 
right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Before the experiment, all subjects were given 
written informed consent, and received £20 reimbursement for their participation. 
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One subject was excluded due to chance performance on the baseline ongoing task. 
Hence sixteen subjects (10 males, mean age=23.69, ranged from 19-32 years) were 
included for further analysis. 
 
Experimental design 
The basic structure of the PM experiment 
The PM experiment used a 2 x 2 factorial design, where the two factors were 
the ‘type’ of the PM targets and the ‘modality’ of the stimuli during the PM task. The 
‘type’ of the PM targets could be either a specified item (the ‘exemplar’ condition) or 
an unspecified item that belonged to a category (the ‘category’ condition). The 
‘modality’ of the stimuli referred to the format of the experimental materials 
presented during the ‘lighter item’ ongoing task, which can be either pictures (the 
‘picture’ condition) or words (the ‘word’ condition). The PM experiment was divided 
into four sessions, and each session contained 20 blocks. As is the standard setup 
for neuroimaging PM paradigms, there was a ‘baseline’ ongoing-only (OG-only 
blocks) condition that required performing the ongoing task, and experimental 
conditions where an additional PM task was embedded within the ongoing task (PM 
blocks) that required maintaining a PM intention (see Tabel 8.1 for the terminology 
used in the current PM experiment). Each session included 20 blocks, and 4 of the 
20 blocks were the ‘baseline’ OG-only blocks. The other 16 blocks in the same 
session were the ‘PM’ blocks, where subjects were required to perform the ongoing 
task, and simultaneously maintain a PM intention.  
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Table 8.1. The terminology used and its definition in the current PM experiment. 
Terminology Definition
The odd one out procedure To odd one out by identifying the odd item or the two similar items.
The OG task (the lighter item task) To choose the item that weights the least amongst the two items presented side-by-side. 
OG-only blocks OG blocks where no PM intention is being implemented.
OG-uncontaminated 
a
  OG-only blocks that are performed before any PM instruction is given. 
OG-contaminated OG-only blocks that are administered after a PM instruction has previously been implemented. 
PM blocks Blocks where a PM instruction has been given, and subjects are expecting to see a PM target. 
PM trials The specific trials where a PM target is available to subjects.
  OG-PM trials This refers to the OG trials (besides PM trials) during PM blocks.
a
 All the subjects in the current PM study are given PM instructions, which makes all the OG-only blocks 'contaminated'. 
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The odd one out procedure 
As one of the three manipulations of the current PM experiment, we asked 
subjects to do an ‘odd one out’ procedure to work out the PM target by themselves 
as part of the PM encoding stage. In the ‘odd one out’ procedure, three items were 
presented horizontally on the screen, and the items were either in verbal or 
non-verbal (picture) formats. Two of the three items belonged to the same category 
whilst the third item was from a different category. In the ‘OG-only’ blocks, the 
non-verbal items in the ‘odd one out’ procedure were horizontal or vertical lines 
shown in white on a black background, whereas the verbal items were either the 
letters ‘H’ or ‘P’. Subjects were required to detect the repeated or odd stimulus, but 
no further encoding process was required. In the ‘PM’ blocks, the items appearing in 
the ‘odd one out’ procedure were pictures showing, or words describing, common 
objects. Subjects were required to detect the odd one out, and further to remember 
either the category of the two similar items in the ‘category’ condition, or the identity 
of the odd item in the ‘exemplar’ condition.  
 
The ongoing task of the PM experiment: weight judgement  
After the ‘odd one out’ procedure in each block, subjects were required to 
perform a ‘lighter item’ task as the ongoing task of our PM experiment. In the ‘lighter 
item’ task, two items were presented horizontally on the screen, which would be 
either pictures showing or words describing common objects. Subjects were 
required to choose the item that weighed the least (i.e. was the lighter) amongst the 
two items. One of the three critical manipulations in the current PM experiment was 
the cross-modality design between the format of PM targets encoded during the ‘odd 
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one out’ procedure and the format in the ‘lighter item’ task. The modality of the items 
presented was always the opposite between the two stages, i.e., if pictures were 
shown during the ‘odd one out’ procedure, words would be shown in the subsequent 
‘lighter item’ task, and vice versa. As the ‘modality’ factor of the PM experiment, for 
blocks using picture stimuli in the ‘lighter item’ task were labelled as the ‘picture’ 
condition, and blocks using word stimuli in the ‘lighter item’ task were labelled as the 
‘word’ condition. The PM target embedded in each PM block was different, and 
subjects were reminded that the encoded PM target in each block applied to that 
particular block only before administering the experiment.  
 
The 2 x 2 factorial design (type x modality) 
In the ‘PM’ blocks, subjects were required to perform the ‘lighter item’ task, 
and simultaneously maintain the encoded PM target during the preceding ‘odd one 
out’ procedure in the same block. If the PM target was successfully recognised, they 
needed to remember to respond to that PM target. As one of the three manipulations 
of the current PM experiment, each ‘PM’ block contained only one PM target. In the 
16 ‘PM’ blocks of one session, 4 of the PM targets were exemplar targets in word 
format (the exemplar-word condition), 4 of the PM targets were exemplar targets in 
picture format (the exemplar-picture condition), 4 of the PM targets were category 
targets in word format (the category-word condition), and 4 of the PM targets were 
category targets in picture format (the category-picture condition). The remaining 4 
‘OG-only’ (contaminated) blocks in the same session were served as the ‘baseline’ 
blocks for each corresponding ‘PM’ blocks. All the blocks were presented 
pseudorandomly within each session, e.g., one of each exemplar-word, 
exemplar-picture, category-word, category-picture block, along with an ‘OG-only’ 
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block formed a ‘set’, and there were four sets in each session, with a constraint of no 
blocks in the same condition appeared consecutively.   
 
Procedure 
In the PM experiment, the duration of each block was 28 seconds. At the 
beginning of each block, an instruction saying either ‘ODD ITEM?’ or ‘SIMILAR 
ITEMS’ was presented on the screen for 2 seconds. Based on the instruction, 
subjects were instructed to identify the odd item or the two similar items in the 
following ‘odd one out’ procedure. In this ‘odd one out’ procedure, three items were 
presented on the screen, and the instruction remained at the bottom of the three 
items. Subjects were required to respond by pressing one of three assigned keys on 
a response box when instructed ‘ODD ITEM?’, and by pressing two of the three keys 
sequentially when instructed ‘SIMILAR ITEMS’. Subjects were allowed to press the 
same key multiple times to un-select or re-select the item if necessary. The duration 
allowed for answering the odd one out questions was 5 seconds. After the 5 second 
limit, in the ‘OG-only’ blocks, a cue saying ‘WAIT’ appeared at the bottom of the 
three items and subjects were required to do nothing for the next 3 seconds. In the 
‘PM’ blocks, a cue saying ‘REMEMBER IT’ appeared at the bottom instead and 
subjects were required to remember the odd item as the PM target in the ‘exemplar’ 
condition. Alternatively, in the ‘category’ condition, subjects were required to 
remember the category that the two similar items belonged to, and this was the PM 
target (see Figure 8.1). The duration for encoding the PM target was 3 seconds. 
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Figure 8.1. The experimental procedure of the PM experiment. The first row 
demonstrates the exemplar-word condition in ‘PM’ blocks, the second row 
demonstrated the category-picture condition in ‘PM’ blocks, the third row 
demonstrated the exemplar-word condition in ‘OG-only’ blocks, and the fourth row 
demonstrated the category-picture condition in ‘OG-only’ blocks. 
 
The duration of the subsequent ‘lighter item’ block was fixed at 16 seconds. 
Based on the picture superiority effect, compared with word stimuli, response speed 
should be faster to picture stimuli. This acceleration of response speed would 
inevitably lead to an exposure of more trials in the picture condition, and 
subsequently lead to an unequal proportion of PM targets between the ‘picture’ and 
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the ‘word’ conditions. In order to control for this potential bias accompanied by 
different stimulus modality, we optimised the duration of each trial based on a pilot 
study using eight subjects. Hence, during the ‘lighter item’ ongoing task, the two 
items appeared on the screen for at least 1.5 seconds. If a response was made 
faster than 1.5 seconds, the response was registered and the two items remained on 
the screen until 1.5 seconds from the trial onset. If no response was made up to 2.5 
seconds from the trial onset, no response would be registered for that trial and the 
next trial appeared on the screen right away. As a result, the number of trials in the 
‘lighter item’ task would be in average 7 -11 trials, which made the proportion of PM 
targets approximately 9%-15% of total trials, depending on the response pace of the 
individual (see Table 8.2). 
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Table 8.2. The experimental design of the PM experiment, which included the number of blocks, number of PM targets, estimated trial 
number, and the PM proportion in each condition. 
Condition 
  Number of Number of Time limit Time limit Trial numbers PM proportion
  blocks PM target total (sec.) per trial (sec.) in each block in each block (%) 
OG-only
Exemplar-Word  1 0 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 N/A 
Exemplar-Picture 1 0 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 N/A 
Category-Word  1 0 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 N/A 
Category-Picture 1 0 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 N/A 
PM  
Exemplar-Word  4 1 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 9.4 ~ 15.6 
Exemplar-Picture 4 1 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 9.4 ~ 15.6 
Category-Word 4 1 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 9.4 ~ 15.6 
Category-Picture 4 1 16 1.5 ~ 2.5 6.4 ~ 10.7 9.4 ~ 15.6 
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The PM target in each ‘PM’ block would be presented in a pseudorandom 
way, where the trials containing PM targets would be shown at the sixth to the 
thirteenth second after the onset of each ‘lighter item’ task. The first 32 sets of 
experimental materials used in the ‘odd one out’ procedure and the later 32 sets 
were the same items, except that the items were swapped for the ‘type’ factor in the 
same modality. For example, the pictorial ‘watermelon-strawberry-briefcase’ 
combination was instructed ‘ODD ITEM?’ in session one. In session three, the same 
pictorial combination was instructed ‘SIMILAR ITEMS?’ instead, with the position of 
the three items re-arranged in different order. A 2 second break was presented at 
the end of the ‘lighter item’ task in each block, and subjects were allowed to take a 
short break at the end of each session if needed. A six-minute T1-weighted 
structural scan was conducted between the second and the third session. The entire 
MRI scanning time for the PM experiment was approximately 50 minutes.  
 
MRI acquisition 
A 1.5 T Siemens TIM Avanto scanner was used to acquire both T1-weighted 
structural images and T2*-weighted echoplanar images (64 x 64; 3.5 x 3.5 mm pixels; 
echo time, 40 ms) with blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. Each volume 
comprised 31 axial slices (3.5 mm thick, oriented approximately to the anterior 
commissure–posterior commissure plane). Functional scans were acquired in four 
sessions, each comprising 227 volumes (approximately 9 min). Volumes were 
acquired continuously with an effective repetition time of 2.5 s per volume. The first 
two volumes in each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. 
Between the second and the third functional scan, a 6 min T1-weighted structural 
scan was performed. 
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Data analysis 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were analyzed using SPM8 
software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). The volumes were 
realigned, corrected for different slice acquisition times, normalized into 3.5 mm 
cubic voxels using the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain and 
fourth-degree B-spline interpolation, and smoothed with an isotropic 8 mm full-width 
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. The volumes acquired during the four sessions 
were treated as separate time series. For each series, the variance in the BOLD 
signal was decomposed with a set of regressors in a general linear model (Friston et 
al., 1995), using a mixed blocked and event-related design (Visscher et al., 2003). 
The regressors for the ‘odd one out’ task and the ‘lighter item’ task were modelled 
using boxcar design, and the regressors for PM-hit trials were modelled using delta 
function. Separate regressors coded for (1) odd one out – ‘OG-only’, (2) odd one 
out – ‘PM’, (3) encode – ‘OG-only’, (4) encode – ‘PM’, (5) lighter item task – 
‘OG-only’, (6) lighter item task – ‘PM’, (7) PM-hit trials. These seven regressors were 
coded separately for the exemplar-word, exemplar-picture, category-word and 
category-picture blocks, which made 28 regressors. We further set up two additional 
regressors, one for modelling PM-miss trials and the other one for excluded blocks, 
i.e., the entire block was excluded when mistakes were made during the ‘odd one 
out’ task, which comprised 12 excluded blocks from the total 1280 blocks (20 blocks 
x 4 sessions x 16 subjects). All the 30 regressors were aligned to the onset of each 
event modelled by either boxcar or delta function. The events were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function, and the duration for the ‘odd one out’ 
task was 5 seconds, encoding for 3 seconds, the ‘lighter item’ task for 16 seconds, 
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and PM-hit trials for 0 second. These regressors of interest, together with the 
additional regressors representing residual movement-related artefacts and the 
mean over scans, comprised the full model for each session. The data and model 
were high-pass filtered using a cut-off of 1/128 Hz. 
Parameter estimates for each regressor were calculated from a least mean 
squares fit of the model to the data. Effects of interest were assessed in a 
random-effects analysis as follows. The parameter estimates representing all 
regressors were first contrasted between the ‘PM’ conditions and the corresponding 
‘OG-only’ conditions, i.e., the contrast images for odd one out – ‘PM’ versus odd one 
out – ‘OG-only’ in the exemplar-word condition. All the resulting contrast images 
were then entered into different factorial design ANOVA using non-sphericity 
correction (Friston et al., 2002), including separate GLM models for the ‘odd one out’, 
PM encoding, and the ‘lighter item’ task. The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
entered for analysis represented the factors crossing the ‘PM type’ factor: exemplar 
vs. category, and the ‘modality’ factor: word vs. picture, which resulted in analysis of 
PM encoding during the ‘odd one out’ task and PM retrieval during the ‘lighter item’ 
task in the EW, EP, CW, and CP conditions. Appropriate contrasts for effects of 
interest were conducted at the second level, applying a height threshold of p<0.001 
uncorrected in conjunction with an extent threshold determined by SPM8 to achieve 
p<0.05 family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain 
volume. 
 
8.3  Behavioural and fMRI part of the result 
Behavioural part of the result 
  
309 
 
 
The behavioural part of the analysis focused on the performance during the 
‘lighter item’ task, and was divided into two parts. In the first part, in order to examine 
the difference between PM-related (e.g., the ‘PM’ blocks) and PM-unrelated (e.g., 
the ‘OG-only’ blocks) effect, we first collapsed the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ factors by 
comparing the overall effect between the ‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks. In the 
second part, we examined the ‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks separately. Given that 
no PM-related actions were required in the ‘OG-only’ blocks, we collapsed the type 
factor and only examined the ‘modality’ effect between the word and the picture 
conditions. In the ‘PM’ blocks, we examined the effect of ‘type’ and ‘modality’, as well 
as the ‘type’ x ‘modality’ interaction. Furthermore, we also examined the ‘type’ and 
the ‘modality’ effect to performance to the PM target trials in the ‘PM’ blocks. 
 
The accuracy for the ongoing (weight judgement) task 
The accuracy for the ‘lighter item’ task in each condition were summarised in 
Table 8.3. In the first part of the analysis, the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ factor were 
collapsed together, and a paired t test showed a significant difference between the 
‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks (t(15)=-2.552, p=0.022), showing subjects had 
significantly higher accuracy in the ‘OG-only’ blocks than in the ‘PM’ blocks. In the 
second part, analysis of the accuracy in the ‘OG-only’ blocks collapsing the ‘type’ 
factor identified a significant effect of ‘modality’ (t(15)=2.806, p=0.013), where the 
accuracy was significantly higher in the ‘picture’ condition than in the ‘word’ condition. 
For the analysis in the ‘PM’ blocks, repeated measures ANOVA found a significant 
main effect of ‘modality’ (F(1,15)=37.126, p<0.001), showing significant the accuracy 
was significantly in the ‘picture’ condition than in the ‘word’ condition. No significant 
main effect on ‘type’ and type x modality interaction were found.  
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Table 8.3. The accuracy for the ‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks in the ‘lighter item’ task, and the main effect of different factors were 
presented in separate columns.  
          
 mean  SD  
Main effect of  
          block  type  modality  
OG-only 
Overall 0.91  0.01  p=0.022 
Word condition 0.89  0.05  p=0.013 
Picture condition 0.92  0.04  
OG-PM  
Overall 0.89  0.01  
Exemplar-Word condition 0.85  0.08  p=0.669 p<0.001 
Exemplar-Picture condition 0.93  0.03  
Category-Word condition 0.85  0.06  
    Category-Picture condition 0.93  0.03        
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The reaction time for the ‘lighter item’ task 
The reaction times for the ‘lighter item’ task in each condition are 
summarised in Table 8.4. In the first part of the analysis, the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ 
factor were collapsed together, and paired t-test did not find a significant effect 
between the ‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks (t(15)=-1.457, p=0.166). In the second 
part, analysis of the ‘OG-only’ blocks using a paired t test identified a significant 
effect of ‘modality’ (t(15)=11.288, p<0.001), where subjects responded significantly 
faster in the ‘picture’ condition than in the ‘word’ condition. For the analysis of the 
‘PM’ blocks, repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of ‘modality’ 
(F(1,15)=334.663, p<0.001), which revealed that the response speed was 
significantly faster in the ‘picture’ condition than in the ‘word’ condition. No significant 
‘type’ or type x modality interaction was found.  
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Table 8.4. The reaction time (msec.) for the ‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks in the ‘lighter item’ task, and the main effect of different 
factors are presented in separate columns. 
          
 mean  SD 
Main effect of  
          block  type  modality  
OG-only 
Overall 1079.1 50.2 p=0.166 
Word condition 1222.7 218.2 p<0.001 
Picture condition 935.4 196.0
OG-PM 
Overall 1093.3 46.8 
Exemplar-Word condition 1247.6 201.8 p=0.415 p<0.001 
Exemplar-Picture condition 933.0 176.7
Category-Word condition 1251.4 201.0
    Category-Picture condition 941.2 184.0       
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In Einstein et al. (2005), it was shown that the ‘cost’ of the response speed 
between the ongoing and the PM task was significant in the non-focal condition, but 
not significant in the focal PM condition. Therefore, we used the reaction time in the 
‘OG-only’ blocks as the ‘baseline’, and compared the reaction time in the ‘exemplar’ 
and the ‘category’ conditions of the ‘PM’ blocks separately by collapsing the 
‘modality’ factor. Paired t tests showed that the difference was not significant when 
comparing the ‘OG-only’ blocks from the ‘exemplar’ condition in the ‘PM’ blocks 
(t(15)=0.999, p=0.333), nor in the ‘category’ condition (t(15)=1.82, p=0.089). 
However, we have identified a strong picture superiority effect showing that picture 
stimuli were associated with better accuracy and faster response speed than word 
stimuli. This intrigued us to further analyse the ‘cost’ of response speed, compared 
with the baseline ‘OG-only’ blocks, in the exemplar and the category conditions 
using word and picture stimuli separately. Analysis of blocks using word stimuli 
showed that the ‘cost’ of response speed was significant comparing with the 
‘OG-only’ blocks in the ‘category’ condition of the ‘PM’ blocks (t(15)=-2.3, p=0.036), 
but the ‘cost’ was not significant in the ‘exemplar’ condition of the ‘PM’ blocks 
(t(15)=-2.06, p=0.058). On the other hand, analysis of blocks using picture stimuli 
revealed that the ‘cost’ of response speed was not significant either in the ‘OG-only’ 
blocks in the ‘exemplar’ t(15)=0.017, p=0.871) condition, or the ‘category’ condition 
(t(15)=-0.39, p=0.705) of the ‘PM’ blocks. 
 
The performance for the PM target trials 
The accuracy and the reaction time for the PM target trials in the ‘lighter item’ 
task are summarised in Table 8.5. Repeated measures ANOVA of the accuracy to 
the PM targets in the ‘PM’ blocks found a significant effect of ‘modality’ 
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(F(1,15)=18.798, p=0.001), which showed that the correct detection rate for PM 
targets was significantly higher for pictures than for words. No significant effect of 
‘type’ or type x modality interaction was found. Repeated measures ANOVA of the 
reaction time to the PM target trials revealed a significant effect of ‘modality’ 
(F(1,15)=370.246, p<0.001), where the response speed was significantly faster to 
pictures than to words. No significant effect of ‘type’ and type x modality interaction 
was found. 
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Table 8.5. The accuracy and the reaction time (msec.) for the PM target trials in the ‘PM’ blocks, and the main effect of different factors 
are presented in separate columns. 
          Accuracy   Main effect of  
          mean SD    type  modality  
Accuracy 
Exemplar-Word condition 0.66  0.19  p=0.001 
Exemplar-Picture condition 0.79  0.14  
Category-Word condition 0.64  0.20  
Category-Picture condition 0.79  0.12  
Reaction time  
Exemplar-Word condition 1134.7 199.5 p<0.001 
Exemplar-Picture condition 852.4 175.3 
Category-Word condition 1109.1 198.1 
  Category-Picture condition   888.1 203.1       
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Supplementary analysis 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the purpose of setting a 1.5 
second minimum duration for each trial was to control for the overall proportion of 
PM targets in the ‘picture’ and the ‘word’ conditions. To examine if this had an effect 
on the proportion, we examined the trial numbers in the ‘lighter item’ task (see Table 
8.4). We followed the same procedure as for the analysis of the accuracy and the 
reaction time to investigate the trial numbers in each. In the first stage, paired t tests 
found no significant difference between the ongoing trials during the ‘OG-only’ and 
the ‘PM’ blocks (t(15)=0.524, p=0.608). In the second stage, analysis of the ‘OG-only’ 
blocks using paired t test found a significant effect of ‘modality’ (t(15)=-3.90, 
p=0.001), which indicated that subjects responded to  significantly more trials in the 
‘picture’ condition than in the ‘word’ condition. In the ‘PM’ blocks, repeated measures 
ANOVA also showed a significant main effect of ‘modality’ (F(1,15)=32.654, 
p<0.001), where more trials were processed in the ‘picture’ condition than in the 
‘word’ condition. But no significant effect of ‘type’ or type x modality interaction was 
found. 
 
The fMRI part of the result 
Analysis of the brain activation was conducted by two approaches, one 
measured the activated during the whole block (the sustained effect), and the other 
investigated the neural activity associated with particular trials (the transient effect). 
 
The sustained brain activation of the lateral vs. medial rostral PFC dissociation 
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In this section, we included all the trials in the ‘PM’ and the ‘OG-only’ blocks 
to examine the sustained effect by collapsing the ‘type’ and ‘modality’ factors during 
the ‘lighter item’ task (see Table 8.6 for results). The brain activity in the ‘PM’ blocks 
was compared to the ‘OG-only’ blocks, and the result showed increased activation in 
the left BA46 region (peak MNI: -40, 28, 24, p(FWE)=0.005). In order to examine if 
the current PM experiment evoked the ‘standard’ lateral rPFC activation identified in 
the previous PM studies (Burgess et al., 2001; 2003; Simon et al., 2006; Okuda et al., 
2007; Gilbert et al., 2009), a lenient p<0.005 threshold was applied for exploring 
increased activations in the rPFC region. The lenient threshold located a right lateral 
PFC activation in BA10 region (peak MNI: 31, 49, 17), and this activation survived 
from small volume correction using the MNI coordinate of the ‘intention retrieval PM’ 
> ‘uncontaminated OG’ contrast reported in Simons et al. (2006). The analysis of the 
‘OG-only’ blocks compared against the ‘PM’ blocks in the ‘lighter item’ task identified 
a widespread frontal, parietal, and subcortical regions including hippocampus and 
claustrum (all p(FWE)<0.05). The observed medial rPFC activation was in the 
medial BA10 region (peak MNI: 10, 60, 24) extending posteriorly to BA8 area (all 
p(FWE)<0.05) (see Figure 8.2, for illustration). 
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Table 8.6. Regions showing significant differences in 'sustained' BOLD signals in the 'lighter item' task during the PM and the OG-only 
blocks. 
      MNI coordinates       
  Brain region BA x y z p(FWE) a Zmax k 
PM blocks > OG-only blocks 
  Middle Frontal Gyrus BA46 -40 28 24 0.005 4.30 102 
Precentral Gyrus BA6 -36 0 31 
Precentral Gyrus BA6 -50 4 34 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA10 31 49 17 0.049 b 2.84 7 
PM blocks < OG-only blocks 
Inferior Parietal Lobule Claustrum -36 -11 -5 0.05 5.00 56 
Inferior Parietal Lobule BA39 -50 -67 41 <0.001 4.78 228 
Inferior Parietal Lobule BA40 -57 -53 41 
Parahippocampal Gyrus BA40 -61 -39 38 
Parahippocampal Gyrus Hippocampus 27 -18 -19 0.007 4.75 96 
Parahippocampal Gyrus BA19 27 -53 -1 
Paracentral Lobule BA37 31 -39 -8 
Precental Gyrus BA3 17 -35 55 <0.001 4.52 543 
Precental Gyrus BA4 31 -25 55 
Angular Gyrus BA4 38 -18 48 
Angular Gyrus BA39 52 -63 34 <0.001 4.42 243 
Middle Temporal Gyrus BA39 45 -70 31 
BA21 69 -48 -1 
Inferior Parietal Lobule Claustrum 38 -18 -1 <0.001 4.29 207 
BA40 62 -32 41 
Inferior Fronal Gyrus Claustrum 34 -14 13 
Inferior Fronal Gyrus BA10 52 39 -1 0.047 4.05 57 
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Superior Frontal Gyrus BA47 48 42 -8 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA8 -15 49 38 0.031 4.01 65 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA10 10 60 24 
BA8 -12 42 48 
* Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. BA refers to approximate (±5mm) Brodmann area   
a Corrected for multiple comparison across all brain voxels 
b Small volumue correction using the MNI coordinate in Simons et al. (2006) 
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Figure 8.2. Functional imaging results in the 'lighter item' task during the PM and the 
OG-only blocks. (a) Stronger sustained activation in the left BA46 region when 
contrasting ‘PM’ blocks to ‘OG-only’ blocks. (b) Stronger sustained activation in the 
medial BA10 region in the ‘OG-only’ blocks vs. ‘PM’ blocks contrast. 
 
The sustained and transient brain activity between the effect of ‘type’ 
First, to examine the sustained brain activity between maintaining PM 
intentions varying in specificity, we compared the sustained brain activation between 
the ‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions during the ongoing task (see Table 8.7). 
Brain activity in the ‘category’ condition compared against the ‘exemplar’ condition 
revealed strong activations in the occipital and temporal region including fusiform 
gyrus and middle occipital gyrus (all p(FWE)<0.001). No enhanced activation was 
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found in the ‘exemplar’ vs. ‘category’ contrast. Next, we examined the transient brain 
activity associated with successful detection of PM targets of varying specificity, and 
the results are reported in Table 8.7. A paired t test comparing the ‘category’ 
condition against the ‘exemplar’ condition revealed increased activations in the right 
inferior parietal lobule and frontal region in left BA46 (MNI: -47, 35, 20, p(FWE)=0.04, 
see Figure 8.3). No activations were found in the reverse exemplar vs. category 
comparison. 
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Table 8.7. Regions showing significant differences in 'sustained' BOLD signals to ‘sustained’ and 'transient' effects during the 'lighter 
item' task between PM type. 
        MNI coordinates       
    Brain region BA x y z p(FWE) a Zmax k 
Sustained block effect 
PM type: Exemplar condition > Category condition 
PM type: Exemplar condition < Category condition 
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 27 -42 -15 <0.001 4.99 203 
Superior Occipital Gyrus BA19 38 -77 27 <0.001 4.86 317 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA19 31 -91 6 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA18 -33 -88 3 <0.001 4.72 213 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA18 -26 -95 6 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA19 -43 -81 -1 
Interaction: PM type x Modality  
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 24 -77 -15 0.015 4.43 80 
Ligual Gyrus BA17 17 -91 -1 
Fusiform Gyrus BA18 20 -84 -12 
Transient trial effect 
PM type: Exemplar condition > Category condition 
PM type: Exemplar condition < Category condition 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA46 -47 35 20 0.04 4.34 42 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA45 -47 35 6 
    Inferior Parietal Lobule BA40 34 -56 45 0.025 3.96 48 
* Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. BA refers to approximate (±5mm) Brodmann area 
a Corrected for multiple comparison across all brain voxels 
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Figure 8.4. The t stronger transient activation for PM hit trials when comparing the 
‘category’ condition to the ‘exemplar’ condition in the left BA46 region. 
 
Supplementary analysis – the sustained activation between the effects of ‘modality’ 
In the current PM experiment, we used a cross-modality design to control for the 
TAP and repetitive priming effects to PM performance, which allowed us to examine 
the effect of ‘modality’ when using different format of materials in a PM paradigm 
(see Table.8.8 for results). The analysis of the sustained brain activity in the ‘lighter 
item’ task found that the ‘word’ condition compared against the ‘picture’ condition 
elicited strong activity located in the occipital region and frontal region in left BA8/9 
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(MNI: -22, 42, 45, p(FWE)=0.04). No activations were found in the reverse picture vs. 
word contrast. Importantly, repeated measures ANOVA identified a significant type x 
modality interaction in the right fusiform gyrus (MNI: 24, -77, -15, p(FWE)=0.015). 
Follow-up analysis demonstrated that brain activity was higher in the ‘category’ than 
in the ‘exemplar’ condition only using picture stimuli (t(15)=-7.1, p<0.001), but the 
difference was comparable using word stimuli (t(15)=-0.05, p=0.961) (see Figure 
8.4). The analysis of transient activity associated with successful PM target detection 
revealed that the ‘word’ condition evoked stronger activations in bilateral occipital 
region than in the ‘picture’ condition, and the reverse contrast showed stronger 
activations in the thalamus (see Table 8.8). 
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Table 8.8. Regions showing significant difference in ‘sustained’ block effects and 'transient' PM-hit trial effects during the 'lighter item' 
task between modality. 
        MNI coordinates       
    Brain region BA x y z p(FWE) a Zmax k 
Sustained block effect 
Modality: Word condition > Picture condition 
Cuneus BA19 31 -84 27 0.001 4.81 159 
Middle Temporal Gyrus BA19 41 -77 20 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA8 -22 42 45 0.04 4.47 60 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA9 -29 49 34 
Cuneus BA17 -15 -95 6 <0.001 4.42 254 
Cuneus BA19 -22 -88 27 
Middle Temporal Gyrus BA19 -36 -81 20 
Modality: Word condition < Picture condition 
Transient trial effect 
Modality: Word condition > Picture condition 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA19 38 -81 10 p<0.001 6.81 1632 
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 -26 -53 -15 
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 34 -70 -15  
Modality: Word condition < Picture condition 
Pulvinar Thalamus -8 -25 6 0.042 3.97 45 
Pulvinar Thalamus 10 -35 13 
  Ventral Lateral Nucleus Thalamus -19 -14 13     
* Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. BA refers to approximate (±5mm) Brodmann area 
a Corrected for multiple comparison across all brain voxels 
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Figure 8.4. The type x modality interaction where stronger sustained activation was 
found when comparing the ‘Category-Picture’ condition to the ‘Exemplar-Picture’ 
condition, but comparable when comparing the ‘Category-Word’ condition to the 
‘Examplar-Word’ condition in the right fusiform gyrus.. 
 
Supplementary analysis – the sustained activation of the encoding stage 
We also examined the sustained brain activity associated with PM encoding 
during the ‘odd one out’ procedure following the same procedure as in the ‘lighter 
item’ task, and the results were summarised in Table 8.9. When comparing the ‘PM’ 
blocks against the ‘OG-only’ blocks collapsing across the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ 
factors, increased activations were found in lingual gyrus, bilateral fusiform gyrus 
(BA19) and dorsal cingulate gyrus in BA24. No activations were found when 
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comparing the ‘OG-only’ blocks with the ‘PM’ blocks. We further investigated the 
brain activity during the PM encoding stage between the ‘exemplar’ and the 
‘category’ conditions. When comparing the ‘category’ condition against the 
‘exemplar’ condition, the result demonstrated a strong activations in the PFC region 
located in medial BA9 (peak MNI: -1, 60, 31, p(FWE)=0.019, see Figure 8.5.) 
extending posteriorly to BA6. No activations were found in the opposite exemplar vs. 
category contrast. Comparison between modality (word vs. picture) found no 
enhanced activations in the word vs. picture contrast or the picture vs. word contrast. 
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Table 8.9. Regions showing significant differences in ‘sustained’ effects during PM encoding between experimental conditions. 
      MNI coordinates     
    BA x y z p(FWE) a Zmax k 
PM blocks > OG-only blocks 
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 -36 -74 -19 <0.001 5.46 1144 
Cuneus/Ligual Gyrus BA17/18 -15 -95 -1 
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 31 -81 -19 
Cingulate Gyrus -22 4 31 0.011 4.89 76 
Cingulate Gyrus BA24/32 -15 7 34 
-15 11 20 
PM blocks < OG-only blocks 
PM type: Exemplar condition > Category condition 
PM type: Exemplar condition < Category condition 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA9 -1 60 31 0.019 4.33 66 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA9 -12 49 31 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA8 24 42 41 0.009 4.04 80 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA6 10 21 52 
Medial Frontal Gyrus BA8 17 32 38 
Modality: Word condition > Picture condition 
Modality: Word condition < Picture condition 
* Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. BA refers to approximate (±5mm) Brodmann area 
a Corrected for multiple comparison across all brain voxels 
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Figure 8.5. The activation that showed stronger sustained activation during PM 
encoding when contrasting the ‘category’ condition to the ‘exemplar’ condition in the 
dorsomedial PFC region. 
 
Supplementary analysis – the sustained activation of the odd one out stage 
We also analysed the sustained brain activity associated with classification 
process during the ‘odd one out’ procedure, and the results were summarised in 
Table 8.10. When comparing the ‘PM’ blocks against the ‘OG-only’ blocks collapsing 
across the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ factors, widespread activations were found in 
frontal region including bilateral BA46/9, as well as in occipital region (bilateral 
BA18). The reversed ‘OG-only’ blocks vs. the ‘PM’ blocks contrast showed stronger 
activities in parietal region and frontal region in the medial rPFC region (peak MNI: 
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10, 60, 24, p(FWE)<0.001) extending posteriorly from BA10 to BA8. For the 
comparison between the ‘type’ of PM targets, no increased activity was found in the 
exemplar vs. category contrast, or the reversed category vs. exemplar contrast. On 
the other hand, analysis of the ‘modality’ factor revealed that, in the word vs. picture 
contrast, a stronger activation was found in the occipital region (BA18) extended 
anteriorly to fusiform gyrus (BA37). The reversed picture vs. word contrast revealed 
stronger activities in occipital region (BA18) and bilateral sensory cortices including 
BA3 and BA6.  
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Table 8.10. Regions showing significant differences in ‘sustained’ effects of the classification process during the 'odd one out’ 
procedure between experimental conditions. 
      MNI coordinates     
    BA x y z p(FWE) a Zmax k 
PM blocks > OG-only blocks 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus BA18 38 -88 -8 p<0.001 Inf 844 
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 34 -60 -15 
Superior Occipital Gyrus BA19 31 -74 27 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus BA18 -33 -91 -8 p<0.001 Inf 1079 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus BA18 -40 -84 -8 
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 -40 -49 -19 
Precentral Gyrus BA6 -36 4 31 p<0.001 7.31 899 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA46 -43 28 24 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA46 -43 32 13 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA8 -5 18 48 p<0.001 6.62 228 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA46 41 28 20 p<0.001 5.45 327 
Precentral Gyrus BA9 38 11 31 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA6 31 0 48 
PM blocks < OG-only blocks 
Supramarginal Gyrus BA40 55 -56 31 p<0.001 4.84 204 
Supramarginal Gyrus BA40 55 -39 31 
Inferior Parietal Lobule BA40 62 -28 27 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA10 10 60 24 p<0.001 4.48 170 
Superior Frontal Gyrus BA8 20 49 41 
Medial Frontal Gyrus BA9 20 56 27 
Cuneus BA18 13 -91 20 p=0.053 4.24 48 
PM type: Exemplar condition > Category condition 
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PM type: Exemplar condition < Category condition 
Modality: Word condition > Picture condition 
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 34 -60 -15 p<0.001 6.45 635
Inferior Occipital Gyrus BA18 41 -84 -5 
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 27 -42 -15 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA18 -40 -84 3 p<0.001 6.37 549
Fusiform Gyrus BA37 -29 -49 -15 
Fusiform Gyrus BA19 -29 -63 -15 
Modality: Word condition < Picture condition 
Ligual Gyrus BA19 24 -63 3 p<0.001 4.6 270
Ligual Gyrus BA18 -15 -74 6 
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA18 -12 -98 17 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA6 31 4 41 p=0.026 4.22 60
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA6 34 0 55 
Middle Frontal Gyrus BA6 27 -7 55 
Postcentral Gyrus BA3 -40 -18 52 p<0.001 3.93 154
Precentral Gyrus BA6 -36 -11 45 
Inferior Parietal Lobule BA40 -33 -39 41 
* Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute reference brain. BA refers to approximate (±5mm) Brodmann area 
a Corrected for multiple comparison across all brain voxels 
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8.4  Discussion of the prospective memory test 
Behavioural effect on OG-only vs. PM trials 
The PM experiment used a cross-modality design and a novel setting for PM 
encoding to control for the potential TAP and repetitive priming effects on PM 
performance. In the behavioural part of the study, when comparing the accuracy for 
the ‘lighter item’ task between the baseline ‘OG-only’ and experimental ‘PM’ blocks 
by collapsing the ‘type’ and the ‘modality’ factors, the result revealed that subjects 
responded more accurately in the ‘OG-only’ blocks than in the ‘PM’ blocks. This 
suggested that maintenance of future intentions in the ‘PM’ blocks interfered with the 
ongoing activity, and resulted in lower accuracy on identifying the item that weighted 
lighter amongst the two items. On the other hand, analysis of reaction time found 
that, despite the averaged response speed was faster in the ‘OG-only’ blocks than in 
the ‘PM’ blocks, the difference was not significant. This insignificant ‘cost’ between 
the PM-unrelated and the PM-related conditions was inconsistent with the finding 
demonstrated in previous PM studies (e.g., Burgess et al., 2003; Einstein et al., 
2005), where significantly slower reaction times were identified when subjects 
performed an additional PM task compared with the baseline ongoing situation. 
Nevertheless, the current PM experiment used a cross-modality design and found 
robust picture superiority effect. To examine if there is any modality-specific 
difference, we further analysed the blocks using words and pictures in the ‘lighter 
item’ task separately. The result showed that reaction time was significantly slower 
in the ‘PM’ blocks than the ‘OG-only’ blocks when using word stimuli (PM blocks: 
1249.51 msec., OG-only: 1222.72 msec.; t(15)=-2.334, p=0.034), which was 
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consistent with the finding observed in Einstein et al. (2005). However, in blocks 
using picture stimuli, the ‘cost’ between the ‘PM’ blocks and the ‘OG-only’ blocks 
remained insignificant (PM blocks: 937.11 msec., OG-only blocks: 935.40 msec.; 
t(15)=-0.122, p=0.905). This suggests a possible format-specific distinction, where 
the ‘cost’ between PM-related and PM-unrelated conditions was more prominent 
using verbal stimuli than using non-verbal stimuli. Furthermore, this distinction 
between modality supported the picture superiority effect, i.e. acceleration when 
responding to pictorial stimuli and/or attenuation to the interference contributed by 
maintaining delayed intentions.  
 
Behavioural effects of exemplar vs. category PM intentions 
Next, we examined the effect of ‘type’ by comparing performance between 
the ‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions in the ‘PM’ blocks of the ‘lighter item’ 
task. The result found no significant ‘type’ effect on accuracy and reaction time. We 
did not find a significant effect of ‘type’ that demonstrated in Einstein et al. 
(2005),where subjects responded significantly slower when maintaining non-focal 
intentions, compared with focal intentions. A possible explanation was the single PM 
target block design in the current PM experiment, where each block contained only 
one PM target, and subjects were required to work out a new PM target that applied 
to that particular block only at the beginning of each block. As a result, the exemplar 
PM target in the current PM experiment was different between each block, but the 
focal PM target in Einstein et al. (2005) remained the same throughout the task. It is 
possible that this critical difference made subjects develop a strategy to cope with 
processing one-time PM targets (e.g., current PM experiment) vs. multiple, repeated 
PM targets (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005). For example, in Einstein et al. (2005), 
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subjects might adapt a strategy specifically for maintaining the repetitive focal PM 
intention, and the repetitive exposure of the identical PM targets might free up the 
attentional load in the focal PM condition as the test progressed. On the other hand, 
the non-focal PM target shared only partial features between each other, and 
subjects needed to engage in relatively higher effort to maintain non-focal PM 
intentions. As a result, it is possible that the response speed accelerated as the PM 
test progressed in the focal PM condition, and led to significantly faster ‘averaged’ 
reaction times in the focal PM condition, compared with the non-focal PM condition, 
when taking the PM performance as a whole. By contrast, in the current PM 
experiment, each PM intention was different from each other in each block, 
regardless of the exemplar or the category conditions. This constant change of the 
PM targets might limit the observed advantage of focal processing identified in 
Einstein et al. (2005), which were possibly contributed by, to a certain degree, the 
level of shared features between PM intentions. 
For the analysis of the PM trials where subjects correctly identified the PM 
targets revealed no significant effect of ‘type’ on accuracy and reaction time between 
the ‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions. This was inconsistent with the result in 
Einstein et al. (2005), where PM accuracy was significantly higher for detecting focal 
targets than for non-focal targets. A possible explanation was the cross-modality 
design in the current PM experiment, which was originally introduced to control for 
the effect of repetitive priming to PM detection. To elaborate on this manipulation to 
PM target detection, for example, in Einstein et al. (2005), the word ‘dormitory’, as 
the focal PM target, was pre-exposed to subjects before administering the PM task, 
but the syllable ‘tor’, as the non-focal PM target, appeared only a fraction to subjects 
in advance. As we speculated earlier, non-focal PM targets had a relatively lower 
level of repetitive features compared with focal PM targets. The advantage of focal 
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processing might be partially contributed to by the repetitive priming effect, where a 
stimulus that was previously experienced would lead to quicker and better 
performance on the later exposure of the same stimulus. In the current PM 
experiment, the cross-modality design eliminated the potential benefits coming from 
repetitive priming on the perceptual level, and, if any, subjects could only rely on a 
priming effect on the conceptual level. As a result, the null result of PM target 
detection between the ‘type’ factor suggested that exemplar PM targets, or targets 
having higher specificity, were not sufficient enough to produce an advantage of 
target detection, compared with category PM targets, or targets having lower 
specificity. Moreover, the single PM target block design might also contribute to this 
null result between the exemplar and category conditions. It is possible that the 
difficulty in identifying the very first PM target, regardless of exemplar/category or 
focal/non-focal conditions, would be identical or comparable. For example, given 
that focal PM targets would re-appear in identical feature every time (e.g., always 
‘dormitory’), whereas non-focal PM targets differed in fragments every time (e.g., 
his’tor’y, ‘tor’nado, ‘tor’toise), the advantage for processing focal PM target might 
become more prominent as the test progresses. In the current PM experiment, the 
single PM target block design highlighted a possible equivalence of identifying PM 
targets that varied in specificity, especially under the circumstances that the TAP 
and repetitive priming effects were controlled. Besides the experimental 
manipulation, it was proposed that subjective factors like a higher level of emphasis 
on the PM instruction could result in greater monitoring for the PM target, and 
subsequently lead to better PM target detection (Einstein et al., 2005). Therefore, it 
is also possible that the single PM target block design in the current PM experiment 
made subjects prioritise the processes relating to PM targets, given that the PM 
target changed every block, which might diminish the advantage of spontaneous 
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focal processing which required a mapping mechanism (c.f., Moscovitch, 1994). 
Lastly, the aim of the current PM study was to examine the effect of PM targets 
varying in specificity, which was one of the many factors that distinguished focality 
between PM targets. The inconsistent findings reported here did not fundamentally 
conflict with the core idea of the multi-process theory, which highlights a 
multi-pathway that subjects can rely on for spontaneous or monitoring processes 
under different circumstances in PM activities. The behavioural result perhaps 
suggested that the exemplar vs. category distinction we manipulated was not 
sufficient to elicit a mechanism that weighted between spontaneous retrieval and 
attentional monitoring processes to PM performance. 
 
Behavioural effect on word vs. picture stimuli 
 The other factor we manipulated in the current PM experiment was the modality 
of the experimental materials. In this cross-modality design, items presented in word 
format during the ‘odd one out’ procedure was presented in picture format in the 
subsequent ‘lighter item’ task, and vice versa. Previous psychological studies 
comparing performance on items presented in verbal vs. non-verbal formats have 
revealed a robust picture superiority effect (Nelson, Reed, & Walling, 1976), where 
concepts are memorised better when presented as pictures than presented as 
words. In the current PM experiment, analysis of the main effect of modality in the 
‘lighter item’ task found that accuracy was higher and response speed was faster to 
pictures than to words, and this superiority effect for processing pictures was also 
evident for PM target trials. Several theories have been proposed to explain this 
format-specific advantage for pictures. For example, the dual coding theory (Paivio, 
1986; 1991) proposed that the advantage occurs during the encoding stage, where 
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pictures are dually encoded by generating both verbal and image codes, whereas 
word stimuli are generated only using verbal code. Hockley (2008) examined the 
picture superiority effect using an associative recognition memory paradigm, where 
subjects were asked to study lists containing random pairs of words and pairs of 
drawings, and later were required to discriminate between intact and rearranged 
pairs of words and pictures. The result revealed an advantage for pictures over 
words using intact picture pairs, which supported the idea that benefits of pictorial 
stimuli originate from the encoding stage. Furthermore, in order to compare the 
difference between within- and cross-modality effect in RM, Sternberg, Radeborg, & 
Hedman (1995) investigated the congruency of item modality (word vs. picture) 
between studying and testing phase. The result demonstrated better recognition and 
faster processing speed when test items were congruent in presentation modality 
between study and test, compared with cross-modality items, which was consistent 
with the TAP effect identified in RM studies. This unique link, or facilitation, between 
the encoding and the retrieval stage in RM was highlighted by the multi-process 
theory in PM, and further demonstrated that the relationship between the underlying 
processes during the PM encoding phase and the PM retrieval phase could benefit 
either spontaneous or effortful processing. The current PM experiment used a 
cross-modality design, and the observed superiority effect for items presented as 
pictures in the ‘lighter item’ task were actually presented as words during the 
preceding ‘odd one out’ procedure (i.e. the PM encoding stage). This seems to 
contradict the findings in RM (Hockley, 2008) by revealing that items in word format 
during the PM encoding stage result in better performance in the subsequent ‘lighter 
item’ task, as well as in PM target detection. Nevertheless, it is important to point out 
that subjects were required to work out the PM target by themselves mentally, which 
meant that the PM targets were never physically presented to subjects during the 
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PM encoding stage. It is therefore possible that t PM targets were stored in a 
conceptual format instead of either in word or picture format. As a result, the superior 
performance for pictures over words observed in the ‘lighter item’ task, as well as 
PM detection, was that pictures carry a lot more information than words in general, 
and are often processed faster and more accurately than words. Furthermore, 
information in the non-verbal format could be more easily for subjects to imagine 
than information in verbal format, and was more concrete and easier to process. 
Lastly, we should emphasise that in the current PM experiment, we did not 
deliberately try to match the modality of experimental materials (word vs. picture) in 
terms of its memorability, but to use a cross-modality design along with an additional 
‘odd one out’ procedure to control for the TAP and the repetitive priming effects to 
PM performance. Our results suggested that delayed intentions can be encoded in a 
format-nonspecific way, and highlighted the dominance of the pictorial stimuli during 
PM retrieval stage in a cross-modality PM study. 
 
fMRI effect in the lighter item task 
The fMRI part of the result could be divided into two parts, the ‘lighter item’ 
task that was associated with PM retrieval and the ‘odd one out’ procedure that was 
involved with PM encoding. First, in the ‘lighter item’ task, when contrasting the 
‘OG-only’ and the ‘PM’ blocks, the analysis revealed a standard PM network, where 
the ‘PM’ vs. ‘OG-only’ contrast demonstrated activation in the lateral rPFC region, 
and the ‘OG-only’ vs. ‘PM’ contrast showed stronger activation in the medial rPFC 
region (Burgess et al., 2001; 2003). Given that the current PM experiment 
implemented several novel manipulations including cross-modality design, 
self-initiated PM intention, single PM target block design, and relatively short 
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retention period (15 seconds maximum), it is critical to first confirm that the current 
paradigm elicited a PM-like network that demonstrated a standard lateral vs. medial 
dissociation in the rPFC region.  
The comparison between the ‘exemplar’ and the ‘category’ conditions was 
analysed in two approaches, a boxcar modelling for the sustained ‘block’ effect, and 
a delta-function modelling for the transient ‘trial’ effect. The comparison of the 
sustained brain activities between blocks including PM targets varying in specificity 
showed that the ‘category’ condition elicited stronger activations in the posterior 
region including the fusiform gyrus and occipital regions, compared with the 
‘exemplar’ condition. The observed activations in the posterior regions suggested an 
enhanced bottom-up mechanism was involved with maintaining an unspecified PM 
intention, compared with maintaining a specified PM intention. This was inconsistent 
with the finding revealed in McDaniel et al. (2013), which identified stronger 
sustained activity in the left anterior PFC region when processing non-focal PM, and 
this has been interpreted as a regulation of top-down attentional mechanism in PM 
tests (Burgess et al., 2011). In the multi-process theory, non-focal PM cues require 
sustained attentional control to maintain a constant recognition process in order to 
identify the item as a PM target, but the identification of focal PM cues can be 
accomplished by spontaneous, effortless retrieval process. There were several 
possibilities relating to the novel manipulations we implemented in the current PM 
experiment that might lead to this opposite finding to McDaniel et al. (2013). First, 
the relatively short block duration might limit any potential observation of ‘sustained’ 
PM effect, which by definition, would be more prominent for a longer maintenance 
period. Second, the single PM target and the constant shifts between detecting 
exemplar and category PM targets between blocks made subjects unable to engage 
in a PM-retrieval mode (Guynn, 2003; Lepage, Ghaffar, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2000) 
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that favoured a non-focal PM condition evident by the PPI analysis in McDaniel et al. 
(2013). Third, repetition priming was shown to associate with reduction in neural 
activation in several brain regions, and was referred as the ‘response suppression’ 
(Schacter and Buckner, 1998). It is possible that the cross-modality design in current 
PM experiments disabled the suppression effect observed in repetition priming, and 
subsequently led to a bottom-up, stimulus-driven effect in the posterior lobes, 
including right fusiform gyrus. Importantly, interaction between the ‘type’ and the 
‘modality’ factors identified activation in the same right fusiform gyrus was stronger 
in the ‘category’ than in the ‘exemplar’ condition only when using picture stimuli, but 
not word stimuli. This format-sensitive effect was consistent with the finding showing 
that the right fusiform gyrus is more sensitive to visual form alterations about objects 
(Marsolek, 1999; Simons, Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003).  
The comparison on the transient brain activities between PM targets trials 
varying in specificity revealed stronger activations in the left BA46 region when 
contrasting the ‘category’ condition to the ‘exemplar’ condition. In McDaniel et al. 
(2013), when processing both focal and non-focal PM targets, the result identified 
equivalent PM-related activity in ventral brain regions. The observed activation in 
ventral brain regions was interpreted as an engagement of bottom-up attentional 
shift and detection of salient target stimuli (Cabeza Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 
2008), which supported the multi-process theory proposing that the retrieval of focal 
PM intentions relies more on bottom-up processes. In the current PM experiment, 
after controlling for the TAP and repetitive priming effect to PM performance, we 
proposed that correct identification to category PM targets, relative to exemplar PM 
targets, involved a top-down mechanism in the left dorsolateral PFC region located 
in BA46. As revealed by Frith et al. (1991), the dorsolateral PFC region is activated 
when making actions with higher degrees of ‘response space’, which accompany 
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willed, open-ended decisions. Successful detection of category PM targets, 
compared with detecting exemplar PM targets, requires a top-down evaluation of 
possible associative links between the encoded PM intention and the expected PM 
target. In other words, subjects are required to make more open-ended decisions, or 
utilise a bigger ‘response space’, in order to successfully detect potential PM targets 
in the ‘category’ condition than in the ‘exemplar’ condition, and willed action 
regulated by the dorsolateral PFC region evident by Frith et al. (1991). The frontal 
regulation observed in our study further suggests that when the TAP and repetitive 
priming effects, which presumably were more related to stimulus-driven, bottom-up 
process, are controlled, it was a top-down regulatory mechanism that differentiated 
potential PM targets varying in specificity. We should emphasise that, as with the 
contradictory findings in the behavioural part of the result, we did not argue against 
the core idea of the multi-process theory, but demonstrated different brain networks 
that associated with processing PM intentions varied in specificity instead. Last, we 
identified a ‘type’ x ‘modality’ interaction in the right fusiform gyrus. Follow-up 
analysis showed that sustained activity associated with maintaining PM intentions 
was stronger in the category vs. exemplar contrast only for picture stimuli, but not for 
word stimuli. This differentiation between modality suggested that, without the 
benefits from the TAP and repetitive priming effects, subjects selectively engaged in 
non-verbal aspect of the information. Under the circumstance where one is 
maintaining unspecified PM intentions (e.g., the category condition), a higher 
demand on the stimulus-driven mechanism may be required, and this facilitates 
processing of items in pictorial format.  
 
fMRI effect during the odd one out procedure 
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We further analysed brain activity during the ‘odd one out’ procedure, and 
focused on examining the effect of PM encoding and categorisation, or the odd one 
out process itself. During the PM coding stage, stronger activations in posterior 
regions including lingual gyrus and bilateral fusiform gyrus were found when 
comparing the ‘PM’ blocks to the ‘OG-only’ blocks collapsing the ‘type’ and the 
‘modality’ factors. Previous neuropsychological studies have identified that the 
lingual gyrus plays an important role in both visual and word processing. For 
example, Machielsen, Rombouts, Barkhof, Scheltens, & Witter (2000) used fMRI to 
investigate the brain regions linked to encoding the images for later recognition, and 
the lingual gyrus was one of the many structures that were involved with memorizing 
the images. Critically, in a recognition test a few weeks later, similar activation in 
lingual gyrus was found during the recollection process. Furthermore, the lingual 
gyrus also was evident to involve with naming stimuli (Bookheimer, Zeffiro, Blaxton, 
Gaillard, & Theodore, 1995), and activated during logical processing for future 
events (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000). In the current PM experiment, 
subjects were required to memorise PM targets in the ‘PM’ blocks, but not in the 
‘OG-only’ blocks. As a result, an additional encoding process was involved, and the 
purpose for this memorisation was to identify future PM targets. The observed 
lingual/fusiform gyrus activation during PM encoding was also found during the 
subsequent PM retrieval stage when comparing the ‘category’ condition to the 
‘exemplar’ condition. This highlighted the potential role of the lingual gyrus in the 
current PM experiment, which included a naming process of the encoded target, 
evaluation of future events logically, and a reactivation during subsequent retrieval 
of unspecified PM targets. It is important to note that, no activations were found 
anywhere when comparing between blocks using pictures and words. This null 
finding implied that, during the PM encoding, the memorisation process of PM 
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targets did not rely more on either verbal or non-verbal aspect of the information. 
This supported our speculation that the inconsistent finding to the picture superiority 
effect originated from encoding stage (Hockley, 2008), where the neural activity 
during PM encoding of PM targets relied on a conceptual, format-unspecific way. 
Comparison between the blocks including PM targets varying in specificity identified 
stronger activation in the dorsomedial PFC region when comparing the ‘category’ 
condition with the ‘exemplar’ condition. The observed activation was part of a 
proactive brain network in Bar (2009), which proposed that human brain is a 
proactive system that continuously generates predictions for anticipating relevant 
future events. This foresight was achieved by an analogical link that focused on 
predictions via associative activation of representations. Therefore, the predictive 
brain could rely on existing scripts in memory, or previously imagined experiences, 
when foreseeing future situations. In the current PM experiment, subjects needed to 
generate a higher level of prediction between the encoded and the anticipated PM 
target in the ‘category’ condition during the ‘odd one out’ procedure. On the other 
hand, the prediction between the encoded and the anticipated PM target in the 
‘exemplar’ condition had a specified linkage, and subsequently required a lower 
level of proactive thinking. In addition, the odd one out procedure could be divided 
into an initial analogical process that first identifies the similarity between the two 
items belonging to the same category before building an associative link between 
the encoded and the anticipated PM target in a predictive way. As mentioned in the 
introduction section, the dorsomedial PFC region was linked to functions including 
making analogical inferences (Volle, Gilbert, Benoit, & Burgess, 2010), detection of 
similarity between dissimilar targets (Pothos, 2005), comparison between 
expectation (Summerfield et al., 2006), and envisage farsighted decisions (Benoit, 
Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011). The observed stronger dorsomedial PFC activation in the 
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category vs. exemplar contrast during PM encoding suggested that this region is 
also involved with the formation of more predictive future intentions. Last, analysis of 
the categorisation process during the ‘odd one out’ procedure showed  widespread 
activations across the anterior and the posterior regions, including occipital lobe and 
frontal lobe when contrasting the ‘PM’ blocks to the ‘OG-only’ blocks. This indicated 
that odd one out for meaningful items elicited both bottom-up and top-down neural 
networks. By contrast, when comparing the ‘OG-only’ blocks to the ‘PM’ blocks, 
stronger activations were identified in the right parietal and the medial rPFC regions. 
The medial rPFC activation located in BA10 was consistent with the ‘rostral PFC 
attentional gateway’ proposed by Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert (2007), where the 
medial rPFC region was found to activate when focusing on stimulus-oriented (SO) 
thoughts compared with engaging in stimulus-independent (SI) processing. In the 
current PM experiment, when doing the odd one out, the ‘OG-only’ blocks required 
subjects to process either lines or letters, which could be accomplished by viewing 
physical features of the items. In the ‘PM’ blocks, on the other hand, subjects 
needed to identify pictures of objects and meaningful words, which involved more 
effort to process, and therefore relied on processing semantic information. It is 
possible that the observed medial rPFC activation when comparing the ‘OG-only’ 
blocks with the ‘PM’ blocks was related to higher level of SO processing, and was 
consistent with the proposed gateway role of the rPFC region in Burgess, 
Dumontheil, & Gilbert (2007). 
  To sum up, the aim of the current PM experiment was to investigate the 
cognitive processes to maintain and detect PM intentions varying in specificity. We 
designed a novel PM paradigm that implemented several novel manipulations 
including cross-modality design, single PM target block design, self-initiated PM 
intention, to control for the potential TAP and repetitive priming effects to PM 
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performance. The behavioural part of the results demonstrated a possible 
format-sensitive differentiation between processing PM intentions varied in 
specificity. The functional neuroimaging results further revealed a dorsolateral PFC 
activation that related to regulation of a more open-ended category PM targets, 
compared with pre-determined exemplar PM targets during PM retrieval. In the PM 
encoding stage, we identified a dorsomedial PFC activation that was associated with 
more proactive future predicting mechanism when encoding an unspecified PM 
intention, compared with encoding a specified PM intention. Together these results 
highlighted the functional roles that different PFC sub-regions play in PM 
performance with varying levels of specificity. 
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Chapter 9. Creativity and the PFC region 
9.1  Creativity, culture, and the PFC region 
Creativity is an ability that involves various aspects of high-level cognition 
and is essential to a range of human behaviours, from trivial daily matters like 
coming up with a new way to make everyday lives easier, to extraordinary 
achievements that significantly improve human society. A critical difference between 
this complex function and other cognitive processes (e.g., attention, memory, 
language) is in the range of definitions amongst individuals. When it comes to 
creative experience, everyone has their own idea of what creativity describes, and 
personal experiences could vary fundamentally, e.g., having an ‘aha’ moment, 
finding new solutions to routine tasks, or sophisticated art creation. In order to study 
this complex mental function experimentally, it is essential to have an agreed 
definition of this mental ability and to design reliable measurement tools to examine 
the underlying cognitive processes it involves. Previous psychological studies have 
proposed that to elicit some acts that are considered creative requires generating 
outcomes that are both novel (original), and useful (appropriate) (Sternberg and 
Lubart, 1999; Plucker and Makel, 2010; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). This definition, 
although simplified, provides scope and opportunity to develop psychometry to 
measure observable creative behaviours, and investigate the neural correlates in 
human brain associated with the experimental variables. To capture the cardinal 
features of creativity, many theoretical frameworks have been proposed. However, 
they have yielded inconsistent findings, with little agreement so far (Fink, Benedek, 
Grabner, Staudt, & Neubauer, 2007; Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 2010; 
Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011).  
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For instance, one of the earliest studies of creativity was Guilford (1950), who 
assessed the ability to generate multiple solutions to open-ended problems without 
an absolute right or wrong answer, a function later referred as divergent-thinking. In 
order to quantified these open-ended answers experimentally, several carefully 
defined criteria were introduced, including fluency (e.g., the quantity of responses), 
originality (e.g., the degree of uncommon of responses), flexibility (e.g., the number 
of different categories of responses), and complexity (e.g., the enrichment of 
responses). Other theoretical frameworks measured the verbal aspect of creativity, 
and focused on examining the ability to combine words that were remotely related in 
a semantic context, e.g., the Remote Associates test (Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 
1964). Dietrich and Kanso (2010) reviewed six functional imaging studies 
implemented divergent-thinking tests to subjects and highlighted the critical role that 
the PFC region plays in this kind of creativity paradigm. On the other hand, when 
reviewing previous neuropsychological experiments using the Remote Associates 
test, it was the anterior cingulate cortex, as well as the superior temporal gyrus, that 
were identified as being involved with semantic aspect of creative thoughts. This 
implies that creativity tests measuring different aspects of creative actions might 
associate with distinct cortical regions in the PFC area. Other reviews of 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have also pinpointed the importance 
of the PFC region in creative thinking, but have not specifically highlighted the link 
between different aspect of creativity and different PFC sub-regions (Arden et al., 
2010; Fink and Benedek, 2013). 
As a form of higher-level human cognition, creative acts require various kinds 
of processes, for example, mental flexibility, verbal fluency, working memory, 
planning and organising ideas, and incidentally, these cognitive functions are all 
shown to involve the PFC region (Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000; Zeki, 2001; 
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Dietrich, 2004; Bogousslavsky, 2005; Changeux, 2005; Ward, 2007). It is possible 
that these various kinds of cognitive processes and their links to the PFC region 
have profound contributions to creative behaviours measured by different 
psychometrical tests. Gonen-Yaacovi, Cruz de Souza, Levy, Urbanski, Josse, & 
Volle (2013) conducted a meta-analysis to statistically test the global and distinct 
associations between different PFC sub-regions and different experimental 
paradigms requiring creativity. In order to specify the potential process-specific PFC 
sub-regions, the experiments included in the meta-analysis were first categorised 
into two separate dimensions, the core ‘nature’ of creativity tests (combination vs. 
unusual generation tests), and the ‘stimuli’ used for creativity tests (verbal vs. 
non-verbal). As defined by Gonen-Yaacovi and colleagues, the ‘combination’ kind of 
creativity tests involved developing associations between remote elements of 
information in order to generate a new outcome, whereas the ‘unusual generation’ 
kind of creativity tests focused on examining the level of fluency, originality, flexibility, 
and complexity of the uncommon ideas (Guilford, 1950). Coordinate-based 
meta-analysis using Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) method first identified 
that, in general, many PFC sub-regions including the caudal lateral PFC, the medial 
and lateral rostral PFC region are implicated in creativity experiments and these 
were included for the analyses. When comparing between the core ‘nature’, the 
‘combination’ type of creativity tests, compared with the ‘unusual generation’ kind of 
creativity tests, showed stronger activations in the left lateral rostral PFC (in BA10) 
and the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (in BA45, 46). In the reverse ‘unusual 
generation’ vs. ‘combination’ contrast, the left middle frontal gyrus (in BA9) was 
found to be more activated. This comparison between the ‘nature’ of creativity tests 
identified enhanced recruitment of the lateral rostral PFC region in the ‘combination 
vs. unusual generation’ contrast, which revealed processes that enabling integration 
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of multiple solutions based on remote association or related similarity. This was 
consistent with the proposed hierarchical organisation of the PFC functions along a 
dimension of progressively higher degree of abstraction (Christoff et al., 2001; 
Hampshire et al., 2010; Krawczyk, McClelland, Donovan, Tillman, & Mcguire, 2010). 
Enhanced dorsolateral PFC activation in BA9 in the ‘unusual generation vs. 
combination’ contrast, on the other hand, was in line with the idea of a fronto-parietal 
network that has its functional role in working memory, monitoring and random 
generation of actions (Frith et al., 1991; Rowe, Hughes, Eckstein, & Owen, 2008). 
This implied a potential explanation that creative thinking requiring unusual 
generation, compared with combining different semantic ideas, involved 
implementing a greater room to generate free choices of responses. Therefore, the 
enhanced BA9 activation highlighted the importance of these spontaneous willed 
actions for ‘unusual generation’ kinds of creativity tests in relative to other creativity 
paradigms. When comparing the type of stimuli used in the various creativity tests, 
the verbal tests elicited higher activations mainly in the bilateral PFC regions (in BA8, 
9, 10, 44, 46, 47) than the non-verbal tests, and the reverse contrast demonstrated 
enhanced neural activity in the left middle frontal gyrus (in BA9). Although 
dissociations between verbal vs. non-verbal information in the lateral caudal PFC 
region are frequently reported (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Sakai and Passingham, 2003; 
Volle et al., 2008), due to the mixed stimuli used in the non-verbal creativity tests 
(visual, spatial, music), it was not possible to interpret the enhanced left rostral PFC 
activation in the non-verbal vs. verbal contrast. Together these findings support the 
view that creativity involves distinct cognitive processes along different dimensions, 
and confirms that different creativity tests make different demands on functions that 
associate with different PFC sub-regions. As a result, given that creativity is a 
complex function that different measurements would activate different neural 
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networks, it is reasonable to have inconsistent findings between different theoretical 
frameworks, or even individuals with different backgrounds. However, investigation 
on the topic is relatively scarce.  
Previous studies have demonstrated that experience has a profound effect in 
sculpturing brain structure. For example, increased regional brain size is found in 
functionally associated cortical regions accompanying superior behavioural 
performance in a wide range of cognitive domains including second language 
acquisition (Golestani, Molko, Dehaene, Lebihan, & Pallier, 2007; Green, Crinion, & 
Price, 2007), spatial navigation (Maquire et al., 2000), and music ability (Gaser & 
Schlaug, 2003). A classic example, for instance, comes from sustained practice in 
juggling, where regional brain volume is increased through behavioural training 
(Draganski et al., 2004; Boyke, Driemeyer, Gaser, Buchel, & May, 2008). These 
studies posited a promising notion that experience can affect brain structure, and 
show the plasticity in structural changes morphometrically. When considering the 
exposure to sustained practice or effect on a longitudinal scale, it is possible to 
suspect that a more influential factor, e.g., the environment, or the culture we live in, 
might show significant effects upon human function and brain structure. A prevalent 
distinction between cultures suggests that Easterners (e.g., Asians) and Westerners 
(e.g., UK, US) show different cognitive processing originating from their own merits 
of collectivism (people who focus more on the significance of cohesion with social 
groups) versus individualism (people who emphasis more on personal liberty and 
desire self-reliance by opposing external interference) philosophies within the 
Eastern and the Western societies respectively (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003). Some 
researchers have proposed that it is the manner of information processing that leads 
to cross-cultural differences, where Asians consider matters holistically and the 
Westerners viewed things analytically (Park and Gutches, 2002; Nisbett and 
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Miyamoto, 2005). Functionally, empirical evidence comes from neuroscientific 
studies like eyetracking data (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005) and fMRI techniques 
(Han and Northoff, 2008) that have demonstrated that cultural differences play an 
important role in daily cognitive functions. Structurally, two imaging studies have 
examined morphological differences in brain structure between the Easterners and 
Westerners, and both highlighted the significance of language and its linked cortical 
areas in cultural difference (Green et al., 2007; Kochunov et al., 2003). Their results 
identified increased tissue in multiple structures including left inferior frontal cortex, 
which was interpreted as the requirement for using Chinese, as compared with using 
English. Chee, Zheng, Goh,Park, & Sutton (2011) extended this cross-cultural effect 
in structural-based studies by investigating differences in brain structure as a 
function of age between Asians (Singaporean) and Westerners (Americans), as well 
as the environmental effects in young (mean age=21 yrs) and older adults (mean 
age=64 yrs). The results showed that young Westerners had higher cortical 
thickness and larger volume in multiple brain regions including the bilateral inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA10, 11, 45, 47) on the lateral surface, and the bilateral superior 
frontal gyrus (BA9, 10) on the medial surface. The observed difference in cortical 
thickness between younger subjects was not significant in older subjects. These 
findings suggest that individuals from the Eastern and the Western societies may 
have distinct behavioural patterns in a range of cognitions that are reflected in 
differences in cortical structure in the PFC region.  
People from Eastern and the Western countries are thought to have distinct 
values that originate from the environment they experience. In particular, there is a 
common perception that the Eastern and the Western cultures have different 
creative behaviours, and much of the difference across cultures seems to be the 
relative weight placed on the two main aspects of creativity: novelty and usefulness 
  
353 
 
 
(Sternberg and Lubart, 1999). Inn the West, “creativity” emphasises originality-based 
phenomena (i.e. novelty) relating perhaps to individualism, whereas Eastern notions 
of creativity are more focused on a connection to the practical realm with the aim of 
maintaining interpersonal harmony (Villalba, 2008). One of the theories explaining 
this difference was proposed by Nisbett and colleagues (Peng and Nisbett, 1999; 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayam, 2001; Nisbett and Masuda, 2003), who argued 
that the Eastern and the Western cultures have distinct biases in information 
processing. In the Western societies, individualistic and self-centred characteristics 
are encouraged, and people tend to process central objects and organise 
information in an analytical way. In contrast, East Asian countries have a rich 
historical background that focuses on their collectivist heritage, and people tend to 
consider themselves as part of a larger whole by biasing more on contextual 
information. In order to measure the difference between this individualism vs. 
collectivism, two types of self-construal, independent and interdependent 
self-perception, were proposed to conceptualise this distinction (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991). Although everyone possesses both kinds of self-construal, 
individuals tend to use one more than the other to guide their behaviour in fitting 
within their culture. The independent self-construal is defined as a bounded, unitary, 
stable self that is separate from social context, where people put emphasis more on 
the independent self by considering themselves unique and distinct from others, and 
pursuit the goals they value (Singelis, 1994). The interdependent self-construal is 
defined as a flexible, variable self that focuses on the connection with others, where 
people with interdependent self-concern with enacting appropriate behaviours and 
maintain harmony with others in order to pursuit belongingness (Singelis, 1994). 
These characteristics made interdependent individuals more likely to act in 
accordance with other’s expectation, instead of following their internal wishes or 
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personal values. As a result, it seems necessary to consider this cultural modulator 
in higher-level cognition like creativity, especially when both functional and structural 
differences relating to the PFC region have been identified between the two cultures 
(Han and Northoff, 2008; Chee et al., 2011). 
In the current study, we compared creativity between two countries, using 
Taiwan as the sample Eastern country and the UK as the sample Western country. 
To create a culture-free comparison, we used creativity tests that required minimum 
verbal content. Based on the categorisation of creativity tests by Gonen-Yaacovi et 
al. (2013), we included the Alternative Uses test (Guilford, 1967) as a measurement 
for ‘unusual generation’ kind of creativity. Given that the ‘combination’ kind of 
creativity tests usually involves semantic processing, e.g., the Remote Associates 
test (Mednick et al., 1964), we did not included any measurement in this category. In 
non-verbal dimension, we included the Design fluency test (Jones-Gotman and 
Milner (1977), as a measurement for creative thinking that required minimum 
amount of semantic processing. Incidentally, a meta-analysis using the 
coordinate-based ALE method in Gonen-Yoaacovi et al. (2013) showed that similar 
regions in the left BA9 were activated in the ‘unusual generation’ vs. ‘combination’ 
contrast, as in the ‘non-verbal’ vs. ‘verbal’ contrast. This prompted us to examine if 
there is a function-structure link between this PFC sub-region and the creativity 
function it supported. In Chee et al. (2011), structural-based analysis was conducted 
to examine the structural difference between cultures using cognitive matched 
young and old adults from Singaporeans and Americans. Using a vector 
machine-based classification with a threshold at accuracy > 65% identified several 
cortical regions was able to differentiate Singaporean and Americans, including 
bilateral inferior PFC region located closely to BA9 region (see illustration of the 
identified inferior PFC region in Figure 9.1). As the classic juggle experiment 
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demonstrated, experience can sculpt brain structure and human function, and 
increased cortical volumes can be associated with improvement with practicing on 
purpose (Draganski et al., 2004). Therefore, we hypothesised that individuals from 
Taiwan and the UK would show difference in creative performances. Moreover, 
previous theoretical frameworks discussing creativity proposed that a creative act 
involves generating ideas that are both novel (original) and useful (appropriate). 
These two dimensions describing creative behaviours are in some ways consistent 
with the distinct cultural values between the Western and the Eastern societies in 
individualism and collectivism, respectively (Villalba, 2008). The two psychometric 
tests we used for cross-cultural study, the Design fluency test and the Alternative 
Uses test, could be viewed as creativity measurements that weigh more on the 
novelty and the usefulness aspects of creativity, respectively. For example, to obtain 
higher score in the Design fluency test, subjects need to generate as many as 
drawings as they can within a fixed period. Importantly, the generated design should 
be something that is not nameable or the fragments of existing items, and as a result 
this requires subjects to use creative thinking that relies more on novelty or 
originality. In contrast, the Alternative Uses test, as the name suggested, requires 
subjects to come up with as many uncommon uses of common objects as possible 
within time limit. Critically, although uncommon, the generated uses for the particular 
item should be applicable or practical in some ways, and subsequently can be used 
to measure creative ability on the useful or practical side. Given that the difference 
on cultural philosophies described earlier, we suspect that the Westerners would 
focus more on the novelty (or originality) aspect of creativity because of 
individualism, where individualists tend to exercise their liberty and the highlight the 
importance of free wills. This kind of personal belief supposes to benefit more on the 
novel (or original) side of creative thinking. On the other hand, the Easterners would 
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emphasis more on the usefulness (practicality) aspect of creativity due to 
collectivism, where collectivists cherish the importance of being a group member 
and therefore prioritise the goal of the group. This characteristic might encourage 
creative thinking to put more effort on the side that potentially affects others, or its 
usefulness. As a result, we hypothesised that the Easterners and the Westerners 
would demonstrate distinct pattern of performance in the two creative tests we used. 
We have three hypotheses for this cross-cultural study on creativity. First, we 
hypothesised that the Easterners and the Westerners would show distinct 
performance on the two creative tests that associated with the PFC region 
(Gonen-Yoncovi et al., 2013). Second, based on the potential mapping between 
cross-cultural values (individualism vs. collectivism) and the two kinds of 
self-construal (independent vs. interdependent), we hypothesised that the 
Westerners would show higher level of independent self-construal, whereas the 
Easterners would demonstrate higher level of interdependent self-construal using 
the Self-construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). Third, we suspect the two creativity tests 
we included have different weightings on the two proposed aspects of creativity, 
where the Design fluency test measures more the novelty part of creativity, and the 
Alternative Uses test focuses more on the usefulness part of creativity. Based on 
previous cross-cultural studies suggesting the two cultures have distinct values, we 
hypothesised that the British subjects would have better score in the Design fluency 
test (relies more on novelty), whilst Taiwanese would generate more creative ideas 
in the Alternative Uses test (focuses more on usefulness). To complete this 
cross-cultural study, a PhD student (a native Taiwanese, Hsuan-Chen Wu), as the 
examiner, travelled to Taiwan and recruited a group of young Taiwanese adults. The 
Taiwanese group was required to administer a Chinese version of creativity 
questionnaire including a range of psychometry. The examiner then return to the UK 
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and recruited a group of young British adults, and the equivalent English version of 
creativity questionnaire was administered to them. It is necessary to recruit native 
Taiwanese in Taiwan because (a) Taiwanese students in the UK will be a 
self-selecting sample, and (b) they have already been exposed to Western 
behavioural and cognitive norms. The creativity questionnaire from both groups of 
subjects were then scored by four ‘blind’ raters, two native Taiwanese and two native 
British, who were not given any background information regarding to the purpose of 
the study. More detailed information of the creativity questionnaire is summarised in 
the methods section. 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Illustration of the bilateral inferior PFC region in BA9 that ables to 
differentiate Singaporean and Americans in Chee et al. (2011). 
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9.2  Methods 
Subjects 
Twenty-two native Taiwanese adults (15 male) and seventeen native British 
adults (11 male) were recruited to administer the same creativity questionnaire in the 
version of their native language. The Taiwanese subjects were recruited from the 
subject database in the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Central University, 
Taiwan, and the British group were recruited from the subject database at the 
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, United Kingdom. 
Both groups of subjects had no histories of hearing, visual, motor impairments or 
neurological disorders. All subjects were required to complete a personal information 
section  including gender, age, language, discipline studied, family income, whether 
they had visited other countries more than a month, familiarity to the other culture, 
and self-assessment of one’s own creativity in a range of 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the 
highest). The average age of the Taiwanese group (mean=29 yrs) was significantly 
higher than the British group (mean=24.1 yrs; t(38)=2.405, p=0.021). No significant 
differences were found between the self-assessed familiarity to the other culture 
(Taiwanese: 3 out of 5, British: 2.68 out of 5; t(38)=1.158, p=0.254). Importantly, 
self-assessment of one’s own creativity revealed that the British group (mean=3.4 
out of 6) rated themselves significantly higher than the Taiwanese group (mean=2.8 
out of 5; t(38)=2.521, p=0.016).  
 
Design and procedure 
  The creativity measurement tool consisted of seven sections. The first 
section required subjects to provide some personal information. The second section 
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titled ‘reasoning ability’ involved testing the subject’s general intelligence using the 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Test (APM, Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988). 
The third section titled ‘your design fluency on creativity’ included a ‘free’ condition 
and a ‘fixed’ condition adapted from the Design fluency test (Jones-Gotman and 
Milner, 1977). All subjects were required to finish the ‘free’ condition first then the 
‘fixed’ condition. In the fourth section, called ‘the ways you show your creativity’, 
subjects needed to complete the Alternative Uses test (Guilford, 1967) by generating 
uses for three common items in the following order: brick, newspaper, and pen. The 
fifth section was called ‘your definition of the concept of creativity’, and subjects were 
asked to choose ten of the total twenty listed adjectives that they considered related 
to creativity. The sixth section was labelled ‘applications of creativity’, which involved 
asking subjects to rate 24 listed actions varying in level of creativity (low vs. high) 
along twelve different disciplines according to three dimensions: creativity, novelty, 
and usefulness. For example, repair an electronic device (lower level of creativity) vs. 
build an electronic device from junk or waste (higher level of creativity) in the 
engineering discipline. The eighth section, which was titled ‘your understanding of 
yourself’, included 28 statements where subjects needed to evaluate themselves on 
a 6-point scale, in order to control for the potential neutral responses and forced 
subjects to choose a side. All subjects were administered the creativity questionnaire 
in the same order, and only the third and the fourth section had a time constraint, 
whilst the other sections were self-paced. The creativity investigation took each 
subject approximately 50 minutes to finish. 
 
Psychomety and scoring 
Raters for the Design fluency test and the Alternative Uses test 
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Two native Taiwanese and two native British ‘blind’ raters were recruited to 
score the creativity questionnaire. The four raters were one male Taiwanese aged 
28 years old majoring in psychology, one female Taiwanese aged 23 years old 
majoring in architecture, one male British aged 25 years old majoring in psychology, 
and one female British aged 25 years old majoring in medicine. All the raters read 
the scoring criteria sheet first, and then were trained by the examiner to ensure their 
capability to give reliable scores using the same criterion. The raters were not 
informed of the purpose of the rating (for cross-cultural study), and rated all the 
questionnaires (no.1 to no. 39) in the same order. 
 
Raven’s APM (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988) 
The Ravens Progressive Matrices were originally developed to assess higher 
level mental ability, which consisted of a series of progressively more difficult items 
that required subjects to choose which piece (from eight options) that best 
completed a pattern series. We used the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices 
test (APM, Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988) set A, that uses non-verbal materials, 
which enables measuring general intelligence for populations where the contribution 
of language should be minimized (e.g., subjects for whom English is not their first 
language). This lower demand of culture loading of Raven’s APM made it an ideal 
measurement for estimating general intelligence between the Taiwanese and the 
British groups. Superior performance required no special knowledge of vocabulary 
because all testing items were geometric matrices, but still demonstrated probably 
the purest measure of analytical fluid intelligence (Carpenter, Just, and Shell, 1990). 
Subjects were told that the test was for measuring reasoning ability, and their task 
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was to identify the figure that was to right ‘shape’ to fill the space. The number of 
errors made was an index of estimated general intelligence.  
 
Design fluency test (Jones-Gotman and Milner, 1977) 
Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977) developed the Design fluency test that 
used visuospatial method to measure the ability to utilise one’s own strategy to 
maximise the production of responses and avoid repetition at the same time. The 
analogous verbal fluency test (Benton, 1968; Milner, 1964) has proved to be 
sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. The Design fluency test was administered by 
oral instruction, and subjects were encouraged to draw as many different designs as 
they could within time limits. In the ‘free’ condition of the test, subjects were required 
to draw different non-verbal designs on a paper in 5 minutes. The restrictions for the 
designs followed the original design fluency test (Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977), 
which included: a) drawing nameable objects or fragments of those is not allowed; b) 
drawing existed geometric objects is not allowed; c) scribbling is not allowed, 
because they usually look similar (see Figure 9.2(a), for illustration of the English 
version). After finishing the ‘free’ condition, subjects were told that they needed to 
complete another drawing session, the ‘fixed’ condition, with other additional 
restrictions on the top of the ‘free’ condition. The further rule limited the drawings to 
four segments: a) a circle would be count as one line, as would a gentle curve; and b) 
a sharp angle would make two lines, as would a steep twist (see Figure 9.2(b), for 
illustration of the English version). The examiner encouraged subjects to make as 
many different designs as possible within 4 minutes, and emphasised that the 
designs in this condition had to consist of exactly four lines without ambiguity. Before 
administering the test, subjects were asked to read all the instructions by themselves 
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first, and the examiner explained all the restrictions again. During the drawing period, 
subjects were allowed to ask questions or request elaboration of the rules once, and 
the examiner would point out subject’s mistake for the first time. For subjects 
claiming to be unable to make any designs, the examiner would give verbal 
encouragement once, but still required subjects to wait until the full time elapsed.  
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Figure 9.2. The English version of the Design fluency test included in the creativity 
questionnaire, where panel (a) shows the introduction for the free condition and 
panel (b) demonstrates the introduction for the fixed condition. 
 
For the scoring of the Design fluency test, the four raters needed to identify 
the total number of designs, the number of erroneous designs that did not follow the 
restrictions, and the number of valid designs. Furthermore, the raters were required 
to rate the valid designs as a whole on four different aspects: creativity, similarity, 
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originality and complexity (Guilford, 1950). The score was made on a 6-point scale, 
where1 indicated that the rater strongly disagreed that the design showed 
creativity/similarity/originality/complexity, and 6 meant that the rater strongly agreed 
that the designs demonstrated creativity/similarity/originality/complexity. 
 
Alternative uses test (Guilford, 1967) 
The Alternative Uses test was designed by J.P. Guilford, the founder of 
modern creativity research, as part of his Structure of Intellect, which provided 
simple measurement for evaluating divergent thinking ability, or spontaneous 
flexibility (Guilford, 1967). In the Alternative Uses test, subjects were asked to 
generate uncommon uses for common objects in a given amount of time. This 
paper-based test provided a psychometric approach to measure the divergent 
thinking part of creative ideas. Subjects were instructed to show their creativity by 
thinking of as many uses as possible for several common objects. An example of 
uses for a ‘paper clip’ was listed as an example to subjects, in order to demonstrate 
potential directions of creative thinking (see Figure 9.3). The examiner emphasised 
that any wild ideas were welcomed and no restrictions were set in this section, 
except for the 3 minute limitation of responding. The three common objects were 
‘brick’, ‘newspaper’, and ‘pen’, and were presented one by one in different pages to 
prevent pre-exposure of the next item.  
For the scoring of the Alternative Uses test, the raters were asked to identify 
the total number of uses, and further count the number of uncommon ones 
separately. In addition, the raters needed to give scores based on the creativity, 
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similarity, originality, and practicality of the uncommon uses generated by each 
subject on a 6-point scale.  
 
 
Figure 9.3. The introduction of the Alternative Uses test included in the English 
version creativity questionnaire, where several examples on the uses of ‘paper clip’ 
were given to subjects. 
 
Self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994) 
  Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that different self-images have 
influences on an individual’s cognition, emotion, and motivation, and the distinction 
between independent and interdependent self-construal could be a possible 
explanation for cultural differences in various kinds of cognition from lower-level 
perception to higher-level motivation. As a result, we focused on examining how 
subjects viewed themselves and its difference across cultures, given that the two 
cultures were shown to have differences between the two kinds of self-construal. 
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The self-construal scale focused on measuring two aspects of self-concepts, 
independent and interdependent, and subjects were required to give evaluation on 
themselves to 28 statements using a 6-point scale.  
 
9.3  Result of the creativity psychometry 
Because of the significant differences in age between the two groups, all the 
following analyses were conducted in ANCOVA model where the effect of age was 
partialed out from the data. The group factor (Taiwanese vs. British) was included as 
a fixed factor, and the measurements in each test of the creative questionnaire were 
included as dependent variables in ANCOVA (see Table 9.1, for summary). 
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Table 9.1. The results of the Raven’s APM, the Design fluency, the Alternative Uses 
test included in the creativity questionnaire. 
Test Condition Measurement
British Taiwanese   
Significancemean SD mean SD   
Raven's APM
Errors 0.88 1.50 1 1.09 p=0.436 
Design fluency test 
Free condition
Total designs 9.58 6.18 4.77 2.81  p=0.006 *
Errors 0.85 0.73 1.10 0.86  p=0.503 
Valid designs 8.70 6.08 3.67 2.98  p=0.004 *
Creativity 3.77 1.17 3.15 1.42  p=0.361 
Similarity 3.51 0.85 3.54 1.25  p=0.831 
Originality 3.70 1.04 3.21 1.27  p=0.383 
Complexity 3.80 1.03 2.90 1.23  p=0.068 
Fixed condition
Total designs 15.23 7.23 9.95 4.56  p=0.025 *
Errors 2.22 1.38 2.64 1.48  p=0.208 
Valid designs 13.01 6.86 7.30 4.42  p=0.009 *
Creativity 2.94 0.99 2.77 1.17  p=0.916 
Similarity 3.80 0.75 3.57 0.96  p=0.310 
Originality 2.69 0.62 2.43 1.10  p=0.580 
Complexity 2.35 0.74 2.23 0.94  p=0.951 
Alternative Uses test 
Brick 
Total uses 7.60 1.84 6.90 1.95  p=0.332 
Uncommon uses 3.69 1.42 3.43 1.32  p=0.721 
Creativity 2.94 0.73 2.82 0.84  p=0.952 
Similarity 3.11 0.71 2.88 0.71  p=0.037 * 
Originality 2.97 0.74 2.79 0.88  p=0.797 
Practicality 4.85 0.48 4.62 0.26  p=0.006 * 
Newspaper
Total uses 9.05 2.25 8.13 2.66  p=0.269 
Uncommon uses 4.11 1.36 4.02 1.37  p=0.973 
Creativity 2.66 0.54 2.67 0.75  p=0.715 
Similarity 3.04 1.00 2.71 0.60  p=0.202 
Originality 2.64 0.51 2.64 0.68  p=0.816 
Practicality 4.61 0.43 4.70 0.44  p=0.503 
Pen 
Total uses 7.82 2.72 7.36 2.77  p=0.620 
Uncommon uses 3.75 2.06 3.90 1.83  p=0.703 
Creativity 2.94 1.26 3.06 1.24  p=0.498 
Similarity 2.97 1.00 2.61 0.88  p=0.250
Originality 2.89 1.13 2.90 1.17  p=0.694 
    Practicality 4.55 0.66 4.29 1.14    p=0.404 
* Independent t test significance p<0.05
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Raven’s APM 
ANCOVA on the number of errors in Raven’s APM did not find a significant 
difference between groups (F(1,36)=0.622, p=0.436). 
 
Design fluency test 
In the ‘free’ condition, the British group generated significantly more designs 
(F(1,36)=8.706, p=0.006), as well as significantly more valid designs (F(1,36)=9.420, 
p=0.004), than the Taiwanese group (see Figure 9.4, for some of the designs). No 
other significant effects of group were found in any other measurements in the ‘free’ 
condition. In the ‘fixed’ condition, ANCOVA found that the number of generated 
designs (F(1,36)=5.455, p=0.025), as well as the number of valid designs 
(F(1,36)=7.610, p=0.009), were significantly higher in the British group than in the 
Taiwanese group. No significant effects of group were found in the ratings in the 
‘fixed’ condition. 
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Figure 9.4. The generated designs from two Taiwanese subjects (in panel a) and 
two British subjects (in panel b) in the free condition of the Design fluency test 
included in the creativity questionnaire. 
 
Alternative Uses test 
For the ‘brick’ item, the raters gave the British group significantly higher 
scores on similarity (F(1,36)=4.715, p=0.037) and higher scores on practicality 
(F(1,36)=8.408, p=0.006). No other significant group differences were found 
between the number of total uses, the number of uncommon uses, and other ratings 
including creativity, similarity, originality, and practicality to the ‘newspaper’ and the 
‘pen’ items. 
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Self-construal scale 
ANCOVA revealed that the British group did not show significantly higher 
independent self-construal than the Taiwanese group (F(1,36)=0.046, p=0.832). 
Similarly, the Taiwanese group did not demonstrate significantly higher 
interdependent self-construal than the British group (F(1,36)=1.223, p=0.276). 
 
Supplementary analysis 
  In order to statistically examine if the two cultures showed superiority on 
different aspects of creativity (novelty vs. usefulness), we first examine if the test 
scores from the two creativity tests measures distinct component of creative thinking. 
However, the subject number of the current study was too few (17 British vs. 22 
Taiwanese), and the number of measurements was also too few to conduct a 
reasonable data extraction analysis (e.g., principal component analysis). As a result, 
we used Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis to investigate the relationship 
between test measurements within and between the Design fluency and the 
Alternative Uses test. In the Design fluency test, we included the number of valid 
designs in the ‘free’ and the ‘fixed’ conditions, given that invalid designs (e.g., 
drawing nameable objects, or repetitive designs) did not reflect the ‘novelty’ aspect 
of creativity. In the Alternative Uses test, we included the number of uncommon uses 
of the three items separately, because generating common uses of common objects 
did not require any creativity. Spearman correlation analysis revealed a positive 
significant correlation between the number of valid designs between the two 
conditions in the Design fluency test, but these two measures were not significantly 
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correlated with any measures in the Alternative Uses test. On the other hand, 
positive significant correlations were found between the number of uncommon uses 
of the three items in the Alternative Uses test, and these three measures were not 
significantly correlated with any measures in the Design fluency test (see Table.9.2 
for summary). Based on the distinct inter-correlation of measures between the two 
creativity tests, we further summed the five test scores in the Design fluency and the 
Alternative Uses tests separately to form a representative test score for each test. 
Next we inputted the summed scores from the Design fluency test (the DF score) 
and the Alternative Uses test (the AU score) into repeated measures ANOVA, with 
group (Taiwanese vs. British) as between-subject factor, test (AU vs. DF) as 
within-subject factor, and age as covariate of non-interest. Repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group (F(1,36)=9.460, p=0.004), where 
the British group had significantly higher test scores overall than the Taiwanese 
group. No significant main effect of test was found (F(1,36)=0.344, p=0.561). 
Critically, a significant group x test interaction was found (F(1,36)=8.283, p=0.007), 
and follow-up analysis showed that the British group had significantly higher DF test 
scores , but not in the AU test scores (see Figure 9.5).  
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Table 9.2. The relationships between variables from the Design fluency and the 
Alternative Uses tests using Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis, where ** 
indicates p<0.01. 
  
DF item 
(free) 
DF item 
(fixed) 
AU item 
(brick)  
AU item  
(newspaper)  
AU item 
(pen)  
DF item (free) 0.554 ** -0.200 0.171 0.029 
DF item (fixed) -0.015 0.059 0.014 
AU item (brick)  0.534 ** 0.693 ** 
AU item (newspaper)  0.726 ** 
AU item (pen)            
 
 
 
Figure 9.5. The group x test interaction revealed by repeated measures ANOVA, 
which shows the British subjects have significantly higher scores in the Design 
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fluency test, but the difference between groups is not significant in the Alternative 
Uses test. 
 
9.4  Discussion of the creativity questionnaire 
In this study, we used a cross-cultural approach to investigate different 
aspects of creativity that supposedly supported by different PFC regions, given that 
creativity is a complex function that involves various kinds of cognition, and 
meta-analysis demonstrated both shared and specific activations in distinct PFC 
sub-regions support different creativity tests (Gonen-Yoaacovi et al., 2013). We 
used a cultural neuroscience approach by comparing creative behaviours between a 
group of Taiwanese and a group of British young adults. Demographically, the 
average age was significantly higher in the Taiwanese group than the British group. 
Although the age was not perfectly matched between groups, other background 
information including gender ratio, visited the other country or not, familiarity to the 
other culture, did not show significant effect of group (Chi-square test all p>0.05). 
Importantly, the number of errors in the Raven’s APM did not show significant 
difference between groups, which indicated that the subjects from two cultures have 
comparable analytical fluid intelligence. Any observed differences in the creativity 
questionnaire could not be explained by these factors. It is important to note that, the 
British group rated themselves with significantly higher creativity than the Taiwanese 
group did, even after the effect of age was partialled out. It was suggested that the 
Westerners were more inclined to attribute human behaviours to their internal 
dispositions predominately, whilst the Easterners tended to explain their behaviours 
in an interpersonal context (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). In section five of the 
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creativity questionnaire, we asked subjects to select the adjectives that related to 
creativity based on their own definition. All the seventeen British subjects chose 
‘talented’ as one of the adjectives that related to creativity, whereas only sixteen out 
of the total twenty-two Taiwanese subjects chose ‘talented’ (Chi-square test p=0.019, 
two tailed). This simple difference in definition to creativity may suggest that British 
subjects show a higher tendency to attribute creative ability as a kind of personal 
disposition than Taiwanese subjects. Together with the significantly higher 
self-ratings of creativity, these results were consistent with the cross-cultural 
different suggested by Choi et al. (1999), and further demonstrated cross-cultural 
differences could be identified even without implementing well-established 
psychometric measurements, but manifest using simple self-report questionnaire. 
 Next, we analysed the rating scores of the two classic creativity tests, the 
Design fluency test (Jones-Gotman and Milner, 1977) and the Alternative Uses test 
(Guilford, 1967), and focused on the difference between groups. In the Design 
fluency test, the British group made significantly more total number of designs and 
more valid designs in both ‘free’ and ‘fixed’ conditions. On the other hand, in the 
Alternative Uses test, the British group generated more total uses than the 
Taiwanese group for all three items, as well as more uncommon uses for two of the 
three items, but none of these group differences was significant. Previous cultural 
and cognitive framework discussed that possibility that Asians are more likely to 
fixate on contextual information and Westerners tend to fixate on central objects 
using eye-tracking technique (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005). Similar evidence also 
suggests cultural differences in processing facial stimuli (Blais, Jack, Scheepers, 
Fiset, & Caldara, 2008), and the functional imaging method has also demonstrated 
that East Asians and Westerners involve distinct neural networks in ventral visual 
cortex (Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu, & Park, 2006). The current study proposed a 
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possible cross-cultural effect on creativity, which is a higher-level cognition that is 
evident to associate with the PFC region. 
In order to examine the possible association between cultural values and 
creativity, analysis on the Self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994) first found that our 
Taiwanese subjects reported themselves to have higher interdependent 
self-construal score, yet not significant, than British subjects, whilst British subjects 
did not show higher independent self-construal than Taiwanese subjects did. This 
higher interdependent characteristics amongst the Easterners than the Westerners 
supported the individualistic vs. collectivist hypothesis and was consistent with our 
second hypothesis that there is a mapping between self-construal (independent vs. 
interdependent) and social values. Furthermore, this difference in self-assessment 
of personal traits provides a potential scope to explain the distinction between 
cultures observed in other measurements of the creativity questionnaire. In order to 
test the potential dissociation between the performance in different creativity tests 
(the Design fluency and the Alternative Uses test) and different cultures (Taiwan vs. 
the UK), we first conducted Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis to examine if 
the two creativity tests measured distinct creative behaviours. The result showed 
that the measures in each test were positively correlated with each other (all p<0.01), 
but not significantly correlated with measures between tests. Based on the 
difference in the requirement for the two creativity tests, the Design fluency test did 
not emphasise on any practicality issue of the generated designs but focused on its 
novelty, yet the Alternative Uses test asked subjects to come up with unusual uses 
of common objects, which innately required their practicality. The result of 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis therefore suggested a possible 
differentiation of the two creativity tests, where the Design fluency test specified the 
importance of the novelty aspect of creativity, and Alternative Uses test highlighted 
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the usefulness aspect of creative thoughts. Critically, repeated measures ANOVA 
using the summed test scores revealed a significant group x test interaction, 
showing the British group had significantly higher performance only in the DF test 
score but the difference was not significant in the AU test score, compared with the 
Taiwanese group. This interaction indicated that the observed superior performance 
between groups in creative behaviour was only evident in creative behaviours 
focused more on the novelty aspect but comparable on the usefulness side. 
Together with the result identified in the self-construal scale, it is possible that the 
interaction between test and cultures on creative behaviours was wired in different 
societal values. As proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991), the Western societies 
encourage more individualistic and self-centred characteristics, compared with the 
East Asian culture, which focused more on the collectivist culture to view them as 
part of a larger whole. This suggested a weighting scheme between self-reflection 
and considering other’s thoughts might modulate the creative behaviours that 
emphasise on either novelty or usefulness, which are potentially linked to the 
independent and interdependent self-construal in the British and the Taiwanese 
groups respectively. For example, social cognition processes, including 
self-reference, making inference of other’s mental states, empathy for other’s 
emotional states, and social rejection, are involved with both common and distinct 
neural activities in different PFC sub-regions (see Liebermann, 2007 for review). 
Han and Ma (2014) summarised 35 fMRI studies investigating cultural effects on 
human cognition and conducted a whole-brain meta-analysis to identify the potential 
cross-cultural differences in brain activation associated with social cognitive, social 
affective and non-social tasks. The result found that East Asians had stronger 
activity in the dorsomedial PFC and lateral PFC regions when administering social 
cognitive tasks, and showed enhanced activation in the ACC, ventromedial PFC in 
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Westerners. Social affective tasks were associated with higher activation in the right 
dorsolateral PFC in Asians but greater activity in the left insula in Westerners. These 
distinct neural network between cultures highlighted that the East Asian culture 
demonstrated stronger neural activity in brain regions relating to making inference of 
other’s mind (e.g., dorsomedial PFC), whereas the Western culture revealed 
increased activation in brain regions associated with self-reference processing (e.g., 
ventromedial PFC). An important implication of this meta-analysis is the influence 
from socio-cultural environment to neural activity, which shows culturally sensitive 
neural processes that relate to different social behaviours between individualism (the 
West) and collectivism (the East). Therefore, it seems reasonable to suspect that the 
cultural values that emphasise different social cognitions might affect the underlying 
neural mechanisms associated with different PFC sub-regions. Subsequently, this 
profound cultural effect also contributes to other higher-level cognitions, like 
creativity, and can lead to dissociation on creativity measurements weight on 
aspects relating to others (usefulness, practicality) or not (novelty, uniqueness).  
To sum up, this creativity study proposed a fruitful direction on comparing 
cross-cultural difference on higher-level cognition which was evident to be supported 
by the PFC region, and was consistent with the view that practices and 
environmental experiences might sculpt functions. However, due to the relatively 
small groups of students recruited from both countries, there were many potential 
reasons to observe the differences on creative thinking here. This includes factors 
originate from subjects (e.g., the discipline they studied), the educational 
background (e.g., Taiwanese education systems do not reward students being 
creative as in the UK), or even the psychometry implemented (e.g., the creativity 
tests included are all invented by the Westerners, and it might not be surprising to 
find the Westerners perform better in most of them). It is important to note that all the 
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Taiwanese and the British subjects acquired for the current study have structural 
brain scans, and this could be useful for further brain-based measures (e.g., 
voxel-based morphometry). More data and resources are required to investigate the 
function-structure relationship on cross-cultural effect and particular brain structure, 
which refer to creativity and the PFC region, in this case. Therefore the intention of 
this study is to serve as a pilot run leading to a more substantial collaboration 
between the UK and Taiwan, or other Eastern countries. This work might bring 
together cognitive neuroscientist who is interested in how the PFC region supports 
creativity, and researchers who have academic background in sociology, business, 
or education. Studies on human creativity is fundamentally important, given that it is 
commonly enunciated by business leaders that encouraging innovation is at the 
heart of economic success. However, it is not clear that this can be achieved at 
present, since the necessary psychometric tools that are required to measure 
creativity do not exist. This study seems to be a seed study aims at starting to bring 
the methodologies of cognitive neuroscience to bear upon this issue, with a view to 
developing new psychometric instruments in the future. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that this cultural framework targets at measuring structure-function links in 
the PFC region does not indicate that culture is the only factor that sculpts functional 
difference between the East and the West. The effect of culture could be viewed as 
a developmental trajectory that influences culturally specific functional organisation 
of human brain in very sophisticated way. 
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Chapter 10. General discussion of the thesis 
 Converging evidence from different methodologies including various kinds 
of neuroimaging techniques and different subject pathologies has demonstrated 
functional specialisation within the PFC region. It is now possible and necessary to 
examine the established function-structure links by comparing findings acquired 
from different experimental approaches. The current thesis could be divided into 
three major sections, the PFC battery section, the prospective memory section, and 
the creativity investigation section. In each section, we use hypothesis-testing 
approach to first identify the higher-level cognitions supported by different PFC 
sub-regions, and then designed new psychometric tests and implemented new 
approaches, to test the relationship between particular functions, and in most cases 
a specific PFC sub-region that was putatively involved with them.  
 In the PFC battery chapters, the four new psychometric tests are as simple 
as playing some gambling on imaginary money, deciding which item was more 
similar to a reference, watching some videos that involved some conversations, and 
reading some comics that might violate social norms. However, the performances of 
a large group of TD subjects, VBM findings from the TD sub-group, and comparisons 
between ASD subjects are extremely fruitful in understanding the underlying 
constructs and brain regions that support them. All four new psychometric tests from 
the PFC battery broadly confirm the function-structure relationships between varying 
kinds of performances and their associated PFC sub-regions established by 
previous functional imaging studies. This provides strong supporting evidence for 
the functional role of the given PFC sub-region of interest in each PFC battery test, 
and further indicates a potential link between the regional GM volume and the 
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elicited rCBF activity observed in contrast comparisons. Nevertheless, a common 
inference drawn from functional imaging studies is that when a cognitive process A 
occurs, a particular brain region X is activated. However, Poldrack (2006) pinpointed 
a reverse inference fallacy, where reasoning goes backwards from the presence of 
brain activation to the engagement of a particular cognitive function. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, no cognitive function could be ascribed to any cortical region 
exclusively, nor is a particular brain region activated solely by one cognitive process 
(e.g., the specificity issue of the meta-analysis method). The observed 
function-structure relationships in the PFC battery chapters are established by the 
links between behavioural variables and regional GM size in the PFC region. It is 
therefore easier to make inferences based on simple logic such as ‘bigger GM size 
in region X is associated with better behavioural variables measuring function A’. 
When mapping the identified GM clusters that associate with different variables 
across different PFC battery tests, it appears that some of the neural correlates are 
located in similar regions, e.g., the dorsomedial PFC region (see Figure 10.1). 
Spearman rank-order correlation showed that most of the variables that significantly 
correlated with the GM volume in the dorsomedial PFC region are also significantly 
inter-correlated with each other in a positive direction (see Table 10.1). Critically, 
principal component analysis of the TD group revealed that the G_repetitiveness 
factor (including G_wrep, G_lrep) and the M_high+lowmentalizing factor (including 
M_highgroupacc, M_lowdyadacc, M_lowgroupacc) are identified as loading on the 
same component. A potential explanation of these overlapping GM clusters that 
associate with variables in risky decision-making and social cognition might relate to 
stereotype behaviours. A stereotyping network was proposed to involve with the 
encoding and storage of stereotype concepts, the selection and activation of these 
concepts into working memory and their application in behaviours (Amodio, 2014). 
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The dorsomedial PFC region, as part of the network, was suggested to support the 
formation of impression about other people, which required mentalizing to consider 
other’s perspective and motives, a process that engaged in theory of mind. This 
underlying mechanism is similar during risky decision-making, where people would 
generate impression to particular items as well, e.g., this person might give me a 
hard time vs. this option might make me loss money, and these impression would 
lead to a stereotype-like behaviour to make judgments in a rigid mannerism. On the 
other hand, another PFC sub-region that is identified to be associated with various 
PFC battery variables is the lateral OFC region. As Figure 10.2 depicted, the location 
of the GM clusters in the lateral OFC region that correlate with variables measuring 
different cognitions is more wide spread than the GM clusters in the dorsomedial 
PFC region. More importantly, it appears that the lateral OFC region is more 
‘versatile’ in a functional way than the dorsomedial PFC region. The regional volume 
of different GM clusters in this particular PFC sub-region is correlated with variables 
measuring a wide range of mental abilities including risky decision-making (risk rate, 
repetitiveness), cognitive bias (framing effect), reverse learning processes 
(consistency score), and faux pas detection (overall faux pas accuracy). Spearman 
rank-order correlation showed that, compared with the dorsomedial PFC region, 
most of the variables that significantly correlated with the GM volume in the lateral 
OFC region do not show significant inter-correlation with each other (see Table 10.2). 
This is consistent with the view of the multiple-demand (MD) pattern of frontal and 
parietal activity that diversely associates with different cognitive functions measured 
by a various kinds of methods (Duncan, 2006; 2010). Incidentally, the set of regions 
in the PFC region of the MD system include the posterior part of the inferior frontal 
sulcus, the anterior insula and adjacent frontal operculum, and the 
pre-supplementary motor area extending to dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (see 
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Figure 1 in Duncan, 2010). Furthermore, similar activity pattern in the PFC region 
could be also identified in standard test of fluid intelligence, and this general (or g) 
factor is proposed to contribute to performance across tests measuring different 
cognitions (Duncan et al., 2000; Bishop, Fossella, Croucher, & Duncan, 2008). 
These findings using functional imaging technique suggest a pattern of brain 
activation is associated with multiple kinds of cognitive demands, and significant 
increased activity in the right OFC (peak MNI: 36, 36, -15) region is found during 
tasks with high-g involvement compared with matched low-g control tasks (Bishop et 
al., 2008). Therefore, the converging results from behavioural and VBM analyses in 
the PFC battery chapters demonstrate a promising direction of using a 
reverse-engineering (but not reverse inference) method to investigate the 
function-structure relationship using structural-based techniques. Given that 
cytoarchitectonic differences have been identified both between lateral and medial 
sub-regions of rostral PFC (Petrides & Pandya, 1999) and between rostral and 
caudal sub-regions within rostral PFC (Carmichael & Price, 1994), functional 
specialisation of the rostral PFC region (BA10) has also been identified. For example, 
Gilbert et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 104 functional imaging studies 
and revealed functional variation along a rostral-caudal axis of the rostral PFC 
region. Nevertheless, in Gilbert et al. (2006), the activation peaks from different 
psychological paradigms were located close to one another, e.g., the peak activation 
of studies involving mentalizing tests was reliably caudal to those from other kinds of 
studies, and the mean difference along the y coordinates between different 
categories was only 4 mm with substantial overlap between two distributions. As 
depicted in Figure 10.1, structural-based analysis with higher spatial resolution than 
functional imaging studies also shows both overlapping and non-overlapping GM 
clusters in the dorsomedial PFC region. Despite the overwhelming evidence 
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suggesting functional specialisation of the PFC region, it is still debatable to what 
extent this segregation exists, e.g., different PFC sub-regions evidently link to 
different cognitions, yet these seemingly different cognitions might share some 
overlapping mechanisms that associate with similar PFC sub-regions. A new 
methodology combining findings from different techniques should be a promising 
future direction to answer this question. 
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Figure 10.1. All the GM clusters are overlaid on a MNI152 template using MRI croN 
software. G_wrep_overall: the overall repetitiveness in the win condition of the 
gambling test; G_lrep_overall: the overall repetitiveness in the loss condition of the 
gambling test; G_wrate_RA: the risk rate to RA trials in the win condition of the 
gambling test; G_lrep_RA: the repetitiveness to RA trials in the loss condition of the 
gambling test; M_high_acc: the accuracy for high-mentalizing videos in the video 
mentalizing test; M_group_acc: the accuracy for group conversation videos in the 
video mentalizing test; M_highdyad_acc: the accuracy for high-mentalizing dyad 
videos in the video mentalizing test; M_lowgroup_acc: the accuracy for 
low-mentalizing group videos in the video mentalizing test. 
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Table 10.1. The correlations between all the PFC battery variables that significantly correlate with the dorsomedial PFC region. All the 
relationships that have a p value <0.05 using spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis are labelled ‘v’ in the table. 
   The gambling test The video mentalizing test 
   G_wrep_overall G_lrep_overall G_wrate_RA G_lrep_RA M_high_acc M_group_acc M_highdyad_acc M_lowgroup_acc 
G_wrep_overall v v v v 
G_lrep_overall v  v v v v v 
G_wrate_RA 
G_lrep_RA v  v  v v v v 
M_high_acc v  v  v v v 
M_group_acc v  v  v  v  v 
M_highdyad_acc v v v 
M_lowgroup_acc v v v v v 
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Figure 10.2. All the GM clusters are overlaid on a MNI152 template using MRI croN 
software. G_lrep_overall: the overall repetitiveness in the loss condition of the 
gambling test; G_lrate_RA: risk rate to RA trials in the loss condition of the gambling 
test; G_framing: the size of framing effect of the gambling test; R_pscore: 
consistency score in the personality condition of the referential judgment test; 
R_wscore: consistency score in the weight condition of the referential judgment test; 
F_FP_overall: the overall accuracy for the faux pas and the non-faux pas cartoons of 
the cartoon faux pas test. a p=0.051 at FWE-corrected threshold. b p=0.052 at 
FWE-corrected threshold.  
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Table 10.2. The correlations between all the PFC battery variables that significantly correlate with the lateral OFC region. All the 
relationships that have a p value <0.05 using spearman’s rank-order correlation analysis are labelled ‘v’ in the table. 
    The gambling test The referential judgment test The cartoon faux pas test  
    G_lrep_overall G_lrate_RA G_framing R_pscore  R_wscore F_FP_overall  
G_lrep_overall v  v  
G_lrate_RA v  v  v  
G_framing v  
R_pscore 
R_wscore 
F_FP_overall v v 
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In the PM chapter, on the basis of a classic PM paradigm including a 
prospective memory task on the top of a baseline ongoing task, we implemented 
new approaches to examine the cognitive mechanism involved when processing PM 
targets that vary in specificity. The two experimental variables we manipulated, the 
‘type’ of PM targets and the ‘modality’ of stimuli, measured the effect of top-down 
regulation and bottom-up processing respectively. The fMRI part of the result 
demonstrates that PM, as a mental ability involves predicting future events, requires 
both activations in the rostral PFC region, as well as posterior brain activities in the 
occipital region. Nevertheless, it is important to note that we do not find any 
significant effect between ‘type’ of PM targets in the behavioural part of the result. 
Instead, we observed strong effect between ‘modality’ of stimuli. However, when 
plotting the behavioural performance from each subject between ‘type’ and 
‘modality’, the behavioural data actually demonstrate remarkable individual 
differences on the effect of ‘type’ and little or no difference on the effect of ‘modality’. 
As illustrated in Figure 10.3, subjects are consistently making more accurate PM 
detections and shorter response times to pictures than to words, and show distinct 
superiority between exemplar targets and category targets. This indicates that 
different subjects implement different strategies when identifying and responding to 
PM targets that vary in specificity, compared to a robust picture superiority effect 
when processing stimuli differ in format. These behavioural and functional imaging 
results first demonstrate collaboration between ‘perceptual’ and ‘executive’ parts of 
cognition in prospective memory, where we remember to execute what we perceive 
and we perceive what we remember to execute. Furthermore, the distinct response 
pattern between ‘type’ and ‘modality’ may suggest a meta-cognitive process that 
regulates the ‘executive’ part of the PM network, which is consistent with the 
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strategic difference in implementing reminders for PM intention offloading as 
observed in Gilbert (2015). 
 
 
Figure 10.3. Behavioural data from every subject in the PM experiment. Panel (a) 
and (b) shows individual response in accuracy, where panel (c) and (d) shows 
individual response in reaction time. For lines in yellow colour: subjects having 
higher accuracy and longer reaction times in the exemplar vs. category and the word 
vs. picture comparisons. For lines in purple colour: subjects having lower accuracy 
and faster reaction times in the exemplar vs. category and the word vs. picture 
comparisons. For lines in black colour indicate equal values in the comparison.  
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In the creativity questionnaire section, we demonstrated dissociation 
between different aspects of creative behaviours and different cultures. This 
between-population individual difference further demonstrates that the ‘typical’ 
performance in one population might be ‘atypical’ in another population. Although 
current creativity studies do not provide any direct evidence on the causal 
relationship between cultural difference and higher-level cognition supported by the 
PFC region, recent studies in the field of cultural neuroscience reveal convincing 
evidence that cultural values have a profound effect on human functions. For 
example, Ma, Wang, Li, Zhang, Rao, & Han (2014) identified that the brain activity 
associated with cognitive and affective processes was linked to specific cultural 
value (e.g., interdependence) between individuals. Another paradigm using ‘cultural 
priming’ to examine the mediating effect between brain activation and cultural values 
revealed that priming interdependent versus independent self-construal led to 
changes of brain activity relating to self vs. face recognition (Sui and Han, 2007). 
Furthermore, exposure to pictures of cultural icons between the Eastern and the 
Western societies to bicultural individuals resulted in changes in brain activations 
associated with reflection of personality traits of oneself and one’s mother (Ng, Han, 
Mao, & Lai, 2010). These findings provide supporting evidence of a potential causal 
relationship between cultural values and a range of human cognitions. Importantly, 
Chen, Wagner, Kelley, Powers, & Heatherton (2013) found that immigrants showed 
dissimilar brain activity compared with subjects having the same ethnic background 
but developed in distinct cultural contexts (see Zuo and Han, 2013, for similar 
findings). As a result, evidence from cultural neuroscience suggests the importance 
of experience (in this case, culture, in a broader scale) that contributes to human 
cognitive functions. 
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Altogether, the thesis has used a range of approaches to highlight functional 
and structural variation within the PFC region and the mental abilities it supports. All 
three major sections of the thesis demonstrate some principles of organisation that 
exist across individuals, but also highlight the differences in a range of functions that 
could occur between TD individuals, between populations of individuals (TD vs. 
ASD), and between cultures of TD individuals (Taiwanese vs. British). 
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